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Abstract 
The UK credit card market has attracted significant interest since the late 1990s, partly 
because of the strong growth it has enjoyed and also because of the aggressive 
behaviour of a number of new entrants. The credit card market consists of two very 
different businesses: card issuance 
- 
the "consumer-end", which provides credit cards 
and bears the credit risk of the customer and merchant acquiring, and the "backroom 
business", which recruits outlets to accept credit cards and undertakes the processing 
of transactions. The two businesses are distinct and in the UK only a small number of 
firms operate within each segment. This thesis concentrates on issues connect to the 
card issuance business. 
Credit card issuers bundle a wide range of characteristics into their product offering. 
Whilst this allows issuers to differentiate their product and better satisfy consumers 
who have heterogeneous preferences, the Office of Fair Trading has suggested that 
the bundling of characteristics makes informed choice problematic because consumers 
do not know the price of specific credit card characteristics. A hedonic pricing model 
with a two-level nested error component structure is estimated. It is found that 
individuals who hold either a student or an initial credit card are charged a risk 
premium by issuers. In addition, consumers must pay higher prices to hold credit cards 
with certain characteristics such as introductory balance transfer offers, an annual fee, 
a longer than average interest free period, particular loyalty schemes, or donate 
money to charities. 
The research undertaken differentiates itself from the existing literature by testing for 
heterogeneities in the interest rate transmission mechanism by examining how retail 
credit card rates in the UK respond to changes in the Bank of England's base rate. 
Error-correction models are estimated to analyze long-run pass-through; long-run 
mark-up and the short-run spend of adjustment. A number of theoretical arguments 
have been put forward to explain why retail rate responses might be sluggish. These 
include tacit collusion between financial institutions, sunk/menu costs and dynamic 
price discrimination which relies on consumer inertia. Retail credit card rates are 
indeed found to be sticky and overshooting is commonplace. However, the adjustment 
process was found to vary considerably between depending upon card issuer and card 
type. 
Asymmetries in interest rates have attracted considerable attention in the financial 
literature, thus the interest rate transmission mechanism is investigated further by 
examining sign asymmetry. No evidence of asymmetric pricing was found, which 
suggests that credit card issuers respond to base rate increases and decreases at the 
same speed. 
The competitive price setting behaviour of UK credit card issuers is empirically 
analysed. A discrete choice framework is used to look for evidence of price leadership, 
or whether some banks systematically react to movements in input costs more quickly 
than other banks. No evidence is found to suggest that one issuer dominates the 
market and acts as a price leader or that different issuers are responsible for leading 
price movements in different directions. There is no general pattern of price (i. e. 
interest rate) leadership amongst leading issuers in the UK, however, the empirical 
findings do however suggest that issuers do interact with each other and that some 
leader follower behaviour is observed at the portfolio level. 
Naturally, the work undertaken suggests some policy implications for regulators, 
consumer bodies and government agencies. Given that approximately 70 percent of all 
active accounts incur interest charges every month, consumers need to be provided 
with clear information and to be educated further in the benefits of shopping around. 
It is clear that the money transmission mechanism does not impact on credit card 
interest rates as well as it could do. Regulatory efforts are therefore required to help 
reduce interest rates in the light of a decrease in the base rate, thus helping credit card 
revolvers to decrease their debt burden. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Development of the Credit Card Industry 
The origins of the credit card can be found in the USA, where they arose within retail 
stores at the beginning of the twentieth century as an alternative to cash payments 
(Worthington and Horne, 1993). This section traces the history of the credit card 
industry to enable the understanding of the concept of a modern day credit card. 
1.1.1 The History of Credit Cards in the UK 
Consumer credit in the United Kingdom was pioneered by Joshua Kelly Waddilove, 
who in 1920 began issuing cheques and vouchers to needy mothers in Bradford. The 
cheques were redeemable by special arrangement with a local shop (Lindsey, 1994). 
D. G. Hansen wrote: 'It was the forerunner of credit cards in two respects, in that 
payment was made by a voucher and the customer enjoyed the benefits of revolving 
credit. '(Lindsey, 1994: 136). 
The UK's first credit card was issued by Barclays Bank under the brand name of 
Barclaycard on 29th June 1966 (Lindsey, 1994; APACS, 2006a). The Barclays scheme 
followed the introduction of the Bank America card which was introduced in America 
during the 1950s. Barclays Bank was the first overseas licensee of the Bank America 
card (the predecessor of the Visa scheme) after the Bank of America announced that it 
would licence its blue, white and gold card to other banks. 
However, while Barclays has been credited with introducing plastic cards to the United 
Kingdom, it was in fact Arthur Chesterfield, the chief general manager of the 
Westminster Bank, who was responsible for first introducing plastic cards to the UK, by 
persuading the Westminster Bank to purchase a 49% share in Diners Club (Nacelles, 
2005). Plastic cards, in fact have been around since the 1950s when Diners Club and 
American Express launched so-called travel and entertainment cards (Nacelles, 2005). 
These cards were exclusive and very expensive. The introduction of plastic cards by 
Barclays was aimed at the mass market, and aimed to make a profit by lending money 
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rather than simply providing a convenient payment mechanism for a small fee. 
Originally, a customer was expected to repay the outstanding balance in full after 
receiving the monthly bill. In 1976, a breakthrough in the credit card industry was 
made, when the government allowed cards to offer extended credit. 1 
For many years, the Barclaycard was the only credit card available to consumers. The 
success of Barclaycard prompted the other three other major UK banks, Lloyds, 
Midland and the National Westminster together with the Royal Bank of Scotland to 
form the Joint Credit Card Company (JCCC) in 1973. The JCCC was established to 
provide the required marketing service and processing capacity to launch a rival card 
which would provide direct competition to Barclaycard. The rival card operated under 
the name of Access. While the Barclaycard brand remains a household name, the 
Access brand vanished during the early 1990s, becoming part of MasterCard. 
Up until the late 1980s, the UK credit card market was dominated by the two players - 
Barclaycard (VISA) and the Access Group, who between them issued eight out of ten of 
the credit cards in circulation (Rowlingson and Kempson, 1994). The banks which 
issued credit cards all offered similar terms and conditions as well as charging similar 
rates of interest. Despite an increase in competition, credit card issuers were able to 
maintain extremely high interest rates throughout the 1980s. 
The legalisation governing building societies, the Building Societies Act 1962, did not 
allow building societies to issue credit cards. However, this was made possible, 
following the enactment of the Building Societies Act 1986 and the subsequent remit 
made under it by the Building Societies Commission2, which came into force on the 
19th November 1987. Any building society in the UK, who had assets of at least £100 
million, could issue credit cards and at the time, 65 building societies fell into this 
category (Monopoly and Mergers Commission, 1989). A number of building societies 
1 The Credit Card is 40 this week, < http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/5109663. stm> (accessed on 
10/06/2006). 
2 The Building Societies Commission was replaced under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, by 
the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
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began to issue Visa credit cards including the Halifax, the Leeds Permanent, the 
National and Provincial and the Town and County. 3 
Until 1987 there was effectively only one merchant acquirer in the UK for each of the 
two international payment systems (MasterCard/ Eurocard and Visa). A monopoly type 
situation was thought to exist in relation to the supply of credit card services due to 
the absence of competition. The banks which issued credit cards all offered similar 
terms and conditions as well as charging similar rates of interest. MasterCard and Visa 
continue to dominate despite AMEX (American Express) entering into the market. 
The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission (CC) are the two 
bodies who are responsible for regulating UK credit card companies. The OFT has the 
right to act if credit card companies breach certain regulatory acts such as the 
Consumer Credit Act and the Competition Act. 
1.1.2 Recent Developments in the UK Credit Card Market 
The UK is one of the most credit-card-intensive countries in the world with 67 million 
credit cards for a population of 59 million people (APACS, 2007). In the terms of cards 
per head the UK lies fifth in the world, lagging behind the USA, Canada, Japan and 
Singapore, as shown in Table 1.1. In 2005, the UK overtook Germany to become the 
most credit intensive country in Europe. The UK accounts for over 55 percent of the 
155 million credit cards in circulation in Western Europe (Credit Card Consolidation 
Services, 2010). The DTI estimates that consumers could save £1.9bn a year in interest 
payments alone by switching to cheaper credit cards. 
3 The Halifax Building Society converted into plc. status on 2"d June 1997 and continues to issue credit 
cards. The Leeds Permanent Building Society was absorbed by the Halifax in 1995. The National 
Provincial Building Society was taken over by the Abbey National Plc. in 1996, while the Town and 
County Building Society was absorbed by the Woolwich Building Society in 1993. The Woolwich is now a 
trading name of Barclays Bank Pic. 
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During the last 20 years, the UK's financial services sector has undergone extraordinary 
change. Deregulation in the 1980s, combined with technological developments and 
consumer change have bought about demand-led retail banking strategies implying 
the renewal of institution and market structures (Clarke et al., 1998). As a result 
financial institutions have diversified their product ranges and distribution channels 
(Gardner et al., 1999). Important changes to the credit card market include rapid 
growth in direct mail solicitations and related marketing innovations; expansion in the 
use of electronic payment method and in levels of consumer debt burdens; and 
increased default charges. 
1.1.2.1 Background on Current Climate in Credit Card Market 
The UK credit card market has grown markedly since the first credit cards were 
introduced in 1966. Figure 1.1 illustrates the growth in credit cards since 1975 in the 
terms of number of cards in issue and transaction volumes. In 1975 there were 6,410 
thousand credit and charge cards issued by banks, compared to 72598 thousand cards 
in 2008. The number of credit cards in issue have been in slight decline since 2005 
when the number of credit cards in issue peaked at 74583 thousand. Figure 1.1 also 
illustrates the impact of card innovations within the market. Since the introduction of 
premium credit cards in the early 1990s greater numbers of premium, affinity and co- 
branded cards have been introduced. 4 
In the mid-1980s, the credit card business provided significant profits for the retail 
banking industry in the UK. The bulk of these profits came from three sources; interest 
charged to cardholders on unpaid balances, late payment charges and fees paid by the 
retailers that honoured the cards. By the early spring of 1989, the consistently high 
profitability of the UK credit card industry appeared to be threat. Many of the smaller 
banks were beginning to enter the market, the fees paid by retailers declined due to 
increased competition and outstanding balances appeared to be falling. Up until 1989, 
no UK bank had charged an annual fee for the use of a credit card. 
° Types of credit cards will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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Since the early 1990s the number of credit cards available in the UK has rapidly 
expanded and currently there are approximately 1,300 cards to choose from (DTI, 
2003). Multiple card holding has also become increasingly popular. For instance, in 
1995 there were 25.8 million credit cards in issue (Key Note, 1999); however in 2007 
67.3 million credit cards were in issuer with the average consumer holding 2.4 credit 
cards (APACS, 2008). Likewise, in 1995,888 million purchases were made using credit 
cards with an average transaction value of £48.05 (Key Note, 1999) compared to 1.9 
billion purchases with an average transaction value of £63.22 in 2007 (APACS, 2008). 
A detailed overview of the credit card market is given in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 
illustrates monthly changes in the number of cards issued, the percentage of accounts 
which bear interest and the volume/value of transactions. The value of outstanding 
credit has risen from £9,072 million in 1994 to £63,773 million in May 2007. The 
percentage of credit card accounts which bear interest has been variable, in June 1995 
70.4% of accounts bore interest whereas in May 2007,74.7% of accounts did (BBA, 
2009). This peaked at in October 2001 at 81.1%. In addition it can be seen that the 
number of inactive accounts has risen, which corresponds with the decline in accounts 
bearing interest between November 2001 and May 2007. 
1.1.2.2 Credit Card Competition 
Table 1.2 provides insight in to the market conditions observed in the UK credit card 
market. The largest issuers in the UK have witnessed a decline in their market share 
over recent years. Barclaycard, for example, enjoyed a market share of approximately 
26.2 percent in 1997; however by 2001 this had fallen to 19.0 percent (Spencer, 1999). 
Lloyds TSB have also witnessed a decline in their market share with a fall from 16.1 
percent to 11.5 percent. The market share of different providers is presented in Table 
1.3. It is common for issuers to offer a range of credit cards under different provider 
brands. For example MBNA is responsible for issuing credit cards not only under its 
own brand but also for Alliance and Leicester and Abbey, while Barclaycard also issues 
credit cards under the brand name, Goldfish. 
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Table 1.2: Summary of the UK Credit Card Sector 5 
Number Sector Type Dependency 
Card Schemes 3 Oligopoly None 
Banks 15 Imperfect Competition Card Schemes 
Connectivity Solutions 60+ Perfect Competition Banks 
Merchants 2 million N/A N/A 
Cards in Issue 69 million N/A N/A 
Outstanding Balances £65,302 million N/A N/A 
Source: Stretch, C. 2006. "Credit Cards 
- 
How does it all Work? An Overview Paper. " Complementary 
Solutions.; APACS. 2005. Annual Yearbook of Payment Statistics, APACS Administration. 
The UK credit card market experienced high levels of competition in 1999, which led to 
UK issuers to introduce changes to their APRS, and to introduce new customer benefits 
(Key Note, 1999). The expansion of different methods to obtain financial services has 
opened up the sector to non-traditional providers and new channels (Martinelli and 
Sparks, 2003). From a bank-orientated financial system, there has been a shift towards 
a multi-channel system, with traditional barriers to entry which existed to separate 
sectors being eroded. 
Consequently, many companies from different business sectors have entered the 
market, increasing the level and type of competition. Large food retailers appear to 
possess many of the special characteristics (Alexander and Colgate, 2000; Martinelli 
and Sparks, 1999), enabling them to successful role in the provision of financial 
services. Sainsbury's and Tesco moved into the retail banking sector in 1997. 
5 All figures are approximations. 
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Table 1.3: Estimated Market Share, by Brand, April 2008 
Brand Issuer Market Share (%) 
Barclaycard Barclays 22 
Lloyds TSB Lloyds TSB 17 
HSBC HSBC 12 
NatWest RBS 12 
Halifax HBOS 11 
MBNA MBNA 8 
Capital One Capital One 8 
M&S Money HSBC 5 
Tesco Personal Finance RBS 5 
Royal Bank of Scotland RBS 5 
Nationwide Nationwide 5 
Abbey MBNA 4 
Alliance and Leicester MBNA 3 
American Express Amex 3 
Egg Egg 3 
Mint RBS 3 
Co-operative Co-operative 2 
Bank of Scotland HBOS 2 
Goldfish Barclaycard 2 
First Direct HSBC 2 
Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley 1 
Yorkshire Bank/Clydesdale Bank National Bank of Australia 1 
Sainsburys Bank HBOS 1 
Other 
- 
6 
Don't Know 3 
Source: Mintel, 2009 
The high street banks eyed them nervously as they saw the potential for a very real 
competitive threat from trusted retail brands that were able to leverage their large 
and established customer bases (IBM, 2003). Examples of the types of new card 
providers who entered the market during the 1990s are given in Table 1.4. The 
majority of new issuers have waived the annual fee, and many have offered interest 
rates which were significantly lower than that of the traditional high street banks, for 
example, when Egg entered the market in 1999, they offered an APR of 9.9% on 
purchases (Moneyfacts, November 1999). The UK credit card market experienced an 
influx of new issuers from the US. MBNA and HFC, where joined by their fellow US 
counterparts, Capital One, Bank One and the Associates 
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Table 1.4: The Types of New Players in the UK Credit Card Market in the 1990s 
Type of Player Examples of New Players in the UK Market 
Foreign Entrants American Express, Citibank, MBNA, HFC, Capital One, BankOne, 
Peoples Bank, The Associates 
Non-Financial Institutions Virgin, Vauxhall or General Motors (GM), AT&T Universal 
Travel and Entertainment American Express, Diners Club 
Specialist Credit Card Issuers MBNA, Capital One, Household International 
Retail and Store Cards Tesco, Sainsbury's, Marks and Spencer 
Internet Cards Egg, Marbles, Smile, Cahoot 
Source: Wonglimpiyarat, J. 2005. Strategies of Competition in the Bank Card Business: Innovation Management in a 
Complex Economics Environment. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, page 30 
In addition, American Express announced that after its success in the charge card 
sector that it aimed to become a major player in the credit card sector. It has made a 
major impact in the UK credit card market, which is possibly due to only a very limited 
number of merchants accepting Amex. MBNA have been the most successful entrant 
from the US, in 2004 it had a market share of 13% and 20% of the consumer base, 
placing it third behind Barclaycard and the Royal Bank of Scotland who have a market 
share and consumer base share of 16%/25% and 16%/24% respectively (Mintel, 2004). 
In recent years, some European credit card issuers have attempted to enter into the 
UK sector such as the French bank Sygma Banque SA (Groupe Cofinoga), who trade 
under the name laser UK (formally Creation Financial Services ltd) and issue credit 
cards on behalf of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club and Derby County Football Club. 
However, issuers such as Laser UK have failed to make a huge impact on the market. 
Competition not only came from the US but from the internet and the high street. 
Typically, the new entrants have targeted the most profitable customer segments in 
the most lucrative product ranges (Boss et al., 2000). The 1990s saw the emergence of 
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affinity cards and cards issued by non-financial institutions. Supermarket Banks such 
as Sainsbury's Bank and Tesco Personal Finance entered the market and began issuing 
credit cards through joint ventures with Halifax and Royal Bank of Scotland, 
respectively, in 1995. To enable financial services to be offered to customers, UK 
supermarkets have built alliances with financial institutions. Co-operation can be 
either through a joint venture or a tie-up (Martinelli and Sparks, 2003; Alexander and 
Pollard, 2000), see Table 1.5 for a summary of the methods used by different 
supermarkets to enter in the financial sector. Since entering into the retail banking 
sector supermarkets have continued to innovate and rapidly increased their product 
range to cover personal loans, mortgages and credit cards. They have been joined in 
recent years by other retailers such as Safeway6, the Post Office and Asda. Marks and 
Spencer's have offered a range of financial services products and its charge card has 
been available since 1985. However it was not until October 2003 that Marks and 
Spencer entered into the credit card market. In the terms of pricing, supermarkets 
offer some of the most competitive interest rates in the marketplace (IBM, 2003). 
The credit card market experienced dramatic change in 1999. Internet card issuers 
such as Egg, Smile and Marbles entered the market place offering lower interest rates 
than the traditional high street issuers. In 1999, annual fees disappeared and extras 
such as travel insurance and loyalty schemes began to be offered to attract new 
customers. It was observed that a greater number of customers were beginning to 
hold more than one credit card. The profitability of lending on credit cards has hardly 
changed at all between the 1993 and 2004. However since the market has become 
much more competitive, card companies have seen their margins squeezed. The 
majority of cashback deals have been withdrawn and charges are being imposed for 
balance transfers, in order to compensate for the decrease in margins and profit. 
Despite intensive competition from US issuers, such as MBNA, and new entrants, such 
as Egg, the big five banks7 have retained their dominance of the UK credit card market 
(Datamonitor, 2003). 
6 Safeway was subject to a takeover by Morrisons in 2004. 
The big five UK banks are; Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, HBOS and the Royal Bank of Scotland/NatWest. 
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From Table 1.3 it can be seen that the big five banks accounted for around 60% of the 
market in 2004. Apart from Egg, which has approximately a 5% share of the consumer 
base (Mintel, 2004), supermarket and internet cards have not obtained a significant 
market share. 
The rapid expansion of the UK credit card market in the 1990s was stimulated by an 
influx of card issuers from America. MBNA entered the market in 1993 and, along with 
other new entrants such as Morgan Stanley and Capital One, have been credited with 
rejuvenating the pricing structure of the UK credit card market. 
1.1.2.3 Credit Card Products 
Credit card issuers have been concerned with developing new services, mainly by 
exploiting now technology, and by attempting to distribute their products to a larger 
customer-base. During the 1990s, credit cards increased in sophistication with card 
issuers tailoring products to individual customer needs thus exploiting so-called niche 
markets. Through product innovation, customers are now able to choose from a wider 
range of products. Gold cards, which were first introduced around 1995, which had 
additional features, were marketed only to high-income customers and often by 
invitation only. Gold cards have become more common and in 2001 represented 
approximately 22% of all cards in issue (Kubos-Labiak, 2004); however the number of 
gold cards has declined due to the introduction of platinum cards. Table 1.6 provides 
some information on the growth of credit card products. 
By the end of the 1990s annual fees began to disappear, and in bid to attract 
customers, credit card issuers offered extras such as loyalty schemes and travel 
insurance. 
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Table 1.6: Types of Credit Cards in Issue 
Number of Credit 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Cards, 000s 
Total number of 
credit cards in 
32,541 36,565 38,299 41,424 47,808 51,701 58,794 issue 
Gold 
- - 
3,579 4,494 11,817 11,331 9,680 
Platinum 
- - 
389 1,845 2,864 4,431 7,675 
Co-branded 
- - 
1,821 2,024 1,952 1,141 1,454 
Affinity 
- - 
3,303 2,954 2,729 2,301 2,173 
Source: Kubis-Labiak, B., 2004. The UK Retail Banking Market Outlook. Business Insights: London 
1.1.2.4 Rates and Spreads 
Interest rates on credit cards have declined substantially over the past decade, 
consistent with a general decline in market rates. The average credit card yield has 
declined steadily from 23.2% in the first month of 1995 to 14.34% in the last month of 
2006, see Figure 1.3. It is tempting to conclude that this decline in credit card rates is 
due to increased competition from new entrants during the period. However, the 
behaviour of spread between credit card rates and other market rates does not 
necessarily indicate that pricing has become more competitive (Calem, Gordy and 
Mester, 2006). 
Credit card spreads reached their highest levels between 1996 and 1998, see Figure 
1.4. Overall credit card rates have closely followed the trend of market rates. The 
pattern of rate movement suggests that credit card interest rates have become less 
sticky, although spreads continue to vary counter-cyclically. 
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Figure 1.2: Average Credit Card Yields 
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Figure 1.3: Credit Card Spreads 
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It is difficult to draw conclusions based on the behaviour of credit card spreads for two 
reasons. First, these observed spreads are affected by variation in expected credit 
losses, which are difficult to measure (Calem et al., 2006). Second, as document by 
Stango (2002), in recent years issuers have increasingly offered variable interest rates, 
which are likely to change in line with the dynamic behaviour of measured spreads. 
1.1.2.5 Credit Card Marketing 
Marketing innovation and expanded solicitation activity by card issuers is likely to have 
increased the willingness of consumers to shop around for lower rates (Crook, 2002; 
Kerr and Dunn, 2002). Issuers' aggressive mail marketing efforts have been amplified 
by telephone, event and internet campaigns, such behaviour has meant that the 
majority of consumers do not have to search hard to find a new credit card. According 
to Furletti (2003), the number of mailed credit card solicitations increased fivefold over 
a period of ten years from 1991 to 2001. 
1.1.3 The Role of Regulation and Legalisation in the UK 
The regulation of credit cards is currently provided by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, 
which was introduced on 1St July, and a small number of secondary legislations. 8 The 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT) is responsible for enforcing the Act along with local trading 
standard offices. The Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) is responsible for 
maintaining and improving consumer credit regulation. The Financial Services 
Association is responsible for payments after control was transferred from APACs in 
2009. 
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 consists of a number of clauses including Section 75 
which provides protection to consumers buying goods costing between £30 and 
£10,000 on their credit cards. These values have subsequently increased to £100 and 
£30,000. Also under Section 75 of the Consumer Credit Act, credit card companies are 
jointly responsible, along with the supplier of the goods or services, for any breach of 
8 These secondary legislations include the Consumer Credit (Disclosure of Information) Regulation 2004, 
the Consumer Credit (Advertisements) Regulation 1989 and the Consumer Credit (Total Charge for 
Credit) Regulations 1980. 
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contract of misrepresentation by the supplier. In March 2006, the Court of Appeals 
ruled that Section 75 should apply to transactions made overseas on UK-issued credit 
cards, as well as to those transaction made in the UK, even if the transaction is made 
over the telephone or internet with an overseas company (BBC, 2008)9 
The period of high credit card interest rates in the 1990s prompted some critics to call 
for government intervention. It is argued that regulatory efforts to reduce credit card 
interest rates could help revolving credit card users to decrease their debt repayment 
burden. Conversely, government intervention could produce inadvertent negative 
consequences for convenience users. The profits of credit card companies are likely to 
be weakened by lower interest rates. As a consequence, credit card companies are 
likely to impose other revenue-increasing actions such as the shortening the interest 
free "grace" period, reintroducing and/or raising annual fees and raising charges on 
cash withdrawals. By implementing such strategies they can attempt to maintain their 
existing profit levels. However these strategies are likely to raise the cost for 
convenience users of credit cards. Therefore any government intervention in the credit 
card market should be done with extreme caution. 
On 26th July 2005, the OFT issued its provisional conclusions on its investigation into 
credit card default charges. The OFT stated that the charges, typically in the £20 to £25 
range, were "disproportionate" and "unfair". The OFT confirmed these findings in April 
2006. The OFT concluded that a fair default charge should not exceed the level of 
administrative costs usually associated with a default. Many lenders have argued that 
the fee is based on the additional costs which arise from customers making late 
payments. It should be noted that UK banks have successfully fought off a similar 
challenge from the OFT with respect to overdraft charges. 
The OFT set a threshold for intervention at £13. Any default charge above this level 
would be presumed to be unfair, and would be challenged unless there were 
"exceptional business factors". Many issuers have publicly stated that they did not 
agree with the OFT's assessment, but they nevertheless agreed to reduce their 
charges. Default charges have generated large revenues for card providers and thus it 
9 OFT wins credit card cover appeal, < http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/business/4832573. stm> 
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is not surprising that since the OFT ruling, 19 card providers have increased their 
interest rate charges (PWC, 2006). 
In addition to the statutory regulation discussed above, the majority of credit card 
issuers subscribe to voluntary industry codes of practice. The Banking Code and the 
Finance and Leasing Association Code are the two main voluntary codes in the credit 
card industry. Since, the FSA overtook the supervision of the credit card market these 
codes of practice have been come compulsory. 
1.2 The Development of Pricing Strategies 
Intense competition for new customers and the adoption of new technologies in the 
credit card industry has reduced the price of credit for the majority of consumers as 
measured by the nominal annual percentage rate (APR). Card issuers have had to 
surrender some of the net interest rate margin which they have been able to enjoy as 
a result of high APRs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition they have adopted 
pricing strategies which consider an individual borrower's risk and behaviour profile. 
Declining APRs and the disappearance of annual fees have meant card issuers have 
come to rely on new pricing techniques to maintain or increase portfolio profitability. 
Techniques include new APR strategies and fee structures. This section outlines the 
history and dynamics of credit card pricing over the last twenty years. 
Low rate credit cards are relatively new phenomenon in the UK card industry. 
Researchers studying the industry throughout the 1980s and early 1990s found that 
credit cards had substantially higher rates and returns than any other bank credit 
products (Ausubel, 1991). Further research has demonstrated that credit card rates 
have remained high when other interest rates have fallen, this led Calera and Mester 
(1995) to conclude that interest rates on credit cards are "sticky". Mester (1994) and 
Brito and Hartley (1995) provide theoretical explanations for interest rate stickiness 
based on asymmetric information and consumer transaction costs. Credit card issuers 
also appeared to earn super-normal profits during the same period. Figure 1.5 shows 
how credit card rates have tended to be more expensive than other types of lending. 
Since 2004, the typical APR on credit cards has been steadily increasing while interest 
rates on mortgages and personal loans have been declining in line with changes in the 
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base rate. It can be seen that changes in base rates, such as LIBOR are not immediately 
passed on to consumers and from Figure 1.5, there appears to be a lag of around 3 
months for personal loans and mortgages, changes in base rates take a lot longer to 
impact on credit card rates. Borrowing has become cheaper over the last decade 
fuelling a credit boom. 
Figure 1.4: Average Interest Rates on Secure and Unsecure Debt 
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Until the early 1990s, the best way to describe the pricing of credit cards was as high 
and rather simplistic. In general, card issuers offered only one or two card products to 
consumers. Each card had a single APR attached to it, typically around 20%. If an 
applicant was able to pass the risk threshold set by the issuer, they would receive a 
card. However, if the applicant failed to meet the requirements of the issuer, due to 
their credit behaviour being deemed too risky, the application would be declined. This 
resulted in credit card issuers having a portfolio of customers who were priced as if 
they had very similar probabilities of default (Furletti, 2003). This is known as flat rate 
pricing. By charging every customer the same rates, card issuers were able to make 
higher profits on individuals with very low default risk. These excess profits could be 
used to cover defaults generated by individuals whose risk over time, had increased. 
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The influx of new entrants into the market, led to issuers competing on APR. This 
meant that they were forced to eliminate this cross-subsidisation and assess APRs 
based on the analysis of individual borrower risk. 
In the mid-1990s, interest rates in the credit card market began to decline and price 
dispersion has increased as price competition in the market has increased. Rationale 
for the increase in competition includes greater consumer sensitivity to credit card 
interest rates (Gross and Souleles, 2001) and an increase in interest-rate searches 
undertaken by debt-carrying credit card users (Kerr and Dunn, 2002; Kim, Dunn and 
Mumy, 2004). Gross and Souleles (2001) discover that credit card debt has become 
increasingly interest elastic, with approximately half of the effect resulting from 
balance switching. 
Interest rates became much more flexible as credit card issuers switched to variable 
rates by the mid-1990s (Stango, 2000). Issuers had generally switched to using risk- 
based pricing techniques. Risk-based pricing is the practice of charging different 
interest rates on the same loan to different individuals, depending on their credit score 
and other factors which indicate that they have a higher probability of defaulting on 
the loan. Those customers who are deemed to be low credit risks benefit from lower 
interest rates. The introduction of risk-based strategies has enabled issuers to extend 
credit lines, at higher prices, to individuals such as students and those on low incomes, 
who under flat-rate pricing strategies would not receive access to credit. Between 
1989 and 1998, the largest increase in credit card ownership was observed amongst 
customers with the lowest levels of income (Durkin, 2000). 
Another prominent feature of the UK credit card market in the late 1990s/early 2000s 
was the increase in price dispersion. Interest rates of purchases range from zero 
percent (introductory offer) up to rates around 30 percent. Card issuers have made 
widespread use of introductory "teaser" rates to induce card users to switch banks 
(Zywicki, 2000). Teaser rates are very much a feature of the credit boom. "Teaser" 
rates are offered to new customers at a substantially lower rate than the prevailing 
APR for an introductory period of around 3 to 18 months, thus encouraging consumers 
to transfer balances to the new card with a lower interest rate. While convenience 
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users are unlikely to respond to these types of offers, large revolvers will follow them 
with interest. 
1.2.1 The Unbundling of Fees and Costs 
Furletti (2003) suggests that another way in which credit card pricing has developed is 
in the "unbundling" of costs in the form of fees. As previously mentioned, card pricing 
throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, was comparatively simple. Typically, issuers 
charged a fairly high interest rate and an annual fee of around £30.10 The rationale 
behind the annual fee was not only to promote consumer loyalty but to cover the 
majority of the expenses associated with card usage. Only a small number of issuers 
charged over-limit fees or late fees and when they did, these fees were relatively 
small. Competition for new accounts dramatically increased during the mid-1990s, and 
thus changed the way in which issuers priced their cards. Interest rates declined and 
the once universal fee was eliminated. 
Issuers have unbundled the servicing costs (Furletti, 2003), by introducing charges for 
services and conveniences which were once paid for by all customers through the 
annual fee and interest revenues. Some of these fees, such as those, levied on cash 
advances, compensate issuers for the risk of fraud which is thought to be inherent in 
cash or cash-equivalent transactions. Charges are also levied on balance transfers and 
foreign currency transactions. 
1.2.2 The Introduction of Risk-Related Fees 
The decline in interest rates and the unpopularity of annual fees, has naturally led to a 
decline in revenue for card issuers. Thus in a bid to capture some of this revenue, 
issuers developed a more targeted fee structure. In place of charging every customer 
an annual fee to subsidise the costs associated with behaviour of a few, issuers instead 
imposed fees directly on to those customers whose card usage have driven costs 
higher. Credit card issuers impose a charge on customers who break the terms and 
conditions of their credit card agreement by either exceeding their credit limit, making 
late payments or for it a cheque or direct debit bounces. 
lo The card issuer however had the option of waving the annual fee. The annual fee would often be 
wavered if a cardholder spent over a certain amount each year or had large outstanding balances. 
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Issuers have also significantly increased the use of risk-related fees, also referred to as 
default charges. Issuers typical charge a fixed rate penalty to customers who either 
make a late payment or exceed their credit limit. The impact of high default charges on 
issuers' revenues has been substantial. In the UK default charges on average have 
been around £20. 
1.3 Other Aspects Relating to Pricing 
Interchange fees are an integral part of the pricing structure of credit cards. 
Schmalensee (2002) argues that the main economic role of the interchange fee is not 
to exploit the system's market power, but instead to shift costs between issuers and 
acquirers and thus to transfer charges between merchants and consumers to increase 
the value of the payment system as a whole to its owners. The level of the interchange 
fee determines the relative fees faced by cardholders and merchants. Typically 
customers are rewarded for using their credit cards. This has led a number of 
policymakers to argue that merchants pay too much to accept credit cards and that 
these costs are covered by individuals who do not use credit cards, through higher 
retail prices. A higher interchange fee raises the costs of acquirers, who will charge 
merchants more and this lowers the effective costs of issuers, who in turn will charge 
cardholders less (Wright, 2003). 
Baxter (1983) provides an early examination of interchange fees. Baxter (1983) argues 
that in the absence of interchange fees, each type of user will only face the private 
costs and benefits of using the card. A payment from the acquirer to the issuer via the 
interchange fee assists in aligning the private incentive to use a credit card with that of 
social incentives. His key finding was that it is efficiency which calls for card 
transactions whenever the joint benefit exceeds the joint cost of doing so. Baxter 
(1983) provides justification for the setting of interchange fees; however this does not 
mean that payment associations will succeed in setting the fee at the correct level. In 
the 2003, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) began investigating MasterCard's credit card 
interchange fee agreements. The OFT is also reviewing Visa's credit card interchange 
fee agreements. 
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As a caveat it should be noted that a number of retailers have refused to accept credit 
cards issued by American Express (Amex) as the claim that the fees associated with 
accepting these cards are "too high". 
1.4 Summary 
The chapter has provided an insight into the credit card industry which exists in the 
United Kingdom. The history and dynamics of credit card pricing over the past forty 
years have been outlined. Figure 1.6 provides a summary of the milestones in the 
plastic card industry, in particularly highlighting key events which have occurred in the 
UK credit card market. 
Substantial changes in the dynamics of credit card pricing have occurred over the last 
decade. The relatively straightforward pricing model of a single APR, an annual fee, 
and modest penalty charges have been replaced by a much more complex pricing 
model. The new model of credit card pricing consists of a complex set of APRs, new 
and increased fee structures, sophisticated finance charge computation techniques 
and a range f credit card "additions" such as loyalty schemes and cash withdrawals. 
According to Furtelli (2003), this "unbundled" pricing structure has created a card 
product for which consumers pay substantially different prices based upon their 
individual preferences and behaviour. 
Figure 1.5: A Timeline of Events in the UK Credit Card Market 
Time Event 
1880 The first credit voucher in the UK, introduced by the Provident Group. 
Customers are given vouchers which can be used in certain shops. 
1950 Diners Club issues payment cards for restaurant goers in the US 
1960 Bank of America launches Americard. 
1960s MasterCharge competes with Americard and gains many members. 
Americard becomes VISA and MasterCharge becomes MasterCard. 
th June 1966 UK's first credit card is issued by Barclays Bank 
1966 Interbank Card Association (ICA) is formed, the forerunner to MasterCard 
International (MCI). 
36 
Figure 1.6: A Timeline of Events in the UK Credit Card Market Cont. 
Time Event 
1972 National Westminster, Midland, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland join 
together to issue the Access credit card under the Joint Credit Card Company 
(JCCC). 
1st July 1977 Consumer Credit Act comes into force. Section 75 provides protection to 
consumers buying goods costing between £30 and £10,000 (increased to 
£100 and £30,000, subsequently) on their credit card. 
1980s The UK moves to "duality", i. e. banks begin to issue both Visa and Access 
cards. Subsequently, the Access consortium begins to break-up, and 
disappears as a brand as MasterCard gains recognition in the UK. 
1990s The early 1990s see increased competition, notably with an influx of card 
issuers from the USA. Cards begin to be increasingly sophisticated, tailored 
more to individual customer needs, and exploit the so-called niche markets. 
1990s Emergence of affinity cards and cards issued by non-financial institutions. 
1990 Cashback offered at the point of sale. 
1995 Product innovation leads to the issuing of gold cards and, eventually, other 
'status symbol' cards with additional features marketed only to high-income 
customers. 
1997 Supermarket banks (e. g. Sainsbury's Bank, Tesco Personal Finance) enter 
the market and issue credit cards. Chip and Pin trials begin in the UK. 
1999 Half of all UK adults hold a credit card. The average value of a credit card 
purchase exceeds £50 for the first time. 
1999 Internet card issuers (e. g. EGG, Smile, Marbles) join the market place. 
1999 Annual fees disappear, extra such as travel insurance, loyalty schemes; begin 
to be offered to attract customers, who are beginning to hold more than one 
card. 
2000s Aggressive pricing (e. g. zero/low rate offers) position credit cards as a 
cheaper form of personal short-term borrowing than loans. 
2001 More than half of retail spending is on plastic. 
2001 Debit card expenditure exceeds credit card expenditure for the first time. 
2002 Chip and PIN announced in the UK 
2003 Average number of credit cards per adult exceeds two for the first time 
2006 Default charges are capped at £12 by the OFT 
2006 Issuers react to the OFT ruling by raising interest rates, removing 
introductory cards. Annual fees begin to reappear 
Source: APACS/The UK Card Association 
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The adoption of new pricing structures by credit card issuers has meant that the cost 
of using credit cards has increased for some consumers, while for others it has 
deceased. The rapid expansion of the UK credit card market in the 1990s was 
stimulated by an influx of card issuers form America. MBNA entered the market in 
1993 and, along with a number of other new entrants such as Morgan Stanley and 
Capital One, have been credited with rejuvenating the pricing structure of the UK 
credit card market. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE UNITED KINGDOM CREDIT CARD MARKET 
2.1 Introduction 
The rapid growth of the credit card industry over the last decade has attracted 
considerable attention amongst researchers and policymakers. A particularly 
important phenomenon in this market is that interest rates have become much more 
dispersed in recent years and since the late 1990s have ranged from 9 to 40 percent. " 
This dispersion of rates is largely due to card issuers moving towards risk-based pricing 
methods, which reflect the creditworthiness and risk characteristics of different 
consumers. Credit card usage grew rapidly throughout the 1980s, at pace not 
experienced in any other sector of the consumer credit market (Rowlingson and 
Kempson, 1992), thus making this an interesting and important sector to study. 
For many customers worldwide, the credit card has become a practical and natural 
way of paying for goods and services. This is due to advantages such as the ease of use, 
convenience, and the option to revolve credit. Revolving credit allows an individual to 
buy now and pay later at a price. Credit card pricing, involves other elements, including 
annual fees, fees for cash advances, rebates, minimum finance charges, over-the-limit 
fees and late payment charges. In addition, the length of the "interest-free" grace 
period, if any, can have an important influence on the amount of interest consumers 
pay when they use credit cards to generate revolving credit. The pricing of credit cards 
has become more complex with a single credit card having multiple interest rates 
attached to it. 
The objective of this chapter is to present a general overview of plastic payment cards 
which are available in the United Kingdom, along with a detailed discussion on credit 
cards. An introduction to plastic payment cards and an overview of the plastic card 
market is provided in the second section. The third section focuses of credit cards, 
outlining the product alongside the associated advantages and disadvantages. The final 
section will conclude this chapter. 
11 The annual typical rate (APR) can be as high as 60%, when the associated annual fee is factored into 
the year cost. 
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2.2 An Introduction to Plastic Payment Cards 
Transaction volumes of paper cheques are rapidly declining as both consumers and 
retailers become more familiar with the use and acceptance of a variety of plastic 
payment cards (Worthington, 1996). It is important to be able to distinguish between 
the different types of plastic payment cards available and understand the differences 
between them. The evolution of payment methods in the UK is illustrated in both 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1. Table 2.1 indicates that there has been a steady decline in the 
use of cash and cheques as a method of payment since 1965. In 2004, electronic 
payments12 exceeded payments by cheque by 7.249 billion transactions. 13 
Table 2.1: The Evolution of Payment Methods in the UK 
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015** 
Cash 95% 93% 86% 78% 64% 49% 
Cheques 5% 6% 10% 9% 5% 2% 
Automated* 
- 
1% 3% 7% 14% 19% 
Debit Cards 
- - - 
3% 11% 22% 
Credit Cards 
- 
<1% 1% 3% 6% 8% 
* Includes direct debits and salary payments 
** Predicted values 
Source: APACS. 2006a. "40`h Birthday 
Cash remains the preferred option to pay for goods and services; however this has also 
been in decline, falling from 95% in 1965 to 49% in 2005. Technological advances mean 
that businesses prefer to pay employees using automated payments while consumers 
have turned to payment cards and direct debits to pay for goods and services. 
12 Electronic payments includes payments by credit, charge and debit cards as well as payments made 
automotive payment systems (e. g. BACS) 
13 Social Trends 36, for data set see 
http: //www. statistics. gov. uk/statbase/Product. asp? vlnk=5748&More=N (accessed 08/02/2007) 
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Figure 2.1: Non-Cash Transactions': By Payment Method 
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'Figures are for payments only made by households or businesses. Cheque encashments and cash 
withdrawals from ATMs and branch counters using credit/charge and debit cards are not included. 
2 VISA Debit and Switch cards in all years; includes Electron cards from 1996 and Solo cards from 1997. 
3 Includes direct debits, standing orders, direct credits, inter-branch automated items. 
4 VISA, MasterCard, travel and entertainment cards and store cards. 
Source: Social Trends 36, Figure 6.8 and Social Trends 32, Figure 6.13 
While the growth of plastic payment cards continues, since 1994 the growth of debit 
cards has outstripped the growth of credit cards as the preferred method of payment. 
In 2009 the rise of the debit card can be partly attributed to the overall tightening of 
credit in the wake of the recent credit crunch (Pilion, 2009). However, the growth of 
debit cards has been outstripping that of credit since 1994/5. Debit cards were 
originally introduced in the mid 1980s in a bid to reduce the number of cheques being 
used at the point of sale. Through "The Credit Cards (Price Discrimination) Order of 
1990", merchants won the right to charge customers different prices according to the 
chosen method of payment, a small number of merchants such as budget airlines (e. g. 
Ryanair), travel agents and most notably of all IKEA do choose to discriminate against 
customers according to their payment choice. In addition, a small minority of 
merchants, for cost reasons, accept debit cards and not credit cards, for example the 
Post Office. Both of these reasons may have contributed to the growth of debit cards 
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in the UK. Worthington (1995) suggests that the growth of debit cards has been driven 
largely by its use as a substitute for cheques. 
The phase "plastic payment card" is a generic term which denotes any plastic card 
(credit, debit, charge, etc) which can be used to pay for goods and services (APACS, 
2005a). Many authors have dealt with plastic payment cards, for example, Drury and 
Ferrier (1984) differentiate between the different types of plastic cards available in the 
United Kingdom, while Lindsey (1994) devotes a whole book to the study of credit 
cards. Worthington (1996) differentiated between three types of plastic payment 
cards: pay later cards (credit and charge cards), pay now cards (debit cards), and pay 
before cards (telephone cards). 
The cards which come under the umbrella of each of the three types of plastic 
payment cards' are discussed below: 
1. Pay later cards: The following are classified as pay later cards. 
  
Bank-issued cards: Bank-issued cards are usually linked to either the MasterCard 
or VISA organisations. These organisations are bank-owned payment organisations 
and facilitate the exchange and settlement of transactions, under a country's 
commercial banking laws (Mandell and Murphy, 1976; Lindsey, 1994). 
  
Affinity cards: The affinity credit card is a credit card offered by a financial 
institution to members or supporters of a specific organisation, such as football 
clubs, political parties and charities. Originally, these organisations, known as 
affinity partners, on whose behalf the card was to be issued on, could be classified 
by the three Cs of causes, charities and clubs (Worthington, 2001). Examples of 
affinity cards include the Manchester United Football Club credit card (MBNA) and 
la the RSPB credit card (Co-operative Bank). 
  
Co-branded cards: Co-branded cards represent a partnership between a credit 
card issuer and a commercial organisation, such as an airline or a retailer 
(Worthington, 2001). In this situation two different organisations join together to 
issue a co-branded card, the brand of the commercial partner will feature on the 
card as well as the brand of acceptance. An example of a co-branded card is the 
14Card issuers are denoted in brackets. 
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Sainsbury Advantage Card. This card is jointly offer by Sainsbury Supermarket and 
the Bank of Scotland. 
  
Charge cards: Charge cards are often referred to as travel and entertainment 
cards. The two main charge cards are American Express which is issued by 
American Express Travel Related Services, and Diners Club. Charge cards are similar 
to bank-issued cards in that they are a means to pay for goods and services and can 
be used to obtain cash. However, charge cards differ from bank-issued cards as 
they do not offer a line of revolving credit (Worthington, 1997). Unlike bank-issued 
cards, charge card issuers such as American Express and Diners Club do not have 
interest rate income to rely on. Therefore, charge cards have substantial joining 
and annual fees. Charges to the card acceptor are also substantially higher. As a 
result, charge cards are only accepted by a small number of retailers, acceptance 
tends to be restricted to business and tourist areas (Mandell and Murphy, 1976; 
Drury and Ferrier, 1984; Lindsey, 1994; Meidan and Davos, 1994). It should be 
noted that many individuals use their credit cards like charge cards by paying the 
outstanding balance in full before the end of the billing cycle. 
  
Store Cards: These are financial transaction and credit cards which are associated 
with a retailer or a group of retail stores and can only be used to make purchases 
from the retailers concerned. A number of stores in the UK offer stores cards 
including Monsoon, Mothercare and Ikea. 
  
Fuel Cards: Fuel cards are issued by petrol companies. They allow cardholders 
access to credit to pay for petrol purchases (Mandell and Murphy, 1976; Drury and 
Ferrier, 1984). 
2. Pay now cards: when a cardholder pays with a pay now card, the amount paid to 
the merchant is directly debited from the cardholder's account (Worthington, 1997). 
  
Electronic debit cards: A debit card is a payment card which is linked to either a 
bank or a building society account. In addition to being used to purchase goods and 
services, debit cards can be used to obtain cash from ATM machines and as cheque 
guarantee cards. The use of debit cards is free as long as the customer's account 
remains in credit; if the account becomes overdrawn interest will be payable on 
overdraft (Worthington, 1997). In addition, unlike with credit cards in which 
merchants must pay a fee which is equal to a percentage of the transaction 
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amount, the fee for accepting debit cards is much lower amount which is the same 
regardless of the transaction value. In 1990, cashback emerged as a means of 
acquiring cash. This facility means that a debit cardholder can ask for a cash sum 
when he/she purchases goods and services with the debit card, the amount is 
simply added to the debit card bill. Worthington (1996,2000) indicates this facility 
is advantageous to both sides of the transaction. Consumers no longer need to 
spend time searching for ATM machines, while retailers benefit from reduced 
security, shrinkage, and banking costs associated with the handling of large 
amounts of cash. Although many debit cards are either VISA or MasterCard, there 
are many other types of debit card, which are accepted only within a particular 
region or country, for example, Switch (now Maestro) and Solo are only accepted 
in the UK. 
3. Pay before cards: Value is stored on the card and when the card is activated the 
value is used up (Worthington, 1997). 
  
Telephone cards: With telephone cards the consumer adds value to the card prior 
to using it at the retailer's point of service (Lindsey, 1994; Worthington, 1994) 
  
Smart cards: Smart cards are a relatively new delivery system, which acts as a 
medium for many different services such as access keys, information managers, 
marketing tools, and customised delivery systems (Puri, 1997). 
  
Electronic purse: Which is also referred to as an e-purse is a type of smart card. An 
e-purse is a stored-value payment card which can be used to pay for goods and 
services. It is an alternative to cash. The card can either be disposed of or re- 
loadable when stored value becomes zero. The stored value is reduced as 
payments are made. The Mondex card is an example of a smart card. Holders of 
such a card are able to use it as an "electronic purse". 
  
Travel cards: The Oyster card is a form of electronic ticketing designed for use on 
London Transport and National Rail services with the Greater London area of the 
U K. 15 
is For more information on the Oyster Card see http: //www. tfl. gov. uk/tfl/fares-tickets/oyster/general. 
asp (accessed 08/02/2007) 
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Table 2.2: Pre-Paid Cards 
Withdrawal Fee 
Issuer/Card Application Fee Monthly Fee Reload Option 
UK Aboard 
360money £0.00 £1.99 £1.50 £1.50 Internet 
Premium Face to face 
American Express £20.00 £0.00 £1.50 £1.50 Internet 
Travellers Card Telephone 
Cash 2 Go £0.00 f0.00 £1.50 £1.75 Internet 
Face to face 
Cashplus £9.95 £4.95 £3.00 f3.00 Internet 
Telephone 
Face to face 
Liquid £9.95 £3.00 £1.00 £1.00 Internet 
Face to face 
Post Office Travel £10.00 £0.00 £1.50 £3.00 Telephone 
Money Card Face to Face 
Speedcard VEC £9.95 £3.45 £1.20 £1.20 Internet 
Face to Face 
Travelex Cash £0.00 £0.00 £3.50 £3.50 Face to face 
Passport 
Western Union £0.00 £0.00 £3.00 £3.00 Internet 
Travel Cash Card Telephone 
Face to face 
Source: Moneysupermarket. com: the price comparison site http: //www. moneysupermarket. com> 
Notes: All information contained in this table was collected in February 2007 
Pre-paid cards are well used in the USA; however they are a relatively new 
phenomenon in the UK. An increasing number of issuers are entering into the market; 
however the downside of these pre-pay cards is that they can be expensive. Table 3.2 
provides some examples of pre-pay cards which are currently available in the UK. 
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This study focuses on pay later cards, in particular credit cards, to examine the factors 
which influence the "price" of a credit card. Much of the preceding literature on the 
credit card market has focused on the phenomena of interest rates in the 1980s which 
in general were high and sticky. The literature attributes this phenomenon to the 
failure of interest rate competition due to consumer insensitivity to interest rates 
(Ausubel, 1991) and the lack of search by consumers (Calem and Mester, 1995). Brito 
and Hartley (1995), while maintaining the assumptions of consumer rationality and 
competition among banks, introduced transaction costs on alternative forms of 
borrowing as an explanation for the high average interest rates charged on credit card 
borrowing. The next section provides a definition of credit cards and this is followed by 
discussion of the developments of the credit card market and the pricing strategies 
adopted. 
2.3 Definition of a Credit Card 
A credit card is a variable repayment card which offers line of credit to the cardholder, 
who is able to spend up to a pre-arranged ceiling level (Wonglimpiyarat, 2005). The 
outstanding balance must be settled within a given period, or else interest will be 
charged on the remaining balance (Paxson and Wood, 1998). Effectively a credit card 
provides a self-service loan through a non-bank service outlet (Wonglimpiyarat, 2005). 
Lindsey (1994) defined credit cards as plastic payment cards which have access to a 
line of revolving credit and cash. Credit cards may be issued by financial institutions 
such as banks, building societies, personal loan specialists or by non-financial 
organisations, such as supermarkets and fuel companies. Correspondingly, a credit 
card could be used as an identification document to identify the holder as possessing a 
credit account, which then enables the holder to accumulate purchases and 
subsequently pay off the account either in full or part (Frazer, 1985). Additionally, 
there is usually a contract between the card issuer and the cardholder, which sets out 
the rules for using the card. With bank issued cards, there also exists an agreement 
between the bank and the card acceptor, agreeing the acceptance of the card as 
payment for goods and services (Lindsey, 1994). 
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Traditionally credit cardholders can choose between two credit card options: 
 A fee-free card: This type of card must be paid off in full each month. It allows 
consumers to pay by credit card at no additional cost; this means that the cost of 
using the credit card is identical to using cash. Cardholders benefit from the 
interest free period as they have borrowed money at no cost (Worthington, 1996). 
  
Annual fee card: In return for paying an annual fee, cardholders are able to take 
revolving credit by carrying forward an outstanding balance, having paid off a 
fraction of the credit taken (Worthington and Edwards, 2000). 
In the UK and the US, issuers seldom impose per transaction fees or charge annual 
membership fees. Issuers will impose annual fees if the card they are offering is loaded 
with additional enhancements. For example, the annual fee associated with the 
NatWest Black credit card is £250.16 However the card has a number of benefits such 
as: a personal assistant service, family travel insurance, travel services (including hotel 
and flight booking service and priority pass to executive airport lounges), roadside 
assistance and the opportunity to obtain tickets to events such as the Ryder cup. '' 
2.3.1 The Functions of Credit Cards 
Credit cards perform two important functions (Brito and Hartley, 1995). First, they can 
be used as a transactional medium that is a substitute for cash and cheques. Second, 
they can be used as a source of credit, as a substitute for other forms of short-term, 
small value credit, such as personal loans. 
The primary use of credit cards today is as a transaction median, rather than as a 
source of credit. Zywicki (2000) argues that approximately half of credit card users 
should be considered as "convenience users, " who use credit cards primarily as a 
transactional medium, thus paying their outstanding balances in full each month. 
Credit cards enable individuals to minimise their cash balances, thereby allowing them 
to shift their assets into higher-return investments (Zywicki, 2000). 
16 <http: //www. natwestblack. com/natwestblack/common/summarybox. asp> (accessed 10/10/2006) 
17 For up to date information about the benefits associated with the NatWest Black credit card see 
http: //www. natwestblack. com (accessed 10/10/2006). The black credit card is only available to 
individuals who meet the selection criteria; applicants must be over 25 years old and have an income of 
at least £70,000 a year. 
47 
Credit cards are also used by consumers as a borrowing median. Credit cards provide 
users with the opportunity to "revolve" debt from one month to the next; this requires 
the user to pay interest on the outstanding balance. 
In summary, credit cards have three main functions and these functions were 
presented by Mandell and Murphy (1976): 
1. Identification: The earliest function of credit cards was to identify the cardholder; 
2. Payment transfer: Credit cards allow consumers to make purchases without having 
to carry large amounts of cash around; 
3: Consumer credit: Credit cards can be used to obtain consumer credit. Cardholders 
have two repayment options: pay the outstanding balance in full without incurring any 
charges or pay-off a small proportion of the balance and thus incurring interest rate 
charges. As will be illustrated later in this chapter, the credit function of credit cards 
presents an entire set of advantages and disadvantages for issuers and users as well as 
the economy in general. 
Source: Stretch, C. 2006. "Credit Cards 
- 
How Does it all Work? An Overview Paper. " Complementary 
Solutions 
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Figure 2.2: Hierarchy of the Credit Card Industry 
2.3.2 Industry Structure 
The credit card industry includes a number of different levels or structures which will 
be introduced subsequently, Figure 2.2. There are a number of different parties who 
participate within the credit card market, and each is involved in a series of inter- 
related bilateral transactions. 
Figure 2.3, shows the main parties involved in a credit card transaction. This includes: 
the card issuer, who supplies the card to the customer and operates the account from 
which payment is made, the retailer, who exchanges goods or services for the 
customer's card details and consent to make the payment, and the merchant acquirer, 
who recruits retailers to the scheme, reimburses the retailer and obtains funds from 
the card issuer. These participants will be discussed in greater detail below. 
" Credit Card User 
The cardholder is the individual to whom the card has been issued to. Consumers find 
credit cards a convenient method for making purchases by accessing lines of credit 
which they have the option to pay-off either at the end of the billing cycle or to pay 
over a longer period of time. Around 30 to 40 percent of consumers pay their 
outstanding balance in full every month; such consumers are referred to as 
convenience users (Chakravorti and To, 2006). 
" Credit Card Issuer 
The card issuer is the institution which established a line of credit with a cardholder 
and issues the credit card which is then used to purchase goods and services. Credit 
cards can be issued by banks, building societies and retailers. Issuers may provide 
incentives such as frequent-use awards, dispute resolution services, extended 
warranties and low-price guarantees to promote usage. 
The issuing bank which maintains the consumer's credit card account is responsible for 
reimbursing the merchant's account when a credit card purchase has been made. The 
issuing bank then bills the customer for the debt. 
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According to Hamilton and Khan (2001) all major credit card issuers, to a greater or 
lesser extent, hold a portfolio which consists of three types of credit cardholders: 
(i) Non-active cardholders; 
(ii) Non-interest paying active cardholders; and 
(iii) Interest paying credit cardholders. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.4. Active credit cardholders with the greatest propensity 
to revolve are the most profitable. Credit card issuers are most likely to target these 
customers for additional interest-charging services. Credit cardholders who are less 
likely to revolve credit and thus pay interest, are more likely to be targeted by credit 
card issuers with alternative or differentiated products which would be more 
profitable or less costly for the card issuer. Many individuals simple accumulate debt, 
rather than revolve it. 
Figure 2.4: Credit Card Issuer's Portfolio 
Credit 
Cardholders 
Inactive Active 
Cardholders Cardholders 
Non-Interest Interest Paying 
Paying Cardholders Cardholders 
"CONVENIENCE USERS" "REVOLVERS" 
Source: Hamilton, R., and Khan, M., 2001. "Revolving Credit Card Holders: Who are they and how can 
they be Identified. " The Service Industries Journal, 21(3), 37-48. 
" Merchant 
A merchant is a retailer, or any other person, firm, or corporation that (pursuant to a 
merchant agreement) agrees to accept credit cards, debit cards, or both, when 
properly presented. 
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" Merchant Acquirers 
Merchant acquiring banks are central to the UK credit card system. On one side of the 
system, they reimburse the merchants for the value of the goods charged by 
cardholders, and on the other side they collect the cardholder payments from the 
issuing bank. A merchant acquirer is a bank or other financial institution that have a 
business relationship with merchants, retailers and other service providers to process 
their plastic card transactions (APACS, 2006a). For each type of transaction, the 
merchant acquirer collects a fee. From the merchant they collect a merchant service 
charge; this is usually a fixed percentage of the merchant's monthly transaction value, 
which they pass on to the issuing bank. From the issuing bank they collect a domestic 
interchange fee. 
" Network Operators 
The credit card market is an example of a two-sided market. A two-sided market is 
characterised by two sets of end users, each of whom needs the other in order for the 
market to operate. The fundamental characteristic of a payment card system is that 
every card transaction involves two users: a cardholder and a merchant (Rochet and 
Tirole, 2003). 
Payment systems can take on one of two principal forms, depending upon the number 
of parties who participate; these arrangements are illustrated in Figure 2.5, for 
completeness the two party agreements is also illustrated. A store card, like the one 
operated by Debenhams, where the card issuer supplies the goods and services and 
also supplies the finance, is an example of a two party system. Credit card payments 
systems are typically made up of either three or four parties. A three party system 
consists of credit cardholders, merchants and a single financial institution who offers 
the proprietary network service, for example, American Express. A four party system is 
similar to that of a three party system in that it consists of credit cardholders and 
merchants; however it differs by having card-issuing banks and merchant acquiring 
banks, which use the services of a multi-party network such as MasterCard or Visa. 
When the issuer and acquirer are different, the acquirer must pay the issuer an 
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interchange fee. '8 The interchange fee is set collectively by the banks which belong to 
a particular payment system. 
Figure 2.5: Credit Card Agreements 
a) A two-party agreement 
Client Retail Store 
b) A three-party agreement 
Card issuer/Merchant acquiring bank 14 1, Cardholder 
Merchant jv'_ý 
c) A four-party agreement 
Card issuer 
.40. VISA/Master Card 0 Merchant acquiring bank 
Cardholder Merchant 
Source: Lindsey, I. 1994. Credit Card: The Authoritative Guide to Credit and Payment Cards, Rushmere 
Wynne Ltd., p. 82 
Lindsey (1994) stated that VISA is a non-profit making organisation, which is registered 
in the USA; however card issuers in the UK are affiliated to Visa Europe. Visa does not 
have a role in determining cardholder or merchant rates; this is all done by their 
member banks. The role of Visa is to provide the products and services which make 
transactions fast, secure and convenient by connecting the four groups of business and 
individuals who participate in the transaction process. 
The Bank of America provided the foundations of the VISA network when it issued the 
BankAmericard in 1959. During the 1960s the Bank of America licensed the 
BankAmericard program to several other countries. The Bank of America gave up 
control of the BankAmericard program in 1970. The various BankAmericard issuers 
took control of the program, creating the National BankAmerica Inc. (NBI), which was 
responsible for promoting and developing the BankAmericard system. In 1974, 
18 Interchange fees are discussed in greater detail in section 6 of this chapter. 
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IBANCO, a multinational member corporation was founded to manage the 
international BankAmericard program, this was renamed VISA in 1976. VISA is owned 
and controlled by its members, through six elected regional boards, which are: the 
USA, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Middle East and Africa, and Asia Pacific. The VISA 
organisation has three main functions: 
1. To promote and protect the VISA name as an international brand; 
2. To authorise and transmit financial transactions on a national and international 
basis; 
3. To settle transactions, meaning that settlement will usually be made in the host 
country's currency. 
MasterCard (originally called the Inter-bank Card Association) was established in 1967, 
as a rival to VISA. The structure of MasterCard has several similarities to that of VISA. 
Card associations-such as Visa and MasterCard do not issue credit cards themselves. 
Both Visa and MasterCard operate along very similar lines. According 
2.3.3 Advantages of Credit Cards 
Significant changes have occurred in the credit card industry as well as in the payment 
system such as cash, personal cheques, store cards, credit cards, travel and 
entertainment cards and debit cards (Deiner and Katzenstein, 1994). The acceptance 
of credit cards and plastic payment cards has advantages not only for the participants 
who take part but for the economy as a whole. 
At the societal level, the main advantage of credit cards is that they permit individuals 
to smooth their consumption in the face of irregular incomes. Therefore credit cards 
allow the economy to function at a much higher and faster level than it could if it relied 
solely on cash and cash-based instruments (Ritzer, 1995). 
Credit cards offer two transactional advantages over cash and cheques (Zywicki, 2000). 
First, credit cards offer a number of ancillary benefits which are unavailable with cash 
and cheques. Debit cards also offer this benefit to consumers. Second, unlike cash, 
cheques and debit cards, credit cards remove the need to maintain sufficient cash 
reserves to cover current expenditures (Brito and Hartley, 1995). Banknote and coins 
are clumsy and expensive to handle, particularly if travelling aboard and a different 
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currency is requires. Plastic payment cards have facilitated international travel and 
purchases of goods and services (Worthington, 1997). Therefore, the acceptance of 
plastic payment cards has increased all over the world. 
In view of the costs associated with the processing of cheques, banks are particularly 
looking forward to a paperless banking system in the future. Volumes of paper cheque 
transactions are already in long-term decline (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1) as both 
consumers and retailers become more familiar with the use and acceptance of a 
variety of plastic payment cards (Mandell and Murphy, 1976). 
Individuals with high incomes and are time constrained consider plastic payment cards 
to be a convenient and time saving alternative to cash, which has lead to a boom in the 
demand for payment cards (Prideaux, 1999). Debit cards, for example provide instant 
access to funds in a current account. Furthermore, using a debit card or a credit card at 
the point of sale saves time that would be spent queuing for cash at a bank branch, 
and it is also faster than writing a cheque. Credit card and bank statements make it 
quick and easy to check what has been spent and where. 
Credit cards provide flexibility for consumers in matching their income and 
expenditure streams by alleviating the need to maintain sufficient funds at all times to 
cover current expenditure (Zywicki, 2000). This is linked to the fundamental problem 
of cheques. By writing a cheque, an individual is indicating that they have sufficient 
funds to cover the cheque when it is drawn. Therefore an associated problem with 
cheques is that they force merchants to bear the risk of non-payment. Merchants are 
unlikely to be in a position to optimally bear this risk (Zywicki, 2000). Thus, credit cards 
enable the merchant to shift the risk of non-payment to the credit card issuer, who will 
have superior risk-bearing and monitoring capacity. 
The ability to shift the risk of non-payment is particularly important for small 
businesses, which will be at a comparative disadvantage in bearing non-payment risk 
relative to larger businesses. 
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Table 2.3: The Advantages of Credit Cards 
ADVANTAGES 
The card user 1. Flexibility and convenience at home and aboard: Credit cards can 
(Cardholder) be used 24 hours a day to make purchases using the internet, mail 
or telephone. Credit cards are particularly useful for individuals 
who travel aboard as they can be used to make purchases without 
the need for foreign currency. 
3. Less time consuming: Credit card transactions take less time than 
writing a cheque. Credit cards can be used aboard; they are more 
convenient and offer better value than traveller's cheques. 
Traveller's cheques must be ordered a few days before travelling, 
a decision on the amount required and payment must be made in 
advance. 
3. Automatic and instant cash: Credit cards are an automatic source 
of credit. Cardholders can use credit cards to smooth out 
consumption; this means that even when income is low the 
cardholder can continue to have the same spending power. Credit 
cards allow emergency purchases to be made. 
4. Consumer Protection: Credit card payment allows the cardholder 
to claim compensation from the card provider if the goods they 
have bought using the card turn out to be sub-standard or fail to 
be delivered. 
5. Discounts and bonuses: Cardholders may receive discounts or 
extra bonuses on a wide range of services, thus saving the 
cardholder money. 
6. Free insurance cover: A number of credit cards include purchase 
insurance. This insurance covers the replacement of goods, travel 
accident insurance and travel delay insurance. 
7. Access to cash: Credit cardholders have instant access to cash 
anytime and anywhere in the world. 
8. Payment options: Cardholders have the option to pay the 
outstanding balance in full every month or to spread repayment 
over a period of time. 
9. Safety: Credit cards are safer to carry around than cash. 
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Table 2.3: Advantages of Credit Cards Cont. 
ADVANTAGES 
The card 1. Guaranteed payment: The card issuer commits to pay the 
acceptor merchant the moment the transaction has been verified. Therefore 
(Merchant) credit card transactions are often more secure than other forms of 
payments, such as cheques. 
3. Increased sales: Credit cards allow individuals to make purchases 
even if they do not have the cash to do so. Merchants who do not 
accept credit cards are likely to lose sales. The cardholder may 
"trade up" in that he may spend more due to the availability of 
credit. 
3. Greater security: Security is improved as less cash is held on the 
premises. 
4. Speed of transactions at the point of sale: Credit card transactions 
are generally quicker than cash and cheque transactions. 
The issuer 1. Profit: The card issuer is able to generate income from the interest 
paid by cardholders on outstanding balances, the annual fee 
associated with the card and the merchant service fee. 
3. Efficiency: The daily information supplied by the card 
3. Cross-selling opportunities: Issuers have the opportunity to 
promote other products/services with the statements which they 
send to their customers every month. 
4. Cross-subsidisation: Issuers can use the profits made on credit card 
products to subsidise other, less lucrative areas of business, such as 
current accounts. 
Sources: Drury, A. C., Ferrier, C. W. 1984. Credit Cards, London: Butterworths., 14_15; Lindsey, I. 1994. 
Credit Card: The Authoritative Guide to Credit and Payment Cards, Rushmere Wynne Ltd., pp. 19-25; 
Ritzer, G. 1995. Expressing America, California: Pine Forge Press, pp. 3-4; 
Evans and Schmalensee (1993) summarised the mutual benefits of credit cards, 
stating: "The transaction features of payment cards provide real economic benefits. 
Consumers gain from increased convenience. Businesses gain from reduced risk. Both 
gain from transactions that are made easier to consummate. " 
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DeMuth (1986) argues that shifting the risk of non-payment to low-cost risk bearers 
will encourage entrepreneurial growth, making it easier for smaller companies to 
compete with larger retailers who dominate the retail credit market. Chakravorti and 
To (2006) point out that merchants benefit from the acceptance of credit cards. 
Merchants benefit from sales to illiquid consumers who would otherwise would be 
unable to make purchases. Table 2.3 summarises the main advantages of payment 
cards. 
2.3.4 Disadvantages of Credit Cards 
Research by uSwitch19 undertaken in 2006, has found that 3.4 million credit 
cardholders in the UK regularly make only the minimum repayment on their credit 
card. Credit card arrears have risen consistently throughout 2005. The proportion of 
balances which are more than three months in arrears has increased to 8.5%. 
Therefore, it can be seen that credit cards have significantly contributed to rising levels 
of personal debt in the UK. Rowlingson and Kempson (1994) examine how individuals 
use their credit card and the reasons for credit card default. Credit card default can be 
for a number of reasons including loss of income, low priority to paying credit card bills 
and misunderstanding the system of payment. The growth of personal debt20 in the UK 
is illustrated in Figure 2.6. 
The advantages associated with credit cards come at a cost to the cardholder. Card 
issuers, traditionally charged an annual fee; however annual fees were typically phased 
out during the 1990s. Credit cards can be costless to use if the cardholder pays the 
outstanding balance in full at the end of each month. However, consumers are charged 
extremely high rates of interest on outstanding balances if they are not paid in full at 
the end of the billing cycle. In 2005,59% of credit cardholders repaid the outstanding 
balance in full at the end of each month. 
The main disadvantage for merchants is that they must pay a fee every time a 
transaction is completed. With respect to credit cards the fee is a percentage of the 
19 http: //www. uswitch. com (accessed on 01/09/2006) 
20 Personal debt includes total credit card lending, total secured lending (e. g. mortgages) and total other 
consumer credit lending (e. g. unsecured personal loans, motor and retail finance, overdrafts) 
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transaction value, while the fee associated with debit cards is a fixed value which does 
not vary with transaction value. 
Figure 2.6: UK Personal Debt 
1 
1 
1 
1 
O Total Secured 
LendunQ 
. Taal one Consumer Credit L 
UTotal Credit 
Card Lending 
Source: Credit Action. 2006. "Debt Facts and Figures 
- 
Compiled 2nd October 2006. " 
<http: //www. creditaction. org. uk/debtstats. htm>. 
For example, in the UK a merchant would be charged £0.77 for a £100 credit card 
transaction, but only £0.08 for a similar transaction made using a debit card. 21 
Contention exists between merchants and card issuers over costs because the majority 
of retailers object to paying a merchant service fee for each transaction. 
The three most important disadvantages associated with credit cards are discussed 
below: 
1. High Risk: Credit risk is the risk that an asset or loan becomes irrecoverable in the 
case of outright default, or the risk of delay in the servicing of the loan (Heffernan, 
1998). Credit cards become particularly high risk when cardholders, who not have 
enough information or understand the information they have about credit card risk or 
the interest rate they are paying (Berthoud and Kempson, 1992). 
21 Figures worked out using Visa Domestic Interchange Reimbursement Fees for the UK, available from 
www. visaeurope. com. Interchange fee values set July 2009. 
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2. Bad Debts: Bad debts occur when cardholders are unable to repay their outstanding 
balances (Lindsey, 1994; Ritzer, 1995). Rowlingson and Kempson (1994) carried out an 
investigation into the causes of credit card debt. They found a number of reasons for 
the occurrence of bad debt, including, changes in circumstances, over spending, heavy 
card usage and lack of understanding about the associated terms and conditions. A 
major disadvantage of credit cards is that they can encourage individuals to over use 
credit, thus increasing the likelihood of getting into financial difficulties. 
3. Fraud: A fraudulent transaction occurs when a transaction is unauthorised by the 
true cardholder of a credit card. Lindsey (1994) and Ritzer (1995) indicate that there 
are many types of credit card fraud. 
  
Application: Lindsey (1994) states that there are two forms of application fraud. 
Application fraud occurs when either an individual adopts another individual's 
identity to make an application, or the applicant makes false claims about their 
financial situations. The latter is often referred to a financial fraud. 
  
Lost and stolen card: Ritzer (1995) states that lost and stolen cards as the largest 
source of credit card fraud; in this case cards are stolen from the holders 
themselves. According to APACS (2006b) this type of credit card fraud has 
remained relatively static for the past five years. 
  
Counterfeit card fraud (Skimming): The majority of counterfeit fraud cases involve 
skimming, a process in which genuine data on a card's magnetic stripe is 
electronically copied on to another card, without the legitimate cardholder's 
knowledge. 
  
Card not present (CNP): This type of fraud is perpetrated through the theft of card 
details for use in non face-to-face transactions. In the UK, CNP fraud is the most 
common type of fraud experienced (APACS, 2006b) 
  
Mail non-receipt: In this case, cards are stolen in transit, that is after the card 
companies have sent the card out and before the genuine cardholder receives 
them. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the cost of plastic card fraud in the UK over the last decade. The 
introduction of chip and PIN in 2005 has led to a decrease in plastic card fraud losses. 
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Before the introduction of these anti-fraud methods, card fraud losses had been 
steadily increasing since 1995. Fraud losses peaked in 2004, as organised criminal 
groups responsible for recent increases in card fraud realised that the implementation 
of chip and PIN in the UK would severely curtail their ability to commit the types of 
crimes discussed above and, therefore, they increased their activity accordingly 
(APACS, 2005c). While the introduction of chip and PIN has provided successful in 
cutting losses associated with lost/stolen cards, counterfeit cards and mail non-receipt, 
identity theft and card-not-present fraud is continuing to rise. 
Figure 2.7: Annual Plastic Card Fraud Losses on UK-Issued Cards: 1995-2005 
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2.4 Summary 
Plastic cards have a significant impact on the way that individuals both in the UK, but 
also worldwide, pay for goods and services. In the UK today, the majority of consumers 
pay for at least half of their purchases using a plastic card. Most large retailers, 
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supermarkets and online shops accept plastic payment cards as do an increasing 
number of professional service providers. The forerunners of plastic payment cards are 
a distant memory from the sophisticated and widely accepted payments cards that 
individuals have become accustomed to. Nevertheless, these very simple cards laid the 
foundations for what is observed today. 
A credit card is a payment tool which allows an individual to access a flexible source of 
credit. Credit cards can be used by consumers as a borrowing medium. In this case 
individuals repay the outstanding balance in full and on time, thus avoiding incurring 
any interest or charges on their purchases. Credit cards also provide the users with the 
opportunity to "revolve" debt from one month to the next; however this requires the 
cardholder to pay interest and sometimes other fees. 22 There are a number of 
advantages and disadvantages for both consumers and merchants in using credit 
cards, however these advantages and to some extent the disadvantages have been 
eroded by the rise in popularity of debit cards. 
The next chapter provides a critical survey of the literature associated with credit 
cards. The literature is not only large and growing but also remarkably diffused. Credit 
cards have been examined in the context of a large variety of sub-disciplines. This 
literature review will provide a survey of some of the major questions, puzzles and 
issues associated with credit cards. 
22 Credit card issuers often allow customers to transfer outstanding balances from other credit cards, 
this often incurs a fee. Fees can also be charged if a late payment is made or if the cardholder goes over 
their credit limit. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Since their introduction after the Second World War, credit cards have evolved into 
highly complex financial instruments. Their usage reflects a large number of different 
motivations (transactions, debt and consumer benefits), involves a significant number 
of prices (interest rates, teaser rates, grace periods, penalty fees, etc. ) and quantity 
constraints (credit limits, minimum payments, etc. ). These characteristics and their 
associated services are supplied by a large variety of different card providers such as 
banks, building societies and personal loan specialists. In addition, issues of consumer 
behaviour and consumer rationality play a far more significant role in the credit card 
market relative to other financial markets because credit card markets involve 
decisions by consumers rather than corporations or markets. 
The credit card market has drawn a significant amount of attention from researchers 
since the late 1980s, largely because the market appears to be non-competitive. This is 
despite a market structure in which, prima facie terms, fits the competitive paradigm 
remarkably well. Despite this observation, the literature on credit cards is remarkably 
diverse. Researchers have examined these products in the context of a large variety of 
sub-disciplines including: financial economics, banking, monetary economics, industrial 
organisation, regulatory economics, consumer behaviour and network economics 
(Scholnock et at., 2008). It has been argued that there are still many outstanding issues 
and questions about the pricing, use and suitability of credit cards as a payment 
mechanism; this indicates that there are significant opportunities for further research 
in the area of credit cards. Therefore the aim of this chapter is to provide a survey of 
some of the major questions and puzzles of this literature. 
The remainder of this chapter provides a critical survey of the large and diffuse 
literature on credit cards and is organised as follows. Section two reviews the literature 
surrounding pricing and competition within the credit card market. Many of the 
existing studies focus on the failure of competition and asymmetric behaviour of credit 
cards. This includes a discussion on issues such as credit card ownership and usage, 
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debt and the relationship between banks and credit cardholders, and consumer 
behaviour. Studies related to credit card networks are outlined in section four. Section 
five discusses why studying the UK credit market is important, as well as outlining the 
practical and academic contributions of the subsequent research undertaken. Section 
four concludes and outlines the research agenda. 
3.2 Credit Card Pricing Puzzles 
The credit card market has drawn a significant amount of attention from researchers 
since the later 1980s. This is because it appears to be non-competitive despite a 
market structure which in, prima facie terms, fits the competitive paradigm 
remarkably well. This section provides a detailed examination of the various 
hypotheses relating to credit card pricing and a summary of the empirical evidence to 
date. A number of alternative hypotheses have been proposed to explain credit card 
pricing, however little consensus has emerged as to which hypothesis best explains 
credit card pricing. 
3.2.1 Adverse Selection, Search Costs and Switching Costs 
Ausubel (1991) was the first to examine the significant pricing distortions inherent in 
the market for credit cards, and proposes a number of possible explanations for these 
distortions. Ausubel (1991) finds that while the market for credit cards resembles a 
competitive market, the actual interest rate charged by issuers is both high and sticky 
downwards. A variety of explanations are offered based around asymmetric 
information and consumer behaviour. It is highlighted that there are two possible costs 
to consumers who are seeking to change their credit card; search costs and switching 
costs. 
In addition, Ausubel (1991) proposes a theory related to adverse selection, in which 
banks are reluctant to cut interest rates, because this action will attract high risk 
borrowers. This argument is based on the assumption that high risk borrowers are 
more likely to search for low interest rate cards because they assume that they are 
extremely likely to be using this debt in the future. Thus, according to Ausubel (1991) 
the pricing puzzle associated with credit cards can be explained by a combination of 
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search costs, switching costs, adverse selection, and an element of consumer 
rationality. 
Calera and Mester (1995) build on the work undertaken by Ausubel (1991). They argue 
that issuers may interpret large outstanding card balances as a signal of credit risk. This 
is because they are unable to distinguish between card borrowers who intend to use 
the new card to increase their total outstanding debt and those borrower's who are 
simply planning to switch their current balance to the new card. This creates a 
switching cost as borrowers with high levels of debt are more likely to face rejection 
when they apply for another card. In other words, customers tend to become "locked- 
in" to their current issuer once they accumulate a sizable outstanding balance. Calera 
and Mester (1995) tested this informational-based switching cost hypothesis using 
data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finance. They found that households who had 
large outstanding balances were more likely to be rejected or offered cards with lower 
than desired credit limits. These cardholders were also more likely to have experienced 
payment problems. These findings are consistent with informational-based switching 
costs and the adverse selection problem. 
Crook (2002) and Kerr and Dunn (2002) used data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer 
Finances to revisit Calem and Mester's (1995) analysis. Using the later data, they found 
no relationship between search behaviour and outstanding credit card balances. This 
finding is consistent with a more competitive market structure, in which barrier to 
searching and switching has been reduced. This finding also coincides with issuers 
using balance transfers in order to gain market share from their rivals. 
Calem et al. (2006) argue that consumers who have higher outstanding balances on 
their cards also face higher search costs, as they have higher disutility from searching. 
For this reason it is possible that issuers unilaterally lower their credit card interest 
rates to attract those consumers who have lower balances. Alternatively, consumers 
who have larger outstanding balances may have more difficulty in switching to a new 
issuer compared to other consumers. This is because such consumers have a higher 
probability of having their application rejected. 
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Stango (2002) presents a new empirical test of the switching cost explanation 
presented by Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995). Outstanding balances of 
individuals' credit card borrowers serve as a switching cost, thus borrowers with high 
outstanding balances will find it harder to switch to alternative cards. Like Calem and 
Mester (1995), Stango (2002) argues that higher card balances are correlated with 
consumer characteristics which make consumers reluctant to switch. In addition, 
lenders are less likely to provide new credit cards to potential borrowers with high 
balances, thus exaggerating switching costs. Switching costs will be positively related 
to the levels of indebtedness at competitor banks, as this will reduce the ability of 
borrowers to switch banks. Stango (2002) regresses the interest rates of different 
users against the outstanding balances of cardholders at these issuers. His results show 
that the higher the outstanding balances of a provider, and the higher outstanding 
balances of competitor banks, the higher the interest rate charged. 
Berlin and Mester (2004) found that consumer search costs were likely to be an 
inadequate explanation as to why imperfect competition is observed in the credit card 
sector. The distribution of credit card rates during the 1980s, a period when search 
costs were considered to be significant, were found to be inconsistent with those 
derived from many models of search. Berlin and Mester (2004) find that their data is 
not consistent with any of these possible search/non-search equilibriums. 
Despite many changes taking place in the credit card market; Calem, Gorby and Mester 
(2005) find that information based barriers to switching have remained relevant in the 
credit card market. Substantial growth in credit card borrowing since 1989, suggest 
that informational barriers to competition persist. However, the level of credit card 
balances at which they become effective may have increased. This is possibly in part 
due to technological improvements. 
According to Bertaut and Haliassos (2006), in the presence of search and switching 
costs. Credit card issuers would find that lowering the interest rates does not attract 
many consumers whom revolve credit and are good credit risks. Hence this could 
contribute to the stickiness of interest rates. Cargill and Wendell (1996) suggest that, 
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due to the high presence of convenience users, even modest search costs could keep 
the majority of consumers from seeking our lower interest rates. 
3.2.2 Rational or Irrational Consumers 
The economic behaviour of individuals using credit cards has challenged the rationality 
of consumer behaviour (Andreou and Ktoris, 2006). Britio and Hartley (1995) propose 
an alternative explanation to that of Ausubel (1991) and Calem and Mester (1995). 
Their explanation is based on completely rational individuals. According to Britin and 
Hartley (1995), consumers will continue to use the credit function and accumulate 
credit card debt even though the associated interest rate is significantly higher than 
interest rates associated with other forms of bank debt. Essentially, the use of credit 
cards by consumers is an attempt to smooth their income and consumption streams 
over time. In addition, consumers face extremely high transaction costs when 
accessing non-credit card bank credit for short periods of time. 
Britio and Hartley (1995) provide an explanation for the significant spread between 
credit card rates and bank loan rates. They argue that credit cards enable individuals to 
borrow if and when the period for which credit is required is relatively short or 
unpredictable. Given the advantages which credit card borrowing has over other forms 
of borrowing, it is argued that the significant spread which is observed between credit 
card and bank loan interest rates is consistent with an equilibrium model. 
Further studies by, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) 
consider consumers who are time inconsistent. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) investigate 
optimal contracting with dynamically inconsistent agents under adverse selection. 
Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) provide a further explanation, based on the 
assumption that firms are rational, but consumers are to some extent biased and 
irrational. More specifically, they attempt to model how rational firms price products 
such as credit cards, by assuming that consumers have time inconsistent preferences. 
The main theoretical prediction of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) is that for 
products such as credit cards where there are immediate benefits from consumption 
and delayed payments. The time inconsistency of borrowers implies that firms should 
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charge below marginal cost in the short-run, but above marginal cost in the long-run. 
This enables issuers to exploit the fact that consumers may have lower discount rates 
in the future, which implies that naive consumers will underestimate their usage of 
future credit lines. In addition, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) extend their model 
to incorporate switching costs. Using a three-period model, they show that firms have 
an incentive to impose switching costs on consumers because of the time 
inconsistency of consumers. 
3.2.3 Fixed and Variable Interest Rates 
A further explanation to the credit card pricing puzzle is offered by Stango (2000). His 
explanation is based around the stylised fact that credit card issuers can choose to 
charge either fixed or variable rates of interest. Fixed rates remain unchanged for long 
periods, typically for around five years, while variable rates in theory should move 
simultaneously with market interest rates. Stango (2000) investigates whether it is this 
pricing structure which impacts on the competitive structure of the market. Using a 
simple game theory model, he is able to demonstrate that firm size will have a strong 
impact on the pricing structure chosen. Small firms will choose to price more 
aggressively than their larger counterparts, as they are attempting to capture market 
share. Large firms choose to price less aggressively as they try to exploit their existing 
market share. In addition, Stango (2000) finds that the increase in competition for new 
customers during the 1990s is related to the stronger presence of variable rate cards in 
the market. 
3.2.4 Price Discrimination 
Murphy and Ott (1977) study credit cards from the economic theory perspective and 
used microeconomic theory of price discrimination to analyse the discrimination 
between customers who have differing income elasticities. Massoud et al. (2007) are 
the first paper to model banking competition in the credit card market in which banks 
price discriminate when consumers face stochastic shocks to their income which then 
impacts on their repayment choice. 
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It should be noted that firms which offer both fixed and variable rate credit cards, 
typically extend only one type of card to the consumer, this suggests that they are 
using different rate types as a means of price discrimination (Stango, 2002). 
3.2.5 Tacit Collusion 
A fifth explanation for the determination of interest rates has been derived by Knittel 
and Stango (2003). During the 1980s, state level price ceilings based on Usury Law, 
were imposed by many States in the US. However, in some states, there were no 
binding ceilings. Using this institutional detail, Knittel and Stango (2003) examine 
whether credit card providers resort to tacit collusion by using the interest rate level of 
the binding ceiling in some states as the focal point for interest rates in those states 
that did not have a binding ceiling. The empirical results generated by Knittel and 
Stango (2003) are consistent with their hypothesis that the reason for clustering and 
stickiness of credit card interest rates is due to tacit collusion between card providers, 
however, this empirical evidence is only based on pre-1989 data. 
3.2.6 Option Values 
In an attempt to explain high credit card interest rates, Park (2004) focused on the 
option value of credit card lines which, arise from changing default probabilities of 
cardholders. Park's (2004) main argument is that there is an option value inherent with 
open credit lines of credit card borrowers, as individuals can continue to borrow on 
their existing card even as their degree of risk alters. Adverse selection will occur 
because cardholders will become riskier as their borrowing increases. It is for this 
reason that credit card interest rates are much higher than the zero profit interest 
rate. 
A variety of pricing strategies are available to issuers, to enable them to offset the 
option value. Park (2004) argues that if an issuer unilaterally lowers their interest rate 
then they will attract risky borrowers who are likely to become even riskier. Moreover, 
the adverse selection problem of borrowers who become riskier will also occur if an 
issuer charges an upfront fee at the initiation of the credit contract. According to Park 
(2004) when card issuers are well informed about current but not future risk levels, the 
use of introductory offers will serve to mitigate the adverse selection problem. Hence, 
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Park (2004) argues that the option value of open credit lines also explains the 
increased popularity of introductory offers in the credit card market. 
3.2.7 Credit Card Fees and Risk 
While the majority of the credit card literature has focused on the determinants of 
interest rates, Massoud et al. (2007) examine the determinants of credit card penalty 
fees. Currently, this is the only paper which theoretically and empirically examines the 
issuer of penalty fees, despite default charges being commonly debated by consumer 
bodies and government regulatory bodies. For example, in the USA, former 
presidential candidate John Kerry has called for credit card fees to be regulated, while 
in the UK, the OFT have been investigating credit card fees. Furletti and Ody (2006) 
showed that late fees and over limit fees, as a proportion of total credit card loans, 
more than doubled from 0.7 percent in 1990 to 1.6 percent in 2004. 
In order to examine the impact of risk on credit card penalty fees, Massoud et al. 
(2009) examine the bank level risk of credit defaults as measured by the charge-off 
ration from each bank's balance sheet and find an exogenous measure of default risk 
as measured by bankruptcies per capita in the specific states in which each card is 
marketed. Penalty fees are negatively related to card interest rated and do not reflect 
the risk of consumer default. In addition, it was found that issuers with large market 
share charge higher penalty fees than those who have a small market share. 
Laderman (1996) concludes that although cyclical factors in the economy affect 
charge-offs by banks, the aggressive marketing of card issuers since the mid-1980s has 
deteriorated the quality of the cardholder pool and contributed to the high rate of 
charge-offs seen in the 1990s. 
3.3 Consumer Behaviour Puzzles 
Credit cards are one of the most popular payment instruments in the world having 
achieved recognisable success in both the USA and the UK. While credit cards have 
been widely accepted, large differences exist between countries in the terms of 
holding and usage (Worthington, 1995). Section 2.2, reviewed the credit card literature 
relating to issues surrounding credit card pricing, such as interest rates and penalty 
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fees. A number of studies have been concerned with predicting consumer demand 
using a number of economic parameters such as competition patterns (Batra, 1975; 
Garcia, 1980; McAlister and de Spain, 1975; Russell, 1975). 
The literature related to the economic behaviour of households using credit cards has 
identified three puzzles that challenge the rationality of consumer behaviour (Andreou 
and Ktoris, 2006). The first puzzle relates to the observation that the majority of 
individuals choose to borrow through high interest rate bearing credit card loans 
rather than low cost personal loans. Brito and Hartley (1995) argue that individuals 
choose to borrow using credit cards instead of using personal loans, is simply down to 
the bureaucracy and collateral required to secure such a loan. They go on to argue that 
credit card borrowing is considered by individuals to be an easier form of borrowing; 
hence individuals are willing to accept the higher costs associated with credit card 
borrowing simply to avoid the extra time and effort required in order to borrow 
through lower interest bearing loans. 
The second puzzle involves the simultaneous borrowing through credit cards while 
accumulating liquid assets. One would expect individuals to use a proportion of their 
liquid assets, which will yield a lower interest to repay the higher interest bearing 
credit card loan. 
The final puzzle considers why households borrow through credit cards at the same 
time as they save for retirement, in the literature this is known as the debt puzzle. 
Bertaut and Haliassos (2001) have shown that it is not optimal for a household to 
revolve debt on a credit card and at the same time possess liquid assets. Rational 
behaviour would imply that as long as the interest rate charged on outstanding 
balances exceeds the interest rate received by the individual on liquid assets, the 
individual should liquefy their assets and pay-off all outstanding balances. 
3.3.1 The Adoption of Credit Cards 
A credit card is both a payment tool and a convenient source of credit. The costs and 
benefits of account or credit card ownership and optimal balances depend on 
transaction costs, interest rates and institutional restrictions. 
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3.3.1.1 Classification of Credit Card Users 
Matthews and Slocum (1969,1970) classify cardholders into two categories, which are 
based on an individual's "use" of credit cards. The first group is labelled "instalment 
users" because they choose to pay less than the full outstanding monthly balance and 
roll over part of the debt, as a consequence these cardholders must pay interest 
charges on their outstanding debt. The second group is labelled as "convenience 
users". Individuals classed as this type of user, view credit as a substitute for cash and 
they pay the outstanding balance in full within the billing cycle. Worthington (2005) 
refers to the first group as "revolvers" and the second groups as "transactors". In these 
studies cardholders are compared on their social class. These studies find that 
individuals who are considered to be upper class are more likely to be convenience 
users and pay the outstanding balance in full each month. Typically, revolvers are from 
lower social classes. 
A cardholders' age, marital status, and household size may impact on whether an 
individual is a credit card revolver or not. A consistent finding in previous studies is the 
negative relationship between age and being a credit card revolver (Bei, 1993; Canner 
and Cyrnak, 1985; Choi and DeVaney, 1995; Stiedle, 1994; Wasberg, Hira and Fanslow, 
1992). This suggests that households headed by younger individuals are more likely to 
use credit cards as a borrowing instrument than those headed by older individuals. 
3.3.1.2 Factors Affecting Usage 
Credit card usage and ownership are phenomenon usually associated with developed 
countries. Several studies have found that age, sex and marital status are significant 
determinants of credit card selection and usage (Kinsey, 1981; Slocum and Matthews, 
1970). Frank et al. (1965) found that occupation, education and income are generally 
accepted as being significant correlates of usage. Hirschman (1970) indicates that 
credit card possession and use is positively correlated with the anticipation and 
actualisation of further use. Mandel (1972) found that the primary determinants of 
credit card usage were family income and education. Higher income and better 
educated families were found to be more likely to use credit cards than low income 
families. Previous literature on credit cards has indicated that there is a close 
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relationship between credit card usage and the level of economic development in a 
country. 
In a cross-national study undertaken by Kaynak and Yucelt (1984), it was discovered 
that there were similar patterns between ownership and use in Canadian and the USA. 
While individuals in the USA tended to relay more on bank credit cards than Canadian 
individuals, the most -popular cards used in both countries, were found to be 
MasterCard, Visa and Sears. Credit cards were found to be used for purchasing goods 
and services as well as for identification purposes. The majority of respondents did not 
use*their credit cards to their maximum potential. 
Hawes (1988) established the demographic characteristics of cardholders, the type of 
cards which they posses, the frequency of usage as well as the main advantages and 
disadvantages of card ownership. Black and Morgan (1999) demonstrate that between 
1989 and 1996, the proportion of credit cards held by individual on low incomes, 
working in blue collar occupations and by those under the age of 25 have increased. 
The relationship between the financial and demographic characteristics of households 
and the number of credit card accounts which they maintained was examined by 
Kinsey (1981). Households with extremely high incomes were found to hold the largest 
number of credit cards. Other important characteristics, which significantly impact on 
the number of cards held by a household included place of residence, use of current 
and saving accounts and an individual's attitude to credit. 
Devlin, Worthington and Gerrard (2007) examine whether multiple credit cardholders 
have a "main" credit card and other "subsidiary" cards. The main card is the card 
which an individual uses in a frequent basis, while subsidiary cards are cards which are 
used on an infrequent basis or only in an emergency. 
3.3.2 Personal Bankruptcy 
The credit card industry has attracted a lot of attention from policymakers particularly 
as credit card borrowing has become the fastest growing component of the consumer 
4 loan market (Kerr, 2003). Therefore, more recent studies corroborate the view that the 
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size of credit card debt influences the probability of declaring bankruptcy and 
delinquency (Bertaut and Haliassos, 2006). However, researchers disagree on whether, 
and to what extent, credit card borrowing leads to bankruptcy (Starvins, 2000). Gross 
and Souleles (2002a) have examined the issue of credit card delinquency and personal 
bankruptcy. Gross and Souleles (2002a) examined why personal bankruptcy filing in 
the USA increased by around 75% during the period 1994 and 1997. They find two 
possible effects, the "risk effect" and the "demand effect". The "risk effect" occurs 
because the risk of borrowers may have deteriorated. For example, due to the 
increased availability of credit cards, cards are now available to individuals with no or 
extremely poor credit ratings. The "demand effect" is based on the social stigma which 
is associated with declaring bankruptcy. Thus, the rise in bankruptcy filing maybe 
explained by the decline in associated costs. 
Following a lull in credit card defaults in the early 1990s, default and personal 
bankruptcy began to increase sharply after 1995; and this phenomenon has become a 
serious issue for banks and policymakers (Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993). Ausubel 
(1997) and Starvins (1999) both find a strong correlation between credit card debt and 
personal bankruptcy filings. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) found that households with 
more credit card debt are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Ausubel (1997) also found 
that there is a strong correlation between credit card debt and bankruptcy. Gross and 
Souleles (2002b) found that accounts which are characterised by large balances or 
small repayments are more likely to default. Based on these empirical findings, credit 
card issuers are justified in regarding high balances as bad signals even after taking 
credit scores into account. 
Empirical results by Lopes (2008) reinforce the findings of Gross and Souleles (2002a). 
Lopes (2008) investigated credit card debt and default using a parameterised model of 
optimal consumption, which allows for borrowing and default. She states that there 
are a number of reasons for the observed increase in bankruptcy; these include macro 
factors, current bankruptcy laws and a decrease in the stigma associated with filing for 
bankruptcy. 
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Black and Morgan (1999) and Yoo (1998) focused on the alarming rise in credit card 
debt in the USA over the last two decades. These studies reveal that democratisation 
of credit was the principal factor in the growth of debt in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Furthermore, Black and Morgan (1999) have demonstrated that between 1989 and 
1995, the number of credit cards held by young people, individuals on low incomes 
and those working in blue-collar occupations in the US has significantly increased. They 
argue that these factors may explain the subsequent increase in credit card 
delinquency and the increase in the overall debt burden. 
Dunn and Kim (1999) examine credit card default using an ordered probit model. They 
find that the percentage of open credit line a consumer has used and the number of 
credit cards on which the individual has outstanding balances to; have a significant 
effect on the likelihood of default. Starvips (1996) found that defaulters had higher 
interest elasticities, and this could induce banks to keep their interest rates higher. 
Lehnen and Maki (2002) examine whether households are more likely to borrow than 
to save if they live in sates with higher bankruptcy exemptions 
3.3.3 Credit Cards and the Permanent Incomes Hypothesis 
Gross and Souleles (2002b) examine how increases in supply of credit impact on 
consumer borrowing behaviour. The permanent income hypothesis predicts that; if an 
individual receives an increase in the supply of credit, that is their credit limit 
increases, then they will not increase their demand for credit. However, if a consumer 
increases their credit card debt after they have received an increase in their borrowing 
limit, then it can be assumed that they have been liquidity constrained, and thus the 
predictions of the permanent income hypothesis are violated. 
Gross and Souleles (2002b) find that after one year, for every $1000 increase in 
available credit, borrowing increases by approximately $130. This result is highly 
significant and has been subjected to a variety of tests to ensure that causality runs 
from credit supply to credit demand, and not vice versa. Furthermore, the interest 
elasticity of debt is found to be highly significant. This finding suggests that a 1% 
increase in the interest rate results in a $110 deduction in debt. 
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Bertaut and Haliassos (2001) have shown that it is not optimal for a household to 
revolve debt on a credit card and at the same time possess liquid assets. Rational 
behaviour would imply that as long as the interest rate charged on outstanding 
balances exceeds the interest rate received by the individual on liquid assets, the 
individual should liquefy assets and pay-off outstanding balances. Hoch and 
Loewenstein (1991) modelled self-control as a conflict between the two psychological 
forces desire and willpower. They state that a self-control problem arises when there is 
a time lag between the consumption of a commodity and the payment for consuming 
it. Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2000), by incorporating hyperbolic discounting in 
their model, attempt to explain the coexistence of credit card borrowing and saving for 
retirement and conclude that the coexistence of illiquid asset accumulation and credit 
card debt is plausible. 
3.3.4 The Bank-Borrower Relationship 
Some banks have access only to publicly available credit histories, while others have 
access to additional information such as borrower's private financial accounts. Kerr 
(2002) investigates information asymmetries which occur between banks and 
borrowers. Kerr (2002) argues that, in equilibrium, the average rate of interest charged 
by an "external" bank would be higher than that charged by the "home" bank, because 
the borrower would be assumed by the external bank to be much riskier. Berger and 
Udell (1995) demonstrate that borrowers with longer relationships are rewarded with 
lower interest rates. 
3.4 The Pricing of the Network Interchange Fee 
While a significant amount of the existing credit card literature has focused on 
examining pricing strategies and consumer behaviour, another key element of the 
credit card literature is the determination of network interchange fees. In any card 
transaction, the institution which issued the card to the consumer is referred to as the 
issuer, while the bank which processes the transaction on behalf of the merchant is the 
acquirer. When these two banks differ, the acquirer must pay the issuer an 
interchange fee. Baxter (1983) concludes that the interchange fee is necessary to 
balance the demand of consumers and merchants for credit card services and costs 
among issuers and acquirers. He argues that the total demand for credit card services 
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is determined jointly by the demands of the consumers and merchants and total cost 
for credit cards services include both issuer and acquirer costs. 
Schmalensee (2002) analyses the issue of whether the credit card interchange fee 
should be considered as anti-competitive price fixing. Schmalensee (2002) model 
predicts that under most assumptions, the interchange fee actually maximises output 
in order to maximise the systems benefits to the banks (its owners). 
Rochet and Tirole (2002) provide a theoretical examination of interchange fees. This 
model finds that an increase in the interchange fee increases the consumers' use of 
credit cards, providing that the interchange fee does not rise above a certain level. 
Once the threshold is reached, merchants no longer have an incentive to accept credit 
cards as the cost to the merchant is equal or greater than the benefits to the 
consumer. 
The models of Schmalensee (2002) and Rochet and Tirole (2002) have been extended 
by Wright (2003) who examines the optimal interchange fee under a range of different 
assumptions. Wright (2003) concludes that the socially optimal interchange fee occur 
when the interchange fee equals the average transactions benefits obtained by the 
merchants that accept the credit cards. While this fee structure favours cardholders 
over merchants, this optimal fee structure does not distort retail prices. 
Frankel (1988) and more recently policymakers such as the Office of Fair Trading and 
the European Commission have argued that card associates, in particular Visa and 
MasterCard, have set interchange fees too high. This result on merchants paying too 
much for accepting card transactions, a cost which is ultimately passed on to 
customers who wish to pay with cash (Wright, 2003). 
3.5 Why Study the UK Credit Card Market? 
Consumer credit is central to the UK economy. For the majority of individuals in the 
UK, credit cards and other secured and unsecured lending provide people with greater 
control and flexibility when managing their finances, which benefits the economy as a 
whole (DTI, 2003). 
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The UK credit card industry consists of a large number of cards, which are usually 
issued under the international acceptance marquees of MasterCard or Visa. These 
cards are issued by a significant number of issuers, who independently set card terms. 
In addition, the card industry is not subjected to any notable regulation which may 
impede competition. Until the mid-1990s, card issuers mainly competed through 
annual-waivers and other enhancement features, such as loyalty schemes, while 
charging interest rates, which were significantly higher than their cost of funds (Park, 
2004). However, since the mid-1990s, many card issuers have begun to offer low 
introductory rates, but regular interest rates have not been substantially reduced. In 
January 1995, the average credit card rate was 22.2 percent, while the base rate was 
6.13 percent, while in May 2007; the corresponding average rate of interest on a credit 
card was 15.04 percent and the base rate 5.5 percent (Bank of England, 2009). 
The UK credit card market has attracted a significant amount of interest from 
policymakers and consumer bodies over the last decade. This increased interest is 
partly because of the strong growth the market has enjoyed and partly because of the 
aggressive behaviour of a number of new entrants. Interestingly, however 
academically, the UK credit card market has largely been ignored, with the majority of 
academic studies focusing on issues related to the US credit card market. While there 
are some similarities between the US and UK credit card markets, there are also some 
significant differences. 
US issuers tend to focus on price competition, whereas emphasis in the UK has 
traditionally been on non-price competition. A number of US issuers have entered into 
the market during the late 1990s and have undercut the prices of established UK 
issuers. Many of the academic studies related to the UK card market focus on product 
innovation. Particular interest has been in the development of affinity card products, 
for example, Worthington and Horne (1992,1993,1994 and 1998). With the exception 
of Heffernan (2002), there have been virtually no studies which focus on the pricing 
elements of credit cards. 
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3.5.1 Academic Significance of Investigating the UK Credit Card Market 
The majority of the research undertaken on credit card pricing has focused primarily 
on industry characteristics, with the annual fee being the only card characteristic to 
have been researched in any detail (for example, Ausubel, 1991; Stango 2002; 
Heffernan 2002). Credit card issuers can charge either a fixed or variable rate of 
interest, Stango (2000) investigated whether the pricing structure of credit cards 
impacts on the competitive structure of the market. Consumer characteristics, with 
respect to relationship lending, has been explored by Kerr, Cosslett and Dunn (2004). 
However, this paper fails to show the overall impact of consumer characteristics on 
pricing. 
In summary, there is a paucity of research examining the relationship between credit 
card prices and their characteristics. This empirical research will contribute to the 
existing literature by being the first empirical study to combine card, issuer and 
consumer characteristics, by uniquely including the annual fee, introductory offers, 
loyalty schemes, affinity, co-branding, payment networks, minimum monthly 
payments, default charges, interest-free period, charity donations, type of card 
provider, minimum age and minimum income. 
In addition, the majority of the previous research undertaken with respect to credit 
cards has focused on the phenomena of high and sticky interest rates which were 
prevalent throughout the 1980s. One area of study attributes this phenomenon to the 
failure of interest rate competition due to consumer insensitivity to the interest rate 
(Ausubel, 1991) and the lack of search (Calera and Mester, 1995). Britio and Hartley 
(1995), suggest that transaction costs associated with alternative forms of borrowing 
as an explanation as to why high interest rates were observed on credit cards. 
With the exception of Heffernan (2002), there are no existing studies which 
concentrate on the factors which influence and determine the price of credit cards. 
Thus a detailed investigation into the determinants of interest rates would help to fill 
in a gap in the existing knowledge which surrounds credit cards. 
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A significant number of studies such as de Haan and Sterken (2005,2006), Hassink and 
van Leuvesteijn (2003), Gary-Bobo and Larribeau (2002), Crawford and Rosenblatt 
(1999) and Gropp et al. (1997) have all successfully investigated the factors which 
influence the price of mortgages. It is envisaged that the research undertaken within 
the subsequent empirical chapters will enable the credit card literature to be 
expanded to match the type of detailed studies observed in the mortgage market. 
3.5.2 Practical Significance of Investigating the UK Credit Card Market 
The UK credit card market is highly contested, with consumers being able to choose 
from approximately 1500 different credit cards (House of Commons, 2002)23. Over the 
last five, the consumer credit industry has fallen under increased scrutiny over certain 
practices and issues related to pricing. This scrutiny can be very useful if the end 
product results in greater transparency, thus allowing consumers to compare and 
understand different credit card products with ease, and ultimately enables them to 
manage their money more efficiently. A report conducted in 2003, by the House of 
Commons Treasury Committee; concluded that consumers are unable to properly 
compare products adequately and that levels of competition in the credit card industry 
are sufficient. It could be argued that the credit card industry can be made more 
competitive by providing consumers with clearer information, enabling them to 
choose more efficiently between credit cards. It is already easier for consumers to 
compare credit cards as consumers are able to use comparison websites such as 
www. moneyfacts. co. uk, www. moneysupermarket. com, www. moneyexpert. com and 
www. comparethemarket. com. However, to enable credit card issuers to compete 
effectively with on price, it is important that consumers have reliable and clear 
information to enable them to compare the true cost of a range of credit card 
products. 
The development of "summary boxes", a code of banking practice overseen by the FSA 
and the standardisation of the calculation of annual percentage rates (APRs) on credit 
cards have, along with the tightening of the definition of the "typical" rate, has led to 
the UK credit card market becoming more transparent. Unfortunately, these reforms 
23 This estimate is for credit cards only and does not include alternative options such as charge cards and 
store cards. 
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have not been enough to enable consumers to make informed choices about the credit 
cards that they wish to apply for. Unless consumers understand the way in which 
interest rates are calculated on different credit cards, then they are unable to assess 
the true cost, even if the APR on offer is the same. 
Typically, consumers will use the APR to compare credit cards offered by different 
providers. A survey carried out by the OFT, found that "the APR is certainly the key 
item (consumers) look at when making comparisons. Even though they may not fully 
understand what this means, they know to look for a low figure. "24 An online survey 
undertaken in March 2007, by the consumer body "Which? " found that 51% of 
consumers believed that comparing the APRs of different credit cards was the best 
method of determining which is the cheapest card (Which?, 2007). Unfortunately, for 
the consumer the advertised APR does not reflect the way in which interest charges 
are supplied. 
3.5.3 Research Questions 
Based on the literature review presented above, it is apparent from the existing 
research that there are still many issues and puzzles which remain unresolved. For 
example, the issue of credit card interest rates has generated a large number of 
hypotheses, with very little convergence towards a commonly accepted conclusion. 
Given the complexities which are inherent with this product, the credit card market is 
an interesting and complex market to study. Schnolick et al., (2008) argue that; given 
the array of alternative explanations for credit card pricing, it is clear that further 
empirical research is required in order to provide a more robust understanding of 
credit card pricing. 
With the exception of Heffernan (2002), there have been virtually no studies 
conducted which specifically focus on the pricing elements of credit cards. Therefore, 
encouraged by the limited availability of literature in this area, the growing academic 
interest in the size and the dispersion of mark-ups amongst credit card providers, 
particularly in the USA as well as a general increase in worldwide policy issues, the first 
24 OFT, 2004, paragraph 1.11 
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issue to be addressed is the impact of different card characteristics on the overall 
"price" of a credit card. The value of attributes and characteristics are unobserved as 
they are not separately tradable in any market, only the overall price of the credit card, 
including the particular combinations of the attributes, is observed. 
From the literature review, it is apparent that there is a lack of studies focusing on 
competition in the UK credit card market. Therefore an objective of the research to be 
undertaken is to provide a comprehensive review of competition in the UK credit card 
market, by studying the issues from three distinct perspectives: price leadership, 
pricing asymmetries, and the long-run pass-through of capital market rates. Each of 
these measures will provide some insight into how credit card issuers in the UK set 
their prices. 
The second issue to be addressed is the issue of "pass-through". Official interest rate 
changes are intended to influence short rates on money market instruments and retail 
products. The pass-through from money market to bank interest rates has attracted 
particular attention in the light of increased competition in the banking sector over the 
past decade (Weth, 2002). Pass-through has been discussed, in particular, in the 
context of monetary policy since the transmission of market rates to bank retail rates 
is an important element in the monetary transmission process (Weth, 2002). Complete 
pass-through is often taken for granted; however, a common finding of the empirical 
literature is that changes in market conditions are not immediately passed on to retail 
interest rates. Paisley (1994) and Heffernan (1997) use conventional linear methods to 
investigate the relationship between official interest rates and retail rates in the UK; 
however these studies have found mixed evidence for pass-through and did not 
consider the credit card market. Mizen and Hoffman (2003) investigate base rate pass- 
through, using monthly data from the UK deposit and mortgage. In addition, the 
question of whether changes in credit card rates are asymmetric will be addressed. In 
other words, are cost increases passed through more quickly than cost decreased and 
do issuers adjust their interest rates upwards more quickly than they do downwards to 
reach equilibrium. 
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The final question to be addressed in this body of research is whether there is any 
evidence of price leadership, or whether some issuers systematically reach to 
movements in input costs more quickly than their rivals. 
3.6 Conclusion and Research Agenda 
This chapter provides a summary of the theoretical and empirical literature related to 
credit cards. Moreover it outlines the existing literature and any potential gaps in 
knowledge and understanding. A notable feature of the existing literature is that the 
majority of empirical studies focus on the credit card industry in the US. Therefore, a 
novel contribution of this research is that it focuses on the UK and provides a detailed 
study of the pricing arrangements of credit cards in the UK. However, the main 
conclusion of this survey is that while a large amount of research has been undertaken 
on credit cards there are still a great many issues and puzzles that remain to be 
resolved. 
The diverse fields of finance and economics form a basis for much of the research on 
credit cards. In the papers described above, the relevant economic sub-fields include 
financial economics, banking, macroeconomics, industrial organisation, regulatory 
economics, consumer behaviour, and network economics. This list illustrates the 
complexity of what seem like simple product to research, however in some case 
unresolved issues, such as pricing. A number of theoretical explanations have been put 
forward in the literature in an attempt to explain the pricing behaviour of credit card 
issuers. These explanations include; (1) adverse selection, (2) search costs, (3) 
switching costs, (4) rational consumers, (5) time inconsistency on the part of 
consumers, (6) fixed and variable interest rates, (7) tacit collusion, (8) the option value 
of card debt, and (9) risk and return. This list indicates that no single paradigm has 
emerged and that clearly there is significant potential for further research. 
Currently, the main constraint for additional research progress in the payment area is 
the availability of useful data. However it seems evident that researchers who have 
access to detailed data can make significant progress in furthering the understanding 
of credit cards. Of particular importance will be large and detailed datasets at either 
the individual consumer level or, alternatively, at the individual bank level. Two key 
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elements in much of the theoretical literature discussed above are decision making by 
individual consumers and decision making by individual banks. 
Thus to summarise, the aims of the research undertaken in subsequent in this work is 
to provide a comprehensive study of pricing and competition in the UK credit card 
market by: 
" Determining and quantifying the factors which influence the interest rate that 
credit card issuers charge consumers on outstanding balances (Chapter Four); 
" Revisiting the issue of switching costs and paying consumers to switch (Chapter 
Four); 
" Analysing how official changes in the base rate are passed on to retail credit card 
rates (Chapter Five); 
" Analysing issuer interaction within the market as a whole and within sub-markets 
of the sector (Chapter Five); 
" Determining and quantifying, if any of the top ten issuers in the market act as a 
price leader (Chapter Six). 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRICE DISPERSION: WHAT DETERMINES THE PRICE OF 
CREDIT CARDS IN THE UK? 
4.1 Introduction 
Plastic cards are an integral feature of the modern economy. In 2008, there was a total 
of 168.7 million cards in issue 
- 
66.1 million credit cards, 6.4 million charge cards, 76.3 
million debit cards, 19.4 million ATM-only cards and 0.4 million cheque guarantee 
cards (The UK Card Association, 2010). The UK is one of the most credit-card-intensive 
countries in the world; fifth only to the USA, Canada, Japan and Singapore, with 69.9 
million credit cards in circulation for a population of 59 million people (APACS, 2008). 
Furthermore, the UK credit card market accounts for about one third of all EU 
transactions (Cruickshank, 2002). As previously discussed in Chapter Three, the UK 
credit card market has dramatically changed over the last decade. At the beginning of 
the 1990s, the majority of credit cards offered interest rates in the region of 25 
percent. Increased competition from new entrants (e. g. US financial institutions, 
affiliated providers, supermarkets, and mutuals) has led to a reduction in interest rates 
and the introduction of differentiating product characteristics. Thus, providers can 
compete not only on price but also on product characteristics. Whilst the range of 
product characteristics improves the choice available to consumers, the price 
comparison of products with different characteristics is problematic for consumers 
who pay for a bundle of characteristics rather than individual characteristics. 
The majority of research on credit card pricing focuses on industry characteristics with 
the annual fee being the only card characteristic to receive significant attention (e. g. 
Ausubel, 1991; Stango, 2002, Heffernan, 2002). There is a shortage of research 
examining the relationship between credit card prices and their characteristics. Thus, 
this chapter aims to make a significant contribution to the literature on credit card 
pricing by considering a comprehensive range of card characteristics which have not 
been consider in any previous studies. The product characteristics under consideration 
include: annual fee, introductory offers, loyalty schemes, affinity, co-branding, 
payment network, minimum monthly payment, default charges, interest free period 
and charity donations. 
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The effects of product attributes/characteristics on price can be analysed under 
different pricing models. The value of attributes and characteristics are unobserved as 
they cannot be separately traded in any market. Only the overall price of a good, 
including the particular combinations of attributes, are observed. The analysis in this 
chapter draws on the hedonic price tradition of fitting statistical models to estimate 
the effects of credit card characteristics on the observed interest rate. Prices are 
examined from the supply-side perspective, under the assumption, that the credit card 
market operates monopolistically and that credit card issuers are able to differentiate 
their products. 
This chapter is organised in the following way. Section Two reviews existing pricing 
studies within the retail banking sector. This section indicates that there has been a 
lack of studies relating to the pricing of credit cards. Heffernan's (2002) model of credit 
card pricing is reviewed in detail in Section Three. Section Four introduces the hedonic 
methodology, which provides the foundations of the empirical models used in this 
chapter. Section Five builds a hedonic pricing model for investigating credit cards. The 
data is introduced in Section Six. Section Seven analyses the card, consumer and 
supplier attributes using OLS. Section Eight uses a nested multi-level model to 
investigate how particular credit card attributes can act as switching costs and whether 
credit card issuers use particular characteristics of the credit card to pay consumers to 
switch. Conclusions are drawn in Section Nine. 
4.2 A Review of Pricing Studies in the Retail Banking Sector 
Although there is a substantial amount of literature on credit cards, very little research 
has been undertaken to allow factors which influence the price which a cardholder 
pays on their outstanding balances to be fully understood. As discussed in chapter two, 
the majority of studies have focused on the factors which influence credit card 
adoption and usage, price competition and interchange fees. The aim of this section is 
to provide a brief insight into the existing literature which relates to how financial 
products are priced. 
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Heffernan (1993,2002) examines deposit rate, loan rate, mortgage rate and credit rate 
setting behaviour of individual banks and building societies using monthly panel 
data. 25,26 The results indicate an increase in competition in the mortgage market and 
low interest checking accounts, but indicate price discrimination behaviour exists in 
other product markets. Heffernan (1993,2002) suggest that the British retail banking 
sector is best described as being monopolistic with a high degree of imperfect 
information, particularly in the cases of unsecured loans and credit card rate setting. 
The Building Society Act, 1986, allowed British building societies to convert from 
mutual to plc bank status. 27 Heffernan (2005) compares the pricing behaviour of 
building societies and their counterparts who have chosen to convert to plc bank 
status. The purpose of this empirical study was to test the hypothesis that the price 
setting behaviour of converted and mutual financial institutions differ due to their 
respective managers having different maximisation objectives. The former chooses to 
maximise profits, while the latter chooses to maximise consumer utility. Deposit rates 
were found to be permanently lower while mortgage rates were higher, post- 
conversion. Converted mutuals were found to respond more quickly to changes in the 
market rate of interest. The remaining building societies offered proportionately more 
bargains than their counterparts who had converted to plc status. The majority of 
literature in this area however focuses on the expense behaviour and/or the relative 
performance of the two groups, mutuals and plc banks. 28 
Price-setting in the mortgage markets have been studied mainly from the demand 
perspective. These studies have found that lending rates are dispersed across 
households, due to differences in the value of collateral, risk and price discrimination 
(Gary-Bobo and Larribeau, 2002; Crawford and Rosenblatt, 1999; Gropp et al. 1997). 
The Dutch mortgage market has been investigated extensively investigated over the 
last decade (Hassink and van Leuvensteijn, 2003; de Haan and Sterken, 2005,2006). De 
Haan and Sterken (2006) using daily observations on advertised 5- and 10-year 
25 Credit cards were only included in the 2002 study. 
26 Heffernan's (2002) model of credit card pricing is replicated in section 4.3. 
27 Eight building societies converted from mutual to plc status during the period 1995-2000. 
28 Examples of work in this area include Valnek (1999), 
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mortgage interest rates for a sample of the four largest Dutch Banks. They examine 
competition in the Dutch mortgage market by analysing how the four banks respond 
to each other when setting their mortgage rates. 
De Haan and Sterken (2006) present three types of tests of pricing behaviour in Dutch 
mortgage market, using daily observations on 5- and 10- year mortgage interest rates 
as well as monthly observations on the quantities loans outstanding. Their sample 
consists of the four largest banks that have a combined market share of around 80 
percent. The three different models estimated are a VECM, an ordered probit and a 
structural conjectural variation model. De Haan and Sterken (2006) find that the first 
two tests indicate that one of the banks within the sample behaves like a price leader, 
while the third test indicates that all four banks set prices in a competitive manner, 
despite one of the banks being a price leader. 
In the UK deposit account market, while products remain predominately distributed 
through bank branches and other depository institutions, an increasing number of 
deposit accounts are being distributed remotely, either jointly or solely, through 
alternative remote distribution channels, such as the internet, post or telephone. 
Ashton (2002) examines pricing behaviour of depository institutions in the UK. 
Gondat-Larralde and Nier (2006,2004) analyses the competitive process in the UK 
market for personal current accounts. Examining the speed with which the distribution 
of market share changes in response to price differentials, they find that a positive 
relationship exists between market share and price. They argue that this indicates that 
switching costs are prevalent in the personal loan market. This study builds directly on 
the work of Heffernan (2002), who analyses the pricing behaviour of British banks in 
UK retail markets, while distinguishing between different types of imperfect 
competition. 
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4.3 Heffernan's Model of Credit Card Pricing 
Using a generalized pricing model, Heffernan (2002) analysed the pricing behaviour of 
UK financial firms offering credit card products, covering the period 1993-1999.29 
Heffernan's study included all financial institutions offering Visa and/or MasterCard to 
their clients. The "price" of the credit card is the interest rate charged on outstanding 
balances at the end of each month. Heffernan acknowledges in her study that a small 
number of credit card issuer charge annual fees and she incorporates this into her 
model. 
To enable the degree of competition in the bank market to be tested, a benchmark for 
a perfectly competitive rate is required. Heffernan (2002) chooses the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). LIBOR is the rate which banks quote each other for 
overnight deposits and loans. LIBOR represents the opportunity cost of all of a bank's 
assets; for a bank that aims to maximise expected profit, it is the basis for determining 
the marginal revenue for all assets, and the marginal cost of all liabilities. LIBOR is an 
international rate, to which all banks have access to, thus represents a perfectly 
competitive rate of interest. 
4.3.1 Heffernan's Model 
Using a generalised pricing model, Heffernan is able to test for the degree of 
competition in the credit card market, differences in behaviour amongst individual 
firms, and for differences in behaviour amongst individual card issuers and for the type 
of imperfect competition prevalent in the credit card market. Heffernan's generalised 
pricing model is specified as: 
RI 
=ao+ýßJLibor, 
_J+yt+8, 
D, +0, ++s (4.1) 
where Rl; t is the credit card annual percentage rate charged by firm i at time t, j= 
0,1,2,3 the monthly lags used on LIBOR, fit is the fee for credit cards charged by firm i at 
time t, n the number of firms offering the product, yt the time trend and D; the dummy 
29 In addition to credit cards, Heffernan also analyses the pricing behaviour of UK financial firms offering 
savings accounts, high interest cheque accounts, mortgages and personal loans, however these products 
are not interest in the context of this research. 
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variable for each financial firm i; unity for firm i; 0 otherwise. Heffernan estimates this 
equation using ordinary least squares. 
The variable n allows a test for Cournot behaviour, which is present if the coefficient 
on credit card issuers is significantly negative. The dummy variable for each firm allows 
a direct test of Salop and Stiglitz's (1977) theoretical model of monopolistic 
competition with bargains and rip-offs. In the model specified by Heffernan, consumer 
inertia, incomplete information, or a fall in fixed costs will attract more firms, and as a 
consequence greater competition will be generated. When there are a large number of 
players in a market, firms are able to offer relatively good or bad buys to the 
consumer. 
In the Salop-Stigitz model, consumers face unanticipated costs. While some consumers 
know the distribution of prices, others do not. Thus, the former will only choose 
bargains, while the latter will buy randomly. A firm is able to survive by charging either 
a low price, hence a bargain, or a high price, thus being a rip-off. Firms, which offer 
rip-offs, are able to stay in business as long as inert consumers continue to make 
purchases. Firms which offer bargains will profit from a higher volume of sales, as well- 
informed customers will purchases these relatively cheaper products. As relative 
bargains and rip-offs are able to co-exist within the marketplace, a twin peak price 
distribution will be observed. 
In retail banking, some consumers are well informed, while others are not; therefore it 
is possible to test the Salop-Stiglitz theory of monopolistic competition. The dummy 
variable captures the competitive behaviour of each of the individual firms, relative to 
the default bank. The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) is chosen by Heffernan as the 
benchmark to which the competitive behaviour of other firms is compared against. 
Heffernan choose RBS as the default bank as it enables her to examine the pricing 
behaviour of both the top four banks and new entrants into the market. Thus, a 
negative coefficient on the firm issuing the credit card indicates that issuer is offering a 
bargain or good buy relative to the default issuer. A positive coefficient confirms the 
presence of a relative rip-off or bad buy. 
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4.3.2 Heffernan's Findings 
Heffernan's findings are presented in Table 4.1. The adjusted R2 for the model is 0.831, 
suggesting that the overall model is a good fit. The trend coefficient is significant and 
negative, which suggests that credit card rates are declining through the estimation 
period, 1993-1999. The constant term is significant and the coefficient is large and 
positive, which indicates substantial smoothing with discrete price mark-ups. 
It takes three months for credit card rates to respond to changes in the LIBOR. Credit 
card rates are found to respond to 75% of the LIBOR change in the first three months. 
Heffernan concludes that, together with the large mark-up shown by the constant 
term, that credit card products have large spreads and respond to changes in the 
competitive market rate of interest extremely slowly. 
The firm coefficient is negative and significant; this suggests that as the number of 
firms' increases, the APR declines. This suggests the presence of a Cournot model of 
oligopoly. 
Table 4.1: Heffernan's Findings 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 19.516 43.89 
TREND 
-0.011 -2.15 
FIRM 
-0.143 -5.40 
FEE 0.166 10.09 
LIBOR t 
- - 
LIBOR t-1 
- - 
LIBOR t-2 
- - 
LIBOR t-3 0.715 11.15 
R 0.831 
Heteroskedasticity 34.49 
Source: Heffernan, S. A., 2002, "How do UK Financial Institutions Really Price their Banking Products? ", 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 26,1997-2016 
Notes: This table only shows the key variables, for more detailed results see Heffernan, S. A., 2000. 
"Competition in British Retail Banking, 1993-1999. " Department of Banking and Finance Working Paper: 
City University Business School 
Values in bold are significant at the 5 percent significance level 
The coefficient on FEE was found to be strongly significant and positive. As the annual 
fee rises, so does the credit card rate charged. Heffernan argues that financial firms 
charging annual fees are engaging in price discrimination, as other credit cards are 
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available with similar features without the annual fee. This finding suggests that there 
is a lack of competition in the credit card market. Credit card issuers who are charging 
an annual fee to cardholders, are unquestionably selling rip-offs in during the period 
investigated. 
4.3.2.1 Relative Bargains and Rip-offs 
To investigate the relative bargain/rip-off model, Heffernan ranks the financial 
institutions according to their relatively good and bad bargains. The significant t-ratios 
testify to the persistence of a financial institution's position over time. Four out of the 
27 sampled firms have insignificant t-ratios, 19 firms offer relative bargains while four 
firms are classed as bad buys. Table 4.2 shows a large dispersion of bargains and rip- 
offs relative to the Royal Bank of Scotland, which is the default bank. Heffernan finds 
that there is a difference of 16.5% between the relative worst and best buy in the 
credit card market. She finds Standard Charter to be the worst buy, charging 9.1% 
more than RBS and the best buy, Save and Proper to be 7.4% cheaper. These results 
clearly show that the majority of consumers are getting a bargain relative to the 
default bank; however those who are choosing a relative rip-off are pay dearly for this 
choice 
Table 4.2: Heffernan's Findings 
- 
Bargains and Rip-Offs 
Top Five "Best Buys" Top Five "Worst Buys" 
Firm Deviation from Default 
Provider 
Firm Deviation from Default 
Provider 
Robert Fleming S&P 
-7.4 Standard Charter 9.1 
Coutts 
-7.0 Capital 4.2 
Frizzell 
-5.9 Allied Irish 3.51 
People's Bank 
-4.6 Yorkshire 2.23 
Nationwide 
-3.6 Beneficial 0.82 
SOURCE: Heffernan, S. A., 2002, "How do UK Financial Institutions Really Price their Banking Products? ", 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 26: 1997-2016 
The majority of credit card issuers, charge different risk premiums, depending on the 
type of customer; this may partially explain why such a large margin exists between 
the relative good and bad buys in the credit card market. New entrants into the UK 
credit card market have in the main priced below traditional issuers, which has been 
supported by Heffernan's findings. If this was the only explanation for the large 
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margins experienced in the credit card market, then new entrants would be expected 
to charge higher rates of interest than has been observed. This is because riskier 
borrowers, who have been refused credit by traditional issuers, would be attracted to 
these issuers. Evidence from both the credit card market and Heffernan's paper 
demonstrates that this is not the case. 
4.3.2.2 Competition in the Credit Card Market 
Heffernan concludes that the Salop-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition with 
bargains and rip-offs best describes the UK credit card market. In addition the credit 
card market appears to display Cournot like behaviour that is as the number of 
entrant's increases, the interest rate falls. 
4.3.4 Heffernan's Model Revisited 
The work undertaken by Heffernan in 2002, analysed competition and price setting in 
the credit card market between 1993 and 1999. Heffernan's model is re-estimated 
over the period 1992-2007. Competition and pricing is analysed at both the provider 
and card level, as well as on a year by year basis at the firm level, to investigate 
whether pricing and competition has evolved. As the empirical results are extremely 
similar to that of Heffernan, the results are not presented here but instead can be 
found in Appendix A which accompanies this chapter. A summary of the findings are 
presented below. What is clear from this simple study is that as the UK credit card 
market has become more competitive, as well as new products being developed and 
the overall price of a credit card declining, interest rates have become more dispersed. 
4.3.5 Summary 
In summary, this simple analysis provides an insight into the type of competition in the 
UK credit card market. What is clear from the analysis undertaken by Heffernan and 
the empirical results presented in Appendix A is that no two credit cards are identical 
and that price dispersion is a prominent feature of the UK credit card market. Credit 
cards are characterised by different features. It is therefore important that the actual 
features of credit cards are analysed. It is impossible for an individual to make an 
informed decision based on whether a card is a good or bad buy, instead they need to 
take into account their own needs and circumstances. 
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Whilst the range of product characteristics improves the choice available to 
consumers, the price comparison of products with different characteristics is 
problematic for consumers that pay for a bundle of characteristics rather than 
individual characteristics. Indeed, there is concern from the UK Office of Fair Trading 
that the increased number of product characteristics makes it hard for consumers to 
make informed choices and to understand the relationship between product 
characteristics and pricing. 30 This concern might explain the UK Department for Trade 
and Industry's finding that consumers could save £1.9bn a year in interest payments by 
switching to cheaper credit cards (DTI, 2003). It is therefore important to understand 
the relationship between individual credit card characteristics and the price of those 
characteristics, which is the central purpose of the analysis in this chapter. 
4.4 Hedonic Price Theory 
Hedonic pricing models provide an empirical summary of the relationship between the 
price and the attributes of products sold within a differentiated product market. 
Hedonic pricing models can be traced back approximately 80 years ago to the papers 
of Waugh (1928,1929). Beginning with a study on quality-adjusted prices for 
automobiles, Zvi Grilliches (1961) was able to revive interest in the hedonic pricing 
technique. Since then, this technique has been applied to a multitude of products, with 
computers being the most prominent and arguably the most studied products. 
Hedonic pricing can be summarised as follows: it assumes that each product is made 
up of a multitude of definable characteristics, for each characteristic a price can be 
estimated and quality changes in a product can be viewed as adding a new 
characteristic to the product. The resulting price change can then be divided between 
the change resulting from adding the better quality characteristic and from a more 
general price increase (decrease). As such, a quality-adjusted or "pure" price can be 
calculated. 
30 John Fingleton, Chief Executive, Office of Fair Trading. http: //www. oft. gov. uk/news/press/2007/91-07 
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There are two fundamental approaches in the literature to understand the 
characteristics of price. One tradition relates price to a consumer's willingness to pay 
for a particular characteristic. This utility-based interpretation is reflected in the use of 
the term "hedonic" to portray this approach. This view was adopted by Court (1928) 
and other early practitioners. Lancaster (1966) proposed a theory of consumer utility 
based on characteristics rather than goods. The rather restrictive conditions under 
which the hedonic function can be derived from an underlying utility function have 
been described by Diewert (2001). 
The second approach and the generally accept paradigm of the hedonic approach was 
developed in 1974 by Sherwin Rosen. Rosen (1974) related the hedonic function to the 
supply and demand for individual characteristics. This view has been advanced by a 
number of authors including Triplett (1983), Epple (1987), Feenstra (1996) and Pakes 
(2002). 
4.4.1 Theoretical Background of Hedonic Pricing Models 
The foundations of hedonic pricing theory is built on the hypothesis that a good or 
service is characterised by the set of all of its attributes/characteristics. For any given 
good, let the set of characteristics be ordered and denoted by x=(xi, 
... , 
x, j. It is 
assumed that the preference of the economic actors with respect to any good is solely 
determined by its corresponding characteristics vector. 
In addition, it is assumed that, for any good, a functional relationship f exists between 
the price p of the good and the characteristics vector x, in other words: 
P=f(x) (4.2) 
It is the function specified by equation (4.2) which defines the basic hedonic regression 
model or hedonic relationship for any given good or service. The idea of hedonic 
regression stems back to Lancaster (1966) and was advanced by Rosen (1974). 
However, the structure of the relationship between prices and characteristics depends 
on the appropriate equilibrium assumptions. Following, Pakes (2003), let (x;, p; ) 
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denote the characteristics and the price of good i and (x j, p 
-j) denote the 
characteristics and prices of the other market goods, the demand schedule for good i 
is: 
Dt(") = D(xi, Pt, xj, Pp, A) (4.3) 
Where A indexes the distribution of consumer attributes which determines consumers' 
preferences over characteristics. 
If all firms are single product firms and marginal costs are given by mc("), then prices 
are defined as: 
Pr = mc(") + °i(") laoilapl' (4.4) 
The second term of equation (4.4) is the mark-up which varies inversely with the 
elasticity of demand at this point. The hedonic function, h(x), is the expectation of 
price conditional product characteristics, thus using equation (4.4): 
h(x1) = E[piIxi) = E(mc(")Ix1)+ llaoi()/aplýx`ý (4.5) 
here the expectation integrates over randomness in the process which generates the 
characteristics of competing products, input prices and productivity. 
The hedonic function is simply the expectation of marginal costs plus a mark-up 
conditional on "own-product" characteristics. Furthermore, since marginal cost 
depends on the price of purchased inputs, are conditional expectations, which will 
depend on the expected mark-up of input prices. From equation (4.5) it can be seen 
that mark-ups are a complex function of the characteristics of competing product, the 
distribution of consumer preferences. The model can be extended to include multi- 
product firms. If the model is extended to include multiple product firms then the 
mark-up will also include ownership structure. Thus, if the mark-up in the product of 
interest is significant then it should be expected that the hedonic function will change 
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when the number, the characteristics, or ownership pattern of competing products (or 
inputs) change. 
4.4.2 Advantages and Limitations 
The hedonic approach has many merits. Its main advantage is that the approach 
requires the researcher to have access only to certain information, such as the price, 
the composition of attributes, and a proper specification of functional relationships. 
The hedonic method allows a large number of characteristics to be included in a 
transparent manner. The hedonic pricing model can be used to estimate values based 
on actual choices. 31 Hedonic pricing theory implies that an attribute should be included 
in the analysis if it influences consumer and producer behaviour (Hulten, 2002). The 
theory implicitly implies that consumers and producers have the same "list" of 
attributes; however this is not always the case (Pakes, 2003). 
Rosen (1974) acknowledges that there is an identification problem for supply and 
demand functions which have been derived from hedonic price functions, as implicit 
prices are equilibrium prices which have been jointly determined by supply and 
demand conditions. Therefore, implicit prices not only reflect consumer preferences, 
but also determine factors of production. Solving this identification problem requires 
the supply and demand conditions to be separated. Arguea and Hsiao (1993) argue 
that the identification problem is effectively a data issue that can be avoided by 
pooling cross-sectional and time series data specific to a particular side of the market 
in question. However, according to Freeman (1992), the equilibrium assumption 
implies that an implicit process may be specified without separately modelling supply 
conditions. 
4.4.3 Extensions to Hedonic Pricing Theory 
According to Rosen (1974), in a perfectly competitive market in which all consumers 
and producers have complete information about product quality and price, it must 
follow that if two brands with identical combinations of attributes/product features 
exist within the same market, then they must be priced identically. However, this 
31 The literature on the hedonic method, as well as limitations and advantages of the method are 
summarised in Palmquist (1991). 
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assumption of perfect competition has been relaxed to include buyer characteristics 
(Lucas, 1997) and firm effects (Berndt et al., 1995). Some studies such as Robust (2002) 
have relaxed the assumption of perfect competition to include both buyer and firm 
characteristics simultaneously. Palmquist (1989) extended the basic hedonic pricing 
model to incorporate differentiated factors of production, such as labour and land. 
Bresnahan (1981,1987) extended the basic framework proposed by Rosen (1974) to 
allow for price-making behaviour on the part of firms, thus showing how the model 
could be used to study the characteristics of industry competition. 
Delgardo and Waterson (2002) extended the basic hedonic model to include 
organisational characteristics. By developing a hedonic model to investigate price 
dispersion in the UK tyre market, they discovered that chains owned by manufacturers 
sold tyres of other manufacturers on average at price 20 percent higher than that 
charged by an independent firm and 11 percent higher than their own branded 
products. 
Shapiro (1983) presented a theoretical framework to examine the impact of reputation 
on price. He developed an equilibrium price-quality schedule for high quality products 
in perfectly competitive markets, however consumer information is imperfect. Shapiro 
(1983) is able to demonstrate that reputation allows producers to retail their high 
quality items above the cost of production. This premium can be construed as the 
payback for the producer's investment in reputation. On the demand side of this 
market, consumers are assumed to face information costs. Although an improvement 
in market transparency will lead to increased consumer welfare, perfect information is 
shown not to be optimal as long as information is costly to obtain. The concept of 
reputation as a quality indicator is only realistic in a market with imperfect 
information. Reputation effects have been included in hedonic price models for wine 
(Landon and Smith, 1997,1998). 
4.4.4 Estimation Issues 
A major empirical concern relating to hedonic pricing models is the choice of 
functional form. There are several basic functional forms which a researcher can adopt 
such as linear, semi-log, and log-log forms. Bloomquist and Worley (1981) and 
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Goodman (1978) argue that an incorrect choice of functional form can lead to 
inconsistent coefficient estimates. The theory of hedonic pricing provides little 
guidance on the choice of functional form (Halvorsen and Pollakowski, 1981; Butler, 
1982). Halstead et al. (1997) argue that the misspecification of the equation's 
functional form may result in over- or under-estimation. 
A second issue which is frequently associated with hedonic pricing models is the 
misspecification of variables. Misspecification occurs when an irrelevant independent 
variable is included (over-specification), or where a relevant independent variable is 
omitted (under-specification). As hedonic pricing models deal with the implicit prices 
of characteristics of a product, the problem of misspecification of variables is 
inevitable. An over-specified model will provide estimates which are both unbiased 
and consistent, but inefficient because of the inclusion of variables which are 
irrelevant. In comparison, an under-specified model will result in estimated 
coefficients which are both biased and inconsistent. Butler (1982) states as all 
estimated hedonic pricing models are to some extent misspecified, it is generally 
sufficient to estimate models which contain a small number of key variables. It is 
suggested by Butler (1982) that only attributes which are costly to produce and yield 
utility should be considered in the regression equation. 
Many of the problems with hedonic pricing models, such as issues surrounding 
misspecification and functional form, are generic to many econometric applications 
and can be addressed by employing alternative econometric techniques. In a recent 
paper by Ariel Pakes (2003), it was suggested that a number of the associated 
problems were not really problems at all. 
4.4.5 Interpreting Coefficients 
The regression coefficients value the characteristics as they indicate the prices charged 
and paid for an increment of one unit of attribute A, attribute B and so on. Implicit 
prices are much like other prices, in the way in which they are influenced by supply 
and demand. In the standard interpretation of hedonic functions, as proposed by 
Rosen (1974), the price of each characteristic is equal to its marginal cost. Pakes (2003) 
observes that this interpretation assumes that producers have no market power over 
99 
the package of characteristics that they offer and argues that this is a poor assumption 
to impose in a world of product differentiation. 
However, it is wise to engage caution when interpreting the results obtained from 
hedonic regression models, as the estimated coefficients reflect various factors which 
can influence prices. The standard hedonic pricing equation, as outlined by Rosen 
(1972) is a reduced form equation in which attribute coefficients can be interpreted 
under competitive conditions as the marginal cost. According to Pakes (2003), a 
hedonic function is always driven by marginal cost as well as mark-up. Mark-ups are 
thus a complex function of the characteristics of competing products, the distribution 
of consumer preferences and in the case of multi-product firms, the structure of 
ownership (Häring, 2003; Pakes 2003). Pakes (2003) argues that the associated with 
any characteristic may be negative, simply because the price of a product can go down 
when more of that characteristic is obtained. 
4.4.6 The Residuals 
Residuals from hedonic regression models have not only a statistical interpretation but 
also an economic one (Triplett, 2004). If the prices are transaction prices, then 
negative residuals will indicate that a particular product is a "bargain" or a "good buy". 
A bargain is a product which costs less than expected given the quantities of the 
characteristics of the product. Conversely, positive residuals indicate that a product is 
a "rip-off" or a "bad buy" as the price of this product is considered to be expensive 
given the composite of characteristics. 
Griliches (1961) argued that if the hedonic function is correctly specified, then the 
residuals should predict changes in market share. Bargains or good buys should 
experience increases in market share at the expense of bad buys. Cowling and Cubbin 
(1971) explored this suggestion for the UK car market, while Waugh (1928) analysed 
the residuals from his hedonic function for vegetables. It is possible for "good buys" to 
exist alongside overpriced products because consumers are not perfectly efficient 
shoppers. 
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4.4.7 Summary 
Given the well established literature on hedonic regressions (e. g. Oczkowski, 2001; 
Harchaoui and Hamdad, 2000; Combris et al., 1997; Arguea and Hsiao, 1994) and the 
extension of this literature to include firm characteristics (Berndt et al., 1995), buyer 
characteristics (Lucas, 1977), production and organisational characteristics (Delgardo 
and Waterson, 2003), there is clear scope for further analysis of the determinants of 
product pricing and the impact of completion and deregulation on the behaviour of 
firms providing financial products 
4.5 An Application to the UK Credit Card Market 
In this section, a simple theoretical model for the credit card market is developed. A 
credit card offered by issuer, 1, can be regarded as a set of attributes, which may 
consist of services (such as balance transfers, credit card cheques), characteristics (the 
type of credit card, the relationship between the card issuer and provider, etc) or 
customer requirements (minimum age, minimum income, etc): 
li= (XiL X12, X, 3, 
... , 
Xik, 
.... 
Xim) (4.6) 
Where i=1,2, 
... ,n represents the credit card and xik (k = 1, ... , m) each of its 
attributes. According to hedonic price theory, the relationship between the price of 
the ith credit card and its characteristics can be expressed as: 
Pi =P(x; L X12, Xr3,..., Xik,.... Xim) (4.7) 
Where the functional form of P is assumed to be constant in time and across credit 
cards, though the weight or contribution of each attribute may change. By calculating 
the partial derivative of this equation with each card characteristic variable, it is 
possible to obtain the corresponding implicit price of each characteristic. Thus: 
Px, (Xtl ý X12 l Xi3 ,.. -Xik 9 ... q xim) 
(4.8) 
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The partial derivative indicates that the marginal increase of the price of the credit 
card is due to the marginal increase in attribute x;. In market equilibrium the marginal 
implicit price of an attribute is equal to the marginal willingness to pay for this 
characteristic and therefore the implicit price function is tangential to the individuals' 
willingness to pay. The hedonic price function reflects consumer preferences on the 
one hand and marginal costs of producers on the other. 
The application of the hedonic pricing model to the credit card market rests on several 
key assumptions. First, heterogeneity of the credit card market is assumed (Zywicki, 
2000; Ausubel, 1991). A second assumption underpinning the model outlined above, 
is that the credit card market is monopolistic. 
As discussed previously, Rosen (1974) estimated hedonic pricing models to examine 
how product attributes affect price in a perfectly competitive market. The assumption 
of perfect competition has been relaxed to include buyer characteristics (Lucas, 1977) 
and firm effects (Berndt et al., 1995). Hence, the assumption of perfect competition is 
relaxed and the empirical model outlined in this chapter incorporates buyer 
characteristics such as age, income and employment status. It is also recognised that 
firm effects may also be important determinants of price due to market power or 
brand recognition. 
This approach can be justified on the basis of previous research undertaken by 
Heffernan (1993) and (2002), which examined competition in the UK retail bank sector 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Heffernan (2002) examines the deposit rate, loan rate, 
mortgage rate and credit card rate setting behaviour of individual banks and building 
societies, from econometric models of interest rate equations using monthly panel 
data. The results indicate that credit card rate setting in the UK takes place in highly 
monopolistic markets based on imperfect information. As previously mentioned, 
Heffernan (2002) is the only study which empirically investigates price dispersion 
among credit card issuers. She is unable to demonstrate that this dispersion is caused 
by differences in the underlying characteristics of the borrowers; however, as she uses 
firm level data. Heffernan (2002) fails to consider firm, buyer and relationship 
attributes concentrating on market attributes such as the cost of funds and number of 
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competitors. She does however include one card attribute, the annual fee. These 
various aspects of credit card attributes are discussed further in the next sections. 
4.5.1 Credit Card Attributes/ Product Characteristics 
Originally many banks charged an annual fee as well as levying interest on the balance 
outstanding on the account. Competition has forced the majority of banks to drop the 
annual fee and only to apply charges to cards which have very low usage. There is a 
very small number of cards contained in this sample who still charge an annual fee. 32 
Credit cards can be issued under the card acceptance marquees of American Express, 
MasterCard or Visa. These are global companies who manage credit cards, co-ordinate 
payment systems and keep track of transactions. Within the UK credit card market 
there are numerous suppliers offering MasterCard or Visa credit cards, although a 
small number of American Express credit cards are now available. 
Credit card suppliers typically offer at least three different credit card types: usually 
standard (classic), gold and platinum. A small number of suppliers offer student cards, 
which are aimed at individuals aged between 18 and 21 who attend university. 
Standard credit cards are usually available to any individual over 18 subject to the 
application being accepted. In addition to the offer of standard cards, most issuers 
offer premium cards, which usually offer higher credit limits and lower interest rates. 
Many cards offer additional benefits such as travel insurance, product guarantees and 
preferential loan rates. Credit card companies offer premium cards to individuals who 
are considered to be better credit risks. Therefore to qualify for premium cards 
applicants must meet the higher age and minimum income requirements. Gold and 
platinum cards were the original premium cards; however they have now become 
more common and easier to apply for as minimum age and income requirements have 
decreased. The more exclusive cards tend to have annual fees attached to them. Black 
32 It was announced on 13th November 2006, that many credit cards are considering reintroducing 
annual fees on their credit cards. The average revenue per card has halved over the last five years and 
the clamp down on default charges by the OFT has undermined profits. It has been predicted by 
Pricewaterhouse Cooper that card issuers will seek ways to recover £ibn a year. It is argued that card 
issuers will have to levy annual fees costing the average credit card user £35 a year to recover the 
potential £1bn loss. If lenders attempt to recoup losses through interest rates alone, it is predicted that 
APRs would increase on average by 2 percentage points. 
(Source: http: //www. thisismoney. co. uk/creditanloans/article. html? in_article_id=414603&in_page_id=9) 
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credit cards are the ultimate premium card, however application is usually through 
invitation only, therefore obtaining data on these types of card is extremely difficult 
and hence they are not represented in the data set. 
Customer loyalty which was originally ensured by an annual fee and a revolving 
balance built through years or months of purchases, can now be easily captured by 
competitors with no-fee, low-rate offer to transfer balances. Card issuers have had to 
develop new ways of maintaining consumer loyalty through reward schemes such as 
discounts on selected products or point schemers. Often credit cards issuers provide 
benefits such as free travel insurance and holiday discounts to encourage cardholders 
to use their card. However, card issuers have struggled to maintain customer loyalty 
through reward programs, affinity/co-branded relationships and enhanced customer 
services (Furletti, 2003). 
4.5.2 Relationships between Card Issuers and Other Organisations 
The affinity credit card is a credit card offered by a financial institution to members or 
supporters of specific organisations, such as football clubs, political parties and 
charities. Originally, the organisations, know as affinity partners, on whose behalf the 
card was to be issued on, could be classified by the three Cs of causes, charities and 
clubs (Worthington, 2001). Affinity cards which traditionally fit into these categories 
include the Labour Party (Co-operative Bank), Cancer Research UK (Halifax) and 
Chelsea Football Club (MBNA). 33 Recently, the explosion of affinity cards has produced 
examples of "affinities" which are not based on the support or membership of one of 
the three Cs defined previously, but instead is based on loosely defined affiliations 
whose image are portrayed by the card's name and design (Worthington, 2001). There 
are many examples of loosely defined affinity cards in the UK; examples include the 
Classical Arts card (MBNA), aimed at individuals who have an appreciation of the arts, 
the Mini card (Amex) for those who drive a mini, and the Garfield card (MBNA) for fans 
of the cartoon character. 
The key distinction between affinity cards and generic cards is that on the take up of 
the card by the member or supporter of the affinity organisation, a payment is made 
33 Credit card issuer/merchant acquirer is denoted in bracket. 
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by the card issuer, to the affinity partner. The majority of affinity card agreements 
include both an initial donation by the card issuer and an ongoing turnover-related 
payment; this is usually a small percentage of the total spent on the card 
(Worthington, 2001; Varadarajan and Menon, 1988). For example, the Halifax bank 
issues an affinity card on behalf of the NSPCC, an initial donation of £20 is made and 
subsequently 25p is donated for every £100 spent or transferred on to the card. This 
suggests that affinity cards are more expensive than other types of cards such as co- 
branded cards and issuer own brand cards. Credit card issuers claim that money is 
donated to charity at no extra cost to the cardholder. 
Co-branded cards represent a partnership between a credit card issuer and a 
commercial organisation, such as an airline or a retailer (Worthington, 2001). In this 
situation two different organisations join together to issue a co-branded card, the 
brand of the commercial partner will feature on the card and the brand of acceptance. 
MasterCard has been more willing than Visa, to encourage members to co-brand, this 
has enabled MasterCard to regain market share, as these co-branded cards are often 
very attractive to cardholders. This is because instead of the usage incentive going to 
the an affinity partner in the form of donations, the usage incentive connected with 
co-branded cards, is returned to the cardholder, in the form of discounts on the goods 
and services offered by the co-brand partner. For example, Sainsbury's Bank and the 
Halifax issue a co-branded credit card; the cardholder is rewarded for using the card 
with discount vouchers that can be used at any Sainsbury's store in the UK. 
4.5.3 Buyer Characteristics 
When an individual applies for a credit card they must meet the requirements outlined 
by the card provider. These requirements are defined as buyer characteristics. Buyer 
characteristics include employment status, age, income level and citizenship. The 
available data allows the minimum requirements of applicants for a particular card to 
be included, although individual applicant characteristics are not available. 
Credit card issuers can suffer large losses when cardholders do not pay back the 
borrowed money as agreed. Cardholder's credit risk is crucial in determining the card 
issuer's profitability. Conventional credit scoring systems use borrowers' personal 
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characteristics to determine the risk of default. These characteristics include age, 
occupation, place of residence, declared income and credit history (Allen, DeLong and 
Saunders, 2004). Interest rates are expected to be lower on credit cards which have 
higher age and income requirements. 
4.5.4 Firm Effects 
Within the credit card market, mutual and stock organisations coexist and compete for 
the same customers. Fama and Jensen (1983a, b) describe the different incentive 
structures within mutual and stock organisations, which originate from the different 
residual claims issued by each type of organisation. 
Building societies are mutual organisations rather than public limited companies (plc). 
This means that they are owned and operated for the benefits of their members, 
therefore any profit is returned to members through cheaper loans, better returns on 
their savings and better service. Typically there are two types of society members 
investing members and borrowing members. Investing members are individuals who 
hold a current or savings account, while borrowing members are individuals who have 
a society mortgage. It is possible for individuals to be both investing and borrowing 
members at the same time. Since the introduction of the Building Societies Act 1986, 
building societies have been offering a wider range of financial products such as 
personal loans, credit cards and insurance products, however these products do not 
carry membership rights. 34 As credit cards issued by building societies do not entire the 
holder to be a member of the building society is possible that building societies will 
choose to charge a higher price for these products and thus use the income to 
subsidise member products such as mortgages and saving accounts. 
New entrants are threatening existing banks by offering customers better price and 
greater choices. Typically new entrants target the most profitable segments of 
customers in the most lucrative product ranges (Boss et al., 2000). New entrants over 
the last decade include issuers from the US, internet banks and supermarket banks. 
34 The Nationwide Building Society <http: //www. nationwide. co. uk> 
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The internet has not only allowed banks to serve existing customers more cheaply and 
conveniently, but also acquire new customers in previously unreachable markets (Li, 
2002). The internet has lowered barriers to entry in the banking industry, enabling new 
players, who are often equipped with new technologies and new business models, to 
enter the market (Dannenberg and Kellner, 1998). 
According to Li (2002) the main rationales for launching baby e-banks include acquiring 
new customers, exploring the cost advantageous of being "internet only", creating a 
new brand to break away from the constraints of the parent's main brand, and 
exploiting the opportunity of a new technological platform to offer existing and new 
services. 
In the UK, it is not just traditional financial institutions such as banks and building 
societies who offer financial services. Both Tesco and Sainsbury's, two of the largest 
supermarkets in the UK, have been offering financial services for over a decade. 
4.6 Data 
The dataset used in this chapter, contains 1926 individual credit card observations, 
made up from credit cards provided by banks, building societies, internet banks, 
personal loan specialists (e. g. MBNA) and non-banking firms, such as supermarkets and 
football clubs. The 297 cards included in the sample were chosen to represent the 
current climate in the UK credit card market. By the end of 2005, the top five credit 
card issuers in the UK accounted for 65 percent of all credit cards in issue (APACS, 
2006a), the top twenty issuers currently represent approximately 90 percent of the 
credit card market (Which?, 2007). The sample covers a seven month period between 
April 2006 and October 2006. Each credit card is observed for a minimum of one 
month and a maximum of seven months. 
The dataset was derived from individual credit card issuers and provider's websites 
and summary boxes (an example of a summary box is provided in the Appendix A). 35 
The summary box provides consumers with consistent and succinct summaries of the 
35 A complete list of the credit cards used in this study can also be found in Appendix A 
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key features of a credit card, thus enabling consumers to compare different credit card 
products with greater ease (APACS, 2006b). All integral features of the credit card 
product, such as the interest rate free period and introductory rates are included in 
the summary box. Pre-contract, the summary box should appear prominently on or 
within any application form or promotional material with the exception of television or 
radio promotional campaigns. With respect to the internet, a "click-through" to a page 
containing the summary box should always be available. Information on free-standing 
or optional product features such as loyalty programmes and payment protection 
insurance are not shown in the summary box and were sourced from card providers' 
websites. In the next section, the card provider classification and issuers will be briefly 
introduced and an overview of all the variables used will be provided in section 4.6.2. 
4.6.1 Card Issuers and Card Providers 
While there are large numbers of card providers in the UK credit card market, not all of 
these providers are issuers of credit card. This section briefly describes the types of 
card providers and those firms which issue credit cards in the UK. The data sample 
used in this chapter contains 297 different credit cards, which are provided by 188 
different organisations, and issued by 15 different card issuers. 
Table 4.3: Characteristics of Credit Card Issuers in the UK 
Issuer Origin Market Share(') Share of Consumer 
Base12 
American Express us 1.5 3 
Bank of Ireland UK >1.5 >1 
Barclaycard UK 16 25 
Capital One UK 6 7 
Clydesdale Bank UK >1.5 1 
Co-operative Bank UK 1.7 4 
Egg UK 2.8 5 
GE Capital us >1.5 >1 
HBOS UK 12 17 
HSBC UK 10 20 
Lloyds TSB UK 12 16 
MBNA US 13 20 
Morgan Stanley us >1.5 2 
Nationwide Building Society UK 1.6 3 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK 16 24 
""ý"ýý" ý_, -, " " ý"ý. ..... "ý WI U"c'iCUIL <dIU marKet oy me main card issuer groups (Mintel, 2004) 
(2) Estimated volume share of customer base (Mintel, 2004) 
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This thesis adopts the credit card issuer definition used by Schmalensee (2002) and 
Rochet and Tirole (2002), that a credit card issuer is defined as the issuing bank. A 
summary of the characteristics of the 15 issuers are given in Table 4.3. 
A list of card providers can be found in the Appendix A. Issues connected to degrees of 
freedom mean that it is not possible to include a dummy variable for each and every 
card provider. Therefore to enable the effects of organisational structure on the price 
of the credit card, the card providers have been separated into 10 different 
classifications, which will be briefly discussed below and examples of issuers in each 
classification are given in Table 4.4: 
Generic Cards 
0 Bank: A bank is a financial institution whose primary activity is to act as a payment 
agent got customers and to borrow and lend money. Examples include Barclaycard 
(Barclays), Lloyds TSB and the Royal Bank of Scotland. Banks are the traditional 
providers of credit cards in the UK. In 1994, the major clearing banks in the UK 
issued 88.5 percent of all credit cards in circulation; however by 1998 this had 
declined to around 77.5 percent (Key Note, 1999). 
" Building Society: A building society is a mutual organisation which owned by its 
members and not shareholders. Members are those individuals who save with and 
borrow from the society. Building societies do not pay dividends to shareholders so 
they can pass this savings on to members. Credit cardholders are not classed as 
members. Nationwide is an example of a building society which issues its own 
credit cards. MBNA issue credit cards on behalf of a number of building societies 
including the Barnsley, the Cheshire and the Newcastle. 
" Converted Mutual: The Building Society Act 1896, allowed British Building Societies 
to convert from mutual to plc status. Eight mutuals converted in the period 1995- 
2000. Examples include the Halifax and Abbey National. 
" Personal Loan Specialist: MBNA, Capital One and Morgan Stanley are all examples 
of personal loan specialists who issue credit cards in the UK market. A personal 
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loan specialist is a financial institution which does not offer a full range of banking 
services in the UK; instead these institutions offer credit cards and personal loan 
products. The parent company of these card providers are typical retail banks in 
the US. 
" Internet Bank: A number of internet banks are subsidies of high-street banks, for 
example, the parent company of Mint is the Royal Bank of Scotland. Examples 
include Egg, First Direct and Marbles. It is argued that internet banks have cost 
advantages over the traditional bricks and mortar institutions (Li, 2002). 
Affinity Cards 
" Charity: MBNA issue credit cards on behalf of Breakthrough Cancer, while the Co- 
operative Bank issues credit cards on the behalf of Amnesty International, Children 
Aid and the RSPB to name a few. 
" Not-for-Profit Organisation: This includes cards which have been issued on behalf 
of trade unions and professional bodies. For example, MBNA issues cards on behalf 
of CIMA (Charted Institute of Management Accountants) and NFU (National 
Farmers Union). While the Co-operative Bank issues credit cards on behalf of the 
Liberal Democrats and the Bank of Scotland. The Bank of Scotland issues cards for 
UNISON and NUT (National Union of Teachers). 
" Sports/Football Club: Manchester United, Chelsea and Rangers are a few examples 
of football clubs in the UK who have their name affiliated with a credit card offered 
by MBNA. 
Co-Branded Cards 
" Commercial Partner: Commercial partners are card providers who form a 
partnership with a card issuer. The card features the name of the commercial 
partner; however the card is managed by the issuer. Examples include Marks and 
Spencer (HSBC), Mini (Amex) and (MBNA). 36 This variable captures non-equity 
36 Financial partners in brackets 
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strategic alliances. A non-equity strategic alliance occurs when two or more firms 
develop a contractual relationship to share some of their unique resources and 
capabilities to create a competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2005). 
" Supermarket Bank: Sainsbury's Bank (HBOS) and Tesco Personal Finance (RBS) 
Table 4.4: Examples of Credit Card Providers 
General Card Provider Examples 
Classification 
Bank Barclaycard HBOS 
Lloyds TSB 
Building Society Britannia Nationwide 
Newcastle 
Generic Converted Mutual Alliance and Leicester Abbey 
Halifax 
Internet Bank Egg Mint 
Intelligent Finance Smile 
Personal Loan Specialist Capital One MBNA 
Morgan Stanley 
Charity Breakthrough Cancer PDSA 
National Trust RSPB 
Affinity Non-Profit Making Organisation CIMA NFU 
Pass 
Sports/Football Club British Athletics Chelsea 
Manchester United Jordan 
Co-branded Commercial Partner Asda BMW 
Garfield Virgin 
Supermarket Bank Sainsbury's Bank M&S Money 
Tesco Personal Finance 
4.6.2 Other Variables 
The annual percentage rate (APR) is used as a proxy for the price of a credit card and 
thus is the dependent variable. There are 48 explanatory variables, of which five 
variables are continuous, 25 variables are categorical and the other 18 are binary. 
Binary values measure whether or not a certain attribute/characteristic is present; a 
value of 1 is assigned if the characteristic is present, zero if not. In addition these 
variables can be separated into card, firm and borrower characteristics. A full list of the 
attributes can be found in Appendix A. Clearly, this list is far too large for a manageable 
statistical model. However, little research using hedonic pricing models has been 
undertaken in the credit card field. Therefore, there is little guidance with respect to 
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the characteristics that should be included in the model, therefore it is possible that 
some important variables are excluded, while less important ones included. 
" Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the "price" of the credit card, which is the annual 
percentage rate (APR) charged on purchases. The APR, according to the Consumer 
Credit Act, is a measure of the overall cost of credit. Credit card marketing prominently 
displays the APR, with the implication that the lower the APR, the cheaper the card will 
be for customers (HM Treasury, 2003). Following observations in the 2003 report by 
the Treasury Committee that credit card issuers were able to use more than one 
method to calculate APRs, regulations ensuring that all credit card issuers used a single 
method for calculating APRs was introducing in October 2004. 
Under risk-based pricing consumers are offered varying interest rates based on the 
perceived risk to the lender of default. Individuals with bad or non-existent credit 
histories will typically be charged higher interest rates than those individuals with good 
records of using credit. Cards using risk-based pricing will normally advertise the 
lowest rate available, followed by the "typical rate". In the UK, credit card issuers are 
required to advertise the typical APR. 37 The typical APR is the rate at which is offered 
to at least two-thirds of applicants. 
" Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables can be classified into three group; card attributes, consumer 
attributes and firm attributes. A description of the explanatory variables is provided in 
Table 4.5. These attributes are discussed in greater detail in the methodology section. 
37 The typical rate is defined as the rate which is offered to 2/3 of customers, who apply for that 
particular card. Pre-2005 the typical rate was applied to the rate which 50% of customers received. 
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4.7 The Impact of Card, Consumer and Supplier Attributes 
A quick glance at the payment card industry, an individual would not be wrong in 
assuming that credit cards are homogenous products. After all, all credit cards permit 
the user to purchases something and defer payment for a number of days. In addition, 
all credit cards allow individuals to borrow on the spur of the moment to finance a 
purchase. However, credit cards are not homogenous products, as Ausubel (1991) 
naively suggests they are; instead product differentiation can be observed. 
Heterogeneity can be observed amongst issuer and consumers. 
The analysis undertaken in this section seeks to contribute to the understanding of 
credit card pricing by determining and quantifying the impact of card, organisation and 
consumer attributes on price. At the card-level, the value of individual characteristics 
which are not separately tradable are quantified and hence offer an insight into the 
cost/price implication of differentiation on individual attributes when only a bundle of 
characteristics are available to the customer. This is important because product 
differentiation can be used by suppliers to dampen price competition in the face of 
heterogeneous consumer preferences (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). 
The transactor/revolver dimension is not the only dimension in which consumers 
differ. For example, some consumers are willing to pay an annual fee and/or a price 
premium for a credit card which permits them to earn frequent flyer miles, whereas 
others may prefer to use cards which feature the logo of their favourite football team 
or charity. Hence the analysis undertaken below will help consumers to understand 
the cost of choosing such characteristics. 
4.7.1 Methodology 
Following the seminal work of Rosen (1974), hedonic regression models have become 
an established way of examining how price dispersion is determined by different 
product attributes. Recent studies however have also incorporated buyer attributes 
(Lucas, 1997) and organisational attributes (Berndt et a!., 1995; Delgardo and 
Waterson, 2003). Following these approaches, a hedonic regression model 
incorporating card attributes, consumer attributes, and the organisational attributed 
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of the card issuers is estimated. Therefore, in order to determine and quantify how 
various card, organisational, and consumer attributes impact on the price of the 1rn 
credit card in period t, a hedonic regression of the following form is estimated: 
Pit = 8Wmit + VXkit + flZhlt + £it (4.9) 
Where P, is the price of credit card i at time t, denoted by the typical APR, W is a 
vector of m customer characteristics, X is a vector of k card characteristics and Z is a 
vector of h firm characteristics, E is a stochastic error term and ß, rl and y are all 
unknown coefficients which are to be estimated. 
The vector X contains a number of card characteristics which may explain why price 
dispersion in occurs in the UK credit card market. Points and reward schemes also 
influence an individual's choice of credit card, as consumers like to think that they are 
getting something for nothing (Uncle, 1994). Five loyalty programmes were pin 
pointed in the initial review of card characteristics; they include points, cashback, 
discounts, airmiles and other. Other represents loyalty schemes such as free gifts or 
competitions to win once in a lifetime prizes. 
By including firm characteristics it is possible to investigate whether the type of 
institution offering the card impacts on the price. Li (2002) identifies eight business 
middles which have challenged the business model of the traditional banks. The 
inclusion of firm characteristics enables different business models to be investigated in 
the terms of pricing. Internet banks are often argued to have cost advantages over the 
traditional bricks and mortar institutions (Li, 2002), and hence it is envisaged that 
these differences will be picked up by the INTERNET variable. The MUTUAL dummy 
variable intends to show if there are significant differences between building societies 
and their plc counterparts. The price differential between supermarket banks and 
other financial institutions is investigated using the SUPERMARKET dummy variable. 
The relationship between a particular card and the card issuer can be classified as a co- 
branded relationship, an affinity relationship or a generic relationship. A generic 
relationship indicates that the card represents the issuer's "own" brand. 
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The vector W includes both customers' age and income attributes. 
4.7.2 Empirical Results 
Equation (4.9) is estimated using OLS and the results are presented in Table 4.6.38 This 
model assumes that there is no unobserved product or card heterogeneity. Following 
the estimation of the model a number of hypothesis were formed and Walds tests 
undertaken, these results can be found in Table 4.7. The constant term is statistically 
significant and highly positive, thus suggesting that the theoretical base card (MBNA, 
standard, generic bank card, VISA) with no added extras such as a loyalty scheme or an 
interest free period would have an interest rate of 10.4 percent. Naturally, the 
inclusion of introductory offers, charitable or non-charitable donations, an interest 
free "grace" period or an annual fee, will impact on the price of the credit card. 
4.7.2.1 The Impact of Brand on Price 
Credit cards in the UK are issued by either domestic banks or by companies which are 
subsidiaries of US banks. A joint significance test was undertaken to investigate the 
hypothesis that UK issuers all offer the same interest rates and that all US issuers offer 
the same interest rate as each other. This hypothesis was rejected in favour of issuers 
charging different mark-ups. These differing mark-ups may reflect differences in cost- 
bases and the willingness of issuers to respond to changes in the cost of funds, due to 
not wanting to increase interest rates in case they attract a riskier pool of borrowers. 
To be a Barclaycard holder (ISS4), an individual must pay a premium of 3.1%. 
Barclaycard enjoys the privilege of being the first mover into the UK credit card market 
and has built up a strong reputation. The name "Barclaycard" is a premium brand 
which has enabled Barclaycard to charge a higher APR than its mainstream 
competitors (Wonglimpiyarat, 2005). 
38 The standard hedonic model, as depicted by equation (4.8), was regressed for a second tome, with 
the inclusion of a time trend, t. A t-test was carried out on this variable, to test the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient on t is equal to zero. In addition the same model was estimated with the inclusion of time 
dummies. A joint significance test was constructed to test the null hypothesis that the time dummies 
were significantly different from zero. The inclusion of either a time trend or time dummies did not 
impact significantly on the coefficients of other variables in the model and therefore a decision was 
made not to include them in the model reported here. 
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Table 4.6: OLS Estimation Results 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
FV 
-3.3817 0.2961 
ISST 
-6.5171 0.6952 
ISS2 
-2.2086 0.5989 
ISS3 
-0.5136 0.4875 
ISS4 3.1597 0.3852 
ISSS 2.0029 0.6683 
ISS6 
-2.5670 0.8407 
ISS7 1.5600 0.2937 
ISS8 4.1977 0.8741 
ISS9 
-3.7287 0.5612 
ISS10 
-0.7418 0.3779 
ISSll 
-0.1479 0.2983 
ISS12 1.2383 0.4741 
ISS14 2.0535 0.4411 
15515 
-0.3833 0.6552 
ISS16 2.9210 0.5558 
ISS17 2.0378 0.3873 
TYP1 0.1868 0.2525 
TYP2 0.2248 0.1851 
TYPO 1.3778 0.4802 
STAT1 2.3559 0.5359 
STAT2 
-0.2710 0.1332 
STAT3 
-1.5100 0.3411 
LE NPUR 0.0604 0.0289 
LENBAL 0.0575 0.0256 
MIN PAY 3.4452 0.2747 
FEEPA 0.0807 0.0043 
INTFREE 0.0655 0.0093 
DEFAULT 0.0008 0.0756 
POINTS 0.5382 0.1746 
CASH BACK 0.2288 0.1968 
DISCOUNT 0.5034 0.1729 
AI RM I LES 2.3814 0.3304 
OTHER 
-0.7050 0.1635 
DONOPEN 0.0541 0.0146 
DONSPEND 1.6221 0.5682 
MUTUAL 
-0.3450 0.2154 
INTERNET 
-1.0217 0.3075 
SUPERMARKET 
-3.9917 0.4622 
CLASS1 1.3669 0.2058 
CLASS2 1.4076 0.2069 
MININC 
-0.00004 0.0000 
MI NAG E 
-0.4334 0.0666 
CONS 10.4222 1.5388 
R 0.638 F (43,1882) 77.41 
Prob >F 0.0000 
Note: All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent significance level 
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Table 4.7: Significance Tests 
Hypothesis Chi-sq p-value 
All issuers charge the same mark-up 31.88 0.0000 
All UK issuers have the same mark-up 21.61 0.0000 
All US issuers have the same mark-up 67.26 0.0000 
NatWest and RBS have the same mark-up 2.58 0.1081 
Halifax and HBOS have the same mark-up 0.64 0.4241 
All loyalty schemes have the same impact on the interest rate 16.75 0.0000 
LENPUR = LENBAL 0.06 0.8014 
These findings are consistent with the argument put forward by Wonglimpiyarat 
(2005) that Barclaycard does not complete on price instead choosing to market its 
product as a unique service. This enables Barclaycard to differentiate itself from other 
high-street bank credit cards that are simply sold as another feature of the bank's 
service. Barclaycard has invested heavily in a sustained advertising campaign which has 
been designed to send out a message emphasising peace of mind in the case of 
emergency, medical problems on holiday or losing goods which have been purchased 
using the card. 
Discriminatory pricing appears to be apparent between credit card providers who are 
members of the same banking group. The Royal Bank of Scotland (ISS17) and NatWest 
(ISS16) are both divisions of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) group, while Halifax 
(ISS11) and the Bank of Scotland (ISS3) are both part of the Halifax Bank of Scotland 
(HBOS) group39. 
This suggests that although they are members of the same banking group they are 
attempting to target different segments of the market. To hold a card issued by 
NatWest an individual must pay a premium of 2.8% compared to 1.8% to hold a card 
issued by RBS. A significant test is undertaken to investigate they hypothesis that cards 
NatWest and RBS charge the same mark-up over the cards issued by MBNA. A Walds 
test suggests that the two issuers do not complete on price, this suggests that instead 
they choose to compete on non-price characteristics, such as loyalty programs and 
added extras. 
39 In the wake of the current credit crunch HBOS was takeover by Lloyds TSB. Halifax and the Bank of 
Scotland along with Lloyds TSB are all now part of the Lloyds Banking Group. 
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Cards issued by BOS are found to 0.5% cheaper than cards issued by MBNA, while 
cards issued by Halifax are only 0.1% cheaper. A Walds test is undertaken to see if 
these issuers have charge the same rate of interest. BOS and Halifax are found not to 
compete with each other on price. The reason for the merger of Halifax and BOS 
provides some insight into why the two divisions price the same. The BOS was one of 
the two banks which dominated the Scottish Banking market, with a share of 
approximately 30%. Prior to the merger with Halifax, the presence of BOS in England 
and Wales was marginal. The BOS strengths were in business and corporate banking 
rather than retail and therefore it formed a good strategic fit with Halifax, which was 
strong in retail but lacked experience in business and corporate activities (Bank of 
Scotland, 2006). This suggest that as Halifax is more experienced in the retail banking 
sector, it is responsible for decisions relating to the retail side of the business, and 
hence BOS will follow suit. Another argument is that the two issuers choose not to 
compete on price but to compete on non-price characteristics such as type of loyalty 
programme or cardholder effects. 
Recent entrants into the UK credit card market, such as the Bank of Ireland (ISS2) have 
rates which are lower than that of MBNA, this is possibly because they are attempting 
to seek market share and attract customers. A lack of brand awareness/reputation 
means that they have to use price to attract customers. 
4.7.2.2 The Impact of Card Characteristics 
Variable-rate loans have been legal since the early 1980s and immediately became 
prevalent in the mortgage and personal loan markets (Stango, 2002). The majority of 
issuers in the UK offer variable-rate cards to customers, however a small number of 
fixed rate cards are available. Typically, a fixed rate card is 3.4% cheaper than a 
variable rate card. Usually, fixed rate cards are associated with higher age and 
minimum income requirements suggesting that they are given to customers who are 
deemed to have lower default risk attached. Fixed rate cards are a method of gaining 
consumer loyalty. 
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While the coefficients are insignificant on gold (TYP1) and platinum (TYP2) credit cards, 
the coefficient on student card (TYP4) is positive and highly significant. This suggests 
that on average student cards are 1.3% more expensive than standard/classic credit 
cards. Students are deemed by banks to be risky individuals to loan too and hence a 
premium is charged. 
The FEEPA variable is positive and highly significant. As the annual fee rises, so does 
the price of the credit card, that is for every pound the cardholder must pay for the 
privilege of using the card, the APR rises by approximately 0.1%. This result confirms 
the findings of Heffernan (2002). It can be argued that credit card companies are 
engaging in price discrimination because other credit cards are available with similar 
characteristics but without the annual fee. Increased competition has led to annual 
fees being abolished on all but the most exclusive cards. 
Credit cards allow consumers to carry interest-free balances for up to two months, the 
credit cardholder is able not only to carry the balance, interest-free during the credit 
cycle but also for a number of days, typically around 25 days, after the initial credit 
period has ended. Thus, convenience users can avoid all interest charges by paying the 
outstanding balance in full before the interest period ends. The coefficient on INTFREE 
is positive and highly significant, which suggests that subsidisation occurs between 
transaction (convenience) users and revolvers. Interest-free periods are a benefit 
which is coveted by cardholders but expensive to issuers, thus it is not surprising to 
find that as the length of the interest-free "grace" period increases so does the interest 
rate charged on outstanding balances. For each day the interest free "grace" period is 
extended, the interest rate charged increased by 0.1%. 
There are two potential reasons as to why banks encourage convenience users. First, 
extending credit to convenience users could be interpreted as a bank purchasing 
options of the future borrowing of consumers. Second, banks may opt to subsidise 
convenience users, simply to make their overall portfolio performance look better in 
the terms of lower charge-offs and larger credit volumes (Chakravorti and Emmons, 
2001). 
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Chakravorti and Emmons (2001) argue that convenience users are being subsidised by 
their revolving counterparts. They find that the interchange fee charged by American 
Express (Amex), who is primarily a charge-card issuer, is higher than the fee charged by 
Visa and MasterCard, who are primarily credit card issuers. The coefficient on Amex 
(STAT1) is both significant and positive suggesting that the cards issued on the Amex 
network are 2.4% more expensive than cards issued on the Visa network. This finding 
is consistent with Schmalensee (2002) who found that although Amex is smaller than 
both the Visa and MasterCard systems, Amex has generally charged a substantially 
higher merchant discount. 
The coefficient on MasterCard (STAT2) is significant and negative, suggesting that 
cards issued on the MasterCard network are approximately 0.3% cheaper than cards 
issued on the Visa network. Visa has dominated the UK credit of card market, and 
consistently had twice has many credit cards in issue than MasterCard. However, since 
2003 Visa's dominance has been eroded. At the beginning 2003, Visa had 
approximately 40 million cards in circulation compared to MasterCard who had around 
20 million cards, however by the beginning of 2007 the number of cards in circulation 
was 37 million and 30 million respectively (BAA, 2007). There are two potential 
explanations for this. Firstly, MasterCard have been more willing than Visa, to 
encourage members to co-brand (Worthington, 2001). Second, from the findings of 
this empirical study, consumers are choosing to hold card on the MasterCard network 
as they appear to be fractionally cheaper than cards issued on the Visa network. 
The credit card industry has utilised point-based programmes to attract and retain 
customers for a number of years. A typical credit card loyalty programme allows 
members to earn points based on the amount they spend using the card, the points 
can then be redeemed for a variety of rewards. Benefits of programme membership 
include free travel miles, cashback, rebates, discounts, member-only promotions, gift 
certificates, free merchandise, special treatment, or other benefits/recognition. 
Most retailers implicitly suggest that the aim of their schemes is to reward repeat 
purchasing. This is achieved through a combination of discounts and other rewards. 
Uncles (1994) suggest that consumers are motivated to participate in such schemes 
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because, fundamentally, the majority of people like to get something for nothing. 
However, the results obtained suggest that cardholders do not get something for 
nothing; they must pay towards joining and participating in a particular loyalty scheme. 
As mentioned previously, the majority of loyalty programmes are based on a point 
system. The coefficient on POINTS is positive and highly significant. This suggests that 
to join the point scheme cardholders must pay a premium of 0.5%. This premium will 
reflect the cost associated with running the loyalty programme. 
Credit card companies allow cardholders to earn reward points by using their credit 
cards for purchases. To do this, the credit card company must purchase the miles from 
airlines and other enterprises (Waterson et al. 2002). The coefficient on AIRMILES is 
significant and highly positive, suggesting that the offering of airmiles to cardholders 
increases the price of the card by 2.4%. This suggests that card issuers are passing the 
cost of airmiles on to the cardholder. 
Companies are now leaning towards rewarding customers for repeat purchases by 
using experimental rewards, for example a once in a lifetime experience rather than 
simple point reward systems. The variable OTHER, includes experimental rewards, for 
example, the Manchester United credit card, offers cardholders the opportunity to win 
Manchester United "money can't buy" prizes. For every pound spent or transferred on 
to the card a point is awarded and for every 50 points earned is equal to one entry into 
a monthly draw. The prizes are provide by Manchester United and therefore are not a 
cost to MBNA, however they do encourage Manchester United fans to make purchases 
using their card. This is reflected by the coefficient on OTHER being significant and 
negative. 
To entice new applicants, credit card issuers offer promotional offers on purchases and 
balance transfers. For every month that the promotional offer on purchases and 
balance transfers runs, the interest rate which the cardholder must pay on outstanding 
balances increases by 0.1%. If a cardholder chooses a card with an offer on purchases 
and balance transfers, then the price increases by 0.2% for each month these offers 
run simultaneously. A test of equality is conducted to test the hypothesis, that LENPUR 
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and LENBAL is both equal and thus raise the price of credit by the same amount in the 
long-run. It is found that the impact of these offers of the APR is the same. 
Affinity cards generally call for an issuer to contribute a percentage of the amount 
charged to the card and/or a certain amount for each card issued to a member of the 
affinity group (Varadarajan and Mendon, 1988). The providers of affinity cards often 
state that the donations made to the affinity partner are made at no extra cost to the 
cardholder. Thus, the hedonic regression model provides an opportunity to test the 
hypothesis that donations made by card issuers to their affinity cards are made at no 
additional cost to the card holder. The results suggest that for every pound the card 
issuer donates to the affinity card, the interest rate increases by 0.05%. In addition, for 
every additional point the card issuer promises to donate, the interest rate on the 
credit card increases by 1.6%. These findings suggest that credit card issuers do not 
make donations for free, but instead take advantage on cardholder's charitable nature, 
to make additional profits. 
4.7.2.3 The Impact of Consumer Characteristics 
Credit card issuers are increasingly distinguishing between their customers based on 
risk characteristics, thus offering lower interest rates to a select group of low risk 
customers with good payment records. Higher interest rates are retained for 
customers who are assumed to be high risk with a history of late payment or 
customers who have yet to develop a detailed credit history. When advertising credit 
cards, issuers outline a number of requirements which potential applicants must meet. 
Two such requirements are minimum age and income. The MINAGE variable is 
statistically significant and negative, indicating that the interest rate declines with age. 
The age of an individual can be used as an approximation to how they are likely to 
behave. Income is also positive and significant, although the impact on price is 
extremely small. 
4.7.2.4 The Impact of Firm Characteristics 
The current account offered by the majority of banks, forms their "gateway" to 
customer relationships as this is the first product which consumers purchase (IBM, 
2003). Providers then extend their relationship by selling other products such as 
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insurance, personal loans and credit cards. In a similar manner, building societies have 
used mortgage products as their gateway product. This suggests that individuals are 
most likely to hold a credit card issued by a building society, if they are already a 
member of the society. 
The internet has had a profound effect on the financial service sector, dramatically 
changing the cost and capabilities for marketing, distributing and servicing financial 
products, thus enabling new types of products and services to be developed (Clemons 
and Hitt, 2000). Cards issued by internet providers are approximately 1% cheaper than 
cards which come from issuers who have a high street presence. This suggests that 
internet banks do in fact pass their cost advantage of being "internet-only" on to their 
customers. 
Financial products offered by supermarkets, often top the list of best buys by 
undercutting banks using the economies of scale provided by their distribution 
networks. The coefficient on SUPERMARKET is both significant and positive suggesting 
that in average credit cards supplied by supermarket banks are 3.3% cheaper than 
cards issued by banks. This finding supports the research undertaken by IBM in 2003, 
who investigated whether supermarket banks were fulfilling their potential. One 
possible explanation for this price difference is that for supermarket banks there are 
no fixed costs associated with providing the service (IBM, 2003). Supermarket have 
form profit-sharing ventures with existing retail banks. Supermarket banks have 
adopted an open "component" based approach to create a high quality, low-cost 
operating model (IBM, 2003). The enormous physical presence of supermarkets has 
raised consumer awareness and proves an opportunity for low-cost marketing. 
Supermarkets may simply be passing their cost advantages on to consumers. 
Supermarket banks may have sought to create a clear differential between their 
product and products being offered by existing banks. It is possible that supermarket 
have simply extended their "champion" role, based on core grocery brand values if 
trust, value, convenience, and customer service on to credit card products, thus 
making them easier and cheaper than existing products (IBM, 2003). In addition, a 
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credit card is a complement to supermarket shopping and a method of retaining 
consumer loyalty. 
4.7.2.5 The Impact of Relationship Characteristics 
Credit card issuers do not only offer generic bank cards, they also issue cards on behalf 
of others. The coefficient on AFFINITY, suggests that card issued on behalf of affinity 
cards are 1.3% more expensive than "own-brand" credit cards. Co-branded cards are 
also more expensive than an issuer's own card. Schlegelmilich and Woodruffe (1995) 
argue that affinity programmes have lower than traditional marketing costs and, unlike 
co-branded cards, do not require large amounts of revenue sharing or discounts. 
Therefore, taking this into account, it may be expected that the mark-up on co- 
branded cards are higher. 
4.7.3 Summary 
This section has attempted to determine and quantify the relationship between credit 
card prices and card, supplier and consumer attributes. In so doing, it provides insights 
into the factors which impact on credit card pricing in the UK. Card heterogeneity 
makes it difficult for consumers to make comparisons between different cards, as 
credit cards are sold as a bundle of attributes rather than attributes which can be 
bought on an individual basis. The analysis undertaken in this section has made the 
pricing behaviour of issuers more transparent. 
Overall, the results indicate that buyer, card, firm and relationship attributes impact on 
the observed price. The explanatory power of the model is good and the data set 
confirms the strong positive price effects for attributes such as charity donations, 
loyalty programmes, annual fee and introductory offers. Other attributes such as fixed 
interest rates, minimum age and minimum income have a strong negative impact on 
the price of credit cards. 
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4.8 Loyalty Schemes, Switching Costs and Paying Customers to 
Switch 
As mentioned previously, The Department for Trade and Industry (DTI)40 found that 
credit card customers could save £1.9billion a year in interest rate payments by 
switching to cheaper credit cards (DTI, 2003). If this is the case, why are credit 
cardholders in the UK incredibly reluctant to switch credit cards? The theoretical 
literature predicts that when switching costs are present, firms are able to charge 
higher prices (Klemperer, 2005)41. However, Chen (1997) argues that the presence of 
switching costs explains the practice of paying customers to switch. The practice of 
paying customers to switch is a business practice prevalent in the UK credit card 
market via introductory offers on balance transfers and new purchases. 
Previous empirical work on the US credit card market has sought to explain price 
stickiness and consumers' apparent unwillingness to switch. Ausubel (1991) propose 
an adverse selection model where low risk customers are less sensitive to interest 
rates than high risk customers. This particular scenario occurs because the former to 
not intend to borrow using a credit card. Issuers will therefore decide not to compete 
on price because this will only attract customers who are high risk. Calera and Mester 
(1995) and Calem et al. (2006) suggest that switching costs arise due to adverse 
selection. Customers develop a reputation with one issuer who will extend their 
borrowing levels; however, a rival firm will not accept a large balance transfer due to 
adverse selection. Therefore the size of the balance acts as a switching cost. Stango 
(2002) also finds that credit card prices are an increasing function of both outstanding 
balances and annual fees, which can act as switching costs. 
The work makes three contributions to the literature on switching costs in the credit 
card market: (1) it is the first to analyse loyalty schemes as switching costs, (2) it 
determines whether introductory offers are used to pay customers to switch, (3) it is 
the first to capture characteristics at the card and issuer level employing a nested two- 
level error component model. This model, unlike previous studies, is therefore able to 
40 The Department of Trade and Industry was replaced by the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR) in 2007. Subsequently, this has become the Department for Business 
Innovations and Skills (BIS) in June 2009. 
41 Klemperer (2005) provides a detailed review of the literature. 
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control for unobserved heterogeneity at the issuer and card level. The paper also 
makes a contribution to the debate on default charges, determining whether they are 
used to subsidise lower prices. Finally, by examining whether customers pay different 
prices for using proprietary or cooperative payment systems the paper contributes to 
the antitrust debate on payment systems (Schmalensee, 2002). 
4.8.1 Methodology 
In order to determine and quantify how various card, organisational and customer 
attributes impact on the price of the j`h credit card, issued by the i`h issuer in period t, 
equation (4.9) is adapted and a multilevel mixed-effects hedonic regression of the 
following form is employed: 
In P;; t =6 Wlt + yXjt + hZjt +u1, +uz ,ý+E; ýt (4.10) 
where in P is the natural logarithm of the typical Annual Percentage Rate (APR), W is a 
vector of customer characteristics that issuers use to screen applicants, X is a vector of 
card characteristics and Z is a vector of organisational characteristics, u, is a random 
intercept term capturing unobserved characteristics at the issuer level, uY is a random 
intercept term at the card level (which is nested within the issuer level), E is a 
stochastic error term and 8, r7 and y are unknown coefficients to be estimated. It is 
assumed that u, - N(O, CF; ) and u,, - N(O, cr) independently of each other. Equation 
(4.10) is, therefore, a two-level nested error components model of the form outlined 
by Baltagi et al. (2001). Panel data applications typically capture unobserved 
heterogeneity using an idiosyncratic error term. A two-level nested error component 
structure is employed in order to capture unobservable characteristics at the issuer 
and card level where cards are naturally grouped within issuers. 
The key variables of interest to this study are included in the vector X. Namely, the 
points, Airmiles and cash back loyalty schemes and the introductory offers on balance 
transfers and new purchases. These attributes of cards might be used by issuers as a 
means of product differentiation, which issuers use to dampen price competition in 
the face of heterogenous consumer preferences (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). Dummy 
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variables are used to capture cash back, points for using the card and Airmiles. Points 
and Airmiles schemes will generate switching costs because customers typically use 
them as savings schemes. They create 'lock-in' while customers save points or Airmiles 
for particular products or services they can be redeemed against. With cash back 
schemes there is 'lock-in' via forced saving. Customers benefit from the scheme, and 
liquidate their savings, at the end of the year through a rebate on their outstanding 
balance. 2 These switching costs are novel features of the current research. Ausubel 
(1991) and Stango (2002) suggest that the annual fee is a switching cost, which is also 
included. The annual fee makes it more costly for customers to switch and to carry 
more than one credit card. Whilst customers have choices about whether to use credit 
cards with switching cost attributes or not, a feature of all these attributes is that once 
the customer makes the choice to use such a credit card, there are costs to switching. 
Therefore, following Klemperer (1995), it is posited that variables that capture 
switching costs and lock-in will be associated with higher prices. 
Competitors in the credit card market seek to capture rivals' market share with 
introductory offers. Chen (1997) suggests that the presence of switching costs can 
explain the practice of paying customers to switch. Introductory offers tend to take 
two forms: discounts on new purchases and discounts on balance transfers. Two 
variables are included in this model to measure (in months) the introductory offer 
periods on balance transfers and new purchases. Although introductory offers are 
costly to issuers, if issuers are using introductory offers to pay customers to switch and 
are investing in market share, we predict that they will be negatively priced. 
Other interesting variables in the vector X capture payment systems and default 
charges. Dummies are included for cards that allow customers to use both the 
MasterCard and Visa payments, MasterCard and Amex. Visa is the base payment 
system. Ownership structure is an interesting feature of these systems with Visa and 
MasterCard cooperatively setting interchange fees whilst Amex is a proprietary system 
42 Some cards also offer discount schemes, which exploit customers' loyalty to certain retail outlets 
where the discounts are available. In this scheme customers benefit at the point of transaction at 
selected retail outlets. This attribute is used by issuers as a means of product differentiation, which is 
distinct from switching costs because customers are not locked in. Product differentiation is used to 
dampen price competition in the face of heterogeneous consumer preferences (Shaked and Sutton, 
1982). 
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owned by American Express. Visa and MasterCard have consequently received 
attention from antitrust authorities regarding how the interchange fee is set 
(Schmalensee, 2002). However, Schmalensee (2002) argues that the interchange fee 
maximises total output, producers' and consumers' surplus. If this is the case then the 
interchange fee would have no significant effect on the price customers' are charged. 
Default charges are a source of revenue and ultimately large profits for credit card 
issuers. Indeed, in April 2006 the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) announced that 
default charges were excessive (generating in excess of £300 million a year for the 
industry) and were significantly higher than what is legally fair. In addition, Zywicki 
(2000) suggests that late payment and over-limit charges are principal predictors of 
eventual default and that these "hidden fees" are targeted almost exclusively at high- 
risk card users who are the most likely to default. 
The remaining control variables included in the vector X are: dummies for card type 
(i. e. platinum, gold, standard, student and initial), the interest free period, a fixed rate 
dummy and charity donations when an account is opened and via card expenditure. 
The vector W includes both customers' age and income attributes required to obtain a 
card. The vector Z includes the organisational characteristics of the issuer i. e. 
ownership structure, joint venture and alliance, personal loan specialist, and internet 
service provision. 
4.8.2 Empirical Results 
The empirical results are presented in Table 4.8, columns (1) and (2) contain the results 
obtained from estimating the standard hedonic regression, while columns (3) and (4) 
report the results associated with the hedonic model which has been augmented with 
organisational and consumer attributes. The chi-square tests indicate that the 
consumer and organisation variables are jointly significant at the 1% level. While the 
LR tests indicate that both the one-level and two-level nested error components are 
significant and thus the latter is preferred. Furthermore, the coefficients and their 
associated standard errors are noticeably different, demonstrating the importance of 
capturing unobserved heterogeneity at both the issuer and card level. Following, the 
aforementioned tests, the discussion will focus on the results reported in column (4). 
130 
Table 4.8: Estimation Results 
Variable (1) One level R. E. (2) Two level R. E. (3) One level R. E. (4) Two level R. E. 
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err 
FV 
-0.371 0.020 -0.507 0.044 -0.285 0.019 -0.393 0.046 
TYP1 0.741 0.047 0.892 0.110 0.761 0.046 0.907 0.107 
TYP2 0.007 0.016 0.016 0.040 0.073 0.016 0.065 0.050 
TYP3 
-0.091 0.010 -0.074 0.022 0.028 0.012 0.002 0.025 
TYPS 0.265 0.032 0.182 0.070 0.239 0.031 0.142 0.068 
PAY1 
-0.016 0.032 -0.102 0.053 0.055 0.033 -0.033 0.065 
PAY2 
-0.026 0.009 0.002 0.022 -0.012 0.009 -0.002 0.022 
PAY3 
-0.083 0.023 -0.032 0.056 -0.023 0.023 0.033 0.061 
LENPUR 0.005 0.002 
-0.009 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.009 0.001 
LENBAL 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.002 0.004 0.001 
MINPAY 0.036 0.016 
-0.127 0.014 0.003 0.018 -0.138 0.015 
FEEPA 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.0003 0.004 0.001 
INTFREE 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.002 
DEFAULT 0.002 0.001 
-0.001 0.0004 0.002 0.001 -0.0004 0.000 
POINTS 0.058 0.012 
-0.013 0.011 0.055 0.012 -0.015 0.010 
CASH BACK 0.020 0.013 0.005 0.017 0.004 0.013 0.004 0.017 
AIRMILES 0.169 0.020 0.146 0.053 0.174 0.019 0.153 0.051 
DISCOUNTS 0.057 0.010 0.062 0.017 0.053 0.010 0.067 0.017 
DONOPEN 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.001 
DONPUR 0.142 0.039 0.217 0.092 0.188 0.039 0.277 0.094 
COMMERCIAL 0.018 0.015 
-0.005 0.034 
CONVERTED 
-0.104 0.023 -0.138 0.059 
INTERNET 0.003 0.018 
-0.059 0.046 
MUTUAL 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.037 
NON-PROF 0.034 0.014 0.024 0.039 
PERSONAL 
-0.048 0.023 -0.057 0.049 
SPORT 0.010 0.014 
-0.008 0.035 
SUPERMARKET 0.041 0.028 0.168 0.063 
MINAGE 
-0.021 0.004 -0.026 0.008 
MININCOME 
-5e-6 1.2e-6 -3e-6 1.6e-6 
Constant 2.222 0.061 2.725 0.093 2.625 0.097 3.151 0.156 
Time 3.13 [0.79] 12.51 [0.05] 3.24 [0.78] 12.98 [0.041 
Random effects 
[Prob] 
46.29 [0.00] 2619.33 [0.00] 87.17 [0.00] 2436.58 [0.00] 
Two vs. One 
level [Prob] 
- - 
2573.05 [0.00] 
- - 
2349.42 [0.00] 
Fixed vs. 
Random effects 
[Prob) 
16.29 [0.93] 18.77 [0.81] 16.06 [0.99] 17.66 [0.00] 
Regressors 
[Prob] 
2600.90 [0.00] 488.58 [0.00] 3344.16 [0.00] 592.56 [0.00] 
Consumer 
[Prob. ] 
- - - - 
250.5 [0.00] 36.78 [0.00] 
Organisation 
[Prob] 
- - - - 
48.22 [0.00] 19.99 [0.01] 
Notes: (1) All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level, * denoted significant at 10 percent level; 
(2) Time is a joint test statistic [probability level] of the time dummies; 
(3) Random effects is a test statistic [probability level] of the random intercept terms; 
(4) Two vs. One level is a test statistic [probability level] of the nested two-level model versus the one- 
level model; 
(5) Fixed vs. Random is a Hausman test statistic [probability level] of fixed issuer effects versus random 
issuer effects; 
(6) Regressors is a joint test statistic [probability level] of the regressors; 
(7) Consumer is a joint test statistic [probability level] of the consumer characteristics; 
(8) Organisation is a joint test statistic [probability level] of the organisation characteristics. 
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At the card level, the findings of pervious issuer level studies (Ausubel, 1991; Stango, 
2002; Heffernan, 2002) are re-affirmed, as the findings are consistent with the annual 
fee being a significant switching cost. The coefficient estimate on FEEPA in column (4) 
indicates that for every £1 increase in the annual fee, the APR increases by 0.37%, in 
other words for every £100 owed the cardholder must pay an additional 37 pence on 
the debt. 
Only the Airmiles loyalty programmes are found to be a statistically significant 
switching cost. Cards which have the Airmile scheme attached have on average an APR 
which is 16.56% higher than cards which do not have a loyalty scheme attached. This 
finding is consistent with issuers using Airmiles to create consumer lock-in with 
switching costs and exploiting lock-in with higher prices (Klemperer, 1995). 
The coefficient on LENPUR indicates that each additional day on the introductory offer 
for purchases is associated with an average 0.94% lower APR. This is consistent with 
issuers paying customers to switch in the presence of switching costs as predicted by 
theory (Chen, 1997). It is also consistent with issuers using the introductory offer to 
attract customers that are not locked in to a credit card and then locking them in with 
switching costs (Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2004). In any case, in a competitive 
environment issuers are using the offer on purchases as an investment in market 
share. 
In contrast to purchases, the introductory offer on balance transfers costs customers 
an average 0.38% for each additional day of the offer period. If customers are locked in 
due to switching costs, a customer accepting the offer can expect to pay a higher price 
when the offer period expires. If switching costs are not effective, however, customers 
not benefiting from the introductory offer are paying for issuers to increase market 
share. Though introductory offers are not available to all customers, it is still 
interesting to incorporate them in a hedonic regression in order to determine their 
impact on pricing. 
The robustness of the findings for switching costs and introductory offer variables are 
examined by testing their stability over time. These key variables are allowed to vary 
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over time by interacting them with time dummies. The null hypothesis that coefficients 
are constant over time is rejected for CASHBACK, FEEPA, AIRMILES and LENBAL 
However, coefficient estimates on these variables all have the same sign over time and 
the coefficients reported previously in Table 4.8 are simply an average of those where 
there is month-to-month variation. The results of models allowing key variables to 
vary on a monthly basis and tests of the equality of coefficients over time are shown in 
Table 4.9. 
Though not central to this study, it is interesting to note that customers do not pay 
significantly different prices for using different payment systems. This suggests that it 
does not matter to the customer whether a payment system is cooperative or 
proprietary. In the UK the Amex network is smaller than its Visa and MasterCard rivals 
that can offer greater network externalities. Gandal (1994) found customers were 
prepared to pay for network externalities in the spreadsheet software market. 
However, we do not find this to be the case in the credit card market. 
Critics have suggested default charges are a hidden fee. If they were used to subsidise 
the 'headline' APR on which firms compete then we would expect the default charge 
variable to be negatively related to price. We do not find evidence to support this. This 
suggests that issuers are abiding by principles on fair default charges as set out by the 
UK's Office of Fair Trading in 2006. 
4.8.3 Summary 
This is the first study to analyse the effect of switching costs and introductory offers on 
credit card pricing using both issuer and card level data. Full use of this rich data is 
made by estimating a nested two-level error component model, controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity at both the issuer level and the card level. Indeed, tests 
validate the use of this modelling approach and it is found that it impacts on the 
results when comparing it with the one-level model. These findings have implications 
for issuers, customers and policy-makers. 
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Table 4.9: Time Variant Results 
Variable (1) One level R. E. (2) Two level R. E. 
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err 
FV 
-0.259 0.019 -0.361 0.045 
TYP1 0.757 0.045 0.899 0.104 
TYP2 0.078 0.016 0.083 0.038 
TYP3 0.030 0.012 0.006 0.023 
TYPS 0.271 0.031 0.180 0.066 
PAY1 0.044 0.033 
-0.039 0.060 
PAY2 
-0.013 0.008 -0.002 0.021 
PAYS 
-0.029 0.023 0.032 0.059 
LENPUR t=1 0.007 0.003 
-0.008 0.001 
t=2 0.007 0.003 
-0.008 0.001 
t=3 0.005 0.003 
-0.007 0.001 
t=4 0.005 0.003 
-0.006 0.001 
t=5 0.007 0.003 
-0.006 0.001 
t=6 0.011 0.003 
-0.006 0.002 
t=7 0.012 0.003 
-0.006 0.002 
LENBAL t=1 0.018 0.003 0.008 0.002 
t=2 0.019 0.003 0.009 0.002 
t=3 0.017 0.003 0.009 0.002 
t=4 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.001 
t=5 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.001 
t=6 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.001 
t=7 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.001 
MIN PAY 0.019 0.018 
-0.109 0.014 
FEEPA t=1 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
t=2 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
t=3 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
t=4 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 
t=5 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 
t=6 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 
t=7 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.001 
INTFREE 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.002 
DEFAULT 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
POINTS t=1 0.054 0.029 
-0.015 0.015 
t=2 0.076 0.028 0.001 0.015 
t=3 0.097 0.028 0.006 0.015 
t=4 0.077 0.029 0.003 0.015 
t=5 0.070 0.029 
-0.019 0.015 
t=6 0.058 0.023 
-0.008 0.012 
t=7 0.049 0.023 
-0.007 0.012 
CASHBACK t=1 
-0.011 0.036 -0.001 0.021 
t=2 
-0.006 0.025 0.007 0.018 
t=3 
-0.017 0.025 0.004 0.018 
t=4 0.014 0.025 0.034 0.018 
t=5 0.038 0.026 0.051 0.018 
t=6 0.070 0.044 0.099 0.024 
t=7 0.080 0.044 0.116 0.025 
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Table 4.9: Time Variant Results Cont. 
Variable (1) One level R. E. 
(2) 
(2) Two level R. E. 
Coeff Std Err Coeff Std Err 
DISCOUNTS t=1 0.048 0.025 0.032 0.018 
t=2 0.049 0.024 0.037 0.018 
t=3 0.066 0.024 0.037 0.018 
t=4 0.064 0.024 0.047 0.018 
t=5 0.053 0.024 0.037 0.018 
t=6 0.042 0.024 0.036 0.018 
t=7 0.040 0.024 0.030 0.018 
AIRMILES t=1 0.211 0.044 0.210 0.052 
t=2 0.189 0.044 0.188 0.052 
t=3 0.191 0.044 0.187 0.052 
t=4 0.194 0.044 0.171 0.052 
t=5 0.150 0.044 0.132 0.052 
t=6 0.170 0.044 0.131 0.052 
t=7 0.187 0.045 0.164 0.052 
DONOPEN 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 
DONPUR 0.199 0.038 0.301 0.091 
COMMERCIAL 0.014 0.014 0.002 0.032 
CONVERTED 
-0.100 0.022 -0.135 0.057 
INTERNET 0.016 0.018 
-0.036 0.044 
MUTUAL 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.036 
NON-PROF 0.032 0.014 0.023 0.038 
PERSONAL 
-0.054 0.022 -0.062 0.046 
SPORT 0.009 0.014 
-0.003 0.033 
SUPERMARKET 0.018 0.027 0.141 0.061 
MINAGE 
-0.019 0.004 -0.015 0.007 
MI NI NCOM E 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant 2.504 0.098 2.858 0.152 
Random effects 
[Prob] 
86.48 (0.000) 2621.93 (0.000) 
Two vs. One level 
[Prob] 
- - 
LENPUR [Prob] 6.70 (0.350) 3.56 (0.736) 
LENBAL[Prob. ] 39.46 (0.000) 26.77 (0.000) 
FEEPA [Prob] 45.01 (0.000) 288.44 (0.000) 
Points [Prob] 2.44 (0.875) 4.91 (0.556) 
Cashback [Prob] 7.74 (0.258) 60.70 (0.000) 
Discounts [Prob] 1.11 (0.981) 2.01 (0.919) 
Airmiles [Prob] 1.25 (0.974) 19.09 (0.004) 
Notes: (1) All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
(2) Random effects is a test statistic (probability level] of the random intercept terms; 
(3) Two vs. One level is a test statistic [probability level] of the nested two-level model versus the one- 
level model; 
(4) LENPUR is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients LENPUR 
(5) LENBAL is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients LENBAL 
(6) FEEPA is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients FEEPA 
(7) Points is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients POINTS 
(8) Coshbock is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients CASHBACK 
(9) Discounts is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients DISCOUNTS 
(10) Airmiles is a joint test statistic (probability level) of the coefficients AIRMILES 
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The evidence indicates that Airmiles and loyalty schemes are attributes which can be 
used by issuers to create consumer lock-in. Such lock-in creates switching costs, which 
in turn allows issuers to charge a higher price for products offering this attribute 
compared to those credit cards that do not possess such attributes. The empirical 
evidence suggests that points and cashback schemes do not create customer lock-in 
which can be exploited by issuers. A policy intervention might require issuers to be 
transparent regarding the cost of loyalty schemes. However, it is not clear, whether 
policymakers should act to inhibit loyalty schemes. Indeed, paying customers to switch 
occurs because of the presence of switching costs (Chen, 1997). Thus, the market itself 
might be providing a solution to the presence of switching costs. 
The Amex payment network is accepted by fewer merchants compared to Visa and 
MasterCard. This implies that Visa and MasterCard can offer greater network benefits 
to customers compared to Amex. Previous empirical research on spreadsheets, 
undertaken by Gandal (1994), found that product attributes exhibiting positive 
network effects are associated with higher prices. Indeed, network attributes do not 
significantly affect pricing. There has also been policy concern regarding the potential 
abuse of the collectively set interchange fees of Visa and Mastercard. The main 
concern is with the effect on merchants, whose fees are generally affected by the 
interchange fee (Schmalensee [2002]). Our results confirm that customers are not 
affected by whether the payment system is a collective or under proprietary 
ownership i. e. Amex. 
In April 2006, the OFT announced that default charges were excessive and were 
significantly higher than what was deemed to be legally fair, There has been some 
concern that the revenues from default charges are being used to subsidise lower 
"headline" prices; however, no evidence has been found in this instance to support 
this claim. A possible explanation may be that issuers have begun to set their default 
charges fairly by following the guidelines outlined by the OFT in 2007. 
4.9 Conclusion 
The adoption of new pricing structures has increased credit costs for some consumers 
and has deceased for others. Low-risk individuals are able to behave in such a way, 
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that they are able to avoid new and increased fees and generally experience lower 
credit costs then they might have done during the early 1990s. High-risk borrowers, 
who may not have previously qualified for unsecured credit, can now obtain credit by 
paying a risk premium. The current pricing structure has resulted in credit card users 
"paying their own way. " 
This chapter has attempted to determine and quantify the relationship between credit 
card prices and credit card attributes, supplier attributes and consumer attributes. In 
so doing, it provides insights into the factors which impact on credit card pricing in the 
UK. Card heterogeneity makes it difficult for consumers to make comparisons between 
different cards, as credit cards are sold as a bundle of attributes rather than attributes 
which can be bought on an individual basis. The OFT has found that almost 70% of 
individuals do not shop around for the cheapest deal and that those who choose an 
average priced credit card rather than the cheapest option are losing an average of 
£137 a year (Which? News, February 2008). Therefore, the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter attempts to make the pricing behaviour of card providers and card issuers 
more transparent by quantifying the card, buyer and issuer attributes. Alena Kozakova, 
Principal Economist for consumer body Which? stated that: "People believe that APRs 
are a dependable way of comparing credit cards, but our research shows that APR 
cannot be relied upon for true comparisons" (Which? News, April 2007). 
The subsequent chapters will empirically analyse the price-setting behaviour of the 
major credit card issuers in the UK. The next chapter will analyse the interest rate 
channel of the monetary transmission mechanism and pricing asymmetries using 
monthly posted interest rates on purchases. 
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CHAPTER5 
INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH: THE CASE OF THE UK 
CREDIT CARD MARKET 
5.1 Introduction 
There are a number of conduits which central banks can use to utilise monetary policy. 
An important channel is the manipulation of the central bank's official interest rate to 
enable inflation targets to be achieved. For this monetary policy tool to be successful 
in influencing future spending as well as the inflation rate, official changes must 
produce similar changes in short money market instruments and retail rates. Retail 
rates are likely to have some influence on aggregate demand (Kwapil and Scharlar, 
2006). In the UK, the impact of official interest rate changes on retail interest rates is 
the most important medium for influencing consumption, which makes up 60% of 
aggregate demand (Fuertes and Heffernan, 2006). 
Early studies on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy assumed immediate 
and complete pass-through of changes in official rates to retail rates (see for example, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Altunbas et al., 2002). However, 
more recent studies have shown that pass-through maybe incomplete and that the 
speed of adjustment maybe sluggish. Pass-through and adjustment speed have also 
been found to differ across financial institutions and across financial products (see for 
example: Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Mojon, 2000; de Bondt, 2002; Hoffman and 
Mizen, 2004). Furthermore, it has been found that the speed of adjustment may be 
asymmetric (see for example, Frost and Bowden, 1999; de Haan and Sterken, 2005). 
While there are numerous studies on monetary policy transmission, the retail interest 
rate process is relatively under explored in the context of credit cards. Thus, this 
chapter analyses the dynamic relationship between the Bank of England Base Rate and 
retail credit card rates by measuring the pass-through process between these interest 
rates in the UK banking system. Official interest rate changes are intended to influence 
short rates of money market instruments and retail products, such as deposit accounts 
and mortgages. Often complete pass-through is simply taken for granted. In an ideal 
world, official base rate changes should be completely "passed through" to market and 
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retail rates over a reasonably short time span. In practice, official base rate changes 
may not be fully and instantaneously passed through to retail rates, differentials may 
persist for a period of time. Many empirical studies have found that interest rates 
appear to respond on a less than one-for-one basis to policy rate changes (for 
example, de Bondt, 2005; Ehrmann et al., 2003). 
Numerous studies on the response of loan rates to monetary policy have established 
two stylised facts. First, loan rates are sluggish or sticky in responding to monetary 
policy actions. Second, financial structure appears important in explaining this 
phenomenon. Many theories of slow or incomplete price adjustment in goods and 
labour markets have been suggested. These include theories based on market 
structure and a lack of competition, implicit risk-sharing contracts, cost of changing 
prices and consumer switching costs. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) provide a detailed 
summary of the various theories of price rigidity. In the banking sector, price stickiness 
has often been attributed to a lack of competition (Hannan and Liang, 1991). There are 
many examples in the existing literature of explanations used to explain price 
stickiness in goods markets being applied to financial markets. For example, Hannan 
and Berger (1991) use the menu cost model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) to 
explain stickiness in bank deposit rates. While Klemperer (1987) suggests that his 
model of switching costs could also be used to explain stickiness. Fried and Howitt 
(1980) used Azariadis' (1976) model of implicit insurance contracts in labour markets 
to explain loan rate stickiness as a method of assuring risk averse lenders of a relatively 
constant rate of interest. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides a detailed definition of pass- 
through. In addition, it introduces several theories which provide explanations for 
sluggish and incomplete adjustment of retail interest rates. Section three provides an 
overview of the existing literature with respect to base rate pass-through. Section four 
introduces the data used within the study and considers the stylized facts relating to 
the UK credit card market. A simple linear model of interest rate pass-through is 
presented in section five. Section six uses a simple linear error correction model to 
investigate the response of credit card interest rates to changes in the cost of funding. 
Before the model is estimated, some preliminary analysis is undertaken on the time 
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series data. It is often argued that the adjustment of bank interest rates is non-linear; 
therefore, section seven analyses pass-through using a non-linear model. Also, 
explanations for asymmetric price adjustments are identified and these explanations 
are discussed with respect to the credit card market. Section eight concludes this 
chapter. 
5.2 The Determinants of Pass-Through 
The pass-through mechanism involves a process whereby impulses on interest rates 
administered by the monetary authorities or on money market interest rates are 
transmitted to short-term lending rates (Humala, 2005). Measuring pass-through 
involves assessing the impact of changes in money market rates on retail rates both in 
the short-term and the long-term, as well as the speed of adjustment. 43 
However, the meaning of pass-through appears to vary across studies. Therefore, in 
the context of this study, the term pass-through refers to the extent to which changes 
in money market rates are reflected in changes in retail rates both in the short- and 
long-run. Complete pass-through is said to occur when a movement in the money 
market rate leads to a one for one change in retail rates. Retail rates are often 
described as "sticky" due to the slow response of these rates to movements in the 
money market rate (see for example, Ausubel, 1991; Calem and Mester, 1995; and 
Mester, 1994). 
5.2.1 Why Doesn't Pass-Through Occur Straight Away? 
Hoffman and Mizen (2002) argue that for there to be a departure away from 
continuous adjustment to retail rates, there must be costs associated with adjusting 
retail rates. Costs may arise due to the search for information, Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989); menu costs related to adjusting prices, Rotemberg (1982), Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985), Ball and Romer (1989), Mankiw (1985), Benabou and Gertner (1993), Bail and 
Mankiw (1994); or non-pecuniary costs of lost custom after adjustments are made, 
Okun (1981) and Rotemberg (1992). All retailers offering financial products face these 
types of costs when making adjustments to retail interest rates but the incidence of 
43 The length of tome from the initial impact until the final effect is observed. 
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the costs may not be identical, hence this may possibly explain why the adjustment to 
retail rates differs by type of institution. 
5.2.2 The Determinants of Pass-Through 
The influence of monetary policy on interest rates depends importantly on the 
structure of the financial system. Significant changes to the structure of financial 
markets and institutions in the UK are likely to have altered the interest rate channel. 
Key developments include the deregulation of the financial system, the growth of 
capital markets as an alternative to bank intermediation, increased competition 
amongst intermediaries both domestically and internationally, and greater 
transparency by the Bank of England about monetary policy operations. These changes 
in the financial system may have altered both the timing and the magnitude of the 
response of interest rates to monetary policy. Sellon (2002) argues that the failure of 
long-term interest rates to respond to monetary policy easing maybe an indication 
that monetary policy may have less influence on interest rates than it did previously. 
Thus, there are a number of factors which are likely to determine the degree to which 
changes in the money market rate are passed through to retail rates and the speed at 
which such pass-through occurs. The determinants of the interest rate transmission 
mechanism are reviewed below. 
" Monetary Policy Effects 
Lags in the adjustment of retail rates are likely to occur due to the difficulty of 
interpretation of whether changes in policy are permanent or temporary (Bredin, 
Fitzpatrick and O'Reilly, 2001). The banking sector may therefore be slower too 
respond to temporary changes in the base rate, but quicker to respond to permanent 
changes. 
Banks which are well-capitalised and liquid are able to smooth their interest rates. If 
banks are well capitalised and liquid then they are not forced to adjust immediately to 
changes in monetary policy and have the potential to swallow shocks, at least 
temporarily (Horvath, Krekö and Naszödi, 2004). The stickiness of retail rates may be 
compounded due to the presence of adjustment costs associated with changing retail 
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rates to customers and this may lead to the smoothing of retail rate changes with 
respect to changes in money market rates. 
The relationship between short-term and long-term interest rates is another important 
consideration when examining the impact of monetary policies, for a number of 
reasons. First, the proportion of fixed and variable retail rates will determine the 
relative importance of movements in short and long-run interest rates, and ultimately 
influence the degree of pass-through from money market rates to retail rates. Second, 
it is important to consider whether financial intermediates source their funds from 
short or long-run capital markets. If a financial intermediary's main source of funding is 
from short-term capital markets, then changes in short-term rates are likely to feed 
into retail rates. However, if the main source of financing is from long-term capital, 
then there is likely to be a weak link between changes in policy rates and retail rates 
(Bredin, Fitzpatrick and O'Reilly, 2001). Sarno and Thornton (2004) argue there may 
not be a one way causation running from money market rates to retail rates. 
  
The Role of the Financial System 
The strength and speed of monetary interest rate transmission can be strongly related 
to the structural properties of a financial system, see for example, Cottareli and 
Kourelis (1994), Ehrmann et al. (2001) and Mojon (2000). Disintermediation, the 
intensity of competition within the banking sector, the capitalisation and liquidity 
position of banks as well as monetary policy and interest rate volatility can all impact 
on the strength and speed of the transmission of interest rate changes. 
The degree of disintermediation and the role of non-bank financing have an impact on 
the elasticity of both loan demand and deposit supply with respect to the money 
market rate. On the asset side, loan demand is expected to react more intensely to 
interest rate changes in an economy which has highly developed capital and money 
markets, as companies are then able to substitute bank loans with other forms of 
financing (Horvath, Krekö and Naszödi, 2004). 
The intensity of competition amongst banks will also influence the interest rate 
elasticity of loan demand and deposit supply. Bredin, Fitzpatrick and O'Reilly (2001) 
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argue that in monopolistic or oligopolistic settings, in general a one for one movement 
in retail rates in response to changes in money market rates will not occur. Deposit 
rate rigidity under the assumption of menu costs and monopolistic competition has 
been studies by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Hannan and Berger (1991). 
  
Other Determinants 
Berlin and Mester (1999) claim that banks which rely heavily on non-insured funding, 
will adjust their deposits rates by more and at a faster rate than those banks whose 
liabilities are less affected by market movements. Berger and Udell (1992) argue that 
financial institutions which maintain a close tie with their customers will change their 
lending rates comparatively less and at a much slower speed. Weth (2002) finds that in 
Germany, banks who have large volumes of long-term business with households and 
firms change their prices less frequently than those who do not. 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) and Mojon (2000) have attempted to relate country and 
specific characteristics to the degree of pass-through in the short-run. Both studies use 
a panel data approach to relate estimates of the degree of short-run pass-through to 
variables such as banking competition, money market factors, financial structure, and 
bank costs. These studies find that inflation, a volatile money market rate and a lack of 
competition all positively contribute to the "stickiness" of interest rates. Other 
determinants which may also impact on the speed and degree of pass-through include 
the characteristics of a borrower (saver) and cyclical elements. 
5.2.3 Theories of Bank Rate Stickiness 
If perfect competition and complete information existed, then price would be equal to 
marginal cost and thus the derivative of price with respect to marginal cost would be 
equal to one. However, as an industry deviates away from perfect competition this 
derivative typically becomes less than one. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) referred to 
the degree of stickiness of bank lending rates as the speed at which these rates adjust 
to their long-run equilibrium values after monetary shocks affecting money market 
rates. Theories concerning the pricing behaviour of banks form a special sub-area of 
the theories of pricing, in addition, explanations about price and wage stickiness are 
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also applicable for bank rates. This section discusses the various theories as to why the 
price of a bank loan may not respond one for one with the cost of providing a loan44 
  
Adverse Selection 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) develop a model of agency costs with respect to the banking 
sector. According to their model, the firm/individual borrower is assumed to know the 
riskiness of their project, while the bank is unable to distinguish between projects. 
Accordingly, this information asymmetry introduces the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. An increase in the interest rate at which investors are able to 
borrow will reduce the expected profit on all investment projects. As banks increase 
the loan rate, those individuals with the safest projects will be the first to withdraw 
from the market. This results in the mix of applicants applying for loans to change 
adversely. When faced with higher interest rates, firms may decide to undertake riskier 
projects. 
  
Switching Costs 
In a market in which consumer goods are sold, the seller is not concerned with who 
buys the product which they are attempting to sell to, as one customer is the same as 
the next. For example, anyone who wants to buy at the listed price from a market stall 
can do so. This is not the case in the bank loan market. Banks are concerned with the 
risk profile and potential behaviour of their customers, as a consequence, banks must 
find out information about the characteristics of each and every potential customer. 
The cost of acquiring information is often passed onto the buyer by way of a fixed one- 
off up-front fee. Often, it is this fee which makes it costly for a buyer to switch from 
one bank to another. 
in addition, there are regular search costs, or "shoe leather" type costs from moving 
from one supply source to another. For example, costs arise from searching and 
comparing different rates, filling out application form and obtaining the relevant 
documentation. Klemperer (1987) illustrates that, in general, the existence of switching 
costs leads to market segmentation, and reduces the elasticity of demand facing each 
firm. 
44 For a more detailed summary of these theories, see Lowe and Rohling (1992) 
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Calem (1992) argues that switching costs are important in the US credit card market. 
When a customer wishes to change credit card providers, the new issuer may require 
the individual to pay off the balance on the existing card. As a consequence this may 
involve several months of curtailed spending, which constitutes a considerable 
switching cost. 
  
Risk Sharing 
If borrowers are more averse to risk than the shareholders of a bank, then potentially 
the stickiness of bank interest rates can be explained using the implicit risk insurance 
argument. Fried and Howitt (1980) applied Azariadis' (1976) model of implicit labour 
contracts to the banking sector. If a borrower is risk averse, then they will prefer stable 
interest payments. As a result the bank would charge a less variable interest rate than 
its marginal cost of funds. The bank seeks compensation for the additional risk by 
charging a higher rate of interest than they would have charged it the borrower had 
been risk neutral. Essentially, the difference between the rate charged to the risk 
neutral and the risk adverse borrowers is an insurance premium. Fried and Howitt 
(1980) argue that customers will not change banks when the lending rate is higher than 
the marginal cost of funds due to the existence of switching costs. Since both parties 
face these switching costs, it is deemed mutually advantageous to maintain a long- 
term relationship. The result is interest rate stickiness. 
  
Consumer Irrationality 
Ausubel (1991) argues that search and switching costs, while present do not 
adequately explain why credit card rates are sticky. Generally, the majority of 
borrowers believe that they will pay the outstanding balance in full before the end of 
the billing cycle, for whatever reason they fail to do so. This type of cardholders is 
insensitive to interest rate changes and is deemed to be low risk. High risk credit card 
borrowers, on the other hand, are more likely to be interest rate sensitive because 
they fully intend to borrow on their credit card. As a consequence, a reduction in the 
interest rate on purchases will only attract those customers who fully intend to 
borrow. This "reverse" adverse-selection problem means that issuers are less likely to 
compete on price and thus rates are likely to be sticky, especially in a downwards 
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direction, with credit card issuers choosing to compete on non-price elements such as 
loyalty schemes, and free purchase insurance. 
  
Other Explanations 
Under certain circumstances and assumptions bank rates may overreact or forego 
changes in the policy rate. According to one argument, bank rates can change prior to 
changes in the marginal cost of funding. For example, banks may anticipate a rise in the 
cost of funding and increase loan rates in advance. This is particularly relevant for 
banks that finance longer-term loans with short-term deposits. 
5.3 A Review of the Existing Literature 
The last decade has been characterised by increased interest in the mechanics of the 
transmission of monetary policy to the banking sector. The effectiveness of monetary 
policy depends on the degree and the speed of interest rate adjustment to change in 
the policy controlled interest rate (Ozdemir, 2009). Thus, both theoretically and 
empirically, the interest rate channel of monetary transmission mechanism has 
received great attention from academics. 
The transmission of changes in the money market interest rate into changes in deposit 
and loan interest rates has been empirically investigated in a number of countries 
using bank level data from, for example: Neumark and Sharpe (1992) for the US, 
Berstien and Fuentes (2003) for Chile, Gambacorta (2004) for Italy, Hoffman and Mizen 
(2002,2004) for the UK, de Graeve et al. (2004) for Belgium and Weth (2002) for 
Germany. In general, these studies are interested in evaluating the responsiveness of 
interest rates to changes in monetary policy and many stress the importance of bank 
characteristics in determining the speed of adjustment. The issue of the pass-through 
of market interest rates to retail interest rates continues to attract significant attention 
in Europe and the US. 
Moore et al. (1988) and Diebold and Sharpe (1990), investigate interest rate rigidities 
in the US using aggregate deposit rates. Both report strong evidence of retail rates 
being slow to respond to changes in market rates. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) use a 
switching model of partial adjustment for US deposit rates. The model switches 
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according to an indicator function, which indicates whether the bank is above or below 
its long-run equilibrium mark-up, assuming that long-run equilibrium deposit rates are 
proportional to Treasury bill rates. 
In the UK, Paisley (1994) and Heffernan (1997) use conventional linear methods to 
investigate the relationship between the pass-through of official interest rate changes 
and changes in the retail rates of banks and building societies. Heffernan's (1997) 
study finds complete pass-through for repayment mortgages and incomplete pass- 
through for savings and current accounts in the long-run for both UK banks and 
building societies. Paisley (1994) does not find complete pass-through in mortgage 
rates for UK building societies. Hoffman and Mizen (2002,2004) employ 17 years of 
monthly data on mortgages and 90-day term deposits in an error correction model 
(ECM) framework. They find complete pass-through for mortgages but not for 
deposits. Hoffmann and Mizen (2002,2004) introduced asymmetries in the adjustment 
process using both exogenous and endogenous drivers. The actual or expected change 
in the official rate proved to be significant. 
In Ireland, Fitzpatrick and O'Reilly (2001) using a money market rate as a proxy for an 
official rate, examine the relationship between base rate changes and four Irish retail 
loan rates. Pass-through in this case is found to be incomplete and that the speed of 
adjustment varies with the type of loan. Evidence is found to suggest that structural 
change is present. 
A number of studies such as Sander and Kleimier (2004), Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan 
(2002), de Bondt (2002), Mojon (2000), Borio and Fritz (1995) and Cotteralli, Ferri and 
Generale (1995) consider differences in pass-through not only across different bank 
lending and deposit rates but also across countries within the euro zone. These studies 
find that there is a substantial degree of short-run bank interest rate stickiness. 
There are a small number of empirical investigations of pass-through which use a 
qualitative dependent variable approach to rate setting. Hannan and Berger (1991) 
and Mester and Saunders (1995), model US deposit and prime rate changes 
respectively using a logit model. This approach enables the authors to assess the effect 
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of a change in the cost of funds and other variables on the probability of deposit/prime 
rate changes. Mester and Saunders (1995) found that changes in the Federal Funds 
rate are generally prompted by a larger probability of an upward response than a 
downward response in prime rates. Hannan and Berger (1991) conclude that deposit 
rates are significantly more rigid when the direction of the stimulus is upward. 
In summary, the main conclusions which can be drawn from the empirical literature 
associated with estimating pass-through are as follows: (1) Lending rates are very 
sticky with respect to movements in policy and market rates in the short-run, however 
in the long-run in many cases pass-through is almost complete. (2) The process of 
transmissions of changes in the policy/market rate to retail rates varies across country. 
(3) The structure of financial market and institutional arrangement inside a country are 
the main factors that contribute to variability of path across countries. 
While a significant number of studies have investigated base rate pass-through in the 
United Kingdom (for example Mizen and Hoffman, 2002 and 2004; Heffernan, 1997), 
they have largely ignored the credit card market choosing to focus on deposit and 
mortgage lending. Therefore, the subsequent work undertaken in this chapter seeks to 
make a contribution to the existing literature by empirically investigating the 
relationship between the base rate and retail credit card lending rates, thus, providing 
an insight into the effects of the monetary transmission mechanism of the UK credit 
card market. 
5.4 Data 
in order to analyse pass-through with econometric models, data at different levels of 
aggregation are used. The data sample contains individual monthly interest rate data 
for the top ten issuers for the period January 2000 to May 2007, as well as aggregated 
interest data calculated as a weighted average of individual card provider's interest 
rates for the period January 1995 to July 2008. Based on the data, it is already possible 
to formulate some stylised facts about interest rates and pass-through in the UK credit 
card market. 
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The analysis is based on monthly data to investigate the interest pass-through of 
official base rate to credit card rates in the United Kingdom. The empirical work 
analyses data collected from the Bank of England (BoE) and Moneyfacts magazine 
(MM), which includes information on lending rates and money market rates. MM is a 
private company which specialises in the collection of large amounts of financial 
information on deposit, loan, investment (e. g. unit trusts) and business finance; all of 
this information is published in a monthly industry magazine. 
The aggregate interest rate data was collected from the Bank of England's statistical 
interactive database. The retail rate is the weighted average interest rate on credit 
cards for banks and building societies. As banks and building societies typically issue a 
range of credit cards, the Bank of England gives preference to the most popular card (if 
known) or the card which has a standard interest free period. Temporary reductions in 
interest rates for things such as "introductory offers", annual fees or cash back are not 
included unless these have already been factored into the APR calculation by the 
issuer. The banks average is weighted according to gross new lending during the 
month for each of the sample institutions. The building society average is weighted 
according to the aggregate building society gross advances during the month. 45 The 
credit card data set does not reflect all available information on each credit card 
product since there can be substantial competition in an array of non-price 
inducements built into the retail products offered by banks and building societies that 
may alter more frequently than the rate itseIf. 46 
A description of variables is presented in Table 5.1. Information on market interest 
rates has been collected from the BoE interactive statistical database. 47 BoE data from 
January 1995 to July 2008 is used to consider the average behaviour of credit card 
issuers and MM data from October 1999 to May 2007 is used to model individual 
issuer behaviour. 
45 Bank of England Explanatory Notes - Household interest rates 
<http: //213.225.136/mfsd/iadb/notesiadb/Household_int. htm> 
46 Chapter four of the thesis has considered the impact of these inducements on interest rates. 
47 See <http: //www. bankofengland. co. uk/statistics/index. htm> for more information 
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The rest of this section will introduce the data set being used and analyses the spread 
activity of credit card issuers. The analysis of average monthly spreads allows a 
detailed review of spread behaviour and an opportunity to look for differences in the 
behaviour of different categories of issuers as well as product sectors and individual 
issuers. The spread is defined as the difference between the credit card rate and the 
base rate. Due to space restrictions some of the tables and figures can be found in 
Appendix B. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean Standard Min Max 
Deviation Value Value 
Monthly average interest 
INT rate charged on credit cards 164 18.43 2.93 14.80 23.01 
Monthly average interest 
INT; rate charged by credit card See table 5.6 for information on individual issuers 
issuer i 
Monthly average rate of 
TB discount 3 month sterling 164 5.19 1.00 3.31 7.29 
treasury bill 
Monthly average London 
LIBOR Inter-Bank Lending Rate 164 5.48 1.11 3.42 7.71 
(LIBOR), 3 month 
Monthly average official 
BASE bank rate 164 5.34 1.05 3.50 7.50 
5.4.1 Market Rates 
Since this chapter is focusing predominantly on monetary policy issues, a direct 
measure of the Bank of England's monetary policy stance is provided by the Bank's 
official base rate. Another potential measure would be to use either the 3 month 
LIBOR or 3 month Treasury Bill rate as a proxy to the official rate. Heffernan (1993, 
1997 and 2002) uses LIBOR as a proxy for the cost of funds. Table 5.2 reports the 
correlation matrix for the base rate, T-Bill rate and the LIBOR rate. 
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Table 5.2: Market Rate Correlation Matrix 
3 Month Treasury Bill 3 Month LIBOR Base Rate 
3 Month Treasury Bill 1 
3 Month LIBOR 0.9875 1 
Base Rate 0.9821 0.9868 1 
Table 5.2 indicates all three rates are highly correlated with each other. Fuertes, 
Heffernan and Kalotychou (2009) argues that using either the LIBOR or T-Bill rate raises 
a number of issues, because although money market rates change with the policy rate 
(Bank of England base rate), they are effectively driven by the demand and supply for 
global interbank funds. Furthermore, anticipated changes to the policy rate are often 
reflected in the market a few weeks earlier which, if incorrect, simply adds noise to the 
retail rate-policy rate nexus. 
Figure 5.1: Market Interest Rates 
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Figure 5.1 indicates the three market rates generally behave in the same manor. 
The base rate is less volatile than the three month LIBOR and the 3 month T-bill 
rate, retaining the same value for a number of consecutive months. For example, 
the base rate remained at 4% for 14 months during the period December 2001 to 
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January 2003. All three market rates declined dramatically between July 1992 and 
July 1994. The base rate and LIBOR rates do occasionally diverge sharply from each 
other. This is particularly noticeable from June 2007. This sharp divergence was caused 
by global market turbulence and the subsequent "credit crunch". In August 2007, the 
three month LIBOR rate stood at 6.8 percent which was over 100 percentage points 
above the base rate. 
5.4.2 Aggregate Interest Rates 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the mark-up between average credit card rates and the base 
rate. The figure indicates that credit card interest rates have been declining over 
the sample period 1992-2008, as a consequence the average spread has also been 
declining. The average interest rate charged by credit card providers during the 
period 1992-1999 was 21.94% while over the period 2000-2008 the average rate 
was 16.42%. Spreads have also declined over the period; the average spread was 
15.63% over 1992-1999, however this has fallen to 11.65% over the period 2000- 
2008. 
Figure 5.2: Credit Card Spread 
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Heffernan (2002) finds that the spread for credit cards offered by banks and 
building societies are higher than that of unsecured loans. This is not surprising 
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considering that providing the cardholder pays the outstanding balance in full at 
the end of the billing cycle; they are effectively getting a free loan for a month. 
Credit card issuers recoup this by charging higher interest rates to the small 
proportion of customers who only pay a percentage of their outstanding balance 
each month. As can be seen from Table 5.3 credit card spreads are on average 10% 
higher than the base rate. Ausubel (1991) attributes higher credit card rates to an 
adverse selection problem. According to Ausubel (1991), desirable customers are 
those who do not intend to borrow but do end up borrowing; these customers are 
deemed to be low risk. On the other hand, high risk customers fully intend to 
borrow. Low-risk customers are less responsive to changes in the interest rate 
because they do not intend to borrow. In this situation, unilaterally lowering the 
credit card rate would disproportionately entice high-risk customers. This adverse 
selection problem enables card issuers to maintain high credit card rates and make 
high profits. 
Table 5.3: Average Interest Rates and Average Spreads on Credit Card Products 
Time Period Average Official Rate Average Interest Rate Average Spread 
1995-2008 18.48 5.35 13.13 
1995-1999 21.94 6.32 15.63 
2000-2008 16.42 4.77 11.65 
1995 22.66 6.57 16.09 
1996 22.36 5.89 16.58 
1997 22.27 6.54 15.74 
1998 22.31 7.23 15.08 
1999 20.10 5.35 14.75 
2000 18.94 5.97 12.97 
2001 18.25 5.21 13.12 
2002 16.27 4.00 12.27 
2003 15.23 3.69 11.53 
2004 15.36 4.38 10.98 
2005 15.98 4.65 11.33 
2006 16.31 4.64 11.67 
2007 15.43 5.51 9.92 
2008 15.42 5.23 10.19 
Source: Bank of England 
The presence of switching costs when changing credit cards enables credit card 
issuers to maintain high interest rates. Individuals who have large card balances 
are more likely to be turned down for new cards, than those with small balances 
(Calem and Mester, 1995). If switching costs are significant, then credit card 
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issuers know that they are able to charge higher rates of interest; this is a sign of 
imperfect competition. 48 
5.4.3 Institutions' Rates 
Credit cards in the UK are provided by a wide range of providers, all of which have 
different institutional backgrounds and cost structures. The credit cards have been 
classified into seven different categories. Table 5.4 presents a summary of the 
finding; part A presents the findings for the period 1992-1999, while part B 
present the findings for the period 2000-2007.49 
Table 5.4: Average Interest Rates and Spreads for Different Institutions 
Type of Issuer Average Interest Rate Interest Rate Spread 
Bank 20.61 14.25 
Building Society 19.38 13.02 
Converted Building Society 19.29 12.92 
Internet 16.65 10.29 
Personal Loan Specialists 16.94 10.58 
Joint Ventures 18.61 12.25 
Charities 21.39 15.03 
a. 1992-1999 
Type of Issuer Average Interest Rate Interest Rate Spread 
Bank 17.50 12.83 
Building Society 16.75 12.08 
Converted Building Society 15.58 10.91 
Internet 13.74 9.07 
Personal Loan Specialists 16.91 12.25 
Joint Ventures 16.87 12.19 
Charities 17.70 13.03 
b. 2000-2007 
The average interest rate has declined across the two-sub samples, for all issuer types 
with the exception of personal loan specialist who, on average, have charged 
approximately the same rate of interest in both periods. Personal loan specialists have 
48 Switching costs have been investigated in chapter four, section eight. 
49 The spread diagrams can be found in Appendix B. 
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been credited with increasing competition in the UK credit card market (Worthington, 
1998). 
Average interest rates for cards issued by banks have declined by approximately three 
percent as have the average credit card rates of internet providers. Building society 
rates have fallen by approximately 2.5 percent and converted mutuals by 3.5 percent. 
Interest rates on credit cards issued by joint ventures or charities have fallen by 
approximately two and 3.5 percent respectively. 
Figure 5.3: Average Interest Rates of Different Types of Institutions 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates the interest rates charged by different types of credit card 
providers over the period 1992-2007. Due to a lack of competition and issuers 
offering almost identical products, interest rates were extremely high. There was a 
sharp decline in the average rate of interest charged by these providers between 
January 1998 and January 2000; this is partially due to an influx of new internet 
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providers. In addition many institutions who operated over the telephone 
switched the majority of their operations to the internet. 
The adoption of the internet meant that such companies were able to streamline 
their operations and thus become more competitive. An interesting point to note 
is that across the two periods the average interest rates charged by personal loan 
specialists have not significantly altered, this suggests that when entering the UK 
credit card market, these providers who are mainly from the USA, decided to price 
aggressively to gain market share. In addition, personal loan specialists have 
chosen not to charge an annual fee. 
5.4.4 Individual Provider Rates 
The average interest rate charged by credit card providers ranges from 10.68% to 
19.61% and the average spread range from 5.25% to 14.61%. Table 5.5 indicates 
that interest rates vary quite considerably between individual credit card providers 
and within provider classifications. Credit cards issued by internet providers have 
the lowest associated interest rate and spread. In general, charity cards have the 
highest associated interest rate. As discussed in Chapter Four the price of a credit 
card does depend on the characteristics of the card, buyer and issuer. However it 
should be noted that credit card issuers such as Barclaycard offer a wide range of 
products. In 2008, Barclaycard offers 12 different products with interest rates 
ranging from 6.8% to 27.9% depending upon the card product, the minimum age 
and income requirements, and card features. Other card providers such as Smile 
and Break-Through Cancer offer two cards and one card respectively. 
As it would be impossible to examine pass-through for every single credit card provider 
and issuer in the UK, ten credit card issuers are chosen to be included in the analysis. 
They are the top five issuers in the UK based upon market share (Barclaycard, MBNA, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB and HSBC), a building society (Nationwide), an 
internet provider (Egg) and two banks (the Co-operative and HBOS). The top five 
issuers include four banks and one personal loan specialist. The top five issuers in the 
UK account for approximately 65 percent of the entire market. While the top ten 
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credit card issuers account for 90 percent of the total market in the terms of 
outstanding balances. 
Table 5.5: Average Interest Rates Spread of Selected Card Providers 2000-2008 
Category Card Provider Average Interest 
Rate 
Spread over Average 
Official Rate 
Bank of Scotland 17.61 12.94 
Barclaycard 17.95 13.28 
Co-operative Bank 18.43 13.76 
Coutts & Co 19.61 14.94 
Bank Lloyds TSB 15.72 11.05 
Midland/HSBC 15.85 11.18 
NatWest 17.27 12.60 
Royal Bank of Scotland 16.77 12.10 
Yorkshire Bank 17.51 12.84 
Abbey National 15.93 11.26 
Converted Alliance & Leicester 16.65 12.00 
Mutual Halifax 14.36 9.69 
Britannia 15.40 10.73 
Leeds Building Society 16.81 12.14 
Building Society Nationwide 15.23 10.55 
Norwich and Peterborough 14.90 10.23 
Yorkshire Building Society 14.84 10.17 
American Express 16.16 11.49 
Personal Loan Capital One 16.34 11.81 
Specialist GE Capital 16.59 11.91 
MBNA 16.40 11.70 
Morgan Stanley 15.67 10.99 
Egg 12.87 8.20 
Intelligent Finance 12.80 6.01 
Internet Mint 10.68 9.25 
Smile 13.92 7.92 
Marks and Spencer 15.92 11.25 
Joint Ventures Sainsbury's Bank 15.26 10.59 
Tesco Personal Finance 15.41 10.73 
Break-Through Cancer 16.10 11.43 
Charity Comic Relief 17.06 12.39 
Greenpeace 18.51 13.84 
Help the Aged 18.09 13.42 
Notes: 
1. Royal Bank of Scotland and NatWest are both members of the Royal Bank of Scotland Group. 
2. Halifax and Bank of Scotland are both part of HBOS. 
3. The top five issuers in the UK are Barclaycard, MBNA, HBSC, HBOS and Royal Bank of Scotland 
Source: Moneyfacts 
A summary of the top ten issuers can be found in Table 5.6. Figure 5.4 illustrates how 
issuer's interest rates have moved over the period October 1999 to May 2007. All 
credit card issuers add a significant mark-up to the base rate and in some cases such as 
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Capital One this mark-up has increased over the sample period. It is not clear however 
from Figure 5.4, if credit card issuers respond to changes in the base rate. 
Some of the issuers have been included in the sample due to their institutional 
characteristics; Capital One is included as a personal loan specialist and to allow a 
comparison with MBNA. The inclusion of Nationwide enables the behaviour of a 
building society to changes in the base rate to be examined. HBOS was formed in 2001 
when Halifax, a former building society, merged with the Bank of Scotland. The 
inclusion of HBOS allows a comparison to be made between building societies, banks 
and converted mutuals to be examined. 
Figure 5.4: Average Issuer Interest Rates and the Base Rate 
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Heffernan (2005) found that converted mutuals respond more rapidly to changes in 
the base rate. The inclusion of HBOS allows analysis of how HBOS behaves with 
regards to changes in the base rate in comparison with other types of issuers other 
than building societies. 
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While classed as a bank, the Co-operative Bank, which markets itself as an ethical 
bank, is a financial entity which belongs to its members, who at the same time are the 
owners and the customers of their bank. Therefore it is possible that it behaves 
differently to changes in its cost of funds to that of other commercial banks. Egg is the 
only internet supplier in the sample, thus it is likely to have lower costs than other 
issuers. 
Table 5.6: Summary of Issuers 
Code Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Barclaycard A 92 15.70 2.23 11.90 19.40 
MBNA B 92 16.42 1.83 11.10 19.62 
HBOS C 92 14.70 1.97 12.03 17.74 
HSBC D 92 15.93 1.79 11.90 18.83 
RBS E 92 17.08 0.67 16.00 18.89 
Nationwide F 92 15.26 0.79 13.90 16.90 
Co-operative G 92 13.51 1.46 11.70 15.98 
Egg H 92 12.77 1.47 9.90 14.90 
Lloyds TSB I 92 15.73 0.53 14.90 16.73 
Capital One 1 92 16.34 3.22 13.65 25.4 
5.4.5 Credit Card Products 
Product innovation has meant that consumers are able to choose from a wide 
range of credit card products. For simplicity, credit card products on offer in the 
UK have been divided into four basic categories; standard/classic, gold, platinum 
and charity. Table 5.7 presents the average interest rates and average spreads on 
standard, gold, platinum and charity credit cards. Again it can be seen that interest 
rates have fallen, as have credit card spreads. Spreads have not fallen by as much 
as interest rates. The average interest rate on standard/classic credit cards the 
interest rate has fallen by approximately five percent, while the interest rate 
spread has fallen by around three percent. 
The average interest rates on gold and platinum credit cards have fallen by three 
percent but the spread has only fallen by one percent. The average rate of interest 
on charity cards has fallen by around five percent. 
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Table 5.7: Average Interest Rates and Spreads on Credit Card Products 
Type of Credit Card' Average Interest Rate Interest Rate Spread 
Classic/Standard 21.35 14.99 
Gold 18.34 11.92 
Platinum 17.03 10.66 
Charity 22.12 15.76 
a. 1992-1999 
Type of Credit Card' Average Interest Rate Interest Rate Spread 
Classic/Standard 16.28 11.61 
Gold 15.34 10.67 
Platinum 14.27 9.60 
Charity 17.57 12.89 
b. 2000-2008 
Notes: As Moneyfacts does not document student credit cards, while these cards will be considered in 
other analysis it is not possible to include them here. 
Figure 5.5: Average Interest Rates of Selected Credit Card Products 
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Figure 5.5 shows a plot of the average interest rates of the four categories of 
credit cards, which confirms that interest rates have been declining. Platinum 
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products were introduced to the market in October 1997, originally with an 
average interest rate which was higher than gold credit cards. When platinum 
cards were first introduced they were by invitation only and in many cases had an 
annual fee attached to them and only a small number of issuers offered this type 
of product. As platinum cards have become more common place, the annual fee 
has disappeared and rates have fallen below that of gold credit card products. In 
general interest rates on all types of credit cards have declined over the sample 
period. However, towards the end of the sample period interest rates appear to be 
slowly increasing. 
Pass-through is examined for three segments of the credit card market: 
standard/classic, gold and platinum at the aggregate level, thus allowing 
differences, if any, in the speed of adjustment to be analysed. It is envisaged that 
changes will be made more quickly to premium credit cards due to the lower 
associated margins. 
5.4.6 Rising and Falling Market Rates 
By examining the spreads over periods of sustained rising and falling base rates, it 
is possible to observe if there are any asymmetries in the way in which institution 
behave during periods of continued base rate rises and periods of declining base 
rates. Heffernan (2002) finds that in the credit card market, rising LIBOR is 
associated with a falling spread of approximately 2.81% for banks and 1.58% for 
the four converted building societies she includes in her sample. 50 Therefore, it 
appears that converted building societies pass on the effects of rising LIBOR more 
than banks. With respect to falling LIBOR, Heffernan (2002) finds that spreads for 
banks are reasonably steady for the first four months, and then fall to a low in 
June 1996, before rising for the rest of the sample period, overall rates declined by 
0.92%. Converted building societies maintain a largely unchanged spread during 
the first three months, which then rises sharply until June 1996, before falling off, 
over the period interest rates declined by 0.15%. It appears that converted 
so The four converted building societies included in Heffernan's analysis are Halifax, Alliance and 
Leicester, Northern Rock and Bradford and Bingley. However not all of these converted building 
societies issue their only credit cards. For example, Alliance and Leicester (now part of the Santander 
Group) sold their credit card portfolio to MBNA. 
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building societies are trying to obtain higher spreads by not passing on the 
benefits of declining LIBOR rates to consumers. However, banks appear, according 
to Heffernan's (2002) empirical study, to be doing the opposite. This suggests that 
the credit card market is not highly competitive. 
5.5 A Model of Interest Rate Pass-Through 
The transmission mechanism of how changes in base rate are passed-through to retail 
interest rates is described in Figure 5.6. This chapter will examine the relationship 
between the official interest rate (the Bank of England base rate) and retail credit card 
rates. 
Figure 5.6: The Transmission Mechanism 
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Source: Crespo-Cuaresma et al., (2006) 
The historically slow response of credit card rate changes in the money market rates is 
consistent with imperfect competition (Calem and Mester, 1995a). Mester (1994) 
argues that the demand for credit cards may potentially be influenced by the level of 
real interest rates in a financial market. There are numerous providers of credit cards 
and no barriers to entry, therefore one would expect such a market structure to lead 
to a competitive performance, in which price aligned with costs and issuers earn a 
normal rate of profit. 51 The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA), in 
2004, undertook an investigation into the extent and speed of interest rate pass- 
through on a basket of bank products. They found that retail interest rates on standard 
credit cards have a very weak relationship with the official rate. 52 The IFSRA was able 
to demonstrate that while average spreads had declined throughout the period of 
51 For further discussion of the structure and performance of the credit card industry see Ausubel 
(1991), Calem (1992), Calern and Mester (1995) and DeMuth (1986). 
52 In the context of the Irish study the official rate refers to the ECB repo rate. 
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study, spreads had widened since decreases in official rates had not be fully passed on 
to consumers. 
Credit card rates tend to be sticky, in other words, they tend to respond slowly to 
changes in cost. Economists have developed an explanation for this phenomenon. For 
example, when a lender lowers its interest rate, those borrowers who are most 
interested in increasing their line of credit are those who are mostly likely to be the 
least creditworthy. Lenders are only able to imperfectly indentify these lenders. Thus, 
as a result, a reduction in the interest rates could potentially lead to higher default 
rates, which in turn lead to the lenders costs riding. The lender can lessen this problem 
by only passing on a fraction of the market interest rate fall to its consumers. 
The interest rate charged on credit card loans helps to cover many costs which 
associated with offering credit card services; this may also explain why issuers do not 
change their rates in tandem with changes in their cost of funds. Raskovich and Froeb 
(1992) investigated how quickly various loan rates changed in response to changes in 
the net cost of providing loans. They found that during the 1980s interest rates on 
credit cards loans varied with changes in the net cost of providing credit card loans to 
about the same extent as interest rates on other types of loans responded to the net 
cost of providing these loans. 
Interestingly, credit card interest rates appear to have become more responsive to 
changes in the cost of funds in the 1990s (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999). Variable-rate 
credit card plans were of minor importance up until the early 1990s (Stango, 2002), 
however by the mid-1990s variable-rate deals outnumbered the fixed-rate offerings, 
and accounted for a greater proportion of cards in circulation (Evans and Schmalensee, 
1999). A potential explanation for this shift is that innovations in credit scoring have 
enabled issuers to identify which cardholders are good and which cardholders are bad 
credit risks with great accuracy. Issuers are therefore able to fine-tune their credit card 
offerings to individual cardholders. 
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5.5.1 Marginal Cost Pricing Model 
In a textbook setting of perfect competition with complete information, prices are 
equal to marginal costs and the derivative of prices with respect to marginal cost is 
equal to one. The derivative of prices with respect to marginal cost typically deviates 
away from one when the assumptions of perfect competition and complete 
information are relaxed. Following Rousseas (1985) the marginal cost pricing model for 
the price setting of banks is: 
ri, c = Yo, i + Y1, irt `+ Ei, r (5.1) 
where rt is the "price" set by bank by i, in other words the interest rate, yo is a constant 
term and rtm is the marginal cost of providing credit approximated by the base rate. 
The intercept term yo is a measure of mark-up, that is, how much a credit card issuer's 
rate is marked above the Bank of England's official base rate over the long-run. The 
parameter yo is expected to be positive for credit cards. The slope coefficient, Vi, 
measures the degree of interest rate pass-through in the long-run from the Bank of 
England's base rate to the interest rate charged to cardholders on outstanding 
balances. If bank interest rates are set within a fully competitive environment they will 
respond quickly and completely, while interest rates set in less competitive or 
oligopolistic segments, adjustment will be slow and incomplete (Laudadio, 1987). 
Values larger than one may signal overshooting, and values below one may represent 
limited pass-through. Both over- or under-shooting are the result of market 
imperfections, but do not solely reflect market power (Sterken, 2006). Complete pass- 
through exists in the long-run if y1= 1. Pass-through is incomplete in the long-run if yl 
< 1. Incomplete pass-through may be attributable to switching costs, informational 
asymmetries, or other market imperfections (Payne and Waters, 2008). If yi > 1, then 
De Bondt (2002) argues that banks are not rationing credit rationing, but instead are 
increasing lending rates to compensate got additional risks. in addition, Kok Sörensen 
and Werner (2006) argue that overshooting may be due to credit risk factors reflecting 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers. 
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The issue of interest rate pass-through is usually estimated using one of the following 
methodologies: panel data estimation, error correction model (ECM) and vector 
autoregression model (VAR). This research will employ the error correction 
methodology. 
5.5.2 The Adjustment of Retail Credit Card Rates to the Base Rate Using 
an Error-Correction Framework 
Hannan and Berger (1991) state that in the presence of fixed adjustment costs retail 
bank interest rates will adjust to changes in market interest rates are lower than the 
costs of maintaining a non-equilibrium bank rate. As a consequence, it is important 
that a time dimension is explicitly considered in the adjustment process of retail bank 
interest rates to changes in market interest rates (de Bondt, 2002). According to de 
Bondt (2002), the degree of market power and asymmetric information costs are likely 
to have long-term effects, while switching costs are expected to play a role in the 
short-term adjustment process of bank rates to changes in the market interest rate. 
It is therefore appropriate to specify the adjustment of retail bank interest rates to 
changes in the base rate within an error correction framework. The main advantage of 
using this empirical approach is that it takes into account both the short-term 
dynamics as well as the possibility of a cointegration or long-term equilibrium 
relationship between the retail interest rate and the base rate (Scholnick, 1991; 
Winker, 1999). 
Thus, using the single equation ECM it is possible to model both the long-run 
relationship and the short-run dynamics. The term "error correction" model applies to 
any model which directly estimates the rate at which a change in Yt returns to 
equilibrium following a change in Xt. The ECM implies that the behaviour of Yt is tied to 
Xt in the long-run and that short-run changes in Yt respond to deviations from the long- 
run equilibrium. The single equation ECM enables the impact of such structural change 
to be easily analysed. Following de Bondt (2002), the error correction model can be 
written as: 
Art =a+ flirt - . ý(rn, t-i - Yo - Yirt `1) + £t (5.2) 
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Where r,,, t is the interest rate charged on outstanding balances in period t and rt' is the 
market interest rate in month t. The long-run equilibrium relationship is given by 
rn, t_1 - µn - Snrml lagged one period. 
A gives the rate at which the model re-equilibrates, that is, the speed at which it 
returns to its equilibrium. Formally, A indicates the proportion of the disequilibrium 
which is corrected with each passing month. 
The error correction model is estimated both on aggregated and issuer level data. 
There are two reasons motivating this decision to estimate the model on aggregate 
data. First, the sample period is longer; second, some issuers had to be excluded from 
because they had an insignificant market share. The aggregate data set comprises 
information on all the interest rates if all issuers which exist in a particular month. 
5.6 Econometric Estimation and Results 
This section presents the empirical results of estimating an error correction model to 
examine the dynamics of base rate pass-through. However, before estimation can take 
place some preliminary analysis must be undertaken. 
5.6.1 Preliminary Time Series Analysis 
Non-stationarity is a property which is common to many macroeconomic and financial 
time series and indicates that a variable has no clear tendency to return to a constant 
value of a linear trend (Greene, 2002). In the case of a K-variable system of non- 
stationary series, it should be possible to determine up to K-1 cointegrating vectors. 
Thus, if both the credit card and the base rate series are non-stationary, the spread 
between the credit card interest rate and the base rate should be stationary. If these 
rates are cointegrated, then a VECM should reveal the short-term dynamics of the 
pass-through mechanism (Humala, 2005). Therefore it is important to examine the 
stationary condition before continuing further. 
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5.6.1.1 Unit Root Tests 
Preliminary standard unit root tests have been conducted for each interest rate series. 
Unit root tests are conducted to verify the stationarity properties (absence of trend 
and long-run mean reversion) of the time series data so as to avoid spurious regression 
(Ozdemir, 2009). A series is said to be weakly or covariance stationary if the mean and 
autocovariances of the series are not time dependent. If a time series has a unit root, 
the most convenient way to remove non-stationarity is to take first differences of the 
relevant variable. A non-stationary series which after being differenced d times, 
becomes stationary, is said to be integrated of order d and denoted as I(d) (Chama and 
Deadman, 1997). 
Following a visual inspection of the base rate and the credit card rate and their first 
differences, which appear to follow a random walk. The results of the unit root tests 
are presented in Table 5.8. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the base rate cannot be 
rejected, however the first difference of the base rate appears to be stationary, this 
leading to the conclusion that the series is 1(1). The null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
credit card rate cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level; however the null 
hypothesis is rejected after first differencing the credit card rate. 
Table 5.8: Unit Root Tests 
- 
Aggregate Data 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Credit Card 
-0.975 -1.017 
tCredit Card 
-11.489 -11.565 
Base Rate 
-0.975 -1.489 
A Base Rate 
-7.129 -7.400 
Notes: All coetticients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
No intercept or constant included. No lags included based on the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
a is the first difference operator 
The aggregate market segment data is examined over the period November 1999 to 
May 2007. A visual inspection of the data was undertaken and the unit root tests 
carried out. Table 5.9 presents the results of the unit root tests. Due to the sample 
period being shorter than the aggregate data, the base rate is again tested for 
stationarity. In all cases the absence of a unit root could not be established and it was 
possible to accept the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 percent significance level. 
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Table 5.9: Unit Root Tests 
- 
Market Segment 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Standard 
-0.805 -0.723 
AStandard 
-10.107 -10.113 
Gold 
-1.174 -1.162 
AGold 
-9.420 -9.425 
Platinum 
-0.854 -1.088 
APlatinum 
-7.313 -7.297 
Base Rate 
-0.585 -1.022 
A Base Rate 
-5.342 -5.344 
Notes: All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
No intercept or constant included. No lags included based on the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
A is the first difference operator 
Finally, the individual issuer's interest rate time series are tested for stationarity along 
with the base rate. Table 5.10 presents the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron tests for stationarity. 
Table 5.10: Unit Root Tests 
- 
Individual Issuers 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Barclaycard 
-1.576 -1.595 
ABarclaycard 
-8.894 -8.877 
MBNA 
-2.033 -2.226 
AMBNA 
-9.343 -9.350 
HBOS 
-1.337 -1.351 
AHBOS 
-9.247 -9.247 
HSBC 
-2.527 -2.644 
AHSBC 
-9.277 -9.277 
RBS 
-2.868 -2.858 
ARBS 
-9.602 -9.609 
Nationwide 
-1.720 -1.638 
ANationwide 
-10.062 -10.116 
Co-operative 
-1.400 -1.434 
Mo-operative 
-9.481 -9.491 
Egg 
-2.135 -2.144 
AEgg 
-9.417 -9.417 
Lloyds TSB 
-1.845 -1.953 
ALloyds TSB 
-9.323 -9.384 
Capital One 
-0.079 0.029 
A Capital One 
-9.591 -9.597 
Base Rate 
-0.585 -1.022 
A Base Rate 
-5.342 -5.344 
Notes: All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
No intercept or constant included. No lags included based on the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
A is the first difference operator 
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The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test shows non-rejection of the null hypothesis of 
a unit root for all interest rates in levels and a clear rejection of the null hypothesis of a 
unit root for those rates in first-differences. Thus, this evidence is consistent with 
interest rates being integrated of order one, l(1). The Phillips-Perron test also indicates 
that for each interest rate series, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected. 
All interest rates series are found to be of order 1(1). 
5.6.1.2 Cointegration Tests 
Engle and Granger (1987) argue that, although a set of economic time series are not 
stationary, there may exist some linear combination of the variables which is 
stationary. Thus the next step is to test for cointegration in the data series, to 
determine whether there is a long-run relationship between the variables. 
To test for the presence of cointegration between each credit card interest rate and 
the market interest rate, Johansen's (1988) test for cointegration was used. The 
Johansen methodology searches for cointegrating relations in a vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model, and thus indicates how many co-integrating vectors, if any, may be 
present. The Johansen test is considered to be superior to the residual-based 
methodology proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), because the latter test is 
inefficient and may be inappropriate if there are multiple cointegrating vectors 
(Heffernan, 1997). 
Having found that all series are of order 1(1), Johansen's trace test is used to test for 
cointegration between the chosen credit card series and the base rate. Table 5.11 
shows that co-integration is indeed found between the aggregate credit card rate and 
the base rate. A lag length of seven is chosen. 
The maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics show that there is one cointegating 
relationship between the aggregate credit card rate and the base rate, at the five 
percent level. The finding confirms the existence of an underlying long-run stationary 
steady-state relationship between aggregate credit card rates and the developments in 
the base rate. 
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Table 5.11: Johansen Cointegration Test 
- 
Aggregate Data 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 20.93 18.17 
r<1 0.8049 3.74 
r<_2 
- 
a. Trace Statistic 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 2013 16.87 
rS1 0.8049 3.74 
r<_2 
- 
b. Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 
-0.65 -1.22 -1.60 
r51 
-0.68 -1.29 -1.70 
r52 
-0.66 -1.27 -1.69 
Notes: All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
c. Information Criterion 
The results of the trace statistic for the market segment data is found in Table 5.12. All 
three rates are found to be cointegrated with the base rate, however the chosen lag 
length depends on the market segment. A lag length of 21 was chosen for standard 
credit cards, a lag length of 18 for gold cards and a lag length of 24 for platinum credit 
cards 
Table 5.12: Johansen Cointegration Test 
- 
Market Segment 
Standard Gold Platinum 
Lag Length 21 18 24 
Trace Test 
r=0 19.08 36.63 67.13 
r=1 0.31 0.43 1.80 
r=2 
- - - 
Note: All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
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In all three cases the trace statistic indicates that there is one cointegrating 
relationship between the chosen market segment interest rate and the base rate at 
the five percent level. 
Table 5.13 shows the results of testing for co-integration between Barclaycard's 
portfolio interest rate and the base rate. As the trace statistic at r=0 of 32.40 exceeds 
its critical value of 15.41, thus the null of no cointegrating vectors is rejected. In 
contrast, since the trace statistic at r=1 of 1.16 is less than the critical value of 3.76, the 
null hypothesis of one or fewer cointegrating equations cannot be rejected. Thus, it 
can be concluded that there is one cointegrating vector. This finding is confirmed by 
the maximum-eigenvalue statistics and by minimizing the information criterion. 
Table 5.13: Johansen Cointegration 
- 
Barclaycard 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 32.4027 15.41 
r51 1.1606 3.76 
r<_2 
- 
a. Trace Statistic 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 31.2422 14.07 
r51 1.1606 3.76 
rS2 
- 
b. Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 3.7729 2.1077 1.0104 
r51 3.5087 1.7854 0.6498 
r52 3.5528 1.8102 0.6618 
Notes: All coetticients in bolo are significant at the 5 percent level 
c. Information Criteria 
Detailed results of testing for co-integration between other issuers and the base rate 
are reported in Appendix B, however a brief summary of the results can be found in 
Table 5.14. 
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Table 5.14: Lag Length and Rank 
Issuer Lag-Length Rank 
Barclaycard 22 1 
MBNA 
- 
No Co-integrating Vector 
HBOS 17 1 
HSBC 24 1 
R BS 23 1 
Nationwide 16 1 
Co-operative 
- 
No Co-integrating Vector 
Egg 
- 
No Co-integrating Vector 
Lloyds TSB 24 1 
Capital One 13 1 
Note: Alaike Criterion used to choose lag length 
5.6.2 Aggregate-Level Analysis 
Having determined that there is a cointegating equation between the credit card 
interest rate series and the base rate series, it is now possible to estimate a bivariate 
cointegating VECM for these two time series. Following Ozdemir (2009) a symmetric 
error correction model with the following specification is estimated: 
Acreditcardt = Ek=1(Pk Acreditcardt_k + Eq=o Wy Lbaseratet_Q 
+A[creditcardt_1 
- 
ßbaseratet_1 
- 
rTrend 
- 
a] + et 
(5.3) 
where creditcardt denotes the interest rate charged by credit card issuers on 
outstanding balances, baseratet is the base rate as determined by the Bank of England. 
The error term Lt is assumed to be normally distributed and not serial correlated. The 
term inside the square brackets is the long run equilibrium lagged by one period. The 
speed of adjustment parameter is denoted by A. The adjustment parameter is 
interpreted in the following way: for example, if A is estimated to be 
-0.25, then this 
would indicate that in a case of a shock to the credit card rate which changes its value 
relative to the equilibrium value, the one forth of divergence is eliminated in the 
following period (Ozdemir, 2009). 
Equation (5.3) is estimated with a lag of twelve months and a trend coefficient, thus a 
model has been generated which captures both the long-run relationship and the 
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short-run interaction between the average rate of interest charged by issuers on 
outstanding balances and the base rate. Table 5.15 summarises the long-run 
coefficients a and 0 as well as the speed of adjustment coefficient X. 
Table 5.15: VECM Results 
- 
Aggregate Data 
Coefficient Standard Error 
Adjustment Parameters 
A 
-0.090 0.044 
Short-Run Parameters 
EK= Vk 0.610 * 
YQ_o tog -0.132 * 
Long-Run Parameters 
a 
-11.589 ** 
6 
-1.707 -0.146 
r 0.032 ** 
Notes: * All Short-Run estimates and associated standard errors can be found in the Appendix. 
** Identification of the parameters in the cointegrating equation is achieved by 
constraining them to be fixed. Fixed parameters do not have standard errors (Stata 
Corporation, 2005). 
All coefficient is bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
The estimates of the normalised cointegrating vector (long-run) which illustrate the 
long-run adjustments for the credit card rate-base rate relationship is given by the 
following equation: 
creditcardt_1 -1.71baseratet_1 + 0.03Trend - 11.59 (5.4) 
Based on the results present in Table 5.15 and equation (5.4), the long-run adjustment 
of the credit card rate with respect to a one percent change in the base rate is 1.71 
percent. Final pass-through of the base rate to retail credit card rates is well above 100 
percent. This overshooting may, amongst other factors, be explained by asymmetric 
information costs without credit rationing (de Bondt, 2002). If credit card issuers 
increase their lending rates exactly one-for-one with the base rate then they will 
attract a more risky class of borrowers. Thus as a consequence, issuers have to 
increase the lending rate premium. 
A number of studies have documented that the credit card business has been 
exceptionally profitable (Park, 1997). Ausubel (1991) finds that the credit card market 
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is extremely profitable due to the substantial premiums which are involved in the sale 
of credit cards. Therefore it is of no surprise to find that the average mark-up over the 
base rate is 11.59 percent. 
At the macro level, if the Monetary Policy Committee are using the base rate as the 
key instrument for changing aggregate expenditure and money aggregates. The 
coefficient A describes the speed at which any disequilibrium in the long-run 
relationship between the base rates and the lending dissipates. The adjustment 
parameter, A, suggests that on average only 9 percent of any base rate change is 
passed-through to consumers within a one-month period. The adjustment towards 
equilibrium is extremely sluggish in the credit card market. This finding supports the 
work of Ausubel (1991) and Calera and Mester (1995), who suggest that interest rates 
associated with credit cards are sticky. 
As mentioned previously in Chapter Two, Ausubel (1991) suggests a variety of 
explanations for this puzzle, including the possibility that credit card borrowers do not 
fully anticipate the degree to which they will use credit cards. Calem and Mester 
(1995) provide empirical evidence that consumer search and switching costs may 
explain interest rate stickiness. Section 4.8 of Chapter Four confirms that there are 
switching costs present in the UK credit card market. 
This sluggishness in the short-run may be due to a wide array of factors. Firstly, issuers 
may be slow to respond to changes in the base rate as they face adjustment/menu 
costs. As a consequence, issuers may decide to adjust lending rates less frequently but 
when they do decide to adjust their rates they do so by a substantial amount. An 
alternative explanation for this sluggish behaviour is that instead of changing interest 
rates in response to a change in the cost of funding, credit card issuers manipulate 
non-price attributes. In Chapter Four, a hedonic pricing model was used to ascertain 
the implicit values of non-price attributes on a sample of credit cards available to new 
consumers and it was found that there was a wide range of characteristics related to 
any given credit card. It is possible that an issuer may choose to change, for example, 
the length of the introductory offer on purchases or balance transfers or the 
components of the loyalty programme in response to a change in the cost of funds, as 
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the cost associated with doing so are lower than that of the menu costs associated 
with notifying cardholders to changes to their interest rates. 
Second, the way in which banks adjust their lending rates is likely to depend on the 
maturity mismatch of their loan and deposit portfolio. The more long-run loans which 
are covered by long-term deposits, the less pressure banks feel to adjust their lending 
rates. In other words, it matters how responsive their liability side is to base rate 
changes. Banks that have extensive recourse to long-run deposits such as saving 
deposits which are not particularly affected by market rates are likely to be slower to 
adjust their lending rates compared to those banks whose liability side relies more 
heavily on deposits or other forms of financing, which are more sensitive to market 
rates (Weth, 2002). Third, if banks have long-term relationships with their customers, 
they may wish to smooth interest rate changes. Finally, macroeconomic conditions 
may also have a bearing on the pass-through mechanism. 
Credit card issuers offer a range of credit cards to consumers. Thus the market has 
been separated into three market segments: standard, gold and platinum. By doing 
this it is possible to determine whether issuers behave differently depending on the 
card. Each individual market segment is analysed and the results are presented in 
Table 5.16. 
Table 5.16: VECM Results 
- 
Market Segment 
Standard Gold Platinum 
Coeff. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error Coef. Std. Error 
Adjustment Parameters 
-0.42 0.17 -0.39 0.23 -0.25 0.35 
Short-Run Parameters 
K_ 4.83 * 3.99 * 0.92 
2: Q_o wq -3.86 * -3.50 * 12.73 
Long-Run Parameters 
a 
-12.43 ** -11.69 ** -9.44 ** 
8 
-0.86 0.200 -0.97 0.06 -0.94 0.04 
t. 
-0.03 ** -0.0003 ** -0.03 ** 
Notes: ' All Short-Run estimates and associated standard errors can be found in the Appendix 
** Identification of the parameters in the cointegrating equation is achieved be 
constraining them to be fixed, fixed parameters do not have standard errors (Stata 
Corporation, 2005). 
All coefficients in Bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
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The estimates of the normalised cointegrating vector (long-run) which illustrate the 
long-run adjustments for the credit card rate-base rate relationship is given by the 
following equations: 
creditcardr_1 
- 
0.86baseratet_1 
- 
0.03Trend 
- 
12.43 (5.5) 
creditcardt_1 
- 
0.97baseratet_1 
- 
0.0003Trend 
- 
11.69 (5.6) 
creditcardt_1 
- 
0.94baseratet_i 
- 
0.03Trend- 9.44 (5.7) 
Based on the results present in Table 5.16 and equations (5.4 to 5.6), the long-run 
adjustment of the average standard credit card rate with respect to a one percent 
change in the base rate is 0.86 percent, while for the gold and platinum cards it is 0.97 
percent and 0.94 percent respectively. This implies that there is complete pass- 
through from changes in the base rate to the issuers' retail credit card rates as all of 
these are extremely close to one. 
The mark-up over the base rate for standard cards is 12.43 percent. The mark-up over 
the base rate for gold and platinum credit cards is 11.69 percent and 9.44 percent 
respectively. Unsurprisingly the mark-up is highest for standard credit cards. Standard 
credit cards have lower minimum income and minimum age restrictions than gold and 
platinum credit cards. The mark-up on the average standard credit card is 0.54 percent 
higher than the mark-up on the average credit card described above using aggregate 
data, while the gold card is 0.1 percent higher and the platinum card 2.15 percent 
lower. 
The symmetric short-run adjustment of credit card lending rates following a deviation 
from the long equilibrium in the previous period is 0.42 for standard rates, 0.39 for 
gold rates and 0.25 platinum rates. Only the gold estimate is significant at the 5 
percent level. 
5.6.3 Individual Issuer Analysis 
This section presents the results of individual credit card issuers, as well as enabling a 
comparison to be drawn between different issuers; it also enables a comparison to be 
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drawn between different types of issuers. The analysis is carried out for the top ten 
issuers in the UK; this includes 6 banks, 2 personal loan specialists, 1 building society 
and 1 internet provider. From the preliminary analysis only seven out of the ten issuers 
had a cointegrating relationship with the base rate. As a consequence MBNA, the Co- 
operative Bank and Egg are excluded from this analysis. Adapting equation (5.3), the 
error correction model for individual issuers takes the following specification: 
KQ 
L1issuern, t = 
Y. (pk/issuern, t_k + cwq&baseratet_q 
k=1 q=0 
+A[issuern, t_l - ßbaseratet_i - an] + E,,, t (5.8) 
where issuer, t denotes the issuer under investigation. The other coefficients are 
defined as above. At the issuer level it was not found necessary to estimate equation 
(5.8) with a trend variable. The number of lags chosen to estimate the model varied 
depending upon the issuer in question. The maximum lag length used is 24 months. 
The chosen lag length for each issuer can be found in Table 5.14. For example, 
Barclaycard is estimated with a lag-length of 22, thus in this instance K=1,2,..., 22 and 
Q=0,1,2,... 22. Table 5.17 provides the results of the bivariate error correction models. 
The estimates of the normalised cointegrating vector (long-run) which illustrate the 
long-run adjustments for the credit card rate-base rate relationship for each individual 
issuer is given by the equations in Table 5.18. As can be seen from equations 5.9 to 
5.15 the mark-up over the base rate varies quite substantially. Nationwide has a mark- 
up of 10.40 percent, which is the lowest of all issuers. This is not surprising given that 
the Nationwide is the only building society in the sample. As the objective of the 
building societies manager is to act in the best interests of the customers, rather than 
shareholders in the case of Banks, this may be reflected in the lower mark-up. 
HSBC has the highest mark-up of all the issuers. HSBC has a mark-up of 24.43 percent 
over the base rate. This value appears to be rather large but could simple be down the 
portfolio of cards that this issuer offers which leads to a high mark-up. 
177 
G) 
0 
N 
N 
4) 
V 
111 
GJ 
t9 
1- 
0 
W 
-i * " * 
N 
ß 0 O 
O 
4- 
M cli 
0 
, 
cu 0 O O O 
V p 
ö 
W O 00 ü iF " 
to O 
13 O O 
4- 
N 
co 
cn ' N 
Ln Im 
Lt) 11 
ü ° ° 
v m 
* * " 
v 
ü 0 
co 
Ln 
s 
oq a) O :t o M 
o0 
V 
im 
U N i fV 
0 
? 
- 00 W O 
* * 
* u1 Ö Ö 
N 
N 
O 
co 
y N N 01 
i 01 r% 
V O O N to Q 
O 
W 
N 
* * [t 
.a p O 
ra N 
ü 
m 
Cl ''-4 
p 
u1 
Q1 
0 00 
Ü ° O ° 9 
ate. L 
v 
ýa E E a CX. Q a 
a 
v C 3 
x 
xu dý 
,a 
ti' l0 M 
to 
ui O O 
c 
0 
O. I, y 
Cl 
0 0 
IT 
CO 
V O N 4 
0 O t0 
co 
yL- O 
Vn F- 
V, 
O 
d Ö OMi Ö 
N 
V ö 
. -i ö ö 
+: v 
a 
k ä a 
c CL 
ä 
4. 
c 
cc 9 3 
c OF 
Q 
-ý ý W W ° ts m 
fu 
fO 
tn 
0 
cu v 
"O 
v 
ro 
N 
C) 
i 
0 
C 
0 
'O 
N 
N 
41 
E 
to 
m 
m 
O. 
e: x ei 
C) 
=X 
U 
O 
NO 
OE CL Q, aM 
N" 
to 
uC 
LC 
in N 
X0 
cv 
Cl ja Cl. v 
0, 
mr 
cu 
ON 
aý c 
M. 2 
ro y 
Q (U W 
o on 
(U 'Z U 
ön ä 
«o °r in 
cy to « 
V) 
u 
N 
Zcu 
u o NL 
Mýc 
a) ; cE 
ro ro 
N ýC 
C). v 
Errm° 
oc 
N0NM 
7OC 
w ::., O 
4- uö E- 
0OO 
vi v CL 
0 Q 
K 
M 
v 
0 Z 
00 N 
Table 5.18: Long- Run Equations for Individual issuers 
Issuer Normalized Cointegrating Vector 
Barclaycard Barclaycardt_1 
- 
0.83baseratet_1 
- 
11.09 (5.9) 
HBOS HBOSS_1- 0.71baseratet_1 
- 
16.59 (5.10) 
HSBC HSBCt_1-1.65baseratet_1 
- 
24.43 (5.11) 
RBS RBSS_1 
- 
0.59baserate, 
_l - 14.25 
(5.12) 
Nationwide Nationwidet_1 
- 
1.02baseratet_1 
- 
10.40 (5.13) 
Lloyds TSB LloydsTSBt_1 
- 
0.26baseratet_1 
- 
14.49 (5.14) 
Capital One CapitalOnet_1 
- 
0.28baseratet_1 
- 
12.37 (5.15) 
The average mark-up over the base rate for Barclaycard is 11.09 percent which is the 
second lowest mark-up of all the issuers considered. Over the last several years, 
Barclaycard has reacted to falling market share by attempting to offer customers 
better service and lower interest rates. As demonstrated in Section 6.3.3, Barclaycard 
has gone from being the most expensive credit card in each segment, to being one of 
the cheapest, if not the cheapest credit card. 
Capital One has an average mark-up of 12.37 percent. Capital One has chosen in recent 
years to concentrate its efforts on the platinum segment of the UK credit card market, 
thus offering a number of cards which have exceedingly low interest rates compared 
to its competitors. RBS and Lloyds TSB have very similar mark-ups in the region of 
14.37 percent; this is not surprising given that these two issuers compete in the same 
markets offering products that are like-for-like. HBOS has an average mark-up of 16.59 
percent. 
The long-run adjustment of lending rates varies between issuers. Out of the seven 
issuers consider only one issuer "overshoots", five have incomplete pass-through and 
one passes changes on a one-for-one basis. Based on equation (5.13) it can be seen 
that the long-run adjustment of Nationwide's lending rate with respect to a one 
percent change in the base rate is one percent, this implies that in the long-run there is 
complete pass-through from changes in the base rate to Nationwide's credit card rate. 
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Nationwide is the only issuer who has complete pass-through. HSBC is the only issuer 
who "overshoots", with respect to a one percent change in the base rate, the lending 
rate adjusts by 1.65 percent. Lloyds TSB and Capital One have the lowest long-run 
adjustments with a one percent increase in the base rate leading to approximately a 
0.27 percent increase in the lending rate. Barclays passes through 0.83 percent, HBOS 
0.71 percent and RBS 0.59 percent of a one percent change in the base rate. 
There is considerable variance in the percentage of error correction within an issuer. 
The coefficients on error correction term (A) is expected to be negative and significant 
(Ozdemir, 2009). In the case of HSBC, Nationwide, Lloyds TSB and Capital One, the 
value is positive and thus an interpretation cannot be made. The symmetric short-run 
adjustment of Barclaycard's lending rate following a deviation following a deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium in the previous period is 0.19. The adjustment 
parameter for HBOS is 0.15 and RBS has the highest adjustment parameter of 0.49. All 
the coefficients are all statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level. 
5.6.4 Summary 
The pass-through process clearly differs across retail credit card rates in the UK. The 
most sluggish interest rates are those interest rates associated with standard credit 
cards. The most sluggish interest rates with respect to issuers are those of Barclaycard 
and HBOS. Furthermore, retail credit card interest rates adjust to changes in the Bank 
of England's base rate with a delay and incompletely in the short-run. At the same 
time, a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between retail credit card interest 
rates. At the market level credit card interest rates more than fully adjust to changes in 
the base rate in the long-run. Interest rates on standard, gold and platinum credit 
cards almost fully adjust to changes in the base rate. However at the issuer level, retail 
credit card rates vary, however in the main issuers fail to pass-through base rate 
changes. 
5.7 Analysis of Non-Linear Adjustment 
The analysis undertaken in the previous section assumes that the speed of adjustment 
is the same, regardless if the direction. This assumption is fundamentally flawed as the 
forces which drive adjustment in one direction may not have the same composition as 
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those which drive them in the opposite direction. According to empirical evidence, in 
the majority of markets, prices respond faster to cost increases than to cost decreases 
(Peltzman, 2000). In other words, price rigidity is often asymmetric, and in many cases 
there is relatively more downward rigidity than upward rigidity. The phase "more 
downward rigidity" refers to the scenario in which prices respond faster and/or more 
to an increase than to a decrease in cost. 
Peltzman (2000) analyzes the price adjustments of 77 consumer goods and 165 
producer goods and concludes that this type of asymmetry in prices adjustment is 
prevalent in two out of every three markets. The market for petrol (gasoline) is a well- 
known example. Consumers closely observe retail petrol prices and regularly complain 
that they rise faster than they fall. This suspicion has generally been confirmed by 
observing time series of gasoline and crude oil prices. For example, Borenstein et al. 
(1997) demonstrated that gasoline prices in the US did indeed rise more quickly 
following an increase in crude oil prices, than they fall following a decrease in crude oil 
prices. However not all empirical evidence supports this notion, Godby et al. (2000) 
does not find any evidence of asymmetries in price adjustments for retail gasoline in 
Canada. 
Asymmetries in interest rates have attracted considerable attention in the financial 
literature, both in the terms of empirical regularities and the underlying theory. 
Asymmetrical rate setting has been studied in the context of deposit rates and 
mortgage rates. The general finding is that US prime rates tend to have more 
downward pressure than upwards stickiness. There are a number of theoretical 
reasons for the non-linear adjustment of bank rates. If the conditions of perfect 
competition are violated, the pricing behaviour of banks might depend on properties 
such as the size and/or direction of the interest rates shocks, and their affect on 
expectations. According to Horvath, Krekö and Naszödi (2004): 
1. The adjustment of bank rates might differ depending on the size of the base rate 
change and/or the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Due to the presence of 
menu costs and the intention of banks to smooth interest rates for their customers, 
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banks may react more intensely to wider changes in the money market rate. In this 
case the adjustment might be significantly faster above a certain threshold. 
2. The adjustment of bank rates may also differ depending on the sign of the base 
rate change and/or the sign of the deviation from the long-term equilibrium. 
3. The effect of yield volatility on pass-through is analysed. Higher volatility and hence 
higher interest rate uncertainty might attenuate the adjustment, as banks judge 
the changes in the money market rate to be transitory. 
Toolsema and Jacobs (2007) study the asymmetric price adjustment of mortgage rates 
in the Netherlands. They use two main interest rates series for their study. The first is 
the average interest rate that the Dutch banks charge for a mortgage with a fixed 
interest term of five years. The second is the long-term (10-year) interest rate. Using 
these two time series, Toolsema and Jacob (2007) estimate a co-integration 
relationship in a bivariate VAR framework, where the mortgage rate is explained by the 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium in the previous month and by the current and 
lagged increases as well as decreases in the capital market rate. Toolsema and Jacobs 
(2007) find that Dutch market rates adjust asymmetrically to changes in their costs. 
Specifically, they find that the response of the mortgage rate it is stronger if the cost, 
that is the capital market rate, increases in comparison to the situation where the cost 
decreases. 
5.7.1 Explanation of Asymmetric Price Adjustments 
A number of theoretical explanations for asymmetries in price adjustment have been 
advanced in the current literature on pricing. This section provides an overview of 
general explanations. Economic theory does not suggest a pervasive tendency for 
prices to respond faster to costs changes in one direction than to those in the other 
direction. According to traditional economic theory, homogenous firms which compete 
on price will earn zero profit and costs shocks are completely transferred to final 
prices. 
Perhaps the most intuitive explanation for asymmetric price adjustment relates to 
market concentration. For example, if barriers to entry are high, then there may be 
scope for firms to co-ordinate prices. Even if firms are unable to explicitly co-ordinate 
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on price there may be room for tacit collision. It is possible for tacit collusion to occur 
with full or partial information on input prices which are available to all participants in 
the market. If information about input prices are asymmetric and firms are engaging in 
an implicit collusive agreement. If firm X's input price increases and other firms are 
unable to observe this, then firm X will choose to quickly increase their output price to 
signal that they are adhering to the agreement. On the other hand, if firm X's input 
price falls, it will be hesitant to decrease its output price, as other firms may interpret 
this as firm X deviating from the collusive agreement, and thus punish firm X by 
competing aggressively (Damania and Yang, 1998). 
However, even if input prices are common knowledge, it is still possible for tacit 
collusion after a decrease in input prices, if the old output price is used as a trigger 
price. In this situation, before the price change, all firms charge the equilibrium 
oligopoly price. The equilibrium will decline, if the input decreases. Firms can then use 
the old equilibrium price to facilitate collusion. If every firm chooses to continue to 
charge the old equilibrium price, then all the other firms will make supernormal 
profits. If one firm decides to reduce their price, all the other firms will follow in order 
to protect their market share. Essentially, no firm has an incentive to adjust their 
output price following a decrease in the input price. Neumark and Sharpe (1992) 
analyse consumer deposit rates and observe that asymmetries occur as a consequence 
of market concentration, which acts as a proxy of market power. 
A second potential explanation based on market power builds on consumer search and 
switching costs. Often it is assumed that searching for a lower price is costly. With 
regards to local monopolies, in the short-run the firm will have some market power, as 
they only have to lower prices to the competitive level, after consumers have engaged 
in the process of search. In other words, the firm is able to slowly pass on decreases in 
the input price to consumers, so they are able to benefit temporarily from higher profit 
margins. This particular argument is more relevant to markets which the demand for 
the product is relatively inelastic (Toolsema and Jacobs, 2007) 
Asymmetries may be caused by adjustment or small menu costs which are incurred by 
firms when they wish to adjust the price or output of a product. Levy et al. (1997) finds 
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that menu costs may indeed prevent price changes. With respect to supermarkets, 
Levy et al. (1997) finds that approximately 20-35 percent of cost-based price 
adjustments are not implemented because the cost of the adjustment exceeds the 
benefit they would receive from doing so. Survey evidence by Blinder (1994) suggests 
that the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs deters price increases more often 
than price decreases; this implies a downward asymmetry in price adjustment. Blinder 
(1994) suggests that this type of asymmetry occurs because firms fear that they may 
lose sales if rivals choose not to match their price increase. 
Unexpected changes to firms' inventory can result in firms incurring costs in the short- 
run. Finite inventories and production lags mean that positive demand shocks cannot 
be accommodated as quickly as negative shocks to demand (Reagen and Weitzman, 
1982). Borenstien et al. (1997) argues that this partially explains the asymmetries 
which are observed in the market for gasoline. Although, according to Peltzman (2000) 
this effect is not particularly important. 
The concept of the kinked demand curve can be used to explain asymmetries. While 
the standard kinked demand curve model does not explain asymmetric adjustments it 
does predict price stickiness in either direction (Toolsema and Jacobs, 2007). 
Roufagalas (1994) assumes that there is a "re-optimisation" cost to consumers' 
financial planning. If a price increase occurs after consumers have decided on their 
optimal consumption bundle, then consumers must re-optimise and incur the 
associated cost, as otherwise their budget constraint will be violated. However, a 
reduction in price will only lead to consumers re-optimising when the decrease is large 
enough. If the reduction is only small, then consumers will simply choose to consume 
the planned bundle and save the excess. This explanation implies that the inverse 
demand function has a complete inelastic (vertical) segment below the current price. 
Thus, a firm facing this demand curve will have no incentive to reduce output after a 
reduction in input prices; as such a reduction will not imply higher sales. Brown and 
Yücel (2000) suggest another variety of the kinked demand concept, when explaining 
asymmetries in the gasoline sector. They argue that, when gasoline prices rise, 
consumers may accelerate purchases in order to beat further price increases, thereby 
causing the price to rise even faster. However, on the other hand, as prices fall, the 
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purchase of gasoline may not slow by much, as consumers fear running out of 
gasoline. 
Other explanations include, for example, Peltzman (2000) who suggests vertical 
market linkages, since they tend to be positively correlated with the asymmetry in his 
empirical results (Toolsema and Jacobs, 2007). Asymmetries tend to increase as the 
number of intermediaries increase. Brown and Yücel (2000) mention mark-ups over 
the business cycle. The difference between price and marginal cost tends to rise as the 
price level increases. De Haan and Sterken (2005) suggest that asymmetries occur as 
banks incur, so-called "offer costs". Mortgage deals offered by financial institutions 
often have an expiry date. While offering a particular deal it is possible for the market 
rate to rise. The client may be allowed to benefit from a lower interest rate if the 
market rate decreases and this may induce asymmetric pricing (Toolsema, 2003). 
5.7.2 Asymmetric Price Adjustments in the Credit Card Market 
Not all of the explanations discussed above apply to the credit card market. For 
example, tacit collusion due to asymmetric information with respect to input prices 
does not seem to be a relevant explanation, since the main "input price" is known by 
all participants in the market. In addition, theories based on inventories and input 
supply shocks does not seem very important for credit cards either, since credit card 
issuers can always turn to the capital market where they ultimately face an "infinite" 
supply of funds at the current interest rate. Also, explanations based on menu costs 
and vertical market linkages do not seem particularly relevant either. Therefore, 
asymmetric credit card rate adjustments might be due to tacit collusion with 
symmetric information, consumer search or switching costs, or varying mark-ups over 
the business cycle. 
A potential explanation for asymmetries in the dynamic behaviour of credit card rates 
is related to prepayment risk (Alink, 2002). In the case of credit cards this refers to the 
risk that current clients may transfer outstanding balances to other issuers if interest 
rates are uncompetitive. This may lead to lower interest revenues from outstanding 
balances. Asymmetries in credit card rate changes may be due to the practice of 
offering fixed rate credit cards for a period of five years. Fixed-rate cards are offered by 
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a number of issuers in the United Kingdom, however the popularity has declined in 
recent years. 
5.7.3 A Model of Asymmetric Cost Adjustment 
The majority of studies which focus on the asymmetric pricing of loans and deposits 
find that the asymmetries favour the lender, for example, Hannan and Berger (1991), 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Allen, Rutherford and Wiley (1999), Toolsema and Jacobs 
(2001) and de Haan and Sterken (2005). However, a small number of papers favour the 
borrowers such as Frost and Bowden (1999) and Chong, Liu and Shrestha (2006). 
Consider the following simple long-run mark-up model, which assumes that, in the 
long-run, issuers set interest rates as a simple mark-up on the cost of funding: 
ri, t = ai + 
ßi rtm + Ei, t (5.16) 
Where r, t is the interest rate charged on purchases by issuer i at time t, and rt' is the 
base rate. The coefficients a; and 8; are issuer-specific mark-up and pass-through 
parameters, respectively. Ej, t is a residual. To recap, a long-run multiplier of one implies 
a perfect (one-to-one) pass-through of the market rate change to the retail interest 
rate in the long-run. A long-run multiplier less than one, implies that there is limited 
pass-through in the long-run, whereas a long-run multiplier larger than one implies a 
kind of overshooting (S6rensen and Werner, 2006). 
To capture the short-run dynamics an error correction model is specified. Following 
Geweke (2004) the short-run model allows for two types of asymmetric price 
adjustment. 
Es=o ý1 firms + Es 0A Orms +w RES 
-i + ü)-RESr-i + Et, r (5.17) 
RES are the residuals which are obtained by estimating equation (5.16). The subscripts 
+ and 
- 
refer to the positive part and the negative part of the time series so that: 
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Xý 1XtiifXX, t<>o 0f (5.18) 
__ 
0ifXt>0 Xt 
-{XtifXt<0 (5.19) 
The first two terms in equation (5.17) are current and lagged base rate increases and 
decreases, respectively. Collectively (X+, R') are amount parameters and (w+, cri) are 
adjustment asymmetry parameters. Amount asymmetry relates to the short-run 
dynamics, in other words, does the interest rate charged by credit card issuers respond 
as quickly to input price increases as they do to price decreases. The adjustment- 
asymmetry parameters measure whether price moves towards the long-run 
equilibrium from below at the same rate as they do from above. Short-run amount 
asymmetry occurs when 2 A+ # 2a" (de Haan and Sterken, 2005). 
The estimated coefficient of w' measures the speed of adjustment in response to the 
previous period disequilibrium relationship between the base rate and the lending rate 
when rates are above their equilibrium level. The coefficient of w measures the speed 
of adjustment in response to the previous period disequilibrium relationship between 
variables when rates are below their equilibrium level. To test whether interest rates 
adjust asymmetrically is to test whether w+ is significantly different from w-. If cri >w+ 
then it can be implied that credit card issuers adjust interest rates upwards faster than 
they adjust them downwards. 
Since the data involves monthly observations with irregular and discrete jumps, the 
positive and negative changes are integrated using the average moving sum (AMS) 
operator: 
R (x, T) = SS-TX-S (5.20) 
Hence the model which will be estimated is: 
Aria = A+ R+ + A-RT + cw+RESr 1+ co-RESc_1 + £,, c (5.21) 
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5.7.4 Results 
5.7.4.1 Aggregate Results 
The interest rate time series were tested for stationarity using Dickey-Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron unit root tests, these results have previously presented in section 
5.6.1, thus they are not reported here. From the results of the stationarity tests it 
has been concluded that the unit root properties of the time series can be used to 
estimate an error correction model. This sub-section presents the findings for the 
credit card market as a whole and for different market segments within the credit 
card market. Aggregate data at the market level is analysed over the period 
January 1995 to June 2008. Aggregate data at the standard, gold and platinum 
level is analysed over the period October 1999 to May 2007. 
" Pass-Through of Costs 
The long run parameters a and 8 are estimated by estimating equation (5.16). A 
simple OLS model is estimated. The results are presented in Table 5.19. The 
coefficient ß gives the long-run response of the credit card interest rate with respect to 
a change in the base rate. In other words, this coefficient summarises the degree of 
long-run pass-through. Complete pass-through would be achieved if ß=1. The slope 
coefficient is found to be 2.31, which is significantly greater than one. This indicates 
that credit card issuers are passing on base rate changes to consumers on an 
approximately two for one basis. This may suggest that perhaps credit card issuers are 
increase lending rates to compensate for additional risks, as pointed out by De Bondt 
(2002). This "overshooting" may, for example, be due to credit risk factors reflecting 
the asymmetry of information between issuers and their borrowers. In addition, this 
"overshooting" suggests that credit card issuers may have been attracting riskier 
borrowers over the period under review. 
Formal statistical tests also reject the null hypothesis that 0=1. This suggests that credit 
card issuers engage in rent-seeking behaviour. By passing the changes in cost of funds 
on a two for one basis, credit card issuers are extracting uncompensated value from 
cardholders without making any contribution to the economy. 
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Table 5.19: Long-Run OLS Results 
- 
Aggregate Data 
Coefficient Standard Error 
a 6.12 0.08 
6 2.31 0.41 
Observation 164 
- 
Adjusted R 0.68 
- 
Wald Tests F-statistic (p-value) 
Ha: 6=1 108.90 (0.000) 
Ho: a=0 80.93 (0.000) 
Note: All figures in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
Unsecured lending to private individuals comprises of both personal loans and credit 
card loans. The average interest rate charged on a £10,000 personal loan was 11.2% 
compared to 18.6% charged by credit card issuers on outstanding balances. Economic 
rent is defined as the difference between the income in the current use of the factor 
and the absolute minimum, required to draw a particular factor unto production, on 
average the associated economic rent of credit cards is 7.4%. While at first glance 
borrowing on credit cards at high rates of interest may appear irrational, the lower 
transaction costs can make credit card services more attractive than bank loans. 
The mark-up over the base rate is found to be 6.12 percent. This mark-up is perhaps 
surprisingly low given the findings of section 6.6.2. Having investigated the credit card 
market as a whole, attention is turned to three segments of the credit card market: 
standard, gold and platinum cards. The long-run results are presented in Table 5.20. 
Table 5.20: Long- Run OLS Results 
- 
Market Segment 
Standard Gold Platinum 
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
a 16.46 0.40 13.27 0.25 11.50 0.29 
0 0.17 0.08 0.63 0.05 0.75 0.06 
Observation 92 
- 
92 
- 
92 
- 
Adjusted R 
- - 
0.64 
- 
S. E. of Regression 
- - - 
Wald Tests F-statistic (p-value) F-statistic (p-value) F-statistic (p-value) 
Ho: 6=1 98.27 (0.00) 47.85 (0.00) 17.71 (0.00) 
H0: a=0,6=1 1723.91 (0.00) 2738.59 (0.00) 1702.12 (0.00) 
Note: All coetticients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
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With respect to standard credit cards, the mark-up is found to be 16.46 and the 
degree of pass-though is found to be considerably less than one. The mark-up on 
gold credit cards is 13.27 and again pass-through is found to be incomplete. 
Finally, the average mark-up on platinum credit cards is found to be 11.50, with 
pass-through incomplete as ß is found to be less than 1. The following general 
conclusions can be drawn. Issuers set interest rates competitively in each market 
segment as the coefficient on ß is significantly positive in each case. Standard 
credit cards appear to follow the market less closely than gold or platinum credit 
cards (ß is the lowest). Platinum credit cards follow the market most closely. The 
mark-up parameter a is highest for standard credit cards. These large mark-ups 
are consistent with the findings of Ausubel (1991) who finds that the credit card 
market is highly profitable due to the substantial premiums involved in credit card 
portfolio sales. 
The mark-up estimates here are not to dissimilar to that found in Section 5.6, 
however the pass-through estimates are found to be much lower. The standard 
credit card segments appears to be extremely sticky, with only 0.17 percent of a 
one percent change in the base rate being passed on to consumers. Pass-through 
is incomplete in both the gold and the platinum segments with 0.63 percent and 
0.75 percent of a one percent change in the base rate being passed on to 
cardholders. These values are close to the estimates obtained previously. As the 
ß's are statistically significant for all market segments, it can be concluded that 
interest rates are set competitively (de Haan and Sterken, 2005). 
The estimated residuals from the above models are used in the corresponding 
ECM-models in the next section. 
" Asymmetric Pass-Through 
To analysis asymmetric cost adjustment, equation (5.16) is estimated. To recap, 
the A-parameters indicate amount asymmetry, while the w-parameters denote 
adjustment asymmetry. Table 5.21 provides the estimation results for the model 
using aggregate credit card data, while Table 5.22 present the estimation results of 
standard, gold and platinum interest rates. 
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Table 5.21: ECM Estimation Results 
- 
Aggregate Data 
Coefficient Standard Error 
A+ 0.286 0.261 
Al 0.591 0.227 
rv+ 
-0.03 0.016 
to- 
-0.01 0.0015 
Observations 162 
- 
Adjusted R 0.11 
Wald Tests F-statistic (p-value) 
Ho: A+ = A- v HI: A+i+ A- 0.79 0.376 
Ho: to+ _ w-v Hl: to+ # to- 0.50 0.482 
Notes: All values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
For the market level data, positive and negative changes were integrated using a 
lag of two months. Other lag-lengths were experimented with. The following 
conclusions were drawn with respect to amount and adjustment asymmetry. 
From the empirical evidence presented here it can be seen that while credit cards 
respond to base rates strongly in the long-run, in the short-run they do not 
respond very strongly at all. With respect to amount asymmetry, no evidence is 
found at the market level to suggest that base rate increases are passed on more 
rapidly than base rate decreases. Credit card interest rates are found to respond 
to market rate decreases but not market rate increases. A possible explanation for 
this maybe that over the course of the sample period, credit card interest rates 
have been declining, see Figure 5.2. This model could possibly have picked up the 
fact that increased competition from new entrants has forced the average interest 
rate down. The adjustment process towards the long-run is not asymmetrical, as 
the null that c)+ = cw- is accepted. 
For standard, gold and platinum cards positive and negative changes were integrated 
over a period of 12 lags. The amount parameters (X`, X-) were largest for gold credit 
cards and lowest for standard cards. The amount parameters are insignificant for 
standard credit cards. This is not surprising as standard credit cards were found 
not to follow base rate changes very closely and only to pass on an extremely low 
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percentage of the base rate change in the long-run, similarly they were found to 
respond very weakly in the short-run. 
Table 5.22: ECM Estimation Results 
- 
Market Segment 
Standard Gold Platinum 
Coef StdErr Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
. 
l+ 0.79 1.05 0.75 1.52 0.59 
Al 
-0.46 1.19 0.49 0.56 0.34 
co+ 
-0.07 -0.21 0.10 -0.08 0.07 
m- 
-0.79 -0.17 0.09 -0.12* 0.07 
Observations 80 80 80 
Adjusted R 0.04 
R 
0.14 0.13 
Wald Tests F-statistic F-statistic (p value) F-statistic (p value) 
Ho: A; 
_ 
. 
tý v Hl: 
A# AT 
1.24 0.02 0.89 1.75 0.19 
Ho: (A) co v Hl: 
W+*CO_ 
0.22 0.06 0.81 0.16 0.69 
Notes: All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
Both gold and platinum cards have large amount parameters. In the short-run gold 
cards respond more strongly to decreases in input prices. However, platinum cards 
appear to respond more strongly to increases in input prices in the short-run. This 
response stronger respond to price increases may be related to the fact that 
platinum credit cards have a lower mark-up associated with them. It may indicate 
that issuers are less able to absorb increased costs due to platinum cards being 
priced closer to the true cost of issuing a credit card. 
According to the estimated model for gold credit cards, the lending rate adjusts 
downwards by 0.21 following a previous period's decline in the base rate. This is 
compared with an upward adjustment of 0.17 when lending rates adjust upwards. 
These estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level. 
Platinum cards adjust downwards by 0.08 and upwards by 0.12 in response to 
disequilibrium. Gold cards respond more strongly to base rate decreases than base 
rate increases. Platinum cards respond more strongly to base rate increases. 
Wald tests are undertaken to test whether the estimated asymmetric coefficients 
are significantly different from each other. If w* is not significantly different from 
w", then this implies that there is no significant asymmetry where the base rate is 
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increasing as opposed to decreasing (Schnolick, 1996). With respect to adjustment 
asymmetry it is found that the adjustment parameters are not statistically 
different for any of the credit card types. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that 
credit card issuers pass on interest increases more rapidly than they do decreases. 
Wald tests are also undertaken to test whether the estimated amount parameters 
are significantly different from each other. If X+ is not significantly different from V 
then interest rates respond to increases in the input price the same as they would 
to decreases input prices. None of the amount-asymmetry parameters are 
statistically different for any of the credit card types. This means that issuer 
respond similarly to input cost increase and decreases on impact. 
5.7.4.2 Individual Issuer Results 
Having analysed the possibility of asymmetric pricing at the market level, attention 
is now turned to issuer level. This sub-section analyses asymmetric price 
adjustment for the top ten issuers over the period October 1999 to May 2007. 
" Pass-Through of Costs 
Table 5.23 reports the results of estimated equation (5.16) for each individual 
issuer. The mark-up parameters, a;, vary from issuer to issuer. However, since 
sample contains heterogeneous products, the estimated mark-ups are 
uninformative with respect to assessing market power (de Haan and Sterken, 
2005). As ß is not significant and positive for all issuers it can be concluded that 
not all issuers price their credit cards competitively, however it is clear that 
interest rate pass-through clearly differs across credit card issuers. 
The pass-through coefficient for Barclaycard is 2.01. As this is greater than one this 
suggests that Barclaycard passes more than just the change in the base rate to 
consumers. The slope coefficient is significantly greater than one; this suggests that 
perhaps Barclaycard are increase lending rates to compensate for additional risks, as 
pointed out by De Bondt (2002). Barclaycard has a mark-up of 6.25. 
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The coefficient on ß is significant for MBNA. However, long-run pass-through is 
incomplete. This is not surprising as MBNA is the European subsidiary of the MBNA 
Corporation, which is based in the USA. MBNA thus has access funds in America 
and thus does not need to concentrate on changes in the base rate, as closely as 
British institutions, as if funds become too expensive if can access alternative 
sources with ease. The mark-up is positive and significant. HBOS has a 0- 
parameter which is close to unity and thus follows the market closely. This 
confirms the finding of Heffernan (2004) that converted building societies respond 
more rapidly to changes in the market rate. In addition, HBOS also has the one of 
lowest mark-ups. HSBC does not follow the base rate very closely and has an 
extremely low pass-through rate, of less than 50 percent. HSBC also has a 
reasonable low mark-up compared to its fellow competitors. RBS has a long-run 
pass-through parameter of 0.65 which suggests that it pass on approximately 65% 
of the base rate change to consumers. The mark-up for RBS is 13.81, which is 
similar to that of Lloyds TSB. 
Nationwide follows the base rate less closely than the other issuers. It has the 
lowest ß coefficient with a value of 0.33. Heffernan (2004) argues that the 
managers of building societies are able to build up reserves or earn a smaller 
margin on loans and deposits because they do not have to maximise profits, 
service external capital, or pay a yearly dividends to shareholders. Thus, the 
objective of a building society manager is to maximise the utility of their 
customers-shareholders. While is has been pointed out that holding a credit card 
does not entitle an individual to become a shareholder, it would not be 
unreasonable to expect that cardholders also hold other products with the building 
society which do entitle them to be a shareholder. Thus, Nationwide may choose 
to smooth interest rates. The mark-up for Nationwide is 13.71 which is also one of 
the lowest market ups in the sample. 
The pass-through coefficient for the Co-operative Bank is 1.66, this is greater than 
one. Again this could suggest that the Co-operative Bank is increasing lending 
rates to compensate for additional risks. As the Co-operative acts in the interest 
of its customers who are also it shareholders, it may be that it uses the profits 
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from its credit card business to subsidies other aspects of the business, which are 
less profitable. 
The coefficient of ß is significant and negative for Egg. A closer inspection of the 
Egg interest rate time series indicates that all interest rate changes have been 
positive, even when the base rate has fallen. Egg has the highest mark-up of all 
issuers. 
Capital One also has a pass-through parameter which is not significant. A possible 
explanation for this is that Capital One decided to re-brand some of their credit 
card products during the sample. Capital One moved away from offering a 
standard credit card which had an interest rate comparable to other issuers, to a 
product which have an annual interest rate in excess of 30 percent, which targeted 
individuals with low or non-existent credit histories. As this coefficient is not 
statistically different from zero, it may be the case that Capital One chooses to 
ignore base rate changes, focusing on ensuring that interest rates match the risk 
associated with the portfolio it holds. Capital One has the second highest mark-up. 
" Asymmetric Pass-Through 
Having considered the long-run pass-through of base rate changes, equation (5.21) 
is estimated for issuers except for MBNA, the Co-operative Bank and Egg, using the 
residuals obtained by estimating equation (5.16). Equation (5.21) is estimated for 
MBNA, the Co-operative Bank or Egg despite no cointegrating relationship being 
found in the preliminary time series analysis which was undertaken in section 
6.1.1. 
Twelve lags were used to capture the shot-run dynamic relationship in the ECM 
system. The results of estimating the asymmetric cost adjustment are presented in 
Table 5.24. Hannan and Berger(1991) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992) argue that 
asymmetric rigidities are due to the cost of adjustment and the offer two reasons 
for asymmetrical adjustment: customer reaction and collusive pricing 
arrangements. According the consumer reaction hypothesis, great rigidity in loan 
rate increases may be expected if customers react unfavourably to unstable rates. 
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In concentrated markets, lending rates may be more rigid downwards due to the 
cost of breaking collusive pricing agreements. The estimated coefficients of the 
asymmetric adjustments are in the main consistent with the common intuition 
that loan rates are more rigid downwards. According to the estimates in Table 
5.24, Barclaycard's lending rates adjust downwards by 0.12 following a decline in 
the base rate the previous month, compared with an upwards adjustment of 0.19. 
However only the upwards adjustment coefficient is significant at the 5 percent 
significance level. MBNA is found to respond to base rate increases but not to 
decreases. The same is true for RBS. 
Interestingly, some issuers respond more strongly to situations in which the 
previous month's base rate is below the long-run predicted rate. Nationwide 
adjusts lending rates downwards by 0.14 following a decline in the base rate 
during the previous month but responds to an increase in the base rate by 
adjusting lending rates upwards by 0.09. The Co-operative Bank also responds 
more strongly to when the base rate is below the long-run predicted rate. The Co- 
operative Bank responds by adjusting rates downwards by 0.37% but upwards by 
0.03. 
Given the nature of both the Nationwide Building Society and the Co-operative 
Bank, perhaps is should be of no surprise that these institutions are more willing 
to "pass-through" base rate changes more quickly than other issuers in the 
sample. In addition, during the Co-operative Bank offers a range of credit cards 
which are tied to the base rate. This means that the Co-operative Bank offered a 
rate of interest on outstanding balances which was tied to the base rate. 
Lloyds TSB responds to base rate decreases but not base rate increases, as only 
the w+ is significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, in response to a decrease in the 
base rate, Lloyds TSB adjusts its interest rate by 0.18. Capital One also responds to 
base rate decreases but not to base rate decreases. A possible explanation for this 
is that Lloyds TSB and Capital One have become less competitive compared to 
their rivals (see section 6.6.3 for a review of competition) and they are attempting 
to become more competitive and gain market share from their rivals. 
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Wald tests are used in order to test whether the estimated asymmetric 
coefficients are significantly different from each other. From the results presented 
in Table 5.24, it can be seen that the adjustment-asymmetry parameters are not 
statistically different for most of the issuers. Thus, credit card issuers adjust their 
rates upwards when they are below equilibrium at the same speed as they adjust 
them downwards when they are above equilibrium. The null hypothesis of no 
adjustment asymmetry is rejected only in the case of the Co-operative Bank and 
Egg (at the 10 percent significance level). 
In general the amount parameters are found to be insignificant for issuers at the 5 
percent significance level, which suggests in the main issuers, do not respond to 
changes in the base rate in the short-run by changing their interest rates. Price 
asymmetry can favour borrowers (Allen and McVanel, 2009). Issuers are likely to 
encounter moral hazard and adverse-selection problems when they raise interest 
rates on outstanding balances in response to higher base rates. More specifically, 
by increasing interest rates, issuers leave themselves with a riskier pool of 
borrowers. Issuers thus may be slower, to raise rates when faced with a temporary 
cost increase. Credit card issuers may be slow to respond to a temporary cost 
decrease, due to the costs associated with notifying existing customers about 
changes to their interest rates, this may be true with temporary rate increases. For 
example, Barclaycard has 11.7 million customers in the UK (Barclays, 2008), it 
would be very expensive to notify every single cardholder if they responded to 
every temporary change in the base rate. 
The amount parameters are largest for Barclaycard. Barclaycard responds strongly 
to increases in the base rate but not to decreases in the base rate. HSBC responds 
more strongly in the short-run to decreases in the base rate. However HSBC does 
not respond to increases in the base rate in the short-run. The Co-operative Bank 
also responds strongly to base rate decreases. RBS is the only issuer that responds 
to both base rate increases and decreases in the short-run. From the estimates it 
appears that RBS responds more strongly to increases in the base rate than 
decreases in the base rate. 
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Wald tests are also undertaken to test whether credit card prices respond as 
quickly to input price increase as they do to price decreases. With the exception of 
the Co-operative Bank, none of the amount-asymmetry parameters are found to 
be statistically different for any credit card. This indicates that credit card issuers 
respond similarly to input cost increases and decreases on impact. 
5.7.4.3 Summary 
In summary, the final pass-through of base rate changes to retail credit card interest 
rates is mixed. Issuers generally choose not to pass base rate changes on to consumer 
or they choose to "overshoot". "Overshooting" in the context of pass-through can 
mean that issuers are attempting to increase lending rates by a higher amount than 
the increase in the base rate, thus providing themselves with a risk premium for the 
increase in the share of more risky borrowers (Grynkiv, 2007). 
In general, no evidence of asymmetric pricing is found in the credit card market. 
However, only one aspect of pricing has been considered. It may simply be the case 
that issuers choose not to change their interest rates in the short-term and instead 
choose to change another aspect of credit card pricing. For example, the can change 
the length and the interest rate on balance transfer offers. It may be easier for issuers 
to do this means that they only have to change the offers they make to new potential 
customers. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The principle objective of this chapter was to quantify the degree of pass-through 
between a variety of money market rates and credit card lending rates. This process is 
important since it will determine in part how sensitive the domestic economy is to 
monetary policy changes as well as determining the speed at which the real economy 
responds to such policy changes. An error correction model is used to capture the 
dynamics of the UK card rate responses to changes in the Bank of England base rate. 
The test is conducted using a monthly time series of interest rates for credit cards over 
the period 1995 to 2008. In addition, monthly interest rates set by individual credit 
card issuers over the period 1999: 11 to 2007: 5. The unique data set made it possible to 
estimate an error correction model (ECM) for every issuer and for different credit card 
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products. The adjustment process is found to vary considerably between and within 
credit card products. The results suggests that the UK credit card market exhibits many 
features of imperfect competition, and that adjustment differences could affect the 
speed of the money transmission mechanism. 
The credit card data set used to investigate pass-through does not reflect all available 
information on each credit card product since there can be substantial competition in 
an array of non-price inducements built into retail products offered by banks and 
building societies that may alter more frequently than the retail rate itself. Official base 
rate changes may possibly be met by alterations to non-price dimensions of the 
products, particularly in short-run, in addition to changes in the associated retail rates. 
Therefore it is conceivable that a switch from one to the other introduces non- 
linearities into base rate pass-through as a result. 
The historically slow response of credit card rates to changes in money market rates is 
consistent with imperfect competition (Calem and Mester, 1995). It is still the case that 
credit card interest rates are slow to respond to changes in the base rate, which would 
indicate that competition within the UK credit card market is imperfect. 
Pass-through in the UK credit card market is found to be extremely mixed. Final pass- 
through of the base rate to retail credit card rates is well above 100 percent. This 
overshooting may, among other factors, be explained by asymmetric information costs 
without credit rationing. At the market segment level, standard credit cards rates are 
found to be extremely sticky. Gold and platinum credit cards appear to be more 
responsive to the base rate in the long-run. 
No common consensus can be drawn about pass-through at the issuer level. Long-run 
responses are extremely mixed. However, in the short-run all issuers respond weakly 
to changes in the base rate. This is perhaps because they are able to alter other prices 
and interest rates such as cost of balance transfers, the length of opening offers on 
purchases and balance transfers. 
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No evidence of asymmetric pricing is found in the UK credit card market, which 
suggests that credit card issuers respond to base rate increases and decreases at the 
same speed. However this appears to be an area which requires further research, due 
to the complexity of how credit cards are priced, this will be discussed in chapter 
seven. 
To complete this comprehensive review of competition in the UK credit card 
market, the next chapter of this thesis investigates price leadership. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PRICE LEADERSHIP IN THE UK CREDIT CARD MARKET 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite a wave of new entrants into the UK credit card market over the last decade, 
extremely high profits, fees and interest rates of credit card issuers indicate that the 
market structure of the credit card industry is oligopolistic rather than fully 
competitive. This conclusion is supported by the findings of chapter four as well as 
being consistent with the very large market shares currently held by the top five and 
top ten credit card issuers, 66% and 91% respectively (Mintel, 2004). 
Traditionally, competition in markets is tested in a structure-conduct-performance 
setting. This paradigm states that market structure influences the performance of 
banks. More concentrated markets facilitate collusive agreements, increase market 
power and thus the profitability of the banks. The relative-efficiency hypothesis argues 
that efficient firms have relatively higher profits and are able to increase their market 
share (de Haan and Sterken, 2006). This leads to a concentration of profitable firms. 
This chapter analyses competition between the top ten issuers in the UK credit card 
market. More specifically, it investigates two aspects of competition: price leadership 
and competitive pricing. Therefore, the research undertaken in this chapter aims to 
answer the following research questions: (1) is there a price leader amongst these ten 
issuers and (2) what the consequences does this have for competition between issuers. 
The methodology adopted in this chapter is as follows: firstly, monthly price setting 
behaviour of the ten issuers using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) framework. 
Causality tests within this framework provide insights into any potential price 
leadership. Secondly, discrete choice analysis is undertaken to enable the questions of 
whether and how each of the ten issuers' monthly decisions to raise, keep unchanged, 
or lower the interest rates depends on the interest rates charged by their competitors. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides an 
overview of price leadership theories and models. The UK credit card market is 
examined in section three. In addition interest rate data and pricing behaviour of the 
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issuers is discussed, as well as a brief review of the studies which investigate 
competition in the UK credit card market. In section four, the pricing behaviour of a 
sample of issuers in the UK is investigated using a vector error correction model. 
Section five estimates a discrete choice model to investigate how individual issuers 
respond to each other when faced with a change in the cost of funds. Section six 
summaries and concludes this chapter. 
6.2 Price Leadership 
Given that the UK credit card market is predominantly dominated by five credit card 
issuers, there is a possibility that one of these issuers acts as a price leader. In this 
situation one firm within the industry announces a price change in advance of the data 
at which the new price will take effect. The new price and date are swiftly matched by 
the other firms within the industry. Even if one of the issuers acts as a price leader it 
does not necessarily imply that other issuers, the followers, do not set their interest 
rates competitively. Price leadership is a widely observed if not somewhat imperfectly 
understood pattern of industrial behaviour (Scherer, 1980). Various types of price 
leadership have been discussed and presented by economists such as Forchheimer 
(1908), Nichol (1930), Stigler (1947b), Markham (1951), Lanzillotti (1987) and Bain 
(1960). Markham (1951) attempted to explain the various details which comprise the 
phenomenon of price leadership by identifying three distinct forms: dominant, 
barometric and collusive price leadership. These three types of price leadership will be 
discussed below in greater detail. 
6.2.1 Barometric Price Leadership 
The term barometric leadership first appeared in a paper by Stigler (1947). Barometric 
price leadership refers to a situation in which a price leader acts as a barometer to 
prevailing market conditions for other firms in the industry (Cooper, 1996). Although 
barometric leadership draws its name from the information-sharing which occurs, 
there are a number other features which are considered to characterise this type of 
phenomenon. 
Markham (1951) suggests that there are two types of barometric price leadership: the 
competitive type and the monopolistic type. The monopolistic type is often referred to 
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as collusive price leadership in the literature. The competitive form of barometric price 
leadership is characterised by: 
" Frequent changes in the identity of the leader; 
" No immediate, uniform response to price changes and, as a consequence followers 
take their time to consider the suitability of a price change implemented by the 
leader; and 
" Variations in market share. 
On the other hand, collusive price leadership is characterised by: 
"A small number of firms, all relatively large in size; 
" Substantial barriers to entry; 
" Limited product differentiation, which reinforces awareness of firm 
interdependence; 
" Low elasticity if demand, which deters price-cutting; and 
" Similar cost functions. 
According to Markham (1951: 898), "The barometric firm possesses no power to 
coerce the rest of the industry into accepting its price 
... 
it simply passes along 
information to the "Big Three" or "Big Four". 
6.2.2 Dominant Price Leadership 
The dominant price leadership model, assumes that there is one large dominant firm, 
and a competitive "fringe" which comprises of a large number of smaller firms. The 
dominant firm is the price leader and consequently sets the market price. All the other 
firms in the market are price followers. In other words, these firms are price takers, 
and each faces a perfectly elastic demand function at the price set by the dominant 
firm. An assumption of this model is that the dominant firm has complete information 
with respect to its own demand and cost functions, as well as those of its smaller 
competition. 
6.2.3 Collusive Price Leadership 
As previously mentioned, collusive price leadership was introduced by Markham 
(1951) in order to support the monopolistic solution to the oligopolist's pricing 
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coordination problem. Scherer and Ross (1990) argue that it is not possible to clearly 
distinguish between collusive and barometric price leadership. 
6.2.4 Price Leadership in the Banking Sector 
Price leadership is a perennial problem for competition regulators. In many industries 
pricing is characterised by price leadership: one of the firms announces a price change 
in advance of the date at which the new price will take effect and the new price and 
date are swiftly matched by the other firms in the industry (Rotemberg and Saloner, 
1993). Often price changes are matched pence for pence, even if the products are 
differentiated. Also it is common for a long period of time to elapses between price 
changes. Sterken (2006) argues that price leadership is not itself a bad thing, as it may 
be caused by corresponding changes to marginal cost, mixed strategies, and product 
heterogeneity. However, if price leadership signals collusive agreements, then it is a 
serious task for the anti-trust authorities. 
Banks usually move together, whether it is to introduce free banking or to restrict it. 
When the movement is to the customer's advantage, few complain. However, when 
changes disadvantage the consumer, it can look suspicious and cause complaints to be 
made. Searjeant (2002) argues that this type of behaviour does not necessarily mean 
that the banks are colluding; it could simply mean that they are all facing the same cost 
issues and are waiting for someone to take an unpopular lead. 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) observe that barometric and dominant firm models are 
often inappropriate for industries in which equal-sized players sell differentiated 
products. In such an industry, it would be expected that all players would engage in 
strategic behaviour. For instance, if one credit card issuer possesses superior 
information about demand, the less informed issuers might find it more profitable to 
follow the leader. It is likely that price leadership leads to price stickiness (Sterken, 
2006). Motta (2004) argues that collusion is more likely to occur in concentrated 
markets, especially when players have the same strength. 
De Haan and Sterken (2006) have tested for price leadership in the Dutch mortgage 
market, using data for both 5- and 10-year maturity mortgage contracts of the four 
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largest banks. Based on both an impulse-response analysis of a Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) and a probit analysis of infrequent rate changes, they find clear 
evidence of price leadership by one of the banks. Given the fact that interest rates 
change infrequently, but in most cases in rather short time intervals, the results appeal 
to the theories of dominant and collusive price leadership. In addition, de Haan and 
Sterken (2006) also use the data set with the addition of market share information to 
estimate a conjectural variation model. 
6.3 Data 
The empirical analysis is conducted using monthly posted interest rates by the top ten 
issuers for the period October 1999 to May 2007. Posted credit rate data was collected 
on a monthly basis from Moneyfacts magazine, the data set has been discussed in 
detail in section four of Chapter Five. The top ten issuers have approximately 90 
percent of the credit card market. The UK credit card market was reviewed in detail in 
Chapter Three; this section provides a brief recap of the market. In addition this 
section, introduces the issuers which will be included in this investigation and make 
some suggestions about how these issuers interact and react to each other. 
6.3.1 The Market 
In the early 1990s, the UK credit card market was dominated by the large high-street 
banks; Barclays, Lloyds TSB, the Midlands (now HSBC) and NatWest. Typically all banks 
would charge cardholders an interest rate in the region of 22%, in addition to an 
annual fee of approximately £10. Consumers had very little choice and cards were 
barely differentiates. Indeed there was an absence of competition with respect to both 
pricing and product characteristics, that is, the majority of credit cards offered similar 
terms and conditions as well as charging similar rates of interest. The changing nature 
of the UK credit card market has been discussed in Chapter Three. 
The market is dominated predominantly by five issuers (Barclaycard, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, 
MBNA and the Royal Bank of Scotland) who had a combined market share of 
approximately 67 percent in 2004 (Mintel, 2004). By the end of 2004, the top ten 
issuers in the UK had a combined market share of approximately 90% (Mintel, 2004). 
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Table 6.1: Information on Issuers 
Issuer Code Market Operating in Market Share' Ranking According to 
Market Share 
Barclaycard A Initial 15.7% 2 
Standard 
Student 
Gold 
Platinum 
MBNA B Standard 9.4% 5 
Gold 
Platinum 
Co-branded 
Affinity 
HBOS C Standard 7.8% 6 
Student 
Gold 
Platinum 
Co-branded 
Affinity 
HSBC D Standard 14.8% 3 
Student 
Gold 
Platinum 
RBS E Black 15.8% 1 
Standard 
Gold 
Platinum 
Co-branded 
Affinity 
Nationwide F Standard 1.6% 10 
Gold 
Co-operative Bank G Standard 2.3% 9 
Gold 
Platinum 
Co-branded 
Affinity 
Egg H Standard 2.8% 8 
Lloyds TSB I Standard 9.7% 4 
Gold 
Platinum 
Capital One J Initial 3.8% 7 
Standard 
Platinum 
European Payment Cards 2004-05 
Instead of simply focusing on the top five issuers this study will consider the pricing 
behaviour of the top ten credit card issuers in the UK. The reason for this is not all 
issuers participate in all market segments, thus it is possible that within a particular 
market segment an issuer may behave differently to different issuers. Analysing the 
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top ten issuers means it is possible to consider the impact of the firm structure on 
price changes. Table 6.1 provides some summary information on the ten issuers which 
are included in this study. 
6.3.2 Leadership Behaviour in the UK Credit Card Market 
There are many examples of leader-follower behaviour in the UK credit card market. 
An example of leader-follower behaviour with respect to annual fees is presented in 
Table 6.2. Following, Barclaycards announcement of their intention introduce an 
annual fee in February 1989, Lloyds followed suit in August of the same year. 
Following Lloyds implementation of the annual fee in February 1990, Barclaycard, 
Midland and NatWest subsequently follow suit. 
Table 6.2: An Example of Leadership in the UK Credit Card Market 
Date Event 
Feb 1989 Barclaycard considered introducing an annual fee 
Aug 1989 Lloyds announces annual fee, Barclays wait 
Feb 1990 Annual Fee takes effect; Lloyds estimates loss of 10% of its credit card customers 
Mar 1990 Lloyds loses 20% of its customers; Lloyds credit card profits declined substantially 
relative to other banks 
Apr 1990 Barclays announces annual fee, to take effect in June 
During 1991 Midland and NatWest also introduce annual fees 
Product innovations within the credit card are often quickly replicated by rival issuers 
as are changes in pricing structures. For example, following the wide spread adoption 
of free zero percent balance transfer offers by issuers, Barclaycard "threw down a 
gauntlet" in August 2004 by introducing a two percent fee on the amount transferred 
on to the card, up to a maximum of £35. MBNA quickly followed Barclaycard in 
September 2004. This was followed by RBS in January 2005, who introduced a fee of 
two percent with a minimum of £5 and a maximum £40. At the time of Mint 
announcing the introduction of a balance transfer fee, Stuart Glendinning, director of 
credit cards at moneysupermarket. com stated "Barclaycard is the UK's biggest credit 
card provider and their decision to implement a fee did, in my opinion, trigger others 
to follow. I expect other providers will take the lead by Barclaycard, MBNA and Mint 
and start charging for balance transfers, especially for periods of nine months and 
over" (Glendinning, 2005). In 2005 more than 50 cards were available with fee-free 
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balance transfers, however by June 2009 this had fallen to just one (This is Money, 
2009). What is clear is that once issuers observe their competitors making changes to 
their terms and conditions, pricing structures and card offerings they are quick to 
follow suit, suggesting that there is leader-follower type behaviour in the credit card 
market. While leader-follower behaviour can be clearly seen in areas such as product 
innovations, responses to OFT rulings and changes to fees, it is unclear whether leader- 
follower behaviour occurs in the setting of interest rates and thus it is the aim of the 
subsequent qualitative and quantitative work undertaken in this chapter to investigate 
the behaviour of credit card issuers with respect to each other and to examine leader- 
follower behaviour. 
6.3.3 The Pricing Behaviour of Issuers 
Table 6.3 gives the date changes made by credit card issuers to their credit card 
portfolio, that is, changes made to the average interest rate charged on their card 
portfolio. The datings clearly show clustering. However Table 6.3 does not provide any 
indication to the size of the changes. Figure 6.1, therefore shows the monthly time 
series of the credit card portfolio of each of the issuers in the sample together with the 
monthly cost of funding. No clear pattern can be detected in Figure 6.1; however one 
interesting feature of this figure is that the average interest rate charged by Capital 
One increases dramatically in August 2006. The explanation for this is that Capital One 
decided to refocus its product portfolio so that it offered cards at different ends of the 
product spectrum, the platinum and starter card segments. In general, this figure 
illustrates the same story as Table 6.3. Most of the time issuers choose not to change 
their prices; over the period 1999(11) to 2007(5) prices remain the same 
approximately 83 percent of the time. When price movement is observed in the credit 
card market, 38% percent of the time a price change is made by a single issuer. On no 
single occasion do all of the top ten issuers change their prices simultaneously. On two 
occasions, five issuers have simultaneously changed prices. On average, issuers made 
16 changes to their interest rates over the sample period. On average, seven of these 
price changes have led to a price increase and nine of these a price decrease. The Co- 
operative Bank has altered its prices on 37 occasions, while Egg PLC made only seven 
changes. 
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Some descriptive statistics of the interest rate data are provided in Table 6.4. Credit 
card issuers mostly change interest rates in small increments on an infrequent basis. A 
statistical summary of the sample indicates that between 2000 and 2007 credit card 
issuers' charged an average of 15.43 percent, while the average cost of funds, depicted 
by the base rate, was 4.70 percent. In terms of the variability, credit card rates were 
more volatile with a standard deviation of 2.18 percent compared to 0.75 percent for 
the cost of funds. 
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics for Issuer Portfolios 
Issuer Mean Median 
Minimum 
Rate of 
Interest 
Charged 
Maximum 
Rate of 
Interest 
Charged 
Standard 
Deviation 
Interest 
Rate at 
Beginning 
of Sample 
Interest 
Rate at 
End of 
Sample 
Barclaycard 15.70 14.9 11.9 19.4 19.4 19.4 12.88 
MBNA 16.42 15.9 11.1 19.62 19.62 17.9 18.83 
HBOS 14.70 14.69 12.03 17.74 17,74 17.735 12.65 
HSBC 15.93 15.93 11.9 18.83 18.83 18.83 15.9 
RBS 17.09 17.08 16.0 18.89 18.89 18.89 16.9 
Nationwide 15.26 15.26 13.9 16.9 16.9 16 16.9 
Co-operative Bank 13.51 13.51 11.7 15.98 15.98 15.78 14.92 
Egg 12.77 12.77 9.9 14.9 14.9 9.9 12.4 
Lloyds TSB 15.73 15.73 14.9 16.73 16.73 16.07 16.4 
Capital One 16.34 16.34 13.65 25.4 25.4 14.9 25.4 
At the beginning of the sample period, Barclaycard charged the highest average 
interest rate; this is consistent with the argument put forward by Wonglimpiyarat 
(2005) that Barclaycard does not compete on price instead choosing to market its 
product as a unique service. However, a series of interest rate cuts between February 
2001 and July 2002 has led to Barclaycard becoming more competitive. From 2003, 
Barclaycard was able to take full advantage of economies of scale after accepting the 
potentially profitable opportunities of servicing other credit card issuers (Batiz-Lazo 
and Nurdilek Hacialioglu, 2004), which also helped them to cut costs. By the end of the 
sample period Barclaycard, apart from Egg, who only operates in a very limited area of 
the market, had the lowest average interest rate. Thus, Barclaycard chooses not only 
to market a unique service but also competes on price. Figure 6.1 suggests that 
Barclaycard follows the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). In the early part of the sample 
Barclaycard follows MBNA, before making decisions which are in the opposite 
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direction to MBNA. In addition it appears that Barclaycard chooses to ignore the 
Nationwide Building Society. 
The personal loan specialist, MBNA, has a higher interest rate at the end of the sample 
compared to the beginning of the sample period. Only Capital One charges a higher 
than average interest rate than MBNA at the end of the sample period. MBNA makes a 
number of steep interest rate changes between April 2005 and August 2006, very small 
declines in interest rates are made at the start of the sample. Halifax Bank of Scotland 
(HBOS) in November 1999 had an average interest rate which was higher than 
Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank, Egg, Lloyds TSB and Capital One. Like Barclaycard, 
a declining in the average interest rate is witnessed. From Figure 6.1, it appears that 
HBOS follows the pricing decisions of the Co-operative Bank in the middle of the 
sample, and does the opposite to Egg between October 1999 and November 2003, 
however in general it appears that they do not really follow the pricing behaviour of 
any of the other issuers in the market. 
With regards to HSBC, Figure 6.1 shows that for large periods of time interest rates 
remained unchanged; however there has been some interest rate movements that 
means the average interest rate has declined over the sample period. Some large 
interest rate changes are observed between December 2004 and August 2006. 
Both RBS and the Co-operative begin and end the sample period with charging 
approximately the same rate of interest. RBS charged the second highest average rate 
of interest behind Barclaycard at the start of the sample period, however by the end of 
the sample period only Capital One had a higher average rate of interest. Interestingly, 
Lloyds TSB and Nationwide had altered their interest rates over the course of the 
sample period so that they were very similar to that of RBS. According to Figure 6.1, 
RBS does not appear to follow anyone, but having made changes to its average interest 
rate it does appear that other issuers make changes subsequently, thus it is possible 
that RBS acts as a price leader. Nationwide charges a higher average interest rate at 
the end of the sample period compared to the beginning. Figure 6.1 suggests that 
Nationwide do not follow any of the other issuers in sample, choosing to make their 
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own decisions with respect to interest rate changes. However the building society does 
appear to move in the opposite direction to both Egg and Capital One. 
Egg entered into the market in October 1999, charging an extremely low interest rate 
of 9.9 percent. However through a number of interest rate increases, its average 
interest rate was significantly higher in May 2007. The introduction of a second 
product in June 2005, led to a sharp decline in the average rate of interest charged. 
Egg appears to ignore the pricing behaviour of the other nine issuers, even choosing to 
increase interest rates when the base rate has declined. This suggests that Egg entry 
strategy was to price below its competitors in order to gain market share, once it had 
gained a slice of the market, it increased its interest rate. Thus, decisions to alter 
interest rates may not simply be down to a change in market conditions (e. g. increased 
competition) or changes in the cost of funds, decisions to alter interest rates may be 
made for other reasons. For example, Egg entered into the market in 1999, with an 
extremely low APR of 9.9%, which suggests they priced low in order to capture market 
share. Egg incurred start-up costs of approximately £500 million and made £150 
million lost in the first two years of trading. Thus Egg may have been unable to 
maintain such a low rate of interest and had to increase its interest rates to enable it 
to become a profitable enterprise. Out of the seven changes made to the interest rate 
only one decision was made to lower the portfolio interest rate by Egg and this was as 
a consequence of introducing a new standard credit card product in October 2005. 
Capital One had the lowest average interest rate at the start of the sample and the 
highest at the end of the sample. From Figure 6.1 there appears to be a general 
upwards trend in Capital One's pricing strategy. This reflects a change in the markets in 
which Capital One have chosen to operate in. Capital One made the decision to 
increase the interest rate on their standard credit card in order to be able to offer it to 
a wider range of customers, such as those with no or an extremely poor credit rating. 
These individuals are deemed to be a higher risk and thus interest rates have to be 
increased to reflect this and compensate for the additional risk that the issuer must 
take on. In summary, six out of the ten issuers included in this study have slashed their 
interest rates over the sample period. Barclaycard, MBNA, HBOS, HSBC, RBS and the 
Co-operative Bank all have an average interest rate which is lower at the end of the 
sample than at the beginning of the sample. This is reflected by the fact that out of the 
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117 decisions made by these issuers to change their prices, 71 of the decisions made 
were to reduce interest rates. Nationwide, Lloyds TSB, Egg and Capital One all had 
higher interest rates at the end of the sample period. In total, these four issuers made 
42 price changes over the sample period with 27 of these being to increase interest 
rates. 
Various types of credit card products are available in the United Kingdom, targeting a 
wide range of different audiences from students through to individuals who have poor 
credit ratings. As can be seen from Table 6.1 the majority of credit card issuers operate 
within three main product segments; standard/classic, gold and platinum. Therefore in 
addition to examining the behaviour of credit card issuers at the issuer level, this 
chapter will also analyse issuer behaviour at the product level. The standard/classic, 
gold and platinum credit card markets are examined in detail below. 
" 
Standard/Classic Credit Cards 
Standard credit cards are usually available to any individual over the age of 18, subject 
to the application being accepted. All of the top ten issuers offer at least one standard 
credit card product, however only one standard credit card is examined for each 
issuer, this card has been selected on the basis that it is available to new customers 
throughout the sample period. 
Table 6.5: Descriptive and Summary Statistics for Standard Credit Cards 
Issuer Mean Median 
Minimum 
Rate of 
Interest 
Charged 
Maximum 
Rate of 
Interest 
Charged 
Standard 
Deviation 
Barclaycard 16.35 15.9 11.9 19.9 3.22 
MBNA 16.68 15.9 14.9 18.9 1.11 
HBOS 17.16 17.9 14.9 19.9 2.14 
HSBC 17.01 15.9 13.9 20.1 1.85 
RBS 17.40 16.9 16.9 23.2 1.00 
Nationwide 14.92 14.6 13.9 17.9 1.20 
Co-operative Bank 15.45 14.9 13.8 18.9 1.02 
Egg 13.81 13.9 9.9 16.9 1.90 
Lloyds TSB 18.04 17.9 17.4 19.9 0.12 
Capital One 25.85 29.9 17.9 34.9 6.33 
218 
0 
N 
W) 
L 
m 
U 
a L 
L 
m 
C 
m 
C 
0 
L 
a 
C 
U) 
H 
Q 
0 
I- 
ü d 
00 
I- 
m 
U 
OC 
C 
(. O 
N 
o in o 
mm 
N Ln 0 
1-1 .I 
(%) aleb 3saJalul 
00 0 
c fo 
0 
0 I- 
a 
1 (o d 
m 
... oc 0 öE 
Z U 
E 
I- 
i 
N 
O 
3 
0 
a) U- 
m 
rn 
U in o 
a) 
c 0 
`-' 
Q 
4+ 
N 
0 
00 
to 
a) 
a 
a, CL 0 0 
u 
v 
C 0 
c 
N 
m 
u 
-92 
L 
O 
L 
C 
E 
I- 
U 
T 
f0 
v 
1. 
1 
co 
v 
v 
-D 
c 
." vi 
In 
cu 
oc 
c 
to L 
u 
a) 
tß 
tÖ 
S. D 
d 
ca 
F- 
O N W L 
.n .n 
E E 
O ü ü 
O O y 
ni ß 
u 
C 
N 
en 
d N 
f0 
L 
` 
O 
Q 
ai 
E 
u 
ö 
a, 
u ro C 7 
LL ý 
d ýC ý 
C N 
ý O 
u + Z 0 m N d p j O 
Y 
O 
d 
C N 
t 
U 
C u C 
O 
c 
N 
f0 
` 
221 
y 
,p 
f0 E d 3 
n v 
a 
.0ä 
a a LL ß' U) Z 
d ö 
L cu 
c 
°1 O 
Y o ` ö ä 
d N L 
W 
E 
ü O vj u 7 
ý C Cý ýO a C 
to ü 
m d m 
` 
y 
v '- a ü 
O v 
t,  o O z 
ö 
O1 O N t7 
O1 O 0O O 0 O 0 O 0 O 0 O 
01 O O O O O O 0 O 
11 N N N N N N N N 
a, 
v u 
C v 
0 
ä 
ü d 
01 
ä, 
.0 
c 
., 
E 
m 
:3 n (U 
t/I 
o, I 
1 
00 
u C) C ü 
N 
0 
a) 
N 
u 
C 
1 
` 
- 
T 
(p 
.Q 
- 
Cl 
-o U to 
C 
10 4J Ü u 
d ai O 
io 
bO N 
W 
W 
r+ O 
N 
y 
N 
.0 
E w E o LL 
O 
mt T 
(. ä+l 
CL 
N 
to M 
w 
C. O 3 N a (u t/1 
N 
f0 
L 
v 
Li 
u 
O 
ro 
of 
a 
0 
0 V CD N ß 
d +-. Z 
_ 
ro 
c .0 0 N ra 
,ö 
<1 I 
A 
. 
1) 
v IS 
d u 
v 
of 
m c ? 
c 0 
(o Z y 
u Z 0) 
c 
LL 
ä 0 
I- 
} 
al 
Q) a O 0 C) N 0 00 00 o0 C0 0 Iý O 
N 
N N 
N NO 
N N O O 
N 
N 
N 
Table 6.5 provides some descriptive statistics on the standard credit card interest rate 
data. Interest rates have ranged from 9.9 percent (Egg) to 34.9 percent (Capital One) 
over the sample period. On average the highest interest rate on a standard credit card 
is 25.85 percent, which is offered by Capital One and the lowest interest rate is 13.81 
percent which is offered by Egg. 
Table 6.6 details the dates of interest rate changes made by issues on standard/classic 
credit cards. Barclaycard have made the greatest number of changes to their interest 
rates, with eight changes being made over the period November 1999 to May 2007. 
The least number of rate changes have been made by Capital One, who made only two 
increases to their rates. Four out of the ten issuers have only made changes in one 
direction. All interest rate decisions made by the Co-operative Bank, Egg PLC and 
Capital One have been to increase the interest rate, while HBOS has made the decision 
to decease interest rates. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the monthly time series of the standard interest rates advertised 
by issuers. Barclaycard began the sample period charging an interest rate which was 
lower than RBS and HSBC, the same as HBOS and higher than the other six issuers 
included in the analysis. The interest rate charged on standard credit cards declined 
over the sample period by approximately five percent, this is partially due to a number 
of interest rate cuts at the beginning of the sample period. It appears that Barclaycard 
follows RBS. 
MBNA at the beginning of the sample period charged an interest rate on its standard 
credit card product which was lower than HBOS, HSBC, Barclaycard and RBS, however 
by the end of the sample period only HBOS charged a higher interest rate. Over the 
course of the sample period, the interest rate charged on a standard credit card by 
MBNA has declined by approximately three percent. Towards the end of the sample 
period it appears that MBNA is following the pricing decisions of Nationwide. At the 
end of the sample period MBNA appears to making pricing decisions which are 
opposite to that of the Co-operative. 
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All interest rate changes made by HBOS have been to decrease the interest rate they 
charge on their standard credit card product, over the sample period the rate of 
interest has declined by around five percent. HSBC at the start of the sample period 
has one of the highest interest rates, however over the course of the sample period 
this has declined by approximately three percent. From Figure 6.2 it appears towards 
the end of the sample, HSBC follows the Co-operative. 
The RBS charged the highest rate of interest on a standard credit card at the beginning 
of the sample period. By the end of the sample period the interest rate had fallen by 
eight percent, with approximately six percent of this decrease occurring around 
November 1999. RBS appears to be the last issuer to remove the annual fee, and as 
this is incorporated into the APR, it is possible that the large decrease in 1999 was due 
to the removal of the annual fee. In general the interest rate charged by RBS has 
remained almost constant with a small blip between February 2004 and April 2005. 
Figure 6.2 indicates that some of the changes made by RBS have been matched by 
other issuers in the market, which would again suggest that RBS acts a price leader. 
Nationwide offered one of the most competitive interest rates on their standard credit 
card product at the beginning of the sample, only beaten by Egg and the Co-operative. 
Over the sample period the interest rate charged by Nationwide had increased by 
around two percent, however interest rates remained constant for large periods of 
time, which suggests that the building society only changed interest rates as a last 
resort. Figure 6.2 indicates that towards the end of the sample period Nationwide 
began to follow the Co-operative. Also it appears that Nationwide ignores the interest 
rate changes of Lloyds TSB. 
The Co-operative Bank has increased the interest rate charged on standard credit cards 
by approximately four percent. Changes to interest rates have been undertaken in 
discrete steps. Towards the end of the sample period it appears that the Co-operative 
Bank may be interacting with Egg. 
Egg has made a series of interest rate increases over the sample period, which has 
meant that the interest rate charged on a standard credit card has increase by around 
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five percent. Egg appears to ignore the interest rate decisions of the other issuers and 
the other issuers ignore the pricing decisions of Egg. The interest rate charged by 
Lloyds TSB is pretty constant over the sample period; this is consistent with the 
summary statistics presented in Table 6.5 which state that the standard deviation is 
0.12. 
Capital One made two clear interest rate increases during the sample period, which led 
to the rate of interest charged on a standard credit card increasing by around 20 
percent. None of the other credit card issuers operating within the standard credit 
card market appear to follow the pricing decisions of Capital One. 
In summary, the behaviour of credit card issuers in the standard credit card market has 
been mixed. In general the newer entrants into the UK credit card market have 
increased their interest rates over the sample period, while the interest rates of 
incumbent issuers have declined over the sample period. There appears to be some 
leader-follower behaviour, but it does not appear that one single issuer leads the 
prices up or down. 
" Gold Credit Cards 
Gold and platinum cards are both classed as premium products. Premium cards have 
typically been perceived as "status symbol" cards aimed at high earners. some 
premium cards charge an annual fee and often have other financial services included 
(e. g. free foreign exchange and travel insurance). The gold credit card was the first 
status card being offered to valued customers on an invitation only basis. Individuals, 
who are offered such cards, are considered to have relatively low default risks due to 
the associated higher minimum age and income requirements. 
The descriptive statistics related to the gold credit card data is presented in Table 6.7. 
From Table 6.7 it is observed that not all of the top ten issuers in the UK actively 
participate in the gold segment of the credit card market. HSBC, Egg and Capital One 
did not issue any gold credit cards within the sample period. MBNA exited the market 
in December 2000, with HBOS and Barclaycard following in February and June of 2004 
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respectively. 53 Only RBS, Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB offered a 
gold credit card product throughout the whole sample period. 
With respect to the average rate of interest charged by each issuer on the gold 
product, it is found that the interest rate charged by RBS, Nationwide and Lloyds TSB is 
less than the interest rate charged on their corresponding standard credit card 
product. Interestingly, the Co-operative Bank charges the same rate of interest on both 
its standard and gold credit card products. This would suggest that in terms of price 
there are no benefits to holding a gold credit card to a standard credit card. The 
standard deviations associated with gold cards are lower than their standard card 
counterparts, suggesting that interest rates on gold cards are less likely to change. 
Table 6.7: Summary of Gold Credit Cards 
Issuer Period Active Mean 
Minimum 
Interest Rate 
Charged 
Maximum 
Interest Rate 
Charged 
Standard 
Deviation 
Barclaycard 10/99 
-06/04 17.94 11.9 19.9 1.99 
MBNA 10/99 
-12/00 17.3 16.9 17.9 0.51 
H BOS 10/99 
-02/04 16.50 14.9 17.9 1.10 
HSBC 
- - - 
- - 
R BS 10/99 
-05/07 17.29 16.9 17.9 0.49 
Nationwide 10/99-05/07 14.70 13.9 16.5 0.79 
Co-operative 10/99 
- 
05/07 15.45 13.8 18.9 1.02 
Egg 
- - - - - 
Lloyds TSB 10/99 
- 
05/07 16.24 15.4 17.9 0.69 
Capital One 
- - - - - 
Details of the month in which interest rate changes are made by issuers are provided 
in Table 6.8. Barclaycard made a series of interest rate decreases before it exited the 
market which suggests that it was not profitable for it to continue offering a gold credit 
card product. RBS, the Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB made 
between three and five changes to the interest rates on gold credit card products. All 
changes made to the interest rate by the Co-operative Bank are to increase the 
interest rate charged. 
53 Barclaycard is back operating in the gold segment of the credit card market; however this appears to 
be more like a standard product. 
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In addition the Co-operative also changes interest rates on gold and standard credit 
card products simultaneously. The other issuers do not change rates on products 
simultaneously. 
The monthly time-series of the interest rates charged on gold credit card products are 
illustrated in Figure 6.3. RBS appears to have an equilibrium interest rate for its gold 
credit card. At the beginning of the sample period RBS charges the highest rate of 
interest, this is probably for the same reasons stated above for the standard product, 
however by the end of the sample there has been a one percent decrease, with only 
Nationwide offering a lower interest rate. Nationwide started and finished the sample 
charging the same interest rate. Consistent with the date changes, the Co-operative 
Bank ended the sample period charging an interest rate which is approximately four 
percent higher. Over the sample period Lloyds TSB increased its interest rate by 
approximately two percent. 
In summary, the gold credit card market appears to be disappearing, with credit card 
issuers preferring to issue platinum credit cards instead. In addition interest rates 
associated with gold credit cards are less likely to be changed to those associated with 
standard credit cards. 
" Platinum Credit Cards 
Platinum cards were first introduced by credit card issuers in the late 1990s and have 
overtaken gold credit cards as the premium product. Similar to gold products, platinum 
products to begin with were offered to an issuer's most valuable customers by 
invitation, however now individuals can choose to apply for a platinum credit card 
directly from the issuer providing that they meet the minimum age and income 
criteria. Similar to the standard credit card market, issuers typically offer a range of 
credit cards within the platinum market segment, for example, Barclaycard as of 
August 2009, has two different platinum cards available to consumers. One platinum 
credit card is chosen for each issuer, where there is more than one platinum product is 
available, the one which has similar attributes and terms to cards offered by other 
issuers in the market is chosen. 
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Table 6.9 provides some summary statistics relating to platinum credit cards. Only 
Barclaycard, MBNA and Capital One have issued platinum credit cards throughout the 
sample period November 1999 to May 2007. This possibly provides a reason for why 
MBNA and Barclaycard exited the gold credit card market early on in the sample 
period. Nationwide and Egg have not entered into the platinum credit card market. 
Nationwide offers standard and gold card products, while Egg chooses to concentrate 
only in the standard segment of the credit card market. Both HBOS and HSBC have 
entered and exited during the course of the sample period. The Co-operative Bank and 
Lloyds TSB entered into the market segment in August 2001 and December 2002 
respectively. Over the course of the sample period platinum rates have ranged from 
9.8 percent to 17.9 percent. On average the cheapest platinum card has been provided 
by Capital One and the most expensive by RBS. All issuers charge on average a lower 
rate of interest on their platinum credit cards compared to that on their standard and, 
if they offer them, gold credit cards. The differential between standard and platinum 
credit cards varies between issuers. On average platinum credit cards issued by the Co- 
operative Bank have interest rates which are approximately one percent lower than 
the rate that they charge on their gold and standard counterparts, while platinum 
credit cards issued by Barclaycard are on average nearly two percent cheaper than 
their standard credit cards. 
Table 6.9: Summary of Platinum Credit Cards 
Issuer Period Active Mean 
Minimum 
Interest Rate 
Charged 
Maximum 
Interest Rate 
Charged 
Standard 
Deviation 
Barclaycard 10/99 
- 
05/07 15.76 11.9 17.9 1.29 
MBNA 10/99 
- 
05/07 15.97 14.9 16.9 0.47 
HBOS 09/00 
-02/04 15.64 12.9 16.9 1.45 
HSBC 12/99 
-04/04 15.9 15.9 15.9 1.43e'14 
RBS 10/99 
- 
05/07 16.3 14.9 16.9 0.80 
Nationwide 
- - - - - 
Co-operative 08/01-05/07 14.51 13.9 15.9 0.73 
Egg 
- - - - - 
Lloyds TSB 12/02 
- 
05/07 14.57 13.9 15.9 0.80 
Capital One 10/99-05/07 11.53 9.8 15.9 1.95 
The date changes for platinum credit cards are presented in Table 6.10. Platinum credit 
card rates appear to be stickier than that of their standard counterparts. Again 
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Barclaycard makes the highest number of changes to its interest rate, nine in total, 
three increases and six decreases. The Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB both make 
two increases in their interest rates. It appears that RBS and MBNA make decisions 
which are opposite to each other. It also appears that Capital One follows the pricing 
decisions of the Co-operative Bank with regards to decisions to increase the interest 
rate. 
The monthly time series plot of platinum interest rates is presented in Figure 6.4. In 
common with the other market segments and the portfolio, Barclaycard is the most 
expensive platinum credit card on offer, however by the end of the sample it has 
become the cheapest available credit card in this segment, with a number of interest 
rate decreases which has led to a three percent decline in the overall interest rate 
charged on outstanding balances. It appears that Barclaycard follows RBS with respect 
to decisions regarding increasing price. RBS is the most expensive issuer in this 
segment of the market, charging a rate of 16.9 percent at in May 2007. Figure 6.4 
suggests that Barclaycard, Lloyds TSB and the Co-operative Bank follows the rate 
changes made by RBS, particularly from late 2003 onwards. It appears that Barclaycard 
does not pay attention to the price changes made by MBNA. 
At the end of the sample period MBNA, the Co-operative Bank, Lloyds TSB and Capital 
One all charge the same rate of interest. MBNA has the same interest rate at the start 
and end of the sample period. MBNA makes very little changes to the interest rate it 
charges on its platinum product. Both the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB have 
increased their interest rates by two percent over the sample period. From Figure 6.4 
there appears to be some interaction between the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB. 
Capital One has generally priced lower than its competitors and has been extremely 
reluctant to change the interest rate of its platinum product. However, when Capital 
One makes changes to interest rates, they are made in large "steps". Thus, Capital One 
has gone from being the cheapest issuer in the market segment to offering a card with 
an interest rate comparable to that of MBNA, the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB by 
increasing interest rates by approximately four percent. 
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In summary, all platinum credit cards are pitched with an interest rate of 
approximately 15.9 percent. Platinum interest rates appear to be extremely sticky, and 
issuer's make fewer changes to these prices than they do to their standard credit card 
products. Also, it appears that each issuer has an equilibrium interest rate to which 
they return to after a temporary shock to the system. 
6.4 Methodology 
A number of approaches have been used to measure competition in the banking sector 
(Ashton, 1999). According to Ashton (1999), these approaches may be broadly divided 
into the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) paradigm and New Economic Industrial 
Organisation (NEIO) approaches. 54 Traditionally, competition in markets has been 
tested in a SCP setting. The SCP paradigm considers how the observable characteristics 
of a market or an industry may affect the conduct and performance of participants 
within the market (Ashton, 1999). Market structure influences the performance of 
banks, more concentrated markets facilitate collusive agreements, increased market 
power and hence increases the profitability of banks. An alternative to the SCP 
paradigm, the relative-efficiency hypothesis argues that more efficient firms are able 
to earn relatively higher profits and are able to in increase their market share. 
A number of different NEIG techniques have been employed to measure the form of 
competitiveness or the closely related concept of contestability (Ashton, 1999). These 
more modern methods focus on a structural description of banking markets as it is 
hard to identify the true structural model relating to profitability and competition. 
NEIO techniques include conjectural variation models and the Panzar-Rosse (1987) 
statistic. The Panzar-Rosse statistic is based on the empirical observation of the impact 
on firm-level revenues of variations in factor input prices (Goddard and Wilson, 2006). 
The Panzar-Rosse statistic may be used to test for long-run competitive equilibrium, 
monopoly and monopolistic competition. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is the sum of 
the elasticities of a firm's total revenue with respect to its factor input prices. If firms' 
pricing policies are consistent with the textbook model of monopoly then the H- 
statistic will be negative. H will be positive and less than unity if firms' operate in 
54 See Bresnahan, 1989 
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monopolistic competition and H will be unity under perfect competition. The Panzar- 
Rosse and Bresnahan-Lau methods require a substantial amount of information on 
quantities sold, costs, prices set, and likely candidates to identify quantity and price 
equations (de Haan and Sterken, 2006). 
Competition in the UK credit card market is analysed by considering how issuers 
operating within the credit card market respond to each other when setting interest 
rates on purchases. This chapter aims to investigate whether there is a price leader 
within the market, and if a leader exists, what impact does this have for competition 
between issuers. The methodology in this chapter is twofold. 
First, the monthly price setting behaviour of credit card issuer's is investigated using a 
vector error correction model (VECM) framework. Price leadership can be investigated 
within this framework using causality tests. Under perfect competition the VECM 
should not yield any evidence of any systematic causal price response between any of 
the issuers. This framework is discussed in greater detail in section five. 
Second, a discrete choice framework, similar to that of de Haan and Sterken (2002) 
and Allen and McVanel (2009), is used to look for evidence of price leadership, or 
whether some banks systemically react to changes in input costs more than others. 
Berger (1995) argues that dominant banks are able to set prices less competitively, 
which in turn may manifest into higher, more rigid, and asymmetric prices. Potentially, 
it is in the best interests of other issuers to follow the dominant issuer's pricing 
strategy. Under perfect competition, the discrete choice model should not suggest that 
the pricing decision of one of the issuers has a unilateral influence on the pricing 
decisions of the other issuers. The discrete choice model is outlined in section six. 
6.5 Modelling Price Leadership using a VECM 
The monthly price setting behaviour of the top ten largest issuers in the UK is 
investigated using a Vector Error Correction (VECM) framework. Before estimating the 
VECM, all interest rates must be tested with respect to their statistical properties. 
Using Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, all interest rates are found to 
be stationary after first differencing, the results can be found in Appendix C. In 
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addition, all credit card rates are found to be co-integrated with the base rate. A 
summary of lag length and the co-integrating rank suggested by Johansen's Trace test 
can be found in Table 6.11; detailed results from undertaking Johansen's tests for co- 
integration can be found in the Appendix C. For the portfolio, the Johansen test 
indicates a co-integrating rank of six, indicating that a VECM can be estimated with six 
cointegrating vectors. For the standard credit card sector, the Johansen-test indicates 
that there are nine cointegrating relationships and thus a VECM with nine 
cointegrating relationships can be estimated. A VECM with four cointegrating 
relationships can be estimated for the gold credit card sector, as the Johansen-test 
indicates that there are four cointegrating relationships. No cointegrating relationships 
were found for the platinum credit card and therefore it is not possible to estimate a 
VECM for platinum credit cards. 
Table 6.11: Lag Length and Rank 
Model Suggested Lag Length Rank 
Portfolio 4 6 
Standard 
- 
excludes capital one 7 9 
Gold 9 4 
Platinum No-Cointegroting Relationship 
Lag length based on the Akaike's Information Criterion (Akaike, 1973) 
As a consequence of the preliminary investigation of the time series properties of the 
data, the eleven interest rates under consideration span a two-dimensional space and 
thus can be represented in the long-run by six linear combinations at the portfolio 
level. Ten standard card interest rates plus the base rate are considered and are 
represented by nine linear combinations in the long-run. Finally, the four gold credit 
card rates plus the base rate are considered and in the long-run are represented by 
four linear combinations. According to de Haan and Sterken (2006) these equations 
can both be interpreted as a mark-up relation on costs. Given the independent nature 
of credit card issuers it seems plausible to have alternative mark-up mechanisms. Table 
6.12 presents the restricted co-integrated relationship for the portfolio, standard and 
gold credit cards. The coefficients restrictions have been based on statistical 
significance. 
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From the restricted cointegrating vectors relating to the issuer portfolios, it can be 
seen that all issuers enter into one or more of the long-run equations. With respect to 
the standard restricted cointegrating vectors, all issuers within the sample are only 
concerned with the base rate in the long run. In the gold credit card market only 
Nationwide and Lloyds TSB appear in the long-run equation. 
Table 6.12: Restricted Co-integration Vectors 
Market Equations 
Segment 
Portfolio RM = 2.26RF + 0.53RG - 0.60RH - 2.43R, 
RA = 1.98RF 
-1.56Ry - 1.62R, - 0.28RG 
RB 
= 
-1.22RF + 0.74RH + 3.08R, 
Rc 
-7.60RF + 2.08RH + 10.59R, - 0.97Rj 
RD 
= 
-3.72RF + 4.00RH + 8.98R, - 0.87R, 
RE = 1.08R 
- 
0.79RH 
- 
1.72R, 
Standard RA = 6.89RM 
RB = 0.58RM 
Rc = 3.26RM 
RD = 2.13RM 
RF = 
-1.11RM 
RG = 
-1.11RM 
RH = 
-2.85R 
Gold R= -0.204R 
Platinum Problem of Co-linearity-VECM could not be fitted 
From Table 6.12 it can be seen that there are six alternative mark-up mechanisms in 
the credit card market and that all ten issuers enter into one or more of the long-run 
equations. Thus at the portfolio level, all interest rates commove in the long-run. 
In the standard credit card market, Barclaycard (RA), MBNA (RB), HBOS (Re), HSBC (RD), 
Nationwide (RF) and the Co-operative Bank (RH) and the Base Rate (RM) are all found to 
commove in the long-run. However the RBS and Egg do not enter into any of the long- 
run equations. This implies that the RBS's interest rate setting policy on standard credit 
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cards only has short-run consequences for the interest rate setting mechanisms of 
other issuers operating in the standard credit card market. The interest rate setting 
policy of Egg only has short-run consequences for the pricing mechanisms of other 
issuers. This is not surprising given that in section 6.3.3, given that Egg chose to 
increase its interest rate despite the actions of the Bank of England or its competitors. 
For gold credit cards, both Nationwide (RF) and Lloyds TSB (R1) enter into the long-run 
equations thus suggesting that these rates commove in the long-run. RBS and the Co- 
operative Bank do not enter into the long-run equations. This implies that the interest 
rate setting policy of RBS and the Co-operative Bank only have short-run consequences 
for the other interest rate setting mechanisms. The base rate also does not appear in 
the long-run equation for gold cards. This suggests that the base rate does not 
influence the long-run interest rate setting mechanisms of issuers. 
Due to the problem of co-linearity it was not possible to fit a VECM for platinum credit 
cards. This is not surprising given that interest rates in the platinum segment of the UK 
credit card market have been extremely sticky and that the majority of issuers charge 
the same interest rate. 
6.5.1 Granger Causality 
Granger (1969) was the first to investigate the direction of causality between different 
variables, and hence the term Granger causality. Granger causality really implies a 
correlation between the current value of one variable and the past values of another; 
it does not indicate that changes in a variable are caused by changes in another. A 
variable yt is said to be Granger-caused by a variable xt if the predictions of yt can be 
improved by including the history of xt in the information set used for the prediction of 
y,. This is not necessary causation, it may well mean that another variable z, correlated 
with both x and y was omitted from the model, this is referred to as a spurious causal 
relation. 
The vector of endogenous variables is divided into two sub-vectors, ylt and Yet, with 
dimensions Rl and R2 respectively, so that the total dimension is R= Ri + R2. Sub-vector 
yit is Granger-causal to Yet if it contains useful information for predicting the latter. 
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First, a vector autoregressive model is estimated in levels. If the model contains p+1 
lags of the endogenous variables, then the test is based on a model with p+2 lags of 
the endogenous variables. 
[Yit] 
Y2r- 
ýi=p 
l 
[a21i 
a22ij 
kt-il 
+ CDr + 
[, l`] (6.1) 
Where Dt is a set of exogenous variables with parameters C. The null hypothesis states 
that ylt is not granger-causal to yet and is tested by checking the null hypothesis a211= 
0, i=1,2....., p+1. To test for granger-causality, the VAR model is considered in levels 
without exogenous variables. 
Table 6.13 to 6.15 present the results of the causality analysis. The tables clearly show 
that the hypothesis of no Granger causality at the five percent significance level cannot 
be rejected in all cases. Examining the portfolio, which is presented in Table 6.13, it 
can be seen that the base rate Granger-causes Barclaycard, as does the interest rates 
of HSBC, the Co-operative Bank, Lloyds TSB and Capital One. In the case of MBNA, the 
null hypothesis of no Granger causality can be rejected in the case of Barclaycard, 
HBOS, HSBC, the Co-operative Bank and Egg. The interest rate chosen by Egg Granger- 
causes the interest rate chosen by HBOS. MBNA granger-causes HSBC. 
The null hypothesis that base rate does not Granger cause RBS is rejected. The null 
hypothesis of no granger causality with Barclaycard, Nationwide, the Co-operative 
Bank or Lloyds TSB and RBS can be rejected in all cases. Lloyds TSB is found to Granger- 
cause Nationwide as is Capital One. The interest rate charged by Capital One is 
Granger-caused by the Co-operative. The null hypothesis that the base rate does not 
Granger-cause Egg can be rejected. The null hypothesis can also be rejected for does 
Barclaycard, HBOS, HSBC, RBS and Nationwide. The null hypothesis that the base rate 
does not Granger-cause Lloyds TSB interest rate can be rejected. The interest rates of 
both HBOS and the Co-operative Bank granger-cause the interest rate of Lloyds TSB. 
With respect to Capital One all tests reject the null hypothesis of no granger-causality 
with the exception of the Co-operative Bank. 
237 
0 
O 
O 
a 
c5 U 
U, 
a, H- 
N 
U 
rl 
G1 
.O t0 
I- 
N 
t 
U O rn 00 O l/1 O ct M N lo O 
A O O 
. -4 14 M , O O M 0 0 0 Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö O Ö Ö 0 
1 
N 
co 
a 
N 00 ^ O N N V N r! M o 
Ö 
L 
u N et m ýf 'i 
) 
oö 
ý 
A y ý 
N 
L 
co 'i O 01 N N N IT M to O 
A Cl I! 1 O Nl N N 00 M Ui N O 0 O O O O O O O O O O 
0 
0 
Li a 
co U, 
x 
-T '4 N 0' O O V fý 1ý N 
r m I, " m Ln V1 
.4 N ýf 
u c; M N N ý4 14 ej M V1 00 
N 
L 
U N Ln M M O of to O lo to O 
A O M 
. 
ti 
, 
N 
. 
ti N tO O to m 
J3 Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
0 
a Ö 
co I 
94 
:E 'e? C, 4
r4 to 0 
-,: p LM 
O 00 t7 N N f, ul N co N O co 
C 
0 
a N W L 
U to O N M in V1 't O N N O A M O 
" 
O O N O O O M 
. -4 O 
L O Ö Ö Ö O O Ö O O O O 
Q 
0 
ä 
Z 
co 
N 
-41 to N V1 N N M cq C31 N 
u 
0 0 
- 
'i . 4 -1 -4 -4 e n 
N 
s 
U M 1N m O N Ln O 00 M O O 
A O 
, 
LI1 cf O M 
. -4 O [f O O O 
. fl L O O D D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
i 
ü 
0 
Q. 
m 
L 
m r4 V N n r, M O LD N 
, 
m lD 1, tO l0 
U 0 M N ýt 6 Ln M 0 0 (n, N O 
N 
N 
L 
U U, 4 :r 0 et a m 00 M m U, 
A 
" 
V R O M N %D O O 
. -4 O O 
.0 O 
Ö Ö O Ö O O Ö O O O 
M O 
ä (0 
m 
co (n N al n 0 N 
t . 
^ ^ N ^ 
" 
" tp V 
N 01 
U l0 ýyj O O vt nj O 00 ý 0 to ri Ln 
00 
C U 
N > N 
x N 
'p 
3 
1+ 
T 
CO 
kA 
C 
0 
uj to > 0 C O vý /0 
ai 
i 
u Z O m v 4 00 
> ä 
m co 
m 
Z S m Z U w = ýp V 
N_ 
Z 
V 4 
-4 ti O O O O N O O O 
A O O O O O O O W O O 
" 0 ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö p 
c ä 
O 
CL ü 
N 
, 
N 
O 
Z 
l0 I N Iý O N in Q1 N 
V N N N rn 00 tD co N ß ti 10 V1 N ý-I N 
N 
o U-1 N O l0 N 00 O 
. 
ti O 
A O O M O M N N oO N O O 
a O O O O O O O O O 0 0 
co 
0 ý 
f- 
C 
N CY) 
00 to l0 
en 
i, 
co 
W m M 
-l 
1- 
co 
O 
LM 
L'I OO O1 
cl 
u ti 01 V V V) LA LA 
1 ý p 
ý y 
N 
t 
o N 
. -4 m o 0 O N to V1 0 
A O O a q O O O N N O O Ö O O O O O O O 0 0 0 0 
0 C a 0 
ö 
Q 
W 
N -41 IR N 00 ri ea-1 M O Q , 
W 
Lr? 
= 
u 
ri 
rr 
ä 
-4 ^ 
0 
.4 
L2 
w 
I, 
N 
LA 
ti ýi ui 
c 
of N 
N 
L 
u 1, 01 0) 
_4 N N M to l0 O O 
A UI 0 m m m N , ' W 0 0 
a ö o ö ö o ö o 0 ö ö a 0) o 
;, a 
d 
a 0 
0 u N N CO 
--4 m d' 00 m N rl 0 
N 
L Ol 
N 
q 
.i 00 1ý O 00 V 0 
u CO 
-cr -T V N m N N N ti 
N 
o o m N '7 LD lD v1 R ei 0 0 A O 
.i N N eY M 
" 
O ri O O O 
Ö O Ö O Ö Ö Ö O O O O Ö 
'ö ä 
c 0 
.a z 
N 
O u1 
.1 
O 
CO tY V! O ID V1 m 
" 
Ol 
m 
_ CO 
0 
" 
CO W 
.. 
ý 
u oÖ r, ui L! i ff mal' a, tG ý 
, 
M , 
r+ 
a) _0 c) 
> 
cc C C 
Y 
> 3 
N UI 
F O 
a 
11 
u Z O O 
( 
m 
co 2 
_ 
C 
_ 
. 
co z 6 ü 
en U 
> a. 
ü _ 
< 
00 m N 
In 
L 
tu U 
L 
i tu 
N 
N 
N 
v 
to 
a 
Co F- 
N 
o o r1 0( N N 00 N N M 'i A O N N IT i I- O O t7 R N 
O O O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
L 
a 
U 
N 
N m m e-1 N ^ m M m E 
-! m O 
. 
N 
~ 
u1 01 
U N 00 N l0 m LO Ln h, 
N 
U r-i co A O q 
" 
O o N N al q O 
J2 O O O 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 
ä 
In O 
co 
2 
N N 10 
N 
N 
00 
-4 0 O1 1ý N 
M 
Y1 0) 
^ 
U ý4 M N N 00 Iý . -ý r m L l ti 
N 
L 
U M N O N N of Ol M 1N O 
A O e-1 O IR O 
-! O O O O 
.0 0 c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ö Q 
z 3 
W 
in 
00 m 00 ä N ^ Ol R N rn 
0 ä a L i d ý 1 ,.. 4 
N 
L 
U N O a In o 
. 
ti 
. -4 O N O 
A 
-4 , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
in ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö d d 0 
m 
u 
ä 
(o ü 
(`o 
m 
Ln tD o) P, en N M 
~ O OI l0 1N l0 00 fN N 
N 
-4 
N ^ 
N e e4 1 ý-1 ry 
N 
L 
u (7) 
A , 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 0 0 0 
.n 
ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö d 
of 
0 
'' 
m 
m 
eil N (3) 00 0 V0 1 ^ r4 10 m N Cl) 
V ti 00 M N M N N 
d 
y 
ü a 
i+ 00 
W 
O_' N Q A CL 
N 
V o 
co 'J In N p T i. 
co co 
Co 
2 
_Ca 
I 
4A 
i_ 
CO z ü W J ä 
N 
U 0 
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ö 0 
in ö ö ö ö ö ö ö ö d ö 0 m L 
a 
I- 
N 
0 
J 
N Omi N 0 N 
rn 00 . 
-1 Lf 00 O M cq 
_ 5- . ,D N 6 
.4 4 
. 
O M N N O O M Vl N N Vl : N eJ r, 
N 
L 
U 
. -1 oo ui o Ln o .i v o 0 A O O O O O O O N 
" 
O O 
O O O O O O O O O O 
O 
I- 
a 
m m W 
N N r, V 1 C4 '! Ln V1 r, 01 rn Cl) Cý Ö In 
N 
N 
. -l -4 N 0 N r N i r4 
N 
U o 0 0 0 o O O O 0 0 
A o 0 0 0 o O O , o 0 0 
. 
ö o o o ö o o ö o ö 
c ä 
o 
ö 
CL Q 
W 0 
U 
N 
N 
M 0) M Ln1 
m 
M 
co 
Ol 
Tr 
M 
C) Ln 
X 00 k6 N 6 Lr k6 N N fli CT o6 Q 
1 (. 6 1N 
u 
c6 
10 
N 
. tt 
N 
t 
U O i N o O o O 
. -i o O A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
.O 
Ö o o Ö Ö o Ö Ö Ö Ö 
O O 
0 ä 
c 
40 
. m Z 
u1Oi 
ä N ö N m m O N 
00 ° U m 
-q N 
N v 
m 
. -4 
' 
N 
L 
V O L! t N O e-4 Ol 1N O M O A O O O O N 00 N O N O 
O O Ö O O O 0 Ö O O 
0 
I- 
a 
N 
N O m N N M 17 ri N tT 
M 
L 1N 
, 
Pal m l0 
U N M N M 
N M tY N 
rl 
M 
N 
72 C) > 3 y m ý co 
x ö y 
w cl: 
9 
N 
co 
f 
co 
Co 
co 
2 
Vf 
2 
m fO 
Z 0 U 
to 
to 
w 
T 
rn 
m 
N 
The causality analysis for standard credit cards is presented in Table 6.14. As with the 
case of the portfolio, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality cannot be rejected at 
the five percent level. The null hypothesis that the base rate does not Granger-cause 
individual issuers interest rates is rejected at the five percent level for all individual 
issuers except for Barclaycard in which case the null hypothesis is accepted. With 
respect to Barclaycard, with the exception of the base rate, the null hypothesis is 
rejected in every case. HBOS, RBS and Egg are followed to granger-cause MBNA. 
MBNA, HSBC and Lloyds TSB are found to granger-cause HBOS. The Co-operative is 
found to granger-cause HSBC. MBNA, HBIS and Egg are found to Granger-cause RBS. In 
the case of Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB the null hypothesis of 
no Granger-causality is rejected in every instance. HBOS, RBS, Nationwide and Lloyds 
TSB are found to granger-cause Egg. 
The causality analysis relating to the four issuers who compete in the gold segment of 
the credit card market are presented in Table 6.14. In all cases the base rate is found to 
granger-cause the individual issuers' rates. Nationwide is found to granger-cause RBS. 
On an individual basis RBS, the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds TSB are found to granger- 
cause Nationwide. The null hypothesis that RBS, Nationwide or Lloyds TSB Granger- 
causes the Co-operative Bank's rate of interest cannot be rejected. The null hypothesis 
of no Granger-causality is rejected in all cases with regards to Lloyds TSB. 
The base rate is included in equation (6.1) to test the mechanism by which it affects 
retail interest rates. If the Bank of England attempts to tighten monetary policy by 
increasing the borrowing rate and this is not passed on to consumers in the form of 
higher credit card rates, then the transmission mechanism is said to be weak or non- 
existent. 
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6.5.2 Impulse Response Functions 
An impulse-response function (IRF) describes how the K endogenous variables react 
over time to a one-time shock to one of the L disturbances. Impulse-response 
functions reveal the implied dynamics of the VECM, that is, how does a shock to a 
particular interest rate affect the other interest rates? If there is a market leader 
present in the credit card market, then the pricing decisions of this particular issuer, is 
likely to have a substantial and persistent impact on the pricing behaviour of its 
competitors. 
Figure 6.5 presents the impulse-responses for shocks to issuer's portfolio interest rate. 
Overall, it is evident that changes to the base rate do not have a significant impact on 
the individual issuer's interest rates. Monetary policy has very little impact on credit 
cards interest rates, instead credit card issuers respond to each other. This finding 
supports the findings of Chapter Five which finds credit cards are sluggish to respond 
to changes in the base rate. This implies that the market is competitive. This finding 
also suggests that the market environment is extremely important in the terms of price 
setting. 
Figure 6.5 presents the impulse-responses for shocks to issuer's portfolio interest rate. 
The title provides the file name, the name of the impulse variable and the name of the 
response variable. So for example, the first column of Figure 6.5, illustrates how 
Barclaycard responds to a shock to itself, how Barclaycard responds to a shock to the 
base rate and so on. With respect to rows, the first row of Figure 6.5, illustrates how 
the other issuers in the sample respond to a shock to Barclaycard's interest rate. Rows 
one, three, four, five, six, seven, eight; indicate that shocks to the interest rates of 
Barclaycard, Capital One, the Co-operative Bank, Egg, HBOS, HSBC and MBNA only 
have a very small impact on the interest rates of other issuers. 
The tenth row shows that shocks to Nationwide's interest rate leads to a very slight 
positive impact. Column ten presents the response pattern of Nationwide. It can be 
seen that Nationwide in the main does not respond to any other the other issuers. 
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It can be seen from the eleventh row that a shock to RBS's interest rate impacts on all 
of the interest rates of the other issuers. A shock to RBS's interest rate has a long-run 
positive impact on Barclaycard, HBOS, Capital One, MBNA and Nationwide. However, 
the impact is negative in the case of HSBC and Egg. The Co-operative's interest rate 
appears to be unaffected by a shock to RBS's interest rate. 
Column two shows illustrates how the base rate responds to a shock to each of the ten 
individual issuers interest rates. It can be seen that the base rate does not react to a 
shock to any of the individual issuers. Row two shows that a shock to the base rate 
does have impact on the pricing of credit cards. However, it is evident that shocks to 
the base rate affect the individual issuer's interest rates in different ways. Barclaycard 
responds positively to a shock to the base rate as does the Co-operative Bank and 
HBOS. Egg and HSBS respond negatively to the shock to the base rate, although HSBC 
does after a negative reaction begin to behave in a positive manor. Lloyds TSB, RBS and 
Nationwide appear in the main not to respond to a shock to the base rate. It is possible 
that smoothing takes place and thus that some issuers do not respond to shocks to the 
base rate until they have determined whether these shocks are permanent or not. 
At the portfolio level it appears that monetary policy has some impact upon credit card 
rates. In addition, it does appear that credit card issuers to react to each other, 
although the amount they react by appears to be rather small. 
The impulse-responses for shocks in the standard credit card are presented in Figure 
6.6. Capital One is not included in this analysis as the card it offers does not appear to 
match the standard products offered by the other nine issuers. Again, column two 
presents the response pattern of the base rate. As with the portfolio, the base rate 
does not respond to shocks to any of the issuer's interest rates. Row two illustrates 
the impact of a shock to the base rate on the interest rates offered by issuers on their 
standard credit card products. The impact of the base rate appears to be far less than 
that at the portfolio level. The interest rate charged by Barclaycard responds to a shock 
to the base rate, in the short-term the shock has a negative affect before it becomes 
positive. 
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The shock to the base rate impacts negatively on MBNA's interest rate. However, in 
general standard credit card interest rates do not respond to a shock to the base rate. 
The first column of Figure 6.6 indicates that Barclaycard sets prices competitively as it 
responds if to its rivals if they suffer a shock. Column three suggests that the co- 
operative Bank responds to all issuers except for Egg and Lloyds TSB. However the 
reaction is only very small. Egg appears not to take into account shocks to its rival's 
interest rates, this may be due to the finding in section 6.3.3 that in the main its pricing 
decisions were the opposite of its rivals; this is illustrated in column four. Column five 
illustrates how HBOS responds to its rivals. Column six indicates that in the main HBOS 
responds positively to the shocks that its rivals experience. Column seven illustrates 
the response pattern of Lloyds TSB, who does not respond to its rivals. The eighth 
column shows that if the other issuers suffer shocks to their interest rates, that 
MBNA's interest rates are affected. 
The ninth column depicts how the Nationwide Building Society responds to shocks to 
the interest rates of its rival issuers. The Nationwide does not appear to respond to its 
rivals. Its interest rates are not affected by shocks to its rival's interest rates. Perhaps 
this is unsurprising due to Nationwide being the only building society to issue credit 
cards. As discussed in Chapter Four, the managers of a building society are likely to 
have different objectives to that of their plc counterparts. By not responding to shocks 
straight away, the Nationwide chooses to smooth interest rates. The tenth column 
illustrates the response patterns of RBS to shocks to its rival's interest rates. RBS 
appears to very unresponsive to its competitors. 
In the case of the standard segment of the UK credit card market, monetary policy has 
very little impact on credit cards interest rates. Instead credit card issuers respond to 
each other. This suggests that the market is competitive. Also this finding indicates 
that the market environment is extremely important in the terms of price setting. 
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The impulse-response diagrams for gold credit cards are presented in Figure 6.7. A 
shock to any of the gold credit card interest rates does not affect the base rate. A 
shock to the base rate does have a slight impact on each of the issuers as shown in row 
one. From the second column it can be seen that a shock to the base rate has a 
positive effect on the Co-operative Bank. The third row indicates the effects of a shock 
to the interest rate charged by Lloyds TSB to the other issuers. A shock to Lloyds TSB 
impacts on the Co-operative Bank's interest rate but does not affect the interest rates 
of Nationwide or RBS. The fourth row shows that a shock to Nationwide's interest rate 
does not affect the other interest rates. RBS appears to be immune to shocks to other 
issuers' interest rates. The fifth row shows the effects of a shock to RBS's interest rate 
on the other issuers. In most cases a shock to RBS leads to more competitive pricing by 
the other issuers. 
In summary, the analysis undertaken here indicates that the credit card market is 
competitive with issuers choosing to respond to interest rate shocks of their rivals. 
The base rate is included in the model to test the transmission mechanism. If the Bank 
of England attempts to tighten monetary policy by increasing the borrowing rate and 
this is not passed on to consumers in the form of higher credit card rates, than the 
transmission mechanism is weak or even non-existent. The transmission mechanism 
appears to be quiet weak, thus supporting the findings in Chapter Five. 
6.6 A Discrete Choice Model of Price Leadership 
The competitive price behaviour of UK credit card issuers is further investigated by the 
means of a discrete choice model. Using discrete choice analysis it is possible to 
consider how a credit card issuer's decision to raise, keep the same or lower their 
interest rates depends on the interest rates of their competitors. As can be seen from 
Figures 6.1 to 6.4 decisions to change interest rates are taken on a much more 
infrequent basis than decision to leave the interest rate unchanged. Like de Haan and 
Sterken (2006), the following model is used to describe the code pattern of each 
issuer, i, at period t. 
c1, r = arý, r-i + Ej i ßl r, r-i + 2rm. r-i i. j=A, B,..., Ij (6.2) 
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where c; tE (-1,0,1) is the dependent variable and is coded into a value of 
-1 if the 
interest rate is lowered, 0 if the interest rate is left unchanged and 1 if the interest rate 
is decreased. R, is the issuers market rate, r is the interest rate charged on outstanding 
balances by credit card issuer, i. The market rate is intended to capture the cost of 
funding for issuers. If the cost of funding increases (decreases), banks will increase 
(decrease) the rate at which they will lend. 
Equation (6.2) relates the interest rate decision of issuer, i, today, the interest rate it 
charged the previous month, the interest rate of their competitor's and to the cost of 
funds. De Haan and Sterken (1996) envisaged that a <0 and A>0; however there is a 
range of possible outcomes for P. If 0=0, then the issuer does not pay any attention to 
the actions of another bank, if 0>0 then the issuer follows its competitor and finally, if 
0<0 then interest rate changes are made contrary to the decision of its competitor. 
The market interest rate is included so that the mechanism in which they affect 
administrated interest rates can be tested. If the central bank attempts to tighten 
monetary policy by increasing the borrowing rate and this is not passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher interest rates, then the transmission mechanism is 
said to be weak or non-existent. If interest rate changes follow market rates then the 
coefficient on A should be positive. 
Table 6.16 presents the results of estimating equation (6.2) using the average interest 
rate charged on the portfolio. Following the work of de Haan and Sterken (2002) and 
Allen and McVanel (2009), only the coefficients from estimating the ordered probit 
model are presented, however the marginal effects for this model are presented in 
Appendix C. The dependent variable, c; t runs horizontally across the Table 6.16, 
therefore the first dependent variable is Barclaycard, the second MBNA and so on. The 
first vertical column of Table 6.16 presents the independent variables. Thus, looking at 
the second column in Table 6.16 it is possible to see how Barclaycard reacts to its 
competitors and the base rate. The coefficient on a is significant and negative. The 
suggestion made previously in section 6.3.3, that Barclaycard follows RBS is confirmed, 
as the coefficient of RBSt_1 is significant and positive. 
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Barclaycard makes decisions which are in the opposite direction to the Co-operative 
Bank. As the coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is significant and positive, it can be concluded 
that Barclaycard makes changes to its interest rates following a change in the market 
rate. 
MBNA follows the pricing decisions of Nationwide but does the opposite to that of 
HSBC. The coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is not significant and thus changes made by 
MBNA to its interest rates do not occur after a change in the base rate. HBOS like 
Barclaycard follows RBS. However, changes to its portfolio are not made following 
changes in the base rate. HSBC acts in the opposite direction to both Nationwide and 
Lloyds TSB. As the coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is significant and positive, it can be 
concluded that HSBC makes changes to its interest rates following a change in the 
market rate. The coefficient of a is negative and significant for RBS. RBS does not 
interact with any of the other issuers in the market. The coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is 
not significant; therefore changes by RBS do not follow base rate changes. Nationwide 
does the opposite to HBOS. The coefficients on a and A are not significant. The Co- 
operative Bank follows MBNA and HBOS but moves in the opposite direction to RBS 
and Capital One. Changes to the portfolio are made following changes to the base rate. 
Egg follows the pricing decisions of HSBC, but does the opposite to Nationwide and 
Lloyds TSB. Lloyds TSB follows HSBC but does the opposite to the Co-operative Bank. 
Changes made to interest rates by Lloyds TSB follow changes in the base rate. Capital 
One follows MBNA, like MBNA the coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is found not to be 
significant. 
6.6.1 Price Leadership when Cost of Funding is Declining or Increasing 
In many industries, empirical studies have shown that the identity of the leader tends 
to vary, see for example, Scherer and Ross (1990), Nicholls (1951) and Markham 
(1961). Scherer and Ross (1990) point out that one of the "distinguishing 
characteristics" of price leadership in industries that do not have a dominant firm is 
that the identity of the leading firm changes from time to time. As has been seen in 
Chapter Five, it is possible that firms behave differently when interest rates are rising 
and falling. This sub-section therefore aims to investigate whether issuer behave 
differently during periods when the base rate is increasing to periods when the base 
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rate is decreasing. in other words, does one issuer lead prices upwards and another 
downwards? Chapter Five of this thesis found that building societies tended to lag 
behind banks in passing rate changes on to their credit card rates. 
Table 6.12 presents the results of estimating equation (6.2) using the average interest 
rate charged on the portfolio, over the period March 2000 to July 2003 when the base 
rate is declining. It should be noted that convergence was not achieved when the 
equation (6.1) is estimated for MBNA, RBS, Egg and Lloyds TSB. Nevertheless, the 
values are reported in Table 6.17 for completeness; however, discussion of these 
coefficients will not be included here. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is not significant for any of the top ten 
issuers. Barclaycard is found to follow the pricing decisions of MBNA and RBS. Both 
HBOS and HSBC make pricing decisions which are contradictory to Egg and Nationwide. 
Nationwide is found to follow Capital One. The Co-operative Bank makes pricing 
decisions which are the reverse of RBS. 
The results of estimating equation (6.2) over the period August 2003 and May 2007 
when the base rate is increasing is presented in Table 6.18. Increased costs of funds 
means that credit card spreads are eroded as are profit margins. Convergence was not 
achieved for the estimation of equation (6.2) for MBNA, Nationwide, Egg and Lloyds 
TSB. For completeness the estimated coefficients are included in Table 6.18, however 
as the standard errors are questionable no conclusions can be drawn from these 
estimates. 
The coefficient on Base Rate1_2 is not significant for any of the issuers except for Capital 
One. Barclaycard makes decisions relating to pricing which are opposite to that of 
Lloyds TSB. HBOS follows Barclaycard and the Co-operative Bank but does the opposite 
to HSBC. RBS does not interact with any of its rivals. The Co-operative Bank follows 
MBNA but does the opposite to RBS. Capital One follows MBNA, RBS, Egg and Lloyds 
TSB but does the opposite to Nationwide. 
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6.6.2 Does the Size of the Interest Rate Change Effect Issuer Behaviour? 
Having examined whether issuer behaviour changes depending upon whether the cost 
of funds is increasing or decreasing, the dependent variable in equation (6.2) is 
recoded so that issuer behaviour can be examined in the context of how much an 
issuer decides to alter their interest rates by. The dependent variable c;, t is recoded so 
that into a value of 
-2 if the interest rate is lowered by more than one percent, -1 if the 
interest rate is lower by less than one percent, 0 if the interest rate remains the same, 
1 if the interest rate is increased by no more than one percent and 2 if the interest rate 
is increased by more than one percent. 
The empirical results are presented in Table 6.19. The coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is 
found to be positive and significant for Barclaycard, RBS, the Co-operative Bank, Egg 
and Lloyds TSB; which suggests that all pricing decisions made by these issuers follows 
a change in the base rate. The coefficient on a is negative and significant for issuers 
except the Co-operative Bank and Capital One. Barclaycard follows RBS and does the 
opposite to the Co-operative Bank. MBNA follows Nationwide but does the opposite 
to HSBC. HBOS does the opposite to Egg. RBS follows the Nationwide and does the 
opposite to Lloyds TSB. The Co-operative Bank follows MBNA, HSBC and Nationwide 
but does the opposite to RBS. Egg follows HSBC but does the opposite to Nationwide 
and Lloyds TSB. Lloyds TSB follows HBOS but does the opposite to the Co-operative 
Bank. Capital One follows MBNA and Egg. HSBC and Nationwide does not react to any 
of the issuers. 
6.6.3 Price Leadership in Different Sectors of the Credit Card Market 
in this sub-section monthly interest rates advertised by the ten largest credit card 
issuers are used to investigate price leadership behaviour and issuer interaction within 
different sectors of the UK credit card market. From the data collected it has been 
possible to separate the credit card market into three sectors: standard/classic, gold 
and platinum. 
6.6.3.1 Standard/Classic Credit Card Segment 
All issuers except for Capital One have credit cards for offer in this segment of the 
market. Capital One has been excluded from this market segment as the card which it 
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classifies as a standard credit card fits the definition of an initial credit card. An initial 
credit card is one which has an extremely high typical APR and is designed for 
individuals who have no existing credit history, low annual income or have a poor 
credit history which they wish to improve. Capital One's standard credit card is more 
likely to compete with Barclaycard's initial credit card which has a typical APR of 
27.9%0.55 
This analysis therefore considers only the top nine issuers in the UK. The results of 
estimating equation (6.2) for standard credit cards are reported in Table 6.20. The 
coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is significant only for Lloyds TSB, while the coefficient a is 
negative and significant for Barclaycard, Nationwide and Egg. Barclaycard follows 
HBOS but does the opposite to HSBC and Nationwide. MBNA follows the pricing 
decisions of Nationwide and Egg; however, it does the reverse to HBOS. Egg tracks the 
Co-operative Bank. HBOS, HSBC, RBS, Nationwide, the Co-operative Bank and Lloyds 
TSB do not react to the price changes of any of their rivals in the standard segment of 
the credit card market. 
6.6.3.2 Gold Credit Card Segment 
Table 6.21 reports the results for gold credit cards. As discussed previously, only four 
of the top ten issuers compete in the gold credit card market; RBS, Nationwide, the Co- 
operative Bank and Lloyds TSB. Both Lloyds TSB and RBS do not react to their market 
rivals. Nationwide follows the Co-operative Bank. The Co-operative Bank does the 
opposite to RBS; however unlike its rivals it does make changes to its interest rates 
following a change in the Base Rate. In addition the coefficient on a is also negative 
and significant for the Co-operative. 
55 For more information on initial credit cards and more particularly the Barclaycard initial credit card see 
http: //www. barclaycard. co. uk/personal-home/cards/initial/index. html (accessed 7`h September 2009). 
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Table 6.21: Ordered Probit Results 
- 
Gold Credit Cards 
Issuer RBS Nationwide Co-operative Lloyds TSB 
RBSt-1 
-59.13 0.51 -7.32 -17.10 
Nationwidet_1 
-23.20 -0.43 0.41 -15.18 
Co-operativet_1 
-9.36 0.60 -1.86 20.64 
Lloyds TSBt_, 16.00 
-0.70 0.11 -33.40 
Base Ratet. l 43.06 0.28 3.82 47.37 
Threshold 1 
-1094.42 -0.72 -126.51 -578.84 
Threshold 2 
-10008.56 3.64 - -483.37 
Pseudo R-sq 0.87 0.13 0.34 0.68 
Observations 92 92 92 92 
Notes: The dependent variable is the monthly decision to lower, leave unchanged or raise the interest 
rate charged on outstanding balances (-1,0,1) 
The base rate is used as a proxy for the cost of funds 
All results in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
" Convergence not achieved, thus standard errors are questionable 
6.6.3.3 Platinum Credit Card Segment 
The results from estimating equation (6.2) for platinum credit cards with the base rate 
are presented in Table 6.22. Due to entry and exit into this market segment, issuer 
interaction is analysed over the period December 2002 to May 2007. The sample for 
the platinum card issuers is shorter than that of the standard and gold issuers as the 
last entrant into the market did not enter until November 2007. The issuers which 
operate during this period are Barclaycard, MBNA, RBS, the Co-operative Bank, Lloyds 
TSB and Capital One. Barclaycard again follows the pricing decisions of RBS. 
6.6.4 Discussion and Implications 
Table 6.23 provides a summary of the findings from the ordered probit analysis. The 
variable Base Ratet-1 was included to test the transmission mechanism. From the 
analysis undertaken above it can be concluded the transmission mechanism is non- 
existent at the card level. In other words, monetary policy has little impact on credit 
card interest rates. If the Bank of England attempts to tighten monetary policy by 
increasing the borrowing rate, this is not going to be passed on to credit cardholders in 
the form of higher interest rates on their outstanding balances. 
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At the portfolio level the coefficient on Base Ratet-1 is positive and significant for 
Barclaycard, HSBC, the Co-operative Bank, Egg and Lloyds TSB, which suggests these 
issuers follow the Bank of England's base rate. Unsurprisingly, US credit card providers 
MBNA and Capital One does not follow the base rate. HBOS, RBS and Nationwide do 
not follow the base rate. With respect to Nationwide, who is the only building society 
to issue credit cards, it is possible that this issuer is engaging in smoothing. If an issuer 
believes that a change to the base rate is only temporary, they are likely to smooth 
over changes, thus increasing stability. As credit card issuers responds to each other 
rather than to the base rate, this suggests that the market environment is more 
important in the terms of price setting. 
No single issuer acts as a price leader. It appears that issuers look for key rivals instead 
of tracking the market as a whole. The key rival to any issuer varies depending on 
factors such as the market segment, whether the base rate is increasing or decreasing 
and the size of interest rate changes. 
At the portfolio level, issuer behaviour is examined over the whole sample period, 
which is then split into two sub-periods, one of increasing cost of funds and one of 
declining cost of funds as well as examines the impact of the size of an interest rate 
movement. At the portfolio level it is seen that all issuers apart from RBS interact in 
some way with at least one of their rivals. 
No evidence was found to sort the idea that one issuer leads the price level upwards, 
while another issuer leads the price level downwards. However, issuers do interact 
differently when the cost of funds is rising to when the cost of funds is declining. 
At the product level, monetary policy has a minimal impact on credit card interest 
rates. In addition credit card issuers appear to set their rates independently of each 
other. Barclaycard sees RBS as its main rival in all areas of the credit card market 
choosing to follow the majority of interest rate decisions of RBS. However, Barclaycard 
appears not see RBS a rival in the standard credit card market. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the pricing behaviour of credit card issuers in the UK, by 
examining how they react to changes in the base rates and changes to each other's 
interest rates. Using monthly observations of the interest rates charged on outstanding 
balances, this chapter has examined the pricing behaviour of the top ten issuers in the 
UK credit card market. These ten largest credit card issuers in the UK, who have a 
combined market share of approximately 90 percent. Firstly, the monthly price setting 
behaviour of issuers was investigated using a Vector Error Correction Framework. 
Using causality tests it is possible to gain insights into price leadership. Under perfect 
competition, the VECM results should not yield evidence of any systematic causal price 
responses between any of the banks. The adoption of vector autoregressive methods 
offers a number of potential advantages to the investigation of price leadership, not 
least of which is that it provides the opportunity to investigate a number of prices as a 
system rather than in pairs. 
By applying an ordered probit model to a sample of card issuers in the UK, it has been 
possible to gain some insight into how card issuers interact with each other both at the 
issuer level and at the product level. Interestingly, it has been found that at the 
product level, the majority of issuers set interest rates independently of each other, 
however, at the issuer level there is much more interaction between firms. In addition, 
at the product level interest rate changes do not follow market rates, but the majority 
of changes at the issuer level do. 
This study opens up a number of avenues for future research and these will be 
discussed and explored in the final chapter of this thesis. Therefore, the subsequent 
and final chapter provides an overview of the research which has been undertaken, 
not only highlighting the key findings of this work but also the limitations as well as 
shaping the direction of future investigations into pricing a competition in the UK 
credit card market. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The main aim of this thesis was to present a study into the factors which influence 
price and competition in the UK credit card market. Thus, this chapter will bring 
together the strands which have been developed throughout the previous chapters of 
this thesis, illustrating the extent to which the major objectives of this study have been 
achieved and to explore the possible implications of the empirical work. 
Credit cards have long been an especially dynamic and profitable segment of the 
banking industry. While the pricing of credit cards is established independently by a 
number of lending institutions, several studies have found evidence of supra- 
competitive pricing and profitability (Ausubel, 1991; Calem and Mester, 1995; Shaffer, 
1999). However, other studies have reported evidence that the higher pricing is 
commensurate with the greater risk associated with credit card lending. 
Notwithstanding the historically large net interest margins, the volume of credit card 
lending has grown rapidly over the years and still retains the potential for substantial 
future growth. The industry's large size, rapid growth, high profitability, a high risk 
constitute the primary motivations to study credit card lending (Kulasekaren and 
Shaffer, 2002). 
The rapid growth in the UK credit card market over the last decade has meant that it 
has attracted considerable attention amongst researchers and policymakers. The UK 
credit card market has proved to be interesting to investigate for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, interest rates have become much more disperse with interest rates ranging 
from 6.8% (Barclaycard Simplicity) to 51.8% (NatWest Black). Secondly, credit card 
products have become more complex. Credit card pricing involves a large number of 
elements including annual fees, cash advances and over-the-limit fees to name a few. 
Thirdly, the UK is one of the most credit-card-intensive countries in the world, with 67 
million credit cards for a population of 59 million people (APACS, 2009). Fourthly, the 
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arrival of several new issuers into the UK market has led to a slight reduction in 
interest rates and an attempt by issuers to differentiate their products. 
With respect to presenting a summary and conclusion to the findings of this research 
and to how this work has made a positive contribution to the literature, this chapter is 
divided into the following sections. Section two provides a summary of the research 
structure. A summary of the research findings is presented in section three. The 
contribution of this research to the literature is presented in section four. Section five 
contains a discussion of the limitations of this work. Section six indicates the direction 
of future research. The last section provides the final conclusion of this research. 
7.2 Summary of Research Structure 
This section provides a brief summary of the research undertaken within this thesis. 
The credit card market has grown markedly since the first credit card was introduced 
in 1966. In the UK by the end of 2007, there were 67.3 million credit cards in 
circulation, held by 30.8 million cardholders, with an average of 2.4 cards per person 
(APACS, 2008). Spending on credit cards in the UK was £133.2 billion in 2007, with the 
average value of a credit card transaction being £63.22 (APACS, 2008). In the early 
1990s, the UK credit card market was dominated by the major banks, Barclays, Lloyds, 
the Midland, the National Westminster (NatWest) and the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
Typically all banks would charge cardholders an interest rate in the region of 22%, in 
addition to an annual fee of approximately £10. Consumers had very little choice and 
cards were barely differentiated. Indeed, there was an absence of competition with 
respect to both pricing and product characteristics (i. e. cards offered similar terms and 
conditions as well as charging similar rates of interest). 
Chapter one raised a number of important questions with respect to pricing and 
competition. A survey of the existing literature is provided in chapter two. The 
literature related to credit cards is not only large and growing, but it is also remarkably 
diffuse. Researchers have examined credit cards in the context of a large and varied 
range of sub-disciplines including banking, macroeconomics, consumer behaviour and 
network economics. From chapter two, it is clear that a significant amount of research 
has already been undertaken on credit cards, but that there was still a large number of 
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issues and puzzles which still needed to be resolved. Thus, the review of the literature 
uncovered a number of gaps in the existing literature, a number of which were beyond 
the scope of this research, but are issues which can be addressed in the future. An 
overview of credit cards with particular focus on the UK was presented in Chapter 
Three. This chapter examined the credit card as a product and looked at the 
advantages and disadvantages of credit cards. It also introduced the credit card 
market, by examining how the UK credit card market has evolved since the 
introduction of the first credit card in 1966 by Barclaycard in the terms of competition 
and pricing. 
US evidence using data from the 1980s and 1990s suggested that credit card prices are 
sticky due to a variety of reasons including: customers choosing credit cards without 
taking into consideration the high probability they will be charged interest on any 
outstanding balances (Ausubel, 1991), tacit price collusion (Knittel and Stango, 2003), 
and switching costs (Calem et al., 2006; Stango, 2002). The introduction of variable 
rate cards increased competition and helped to drive prices down (Stango, 2000). 
Previous UK evidence from Heffernan (2002) focused on how industry characteristics 
(i. e. the number of firms and the benchmark wholesale money market interest rate 
(LIBOR)) impact on issuer-level pricing. Thus, Chapter four sought to contribute to the 
understanding of credit card pricing by determining and quantifying the impact of 
card, organisation and consumer attributes on price. 
Both Chapters Five and Six consider price movements in the UK credit card market 
using industry and individual issuer rates. Chapter Five examines short- and long-run 
pass-through from the market interest rates, in particular the Bank of England's base 
rate to interest rates charged on outstanding balances. Chapter Six documents 
tendencies in price leadership in different segments of the credit card market. 
Chapter Five focused on credit card lending rate adjustments following changes in an 
underlying interest rate. In addition, Chapter Five illustrated that these responses are 
asymmetric in the sense that the credit card rate is more rigid downward than upward. 
An increase in the underlying interest rate is passed on to on to the credit card rate 
faster than a decrease is. This finding is not unique to the UK credit card market, other 
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empirical studies have found similar results in the mortgage market (Toolsema and 
Jacobs, 2007; de Haan and Sterken, 2005, Hoffman and Mizen, 2004), deposit and loan 
markets (Hannan and Berger, 1997), this suggests that the phenomenon of asymmetric 
price adjustments is widespread. A variety of explanations for asymmetric price 
adjustments in general and have discussed their validity for the credit card rate in 
particular. Asymmetric credit card rates may be explained by tacit collusion, consumer 
search or switching costs, or varying mark-ups over the business cycle. 
Chapter six focuses on credit card issuer behaviour. A discrete choice framework, 
similar to that of de Haan and Sterken (2006) and Allen and McVanel (2009) was used 
in chapter six to examine the behaviour of credit card issuers and to investigate 
whether there is any evidence of price leadership. 
7.3 Summary of Research Findings and Research Contributions 
This research started with the overall objective of providing a detailed insight into 
pricing and competition in the UK credit card market. Since their introduction in June 
1966, the growth in the number of credit cards in circulation has been remarkable. 
Until the Monopolies and Mergers Commission report in the late 1980s, the UK credit 
card market was dominated by two main players - the Access Group and Barclaycard - 
who between them issued eight out of ten cards in circulation (Rowlingson and 
Kempson, 1994). After the report a number of other issuers entered into the market, 
and a wide range of products and interest rates are now on offered. This meant that 
cards were still issued under the payment umbrella of either Visa or MasterCard but 
now consumers had more issuers to choose from. This is still the case there are around 
1500 credit cards on offer, issued by approximately twenty issuers all provided under 
the umbrella of Visa and MasterCard. A small number of cards are now issued on the 
AMEX payment network. The rate of growth slowed down in the early 1990s, due in 
part to consumer caution during the recession and in part to the wider availability of 
debit card and the introduction of annual fees. While this research has only scratched 
the surface, a number of interesting conclusions, which are summarised below, can be 
drawn. In addition, the research undertaken has also made a significant contribution to 
knowledge at both the academic and at a practical level. This research undertaken in 
this thesis had the following aims: 
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" To determine and quantify the factors which influence the interest rate which 
credit card issuers charge consumers on outstanding balances; 
" To revisit the issue of switching costs and paying consumers to switch; 
" To analysis how official changes in the base rate are passed on to retail credit card 
rates; 
" To analyse issuer interaction within the market as a whole and within sub-markets 
of the sector; 
9 To determine and quantify if any of the top ten issuers in the market act as a price 
leader. 
The existing credit card literature is remarkably diverse, covering a wide range of topic 
areas. This thesis has provided a comprehensive review of competition in the UK credit 
card market, by studying issues from three different perspectives: price leadership, 
pricing asymmetries and long-run pass-through of capital market rates to typical 
annual percentage rates on purchases. Each of these measures has provided some 
insight into how UK credit card issuers set prices. 
Credit cards have evolved a great deal with the introduction of new credit card 
characteristics that have increased the range of product offerings to consumers. This, 
however, has increased product complexity making it difficult for consumers to make 
choices when the characteristics which determine prices are opaque. Making use of a 
rich data set, the determinants of credit card pricing were examined. Many 
characteristics neglected in previous work have an impact on prices. In particular, 
higher prices observed (or customers are prepared to pay) for cards with the following 
characteristics: initial and student card types, introductory offers on balance transfers, 
an annual fee, a longer interest free period, Airmiles, purchase discounts, and a charity 
donation of purchases. 
By using a simple hedonic pricing model, the analysis in Chapter four sought to 
determine and quantify the impact of card and institution level characteristics on 
price. In summary, the following observations were drawn from this analysis: (1) card 
characteristics such as: introductory offers on balance transfers, the interest free 
period, and loyalty schemes have a positive association with price; (2) cards that select 
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consumers with lower risk characteristics have a negative association with price; (3) 
there is issuer price heterogeneity; and (4) supplier characteristics such as affinity and 
co-brand have a positive association with price. Thus, the analysis undertaken in 
Chapter Four, illustrates what credit card characteristics consumers are paying for, 
which would otherwise remain unknown because consumers choose a bundle of 
characteristics when selecting a credit card. By quantifying, the value of individual 
characteristics that are not separately tradable, an insight has been offered into the 
cost/price differentiation on an individual characteristic which is only available to the 
consumer as part of a bundle. These findings potentially offer some explanation to the 
Department for Trade and industry's finding that consumers could save £1.9 billion a 
year in interest rate payments alone by switching to cheaper credit cards (DTI, 2003). 
However, it appears that UK credit card customers' are reluctant to switch credit cards. 
The remaining empirical work undertaken in Chapter Four concentrated on finding 
explanations as to why consumers were reluctant to switch one card to another. The 
OFT has found that almost 70% of individuals do not shop around for the cheapest deal 
and that those who choose an average priced credit card rather than the cheapest 
option are losing an average of £137 a year (Which? News, February 2008). A hedonic 
model was estimated with a two-level error component structure, this allowed 
unobserved heterogeneity at the issuer and card levels to be controlled for. The key 
findings suggested that (1) the airmile loyalty scheme and annual fee creates switching 
costs and customer lock-in allow issuers to charge higher prices and (2) issuers pay 
customers to switch using introductory offers on purchases. However, no evidence is 
found to support the notion that default charges are used to subsidise lower prices. 
Finally, customers do not pay a premium for using different payment networks. 
Official interest rates have been the main instrument of choice for central banks, 
whether they are focused on achieving specific inflation targets or not, for at least the 
last two decades (Fuertes, Heffernan and Kalotychu, 2006). In order to influence future 
spending and the inflation rate, official interest rate changes must prompt similar 
changes in short money market instruments and retail rates. Much research has been 
undertaken to investigate the pass-through of official interest rate changes to retail 
rates, such as deposit and mortgage products. However, the credit card market has 
been ignored. 
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Interestingly, credit card interest rates appear to have become more responsive to 
changes in the cost of funds in the 1990s (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999). Variable-rate 
credit card plans were of minor importance up until the early 1990s (Stango, 2002); 
however, by the mid-1990s variable-rate deals outnumbered the fixed-rate offerings 
and accounted for a greater proportion of cards in circulation (Evans and Schmalensee, 
1999). While credit card rates do respond to base rate changes they are slow to 
respond, which is consistent with the findings of Calem and Mester (1995). This would 
suggest that competition in the UK credit card market is imperfect and that credit card 
rates are indeed sticky. The Bank of England relies on the assumption that financial 
institutions tend to drift towards a long-run equilibrium rate changes with every rise or 
fall in the policy rate. 
In summary, the majority of the evidence found six suggests that the UK credit card 
market is reasonably competitive. More specifically, no evidence is found that one 
issuer acts as a dominant price leader. Pass-through of official interest rates is mixed. 
7.4 Limitations of the Research 
The researcher acknowledges that despite the significant advantages of the research 
undertaken within this thesis the research does suffer from a number of limitations. 
Firstly, while the research undertaken within this thesis, contributes significantly to the 
existing literature, it only partially addresses the gap in the literature concerning how 
credit card interest rates are determined and the factors which affect the quoted 
interest rate. The penultimate section of this chapter will address this limitation in 
more detail be suggesting additional areas for research with respect to pricing and 
competition. 
An important caveat of the analysis undertaken in this thesis is that individual 
transaction rate, that is, the rate that individual customers are charged or pay on their 
outstanding balances, are not used. Only two-thirds of customers are charged the 
headline interest rate (typical APR) by credit card issuers. This means that one-third of 
customers may be charged a rate of interest which is higher or lower than that 
271 
advertised. This means that important characteristics may be missing from the 
analysis. 
In addition, one tradition of hedonic pricing models relates price to a consumer's 
willingness to pay for a particular characteristic. Therefore, it would be realistic to 
assume that different individuals will prefer different bundles of attributes. For 
example, consumers could be split into growth depending upon whether they revolve 
debt or not. However due to data limitations it is not possible to do this. 
in their super-complaint put forward to the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), Which? argued 
that APRs cannot be trusted and should not be used for like-for-like comparisons. 
Alena Kozakova, Principal Economist for consumer body Which? stated that: "People 
believe that APRs are a dependable way of comparing credit cards, but our research 
shows that APR cannot be relied upon for true comparisons. " (Which? News, April 
2007). According to Which? (2007), the top twenty credit card issuers in the UK, use at 
least twelve different methods to calculate interest rates. Thus, a limitation of the 
research is that, due to a lack of information, these different calculations methods 
could not be included. 
A second, potential short-coming of chapter four is that for convenience users the APR 
is largely irrelevant. Convenience users do not incur interest rate charges because they 
pay their outstanding balance in full before the end of the current billing cycle. While 
the chapter has addressed some of the issues which are faced by revolvers it has not 
addressed any issues which relate to convenience users. In addition, convenience users 
could alternatively use debit cards instead of credit cards. As this is the case, is APR a 
sensible price for convenience users? Chakravorti (2003) argues, that issuers may offer 
convenience users payment services below their marginal cost because such a pricing 
strategy improves the risk of their credit portfolios, increases market share, or 
increases revenue from those convenience users that may choose to borrow in the 
future. If convenience users do choose to borrow in the future than using the APR as a 
measure of potential cost may be useful. 
272 
A major short-coming of most past-through estimates is that they are derived from 
reduced-form regressions of bank lending rates on the money market rate (de Bondt, 
Mojon and Valla, 2005). This modelling approach provides a good summary evaluation 
of the sluggishness of retail interest rates to changes in the money market interest 
rate; however this modelling approach fails to explain how banks price their products. 
Therefore, further work is required to develop a more detailed and complex mode of 
bank pricing. De Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2005) propose a model of bank pricing, 
where banks apply a mark-up with respect to a "cost" that depends on short- and long- 
run market conditions. 
As previously discussed in chapter five, there are a number of theoretical reasons for 
non-linear adjustment of bank interest rates. Using aggregate prices may mask 
demographic heterogeneity. For example, older customers may face higher switching 
costs. A more thorough analysis of asymmetry would require actual transaction prices 
(Allen and McVanel, 2009). 
7.5 Direction for Future Research 
The limitations of this thesis, outlined in the previous section, naturally make 
suggestions for future research. The literature review in chapter two and the work 
subsequently undertaken in this thesis suggests that the credit card market in the UK 
still warrants future research. The research undertaken in this thesis concentrates on 
one element of pricing. 
7.5.1 Pricing 
"Credit card pricing, however involves [elements other than interest rates], including 
annual fees, fees for cash advances, rebated, minimum finance charges, over-the-limit 
fees, and late payment charges. In addition, the length of the 'interest free' grace 
period, if any, can have an important influence on the amount of interest consumers 
pay when they borrow on their credit cards. " 
Federal Reserve Board, 1998: 4 
As mentioned previously, one of the major limitations of this thesis with respect to 
pricing and competition, that it focuses only on one pricing parameter, the price 
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associated with borrowing money to pay for purchases 
- 
the typical annual percentage 
rate (APR) for purchases. As the quote above demonstrates that credit card pricing is 
extremely complex. Evans and Schmalensee (1999) list a number of dimensions in 
which credit cards can differ. Credit cards can differ on the following dimensions: 
" Method of calculating interest rate changes 
" Amount of credit provided 
" 
Service fees 
" 
Interest Rates 
" 
Special Card features 
These are issues which may relate to pricing of a credit card. Chapter four has 
attempted to address some of these issues; however there is still a long way to go until 
these issues have been resolved. 
Methods used to calculate interest charges vary substantially from one card 
programme to another. The most important areas of variation include the length of 
the grace period, the method for calculating the outstanding balance, the type of 
compounding used for calculating finance charges, and the way the effective date of a 
transaction is defined (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999). 
7.5.2 Convenience Users 
Credit cards provide consumers a secure, reliable and convenient means of payment 
(Chakravorti, 2003). As demonstrated in chapters two and four, consumers receive 
incentives to use their credit cards such as dispute resolution services, frequent-use 
rewards, and interest-free short-term loans if no balances are carried between billing 
periods. In addition, credit cards also provide various security features and limit 
consumer liability in the event of fraudulent use. Credit cards, in general, are used by 
two types of consumers; revolvers and convenience users. Industry estimates of 
convenience users range from 30 to 40 percent of all credit cardholders (Chakravorti, 
2003). A limitation of the research is that the APR is irrelevant for convenience users. 
In addition, convenience users could simply choose to substitute their credit card for a 
debit card. An interesting question would be to ask why individuals choose to use 
credit cards rather than debit cards. Chakravorti (1997) concluded that based upon the 
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underlying incentives versus other payment instruments, consumers should always use 
their credit cards to make payments and payoff their balances in full by the due date. 
7.5.3 Competition 
The credit card industry, offers a variety of products, with a range of features and 
pricing strategies to consumers with different demands. Therefore, competition is 
about more than who can offer the lowest price. All cards carry with them a whole 
system of prices (i. e. perhaps an annual fee and, one or more interest rates, along with 
rules for when interest is charged) as well as fees or such things such as late payment 
and cash advances. 
The UK credit card market has been subjected to structural changes over the past two 
decades. This has pushed them to search for more efficient organisational solutions, 
greater variety of the offered services and stronger exploitation of scale economies. 
The last of these phenomena has taken place partially due to increasing consolidation 
of UK banks and the increasing number of joint ventures in the market. For example, 
since this research has been undertaken, HBOS and Lloyds TSB merged to form the 
Lloyds Banking Group. Thus, it is crucial to assess whether such modifications have had 
an impact on the degree of competition characterising the UK credit card market as 
the consolidation process increases the potential for monopoly power to occur. 
Further research is required to evaluate the degree of competition in the credit card 
market. Thus a future research objective is to investigate whether a small number of 
large issuers use their dimension and market leadership to act as a colluding 
oligopolist. 
7.5.4 Regulation 
Regulatory pressure on the consumer credit market continued unabated throughout 
2006. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the Competition Commission (CC) and the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) are all pursuing separate investigations into the 
practices that exist within the sector. Recent investigations have included credit card 
charges, interchange fees, credit card cheques and how interest is charged on credit 
card products. 
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Furletti (2003a) found that late fees (not including overlimit fees) are the third largest 
revenue stream for card providers after interest revenue and revenues received from 
merchants. A Hammer survey found that penalty fees accounted for around 30 
percent of credit card income in 2004 (Furletti and Ody, 2006). Meanwhile, a 
cardweb. com study cited by the Wall Street Journal indicated that in 2001,58 percent 
of cardholders paid a late fee. It is clear that credit card penalty fees are of substantial 
importance for both banks and their credit card borrowers. 
However, despite the significant public policy interest in credit card penalty fees as 
well as the large money magnitudes involved, Massoud et al, (2008) was the first paper 
in the literature to focus specifically on their determinants of penalty charges. Indeed 
until now, the credit card literature has focused almost exclusively on credit card 
interest rates (e. g. Ausubel, 1991; Brito and Hartley, 1995; Stango, 2000). Thus more 
work is required in this area. As mentioned in section 3.12 of chapter three, the OFT is 
involved in a series of investigations into the level of default charges. In July 2005, the 
OFT issued its provisional findings on its investigations into the credit card default 
charges. The OFT stated that charges, usually in the range of £20 to £25, were 
"disproportionate" and "unfair". After further research the OFT concluded that a fair 
default charge should not exceed the level of administrative costs usually associated 
with default. However, despite the positive responses from lenders to the 
recommendations made by the OFT, there are still some unanswered questions, these 
questions include; (1) Is £12 still overpriced, considering the actual cost to the 
provider? (2) Is £12 too low to be a deterrent for consumers to work within their 
agreed limits? (3) What are the methods which providers will implement in order to 
attempt to recoup their losses? (4) What will the effects of this legalisation over time? 
A European directive published on 5th December 2007, has led to the FSA taking over 
from the FSA and the Banking Codes Standards Board. The Payment Services Directive 
(PSD, 2007/64/EC) is a regulatory initiative from European Commission which will 
regulate payment services and payment service providers throughout the European 
Union and European Economic Area. The purpose of this directive is to increase pan- 
European competition and participation in the payments industry, as well as to provide 
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for a level playing field by harmonising consumer protection and the rights/obligations 
for payment providers and users (Martin and Schchloenvoight, 2008). 
7.5.5 The Effects of the "Credit Crunch" 
"Credit Cards are the next Credit Crunch" 
Meredith Whitney, 2009. 
When this thesis was started toward the end of 2005, it was impossible to envisage the 
financial and economic crisis which would hit the UK. The arrival of the credit crunch, 
coupled with extreme competition, an economic downturn, increasing bad debts, and 
government regulations has led credit card companies to re-evaluate their position. An 
example of this is Egg, the online issuer of credit cards who was bought by the City 
Group in 2008. Egg decided to release approximately seven percent of its customers. 
Officially, Egg stated that the release of these customers was due to a credit risk 
review. However, if the rumours in the financial press are to be believed then many of 
the customers released by Egg were those who repaid their outstanding balances in 
full each month. If these rumours are true then Egg effectively dumped those 
customers who were not profitable (77Finance, 2009). Barclaycard has responded to 
recent changes in the financial climate by reducing the credit limits and restricting 
ability to make cash withdrawals of those customers whose credit data indicated that 
they have become financially over-stretched. 
Table 7.1: The Impact of the Credit Crunch on Credit Cards 
Observation 
September 2007 
- 
November 
2007 
April 2008 
- 
July 2008 
August 2008 
- 
November 2008 
No. of Cards No. of Cards No. of Cards 
Increased APR 3 19 16 
Increased Cash per Annum Rates 25 14 12 
Increased Balance Transfer Fees 10 5 11 
increased Cash Advance Fees 69 8 7 
Reduced Number of Interest Free Days 
- - 
7 
Increased Foreign Usage Fees 18 3 4 
Increased PPI 
- 
2 
- 
Reduced Minimum Repayment Reductions 
- 
2 
- 
Increased Account Fee 
- 
1 
- 
Source: Moneytacts 
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Increasingly providers have withdrawn their most competitive deals, while charging 
more for cash withdrawals and/or purchases made abroad. Credit card rates are at 
their highest level for over two years following widespread rate increases. This is 
despite the Bank of England slashing the base rate from 4.75% to 0.5% over the same 
period. Table 7.1 illustrates how the credit crunch and the resulting financial crisis have 
impacted not only on the purchase APR but a whole range of other aspects of credit 
card pricing. 
According to the price comparison website www. MoneyExpert. com, individuals now 
pay on average 1.1 percent more in annual interest compared to what they did two 
years ago. Outstanding balances in the UK currently stand at £64.8 billion, with the 
average consumer having an outstanding balance in excess of £2,000. The study found 
that, on average, customers will now pay 0.95% more on purchases, 0.7% more on 
balance transfers and 1.7% more on cash advances compared to two years ago. 
Table 7.2: Impact of the Credit Crunch on Individual Credit Cards 
Card Name Purchase Rate 
1st August 
2008 
Purchase Rate 
12th 
November 
2008 
Increase 
Abbey Credit Card MasterCard/Visa 15.9 18.9 +3.0 
Bank of Ireland (UK) MasterCard 16.9 17.9 +1.0 
Bank of Ireland (UK) Moneyback MasterCard 16.9 17.9 +1.0 
Bank of Ireland (UK) Moneyback Gold MasterCard 16.9 17.9 +1.0 
Capital One Platinum MasterCard 15.9 16.9 +1.0 
Egg Money MasterCard 14.9 16.9 +2.0 
MINT 7.9 12.9 +5.0 
NatWest Credit Card MasterCard/Visa 14.9 16.9 +2.0 
NatWest Gold MasterCard/Visa 15.9 16.9 +1.0 
NatWest Platinum MasterCard/Visa 15.9 16.9 +1.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland Classic MasterCard/Visa 15.9 16.9 +1.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland Gold MasterCard/Visa 15.9 16.9 +1.0 
Royal Bank of Scotland Platinum MasterCard/Visa 15.9 16.9 +1.0 
Sky MasterCard 16.9 17.9 +1.0 
Virgin Money MasterCard 15.9 16.6 +0.7 
Source: Moneyfacts 
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Table 7.3: The Impact of the Credit Crunch on Cash APRs 
Card Name Cash Rate 
ft August 
2008 
Cash Rate 
12`h 
November 
2008 
Increase 
(%) 
Abbey Credit Card MasterCard/Visa 22.9 27.9 +5.0 
Abbey Zero MasterCard 25.9 27.9 +2.0 
Bank of Ireland (UK) MasterCard 21.04 24.942 +3.902 
Bank of Ireland (UK) Moneyback MasterCard 20.94 24.942 +4.002 
Bank of Ireland (UK) Moneyback Gold MasterCard 20.94 24.942 +4.002 
Bank of Ireland Gold MasterCard 21.04 24.942 +3.902 
Egg Money MasterCard 7.9 24.942 +9.0 
John Lewis Partnership MasterCard 18.9 23.9 +5.0 
M&S Money MasterCard 21.9 23.9 +2.0 
Nationwide BS Classic Visa 22.9 27.9 +5.0 
Nationwide BS Gold Visa 22.9 27.9 +5.0 
Virgin Money MasterCard 24.9 27.9 +3.0 
Source: Moneyfacts 
Furthermore, research undertaken by Moneyfacts. co. uk has shown that the average 
interest rate charged on purchases on 4 `h June 2009 was 18.1 percent. The figure the 
previous month was 17.9% and two years ago it was 16.3%. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 provide 
some specific examples of how the credit crunch has impacted on credit card interest 
rates. 
Figure 7.1 provides some insight into how the UK credit card market has evolved since 
the start of the credit crunch. Consumer credit comprises of credit card debt, 
overdrafts and other loans and advances, such as personal loans and hire purchase 
agreements. Panel A of Figure 7.1 shows that growth in consumer credit was 
extremely rapid during the first half of this decade and credit cards accounted for 
approximately one quarter of all outstanding debt. Net credit card lending has been 
subdued for some time, following a significant tightening in availability in response to 
an increased number of write-offs in 2005. As part of this tightening, credit card 
lenders have increasingly charged fees on balance transfers, where previously these 
had been offered on a zero percent interest rate and no-fee basis, see panel B. 
Effective interest rates on overdrafts and personal loans have fallen in recent months, 
though by much less than the Bank of England Bank Rate and LIBOR; however, interest 
rate on credit cards have remained broadly unchanged, at levels well above pre-2005 
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levels (see panel Q. The recent widening in spreads reported in part reflects lenders' 
perceptions of heightened credit risk on unsecured lending. Write-offs on consumer 
credit continue to remain high and lenders expect arrears and write-offs to increase if 
unemployment rises further. 
The credit crunch is a crisis that has been caused by banks being too nervous to lend 
money to consumers, firms and as well as each other. If they do decide to lend, this 
comes at a cost of higher rates of interest to cover the perception of higher risk. 
Essentially, this has meant that mortgages have become more expensive, credit cards 
dearer, and in the worst case scenario repossessions and bankruptcy. 
Chapter five examined the "pass-through" of monetary policy induced interest rates to 
credit card "borrowers". Given the above discussion this is of course a contentious 
issue and would suggest that more research needs to be undertaken in this area. For 
example what is the relationship between interest rates and credit card default rates 
and bankruptcy laws? Is there any relation to house prices? 
7.5.6 Pass-Through Revisited 
An analysis of credit card interest rate pass-through should consider whether credit 
card pass-through is likely to be similar/different from bank loan pass-through. As this 
thesis focused simple on credit cards this issue was ignored, however future work 
should make comparisons between these products. There are also a number of other 
issues which need to be considered, which are discussed below. 
7.5.6.1 Structural Change 
One of the limitations of the research undertaken in Chapter Five is that structural 
change is not considered. Not controlling for structural change could lead to an 
underestimation of the speed of adjustment from money market changes to retail rate 
changes. 
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7.5.6.2 Panel Models 
Using a panel error correction model (ECM), it is possible to estimate the effects of 
credit card market competition on the long-run equilibrium pass-through of issuer 
interest rest rates to changes in the corresponding market interest rates. 
7.5.6.3 Modelling Pass-Through Using Non-Linear Models 
Non-linearity is broadly defined as any departure away from the conventional linear 
error correction model (ECM) which is typically used to characterise the dynamics of 
retail interest rates, as presented in section 5.4. More specifically, different types of 
nonlinear responses may arise from switching costs, menu costs and uncertainty. 
Section 5.7 look briefly at asymmetric pricing in the credit card market, however there 
is still much work to be undertaken. 
According to Fuertes, Heffernan and Kalotychou (2009), detecting nonlinear behaviour 
in the way in which financial institutions react to policy rate revisions is important for a 
number of reasons. First, it can provide useful insights into the practical operation of 
economic mechanisms. Second, by focusing on a class of models that are close to the 
true data generating process, significant policy implications may follow. The magnitude 
and nature of the adjustment speeds of financial institutions following changes in the 
policy rate are a fundamental element of the transmission mechanism. Nonlinearities 
have important implications for how the central bank models the relationship between 
policy rates and retail rate changes, and consequently how they exercise monetary 
policy. Third, nonlinearities in the propagation of policy shocks can pose unique 
difficulties when attempting to forecast economic variables. Further research into 
these issues can help in explaining how and when the marcoeconomy react to them. 
Complex models need to be developed which consider aspects such as continuous 
time-variation, regime switching and curvature. Conditional continuous variation in the 
context of pass-through refers to an adjustment speed which is proportional to the 
size of the policy rate change instead of being constant over time. Regime-switching 
relates to asymmetric adjustment to policy rate changes which widen or narrow the 
current disequilibrium gap, whilst controlling for the size of the policy rate change. 
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Finally curvature refers to nonlinearity in the "catch-up" mechanism towards the long- 
run path and implies a size-of-gap effect 
In addition, credit cards have a range of prices and interest rates attached to them. 
Further research should look at how these prices and interest rates change in response 
to a change in the base rate. Interest rate stickiness in the credit card market, could be 
due to credit card issuers deliberately not changing the interest rate charged on 
outstanding balances, in favour of changing another aspect of pricing which will not 
lead to high menu costs or attracting a riskier pool of borrowers. 
7.5.7 Entry and Exit 
The majority of the entry and exit literature focuses almost exclusively on firm-level 
decision, excluding an important aspect of firm behaviour: whether to introduce new 
products while the firm produces similar goods, and where to locate them in the 
existing product space, taking into account own models and the possibility of new 
entry (Starvips, 1995). The credit card industry contains many multi-product firms 
which allows for analysis of entry and exit of particular products, and of the strategic 
behaviour of issuers. 
Product differentiation provides issuers with the ability to shelter their products from 
price competition through strategic product location in the presence of inter-issuer 
rivalry. Issuers can extend the degree of product differentiation by dispersing the 
quality (vertical differentiation) and style (horizontal differentiation) of their products 
to capture sales beyond their immediate locale. Alternatively, issuers can choose to 
replace their products or compete internally by cannibalising the products under each 
firm umbrella while mitigating the damaging impacts of within firm competition by 
differentiating and dispersing the full set of products marketed. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Four, credit cards are differentiated by many attributes. 
To analyze spatial location decisions, a comparison needs to be made between the 
various credit cards available. According to Staryins (1995) products which are 
differentiated vertically or horizontally, can be placed in a product space by using an 
imaginary line or circle. 
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7.6 Policy Implications 
In 2007, the OFT announced that a new programme of work with the credit card 
industry and consumer bodies to make the cost of credit cards easier for consumers to 
understand. The research undertaken in chapter four considers credit card attributes 
and how they impact on the price of credit. With approximately 70 percent of all active 
credit card accounts incurring interest charges every month it is important that credit 
card holders are able to choose credit cards while understanding fully all the issues 
that affect the cost of the card. it is therefore important any new work undertaken 
with regards to credit cards explore the issues which surround the cost of credit 
including purchases, cash advances, introductory offers and payment allocation. The 
DTI estimated that consumers could save over £1.9billion in interest payments if they 
switched credit cards. The FSA and other regulators and government bodies need to 
think about how to improve the information given to consumers by credit card issuers. 
In addition improvements should be made to consumer education about the benefits 
of shopping around for a credit card and considering whether a particular 
characteristic is necessary especially if this is going to increase their monthly payments 
by a significant amount. 
In chapter five, credit card rates were found to adjust extremely slowly to the changes 
in the cost of funds and the base rate. In addition chapter six found that in the majority 
of cases credit card issuers do not respond to changes in the base rate, which suggests 
that credit card companies may not lower rates due to a lower cost of funds or 
increase rates when the cost of funds increases. As credit cards appear to be almost 
unresponsive to changes in the base rate, this will pose a greater challenge for 
policymakers conducting monetary policy. Regulatory efforts to reduce credit card 
interest rate could help revolving credit card users to decrease their debt burden. With 
around £64million pounds currently outstanding it is important that every effort is 
made to decrease consumer debt. Thus, regulators need to consider how to make the 
monetary transmission mechanism more effective so that consumers can enjoy lower 
interest rates. In addition, the monetary transmission mechanism needs to work more 
effectively so that increases in the base rate are passed on to consumers, potentially 
discouraging some from borrow excessive amounts. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
Credit cards are a key feature of the modern society and have provoked much 
discussion over recent years. Credit cards have often been attributed with encouraging 
the growth in consumerism and consumer borrowing which occurred in the 1980s 
(Rowlingson and Kempson, 1994). However the greatest concern of all lies in the belief 
that they encourage individuals to live far beyond their means, buying consumer goods 
and services which they can ill afford. 
The objective of the concluding chapter was to briefly explain the research which has 
been conducted throughout the thesis and the motivation for undertaking it. The 
research undertaken in this thesis has fulfilled its objectives in the terms of (1) examine 
and quantifying card, consumer and issuer characteristics, (2) investigating loyalty 
schemes as a form of switching cost, (3) examining base rate pass-through and (4) 
analysing interaction between credit card issuers. 
However, while this research could claim to have made a considerable and positive 
contribution to the understanding of how credit cards are "priced"; equally it has been 
shown that there is a considerable amount of work still to be undertaken in order to 
make important strides in understanding how credit cards are priced and their overall 
impact on the economy. 
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Appendix Al: Heffernan's Model Revisited 
This appendix updates the work undertaken by Heffernan in 2002 with respect to 
credit cards, which looked at competition in this sector between 1993 and 1999. 
Heffernan's model has been discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
Unlike Heffernan who only analyse competition at the provider level, this analysis also 
considers competition at the card level. The evolution of the UK credit card market is 
investigated by estimating the model on a year by year basis at the firm level. Finally, 
for completeness a comparison is made between the period 1992-1999 and 2000- 
2007. 
A1.1 Competition between Providers 
To begin with Heffernan's model is estimated at the provider level, the key results of 
the regression are presented in Table A. 1, while the results of the bargains and rip-offs 
are presented in Table A. 2. The constant term is both positive and significant 
suggesting that there is a large mark-up. This is consistent with the findings of Ausubel 
(1991) who finds that the credit card market is highly profitable due to the substantial 
premiums involved in credit card portfolio sales. 
Ta61e A_1! Fctimntinn Racultc fnr Providers 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 20.548 102.46 
TREND 
-0.021 -26.52 
FIRM 
-0.053 -25.80 
FEE 0.073 12.22 
LIBOR t 
-0.240 -2.08 
LIBOR t-l 0.211 1.05 
LIBOR t-2 
-0.208 -1.04 
LIBOR t-3 0.711 6.30 
R 0.836 
Table A. 2: Best and Worse Card Providers 
Top Five "Best Buys" Top Five "Worst Buys" 
Firm Deviation from 
Default Provider 
Firm Deviation from 
Default Provider 
Cahoot 
-6.11 Vanquish Bank 21.19 
Northern Rock 
-5.71 Standard Charter 9.90 
BMW 
-5.58 Asda 7.84 
Express 
-5.15 Capital Bank 7.53 
Intelligent Finance 
-4.81 Allied Irish 5.42 
The trend coefficient is significant and suggests that the interest rates on credit cards 
have been declining over time. The decline in interest rates is partially due to the 
substantial decrease in the cost of funds as previously demonstrated the base rate has 
declined by 38.5% throughout the sample and in addition by the early 1990s interest 
rates became much more flexible as credit card issuers switched to variable interest 
rates. By all accounts the market had also become more competitive. Increased 
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competition has led to the more established issuers to remove annual fees and to slash 
their interest rates so that they are in line with those offered by new entrants. This is 
supported by the empirical study undertaken in Chapter Five, which graphically and 
numerically demonstrated that the average interest rate on credit cards has 
substantially declined over the sample period. A possible explanation for the change 
experienced, is that technological change allowed more efficient credit scoring to be 
undertaken be large credit card issuers. 
Providers to respond to changes in the base rate, however credit card providers are 
slow to respond to changes. Credit card providers on average take three months to 
respond to changes in the cost of funding. This finding is consistent with Heffernan. 
However, changes in the base rate are not fully passed through to customers within 
three months. 
The coefficient on the firm variable is negative and significant, thus as the number of 
credit card providers has increased, the interest rate charged on outstanding balances 
has deceased. New entrants have entered into the market, forcing the incumbent 
firms to lower their interest rates, to prevent their market share being eroded. 
Similar to Heffernan, the fee coefficient is found to be positive and significant. 
Naturally, this implies that as the annual fee increases so does the interest rate paid on 
outstanding balances. This is to be expected as the annual fee is a component which is 
factored into the APR calculation. 
Using Heffernan's bargain and rip-off strategy it is possible to rank credit card 
providers with respect to each other. Interestingly none of the top five issuers appear 
in the top ten for bargains or rip-offs. There is a spread of 27.3% between the best and 
worse provider. The Vanquish Bank on average offers interest rates which are 21.2% 
higher than that of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Cahoot appears to offer the best deals 
with the average interest rate on their credit card products being 6% lower than the 
default bank. 
A1.2 Competition between Cards 
This section investigates competition at the card level. The regression results are 
presented in Table A. 3. The constant term is significant and positive, thus indicating 
that there is a substantial mark-up. Again this supports the observation that the credit 
card sector is highly profitable (Ausubel, 1991; Park, 1997). The trend term is 
significantly negative, which suggests that credit card rates have been falling over the 
time, which is expected due to previous findings, the same explanations apply here. 
LIBOR is significant; however, it takes on average three months for credit card products 
to react to changes. The card coefficient is both negative and significant which that the 
APR falls, as the choice of credit cards available to consumers Increases. 
There is a large dispersion of bargains and rip-offs relative to the default card. The 
results of the bargain/rip-off analysis are reported in Table A. 4, however due to space 
restrictions only the top ten best and worse buys are reported. As mentioned 
previously the significance of the t-ratio is testament to the persistence of a cards 
position over time. It is discovered that there is a difference of 47.8% between the 
relative worst and best buy in the credit card market. It is found that the Morgan 
Stanley i24 card is the worse buy, charging an interest rate which is 36% higher than 
that of the default card, while the Simplicity Platinum card issued by Barclaycard is the 
best buy with an interest rate which is 11.86 percent cheaper than the default. 
Table A. 3: Estimation Results for Cards 
Explanatory Variable Coefficient T-Ratio 
CONSTANT 21.316 20.96 
TREND 
-0.007 -8.74 
FIRM 
-0.023 -26.47 
FEE 0.011 3.18 
LIBOR t 
-0.378 -4.08 
LIBOR t-1 0.193 1.21 
LIBOR t-2 
-0.192 -1.23 
LIBOR t-3 0.798 8.97 
R2 0.874 
Table A_4! Rect and Wnrce Cards Available 
Top Five "Best Buys" Top Five "Worst Buys" 
Card Deviation from Card Deviation from 
Default Card Default Card 
Barclaycard 
-11.86 Morgan Stanley - i24 36.08 
Simplicity Platinum 
85 
-11.61 Vanquish Bank - 27.64 Abacus 
E Money 
-11.41 Vanquish Bank - Blue 28.94 
Co-operative Bank 
-10.59 MBNA Travel Card 11.65 
Gold Base Rate 
Co-operative Bank 
-9.64 Vanquish Bank - Gold 8.18 
Platinum Flat Rate 
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While a card may appear to be a relative bargain or relative rip-off compared to the 
Royal Bank of Scotland Classic credit card it is important to consider why a card is 
ranked where it is. Unfortunately this extremely simple pricing model does not provide 
any insight into why a card maybe a relative bargain or rip-off, instead it ranks cards on 
the basis on the interest rate charged on outstanding balances. It may be the case that 
a card which maybe ranked as a relative rip-off is in fact deemed as a bargain by the 
individual who holds that particular card. Take for example, the Vanquish Bank, who 
specialise in providing credit cards to individuals who have little or no credit rating, 
have had credit problems in the pass or have an income which is below average. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that to an individual who has an extremely poor 
credit rating and a low income that is able to apply successful for this card then it is not 
a rip-off and indeed to them is a good purchase. Another example is the Morgan 
Stanley i24 credit card, which in this analysis was found to be the worse buy on the 
market. This particular credit card has been dubbed as an "ultra-premium" credit card 
by some observers. The typical APR is 57.8%, based largely on the annual £275 fee. To 
compare credit cards, the i24 offers a rate of 13.9 per cent on purchases. For the £275 
the cardholder receives a number of additional services which include a 24/7 concierge 
service providing 'discovery' and 'recovery' functions, the promise to arrange 
everything from forgotten anniversary presents to restaurant bookings and even 
finding a translator at 04: 00 am on the other side of the world, access to over 450 
airport lounges through the priority pass membership, comprehensive multi trip travel 
insurance, emergency travel assistance and an additional card for partners and family 
members. In addition, the cardholder benefits from receiving 1% cashback on all 
purchases and not being charged a foreign exchange fee. 
Likewise, while a card may appear to be a relative bargain, it is only a relative bargain 
to an individual, if the card meets an individual's needs and characteristic 
requirements. Credit cards have different characteristics. 
In conclusion while this simple analysis provides insight into the type of competition in 
the UK credit card market and is able to rank credit cards according to the interest rate 
charged on outstanding balances it is unable to provide any insight into why credit 
cards charge a particular interest rate. What is clear is that no two credit cards are 
identical. Credit cards are characterised by different features. Therefore it is important 
that the actual features of credit cards are analysed. It is impossible for an individual to 
make an informed decision based on whether a card is class as a good or bad buy, 
instead they need to take into account their own needs and circumstances. 
A1.3 Has Competition Evolved? 
This sub-section investigates how the UK credit card market has evolved over time. 
The sample period May 1992 to May 2007 covers a period of 16 years, and as seen 
previously in Chapter Four, the UK credit card market has experience a significant 
amount of change during this period. To investigate how competition has evolved over 
the sampling period, the model set out by equation (4.1) 
R! 
 
=ao+2: ß, Libor, 
_1+ +gi, +rj, f+s (4.1) I 
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is estimated on a year by year basis. The estimation results and the top five bargains 
and rip-offs the results of which can be found at the end of this section. 
An extremely obvious observation to make is that the number of providers in the 
market has dramatically increased. The sample contains 166 different providers, the 
number of providers in each sub-sample ranges from 40 to 94. 
Throughout the sample the constant remains positive and significant. In 1992, the 
constant suggests that on average the mark-up on credit cards was approximately 
22.96%, the mark-up has fallen as low as 10.42% in 2006, however by 2007 this had 
risen to 16.22%. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) concluded in 2006 that credit card 
default chargers were too high. It ruled that credit card companies should charge an 
amount that was a reasonable estimate of administration costs incurred for dealing 
with transactions and warned that it would consider taking legal action against 
companies who charged more than 12 pounds. Since the introduction of this ruling 
card companies have found other ways of recouping lost revenue. According to 
Moneyfacts, credit card issuers have increased the average interest rate on purchases 
from 14.9% in April 2006 to 17.7% in August 2008m while over the same period the 
Bank of England has only increased the base rate by 0.5% (Naylor, 2008). This 
statement supports the findings of this study and suggests one potential explanation 
for the sudden rise in mark-up is in response to new regulations imposed on card 
issuers. 
In 1992, the coefficient on the FEE was positive and significant, which suggests that as 
the annual fee on a credit card rises, so does the annual fee. This is not a surprising 
finding as the majority of credit cards in this period had an annual fee attached. This 
finding is supported throughout the sample period with only one or two exceptions. In 
1993,1995 and 2004, the coefficient on the FEE was negative and significant. Possible 
explanations for this include reactions to new entrants, the introduction of premium 
rate products. Often premium rate products are associated with large annual fees, as 
cardholders are paying for a number of complementary services which are bundled 
together with credit card product. 
When the coefficient on the TREND variable is significant and negative, it suggests that 
over the time period under consideration, the APR has declined. Generally, it has been 
found that APR are generally vary stable over a period of a year, which suggests that 
credit card prices are sticky and are slow to respond to changes in the cost of funds 
and to changes in the competitive environment. However this analysis does not 
provide any insight in to whether or not The TREND coefficient in 1993 suggests that 
credit card rates were declining; this corresponds with MBNA entering the market. The 
TREND coefficient also suggests that interest rates declined over the year in 1999, this 
probably due to the emergence of a number of internet providers, who had lower 
costs than more traditional providers. 
A1.4 Has Competition Changed Since the 1990s? 
The UK credit card market has undergone a significant amount of change. In this 
section the sample it split into two sections, 1992 to 1999 and 2000-2007, to allow the 
two periods to be compared. Over the period 1992 to 1999, there were 24 card 
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providers who were active throughout the whole period compared to 47 in the period 
2000-2007. 
The results for the period 1992-1999 are provided in Table A. 5. The adjusted R2 for the 
model is 0.74, which suggesting that the overall model is a good fit. The trend 
coefficient is significant and negative, which suggests that credit card rates are 
declining through the estimation period, 1992-1999. The constant term is significant 
and the coefficient is large and positive, 20.44. 
The corresponding results for the period 2000-2007 are presented in Table A. 6. Again 
the adjusted R2,0.73, suggests that the overall fit of the model is good. The trend 
coefficient estimated is significantly negative, and is approximately the same value as 
the previous period, which suggests that credit card rates are declining at a relatively 
constant rate across the two periods. The constant term is significant positive, 
however is larger in this period. 
Providers to respond to changes in the LIBOR rate, however credit card providers are 
slow to respond to changes however the amount at which they respond is less in the 
second period. After 3 months, credit card providers have passed on 74% of the 
change in cost of funds during the 1990s, however during the 2000s only 5% of the 
change in cost of funds has been passed on. There are a number of potential reasons 
as to why changes in the cost of funds are passed on more slowly to consumers. Credit 
card rates perhaps have become stickier. Credit card issuers are now less reliant on the 
base rate as a source of funds. Firms no longer complete on price alone but also 
compete on non-price characteristics. 
The following tables relate to the discussion in A1.3: 
Tahla 1 
_A" 14Q7 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 22.962 9.047 
TREND 0.023 0.146 
FIRM 0.029 0.378 
FEE 0.227 0.104 
R 0.915 
Number of Providers 40 
Tahip 1 
_R" 1447 
Top Five Best Bus To Five Worse Bu s 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Lloyds 
-7.11 Liberal Democrat 7.78 
Coutts & Co 
-5.78 RSPB 7.78 
Bank of C rus 
-4.72 Labour 7.78 
NatWest 
-2.04 Standard Charter 5.47 
AlB 
-1.95 Beneficial 5.47 
319 
Table 2. A: 1993 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 21.133 4.714 
TREND 
-0.107 0.054 
FIRM 0.133 0.082 
FEE 
-0.277 0.107 
R 0.720 
Number of Providers 43 
Table 2. B: 1993 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Bank of Cyprus 
-6.19 Bank of Ireland 4.68 
N&P 
-4.19 Standard Charter 4.01 
-2.76 Giro bank 3.64 
Amnesty International 
-2.70 Leeds Permanent 2.26 
Yorkshire Bank 
-2.32 AA 2.24 
Table 3. A: 1994 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 21.411 1.502 
TREND 
-0.033 0.399 
FIRM 
-0.063 0.032 
FEE 
-0.018 0.059 
R 0.973 
Tnhle 3_R: 1994 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Robert Fleming 
-4.858 Standard Charter 10.71 
The Express Card 
-4.796 The Arts Card 7.71 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.875 Carecard 7.71 
MBNA 
-0.820 National Trust 7.71 
Royal Bank of Scotland 0 Bank of Ireland 7.69 
TnhiP 4_A: 199S 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 21.094 4.095 
TREND 0.017 0.080 
FIRM 
-0.059 0.050 
FEE 
-0.076 0.009 
0.967 
Number of Providers 58 
Table 4. B: 1995 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Bu s 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Skycard 
-4.67 Standard Charter 10.96 
Coutts & Co 
-4.28 NWS 7.81 
Robert Fleming 
-3.72 Alß 7.26 
The Express Card 
-3.39 Allied Irish 7.26 
CMSA 
-2.12 The Arts Card 6.72 
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Table 5. A: 1996 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 14.788 3.833 
TREND 0.013 0.036 
FIRM 
-0.028 0.020 
FEE 0.086 0.030 
R 0.962 
Number of Providers 84 
Table 5.6: 1996 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Coutts & Co 
-4.27 Standard Charter 13.7 
Pro7l 
-3.60 NWS 9.11 
The Express Card 
-2.81 First Trust 8.96 
Skycard 
-2.04 Allied Irish 8.88 
National County 
-1.63 AIB 8.76 
Table 6. A: 1997 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 16.893 3.819 
TREND 
-0.006 0.040 
FIRM 
-0.020 0.047 
FEE 0.0267 0.047 
R2 0.957 
Number of Providers 93 
Table 6. B: 1997 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Robert Fleming 
-4.41 Standard Charter 12.51 
Coutts & Co 
-4.15 Capital Bank 8.26 
The Express Card 
-3.61 Allied Irish 8.00 
The People's Bank 
-2.80 First Trust 7.61 
Skycard 
-2.39 Pro72 5.96 
Table 7. A: 1998 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 18.389* 1.310 
TREND 
-0.002 0.003 
FIRM 
-0.004 0.020 
FEE 0.034 0.009 
RT 1 0.9937 
Number of Providers 89 
Table 7. B: 1998 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Bu s 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Robert Fleming 
-4.68 Standard Charter 11.78 
The Express Card 
-4.43 Capital Bank 7.54 
Co-operative Bank 
-2.62 Allied Irish 7.28 
Pro66 
-2.41 First Trust 6.88 
Fizzell Bank 
-2.29 RNLI 5.15 
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Table 8. A: 1999 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 20.674 2.077 
TREND 
-0.039 0.016 
FIRM 
-0.035 0.025 
FEE 0.092 0.011 
R 0.968 
Number of Providers 83 
Table 8.6: 1999 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
E 
-7.94 Capital Bank 6.90 
The Express Card 
-5.18 Allied Irish 6.53 Smile 
-4.93 First Trust 5.35 
Co-operative Bank 
-4.31 Associates 3.81 
Hamilton 
-3.58 Yorkshire Bank 3.09 
Table 9. A: 2000 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 12.988' 2.240 
TREND 
-0.030 0.022 
FIRM 0.008 0.016 
FEE 
-0.004 0.011 
R 0.952 
Number of Providers 97 
Table 9. B: 2000 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Egg 
-6.92 Capital Bank 8.14 
Northern Rock 
-6.77 Allied Irish 5.92 
Smile 
-4.84 AA 4.20 
Capital One 
-3.87 Associates 4.16 
Hamilton 
-3.24 NSPCC 4.00 
Table 10. A: 2001 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 16.168 1.884 
TREND 
-0.028 0.027 
FIRM 0.010 0.013 
FEE 0.164 0.009 
R 0.985 
Number of Providers 90 
Table 10. B: 2001 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Bus 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Cahoot 
-8.64 AA 3.61 
Leopold Joseph 
-6.96 NSPCC 3.41 
Intelligent Finance 
-6.85 Sk card 3.25 
Northern Rock 
-6.14 GM 3.25 
Pro25 
-5.43 II FC 3.25 
322 
Table 11. A: 2002 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 16.334 2.540 
TREND 
-0.032 0.014 
FIRM 0.032 0.052 
FEE 0.069 0.013 
R2 0.949 
Number of Providers 91 
Table 11. B: 2002 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Cahoot 
-8.51 NSPCC 4.83 
Intelligent Finance 
-7.28 Household Bank 3.75 
Northern Rock 
-5.68 Bud ens 3.72 
Smile 
-4.48 Pro76 3.72 
Co-operative Bank 
-4.02 Bank of Cyprus 3.42 
Table 12. A: 2003 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 16.347 1.661 
TREND 
-0.014 0.007 
FIRM 
-0.023 0.019 
FEE 0.212 0.017 
R2 0.991 
Number of Providers 88 
Table 12. B: 2003 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Leopold Joseph 
-7.26 Vanquish 21.88 
Cahoot 
-6.91 Pro42 5.33 
Intelligent Finance 
-5.67 Skycard 5.33 
Co-operative Bank 
-5.24 HFC 5.28 
Northern Rock 
-4.73 Pro17 5.27 
Table 13. A: 2004 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 18.574 2.933 
TREND 0.012 0.0323 
FIRM 
-0.010 0.037 
FEE 
-0.087 0.011 
R2 0.978 
Number of Providers 94 
Table 13. B: 2004 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Bu Vs 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Northern Rock 
-8.56 Vanquish 19.26 
Cahoot 
-7.38 Asda 11.63 
Mint 
-6.28 NSPCC 5.39 
Intelligent Fiance 
-5.73 Leopold Joseph 5.05 
Pro4I 
-5.32 British Airways 4.46 
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Table 14. A: 2005 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 16.231 5.159 
TREND 
-0.019 0.037 
FIRM 
-0.063 0.064 
FEE 0.144 0.011 
R 0.9543 
Number of Providers 89 
Table 14. B: 2005 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Northern Bank 
-7.00 Vanquish 20.44 
Wanadoo 
-6.10 Asda 12.05 
Co-operative Bank 
-5.35 NSPCC 3.98 
Airmiles 
-4.06 Household Bank 3.90 
American Express 
-3.66 Laiki Bank 3.56 
Table 15. A: 2006 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 10.442 3.248 
TREND 0.014 0.032 
FIRM 0.021 0.021 
FEE 0.119 0.035 
R2 0.938 
Number of Providers 82 
Table 15. B: 2006 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Bu s 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Pro60 
-7.48 Vanquish 19.54 
BMW Amex 
-7.11 Household Bank 3.00 
American Express 
-6.37 Pro21 2.75 
Co-operative Bank 
-5.53 Pro9 2.59 
Egg 
-5.33 Morrisons 2.00 
Table 16. A: 2007 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
CONSTANT 16.224 8.327 
TREND 0.078 0.131 
FIRM 0.046 0.177 
FEE 0.227 0.261 
R 0.990 
Number of Providers 70 
Table 17. B: 2007 
Top Five Best Buys Top Five Worse Buys 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Card Provider Deviation from the 
Default Provider 
Bank of Scotland 
-7.00 Vanquish 19.54 
BMW Amex 
-7.00 Capital One 8.50 
Intelligent Finance 
-5.60 MBNA 2.00 
Pro23 
-5.08 Save the Children 
Pro53 
-4.57 Oxfam 
E20[ý 
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A1.5 Summary 
In this section a comprehensive study of competition in the UK credit card market has been 
presented for the period May 1992 to May 2007. It has been possible to see that there are a 
range of factors which has impacted on the market throughout the period under investigation. 
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Appendix A2: List of Credit Card Issuers 
American Express 
Bank of Ireland 
Barclaycard 
Capital One 
Clydesdale Bank 
Co-operative Bank 
EGG (formerly known as Prudential Banking plc) 
GE Money 
HBOS*'+** 
HSBC 
Lloyds TSB*** 
MBNA 
Morgan Stanley 
Nationwide 
Royal Bank of Scotland** 
includes cards issued by the Bank of Scotland and Halifax. 
includes cards issued by the Royal Bank of Scotland and the National 
Westminster Bank (NatWest). 
HBOS and Lloyds TSB merged together in 2009 to form the Lloyds TSB Banking 
Group. However this does not affect this any of the results in this study. 
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Appendix Al List of Credit Cards used in this study 
Abbey Balance Transfer 
Abbey Cashback 
Abbey Flat Rate 
Abbey Shopping 
Action Aid 
Action Aid Gold 
Alliance and Leicester 
Amazon 
American Express Red 
American Express Blue 
American Express 
Platinum 
American Express Travel 
Amivo 
Amnesty International 
Amnesty Int Advantage 
Amnesty International 
Fixed Rate 
AOL 
Arsenal FC 
Asda 
Aston Villa FC 
BoS One Card 
Barclaycard Charity 
Barclaycard Flexi Rate 
Barclaycard Graduate 
Barclaycard Initial 
Barclaycard Platinum 
Barclaycard Premiership 
Barclaycard Simplicity 
Barclaycard Student 
Barnardos 
Barnsley BS 
Barnsley BS Platinum 
Birmingham FC 
BMA Services 
BMI 
BMW 
Bolton Wanderers FC 
Bradford FC 
Breakthrough Breast 
Cancer 
Britannia BS 
Britannia BS Platinum 
British Airways 
British Airways Prem 
British Airways 
Premium Plus 
Brit Heart Foundation 
British Marine Fed 
British Motorcycle Fed 
Burnley FC 
CAFOD 
CAFOD Advantage 
CAFOD Fixed Rate 
Cahoot 
Cancer Research (Eng) 
Cancer Research (Scot) 
Capital One No Hassle 
Platinum 
Capital One Platinum 
Capital One Classic 
Cardiff City FC 
Carlisle United FC 
Celtic FC 
Charlton FC 
Chelsea FC 
Cheshire Building 
Society 
Cheshire Building 
Society Platinum 
Childline 
Children's Aid Direct 
Children's Society 
Christian Aid 
Christian Aid Advantage 
Christian Aid Fixed Rate 
Chrysler 
Chrysler Platinum 
CIMA 
Classic FM 
Classical Arts 
Co-op Advantage Gold 
Co-op Advantage 
Platinum 
Co-op Advantage 
Standard 
Co-op Base Rate for Life 
Gold 
Co-op Clear Credit Card 
Co-op Flat Rate (Syrs) 
Gold 
Co-op Flat Rate (5yrs) 
Platinum 
Co-op Platinum Base 
Rate Tracker 
Co-op Travel Card 
Colchester United FC 
Coran 
Cricket 
Crystal Palace FC 
Darlington FC 
Delta Air Lines 
Egg 
England Rugby 
Everton FC 
Field and Trek 
First Direct 
First Direct Classic 
First Direct Gold 
Fulham FC 
Garfield 
GE Money Everyday 
GE Money 
Transformation 
Goldfish 
Golf 
Great British Rugby 
League 
Greenpeace 
Greenpeace Advantage 
Greenpeace Fixed Rate 
Grimsby Town FC 
GSE Racing 
Halfords 
Halifax Balance Transfer 
Halifax Balance Transfer 
Platinum 
Halifax Flat Rate 
Halifax One Card 
Hearts FC 
Help the Aged 
Help the Hospice 
Homebase 
Honda Racing 
HSBC 
HSBC Premier 
HSBC Student 
Huddersfield Town FC 
Ideal Home Show 
IF Balance Transfer 
IF Flat Rate 
(point 
Ipswich Town FC 
Jeep 
Jeep Platinum 
Jordan Grand Prix 
Labour Advantage 
Labour Advantage 
Platinum 
Labour Fixed Rate 
Platinum 
Leeds Building Society 
Leeds United FC 
Leicester City FC 
Leyton Orient FC 
Liberal Democrat 
Advantage 
Liberal Democrat 
Advantage Platinum 
Liberal Democrat Fixed 
Rate Platinum 
Liverpool FC 
Lloyds TSB Advance 
Lloyds TSB Platinum 
Lloyds TSB Rewards 
Lloyds TSB Student 
Loughborough Building 
Society 
Loughborough Building 
Society Platinum 
Lufthansa 
Manchester City FC 
Manchester United FC 
Mansfield Building 
Society 
Mansfield Building 
Society Platinum 
Marbles 
Marks and Spencer 
More 
Marriots 
MBNA Classic 
MasterCard 
MBNA France Card 
MBNA Platinum Plus 
MBNA Points 
MasterCard 
MBNA Rewards 
Medical Foundation 
Medical Foundation 
Advantage Platinum 
Medical Foundation 
Fixed Rate Platinum 
Melton Mowbray 
Building Society 
Melton Mowbray 
Building Society 
Platinum 
Mencap 
Mercedes 
Mercedes Platinum 
Middlesborough FC 
Mini 
Mint Classic 
Mint Gold 
Mint Platinum 
Morgan Stanley Buy and 
Fly 
Morgan Stanley Gold 
Morgan Stanley 
Platinum 
Moto GP 
Motocycle Action Group 
Motorcard 
National Aids Trust 
National Geographical 
Society 
Nationwide Comic 
Relief 
Nationwide Classic 
Nationwide Gold 
NatWest Classic 
NatWest Gold 
NatWest Platinum 
NatWest Student 
Nectar 
Newcastle Building 
Society 
Newcastle Building 
Society Platinum 
Newcastle United FC 
NFU 
Norwich and 
Peterborough 
Norwich City FC 
NSPCC 
Oxfa m 
Oxfam Advantage 
Platinum 
Oxfam Fixed Rate 
Platinum 
Oxford United FC 
PADI 
PASS 
PaypalCard 
PDSA 
Peterborough United FC 
Port Vale FC 
Portsmouth FC 
Post Office Classic 
Post Office Gold 
Post Office Platinum 
Priority Club 
QPR FC 
Ramblers' Association 
Ramblers' Association 
Advantage 
Ramblers' Association 
Fixed Rate 
Rangers FC 
RBS Classic 
RBS Gold 
RBS Platinum 
RBS Royalties Classic 
RBS Royalties Gold 
RBS Royalties Platinum 
RBS Student 
RBS WilliamsFl Team 
Reading FC 
RHS 
Robinsons Country 
Leisure 
Rotherham United FC 
Royal Doutlon 
Royal Liverpool 
Philharmonic 
RSPB 
RSPB Advantage 
RSPB Fixed Rate 
RSPB Gold 
Ryanair. com 
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Appendix A3: The Summary Box5657 
SUMMARY BOX 
The information contained in this table summarises the key product features and is not 
intended to replace any terms and conditions 
APR Typical 10.9% APR variable 
Other Interest Rates Introductory Rate Monthly Rate Annual Rate 
Purchases 0% until 1/10/06 0.87% 10.90% 
Cash Advances N/A 0.95% 12.00% 
Balance Transfers 0% until 1/10/06 0.87% 10.90% 
Interest Free Period Maximum 56 days for purchases if you pay your balance in 
full and on time. 
There is no interest free period on cash advances. Interest 
free period on balance transfers only applies to the 
introductory period. 
Interest Charging The periods over which interest are charged are as follows: 
Information 
From Until 
Purchases Transaction Date Statement date 
Cash withdrawals Transaction Date Statement date 
Balance transfers Date debited to Repaid in full 
your account 
Credit card cheques Date debited to Repaid in full 
your account 
If you pay the balance in full, the interest charge for the period 
from the previous statement to the date of full repayment will 
be debited the following month. 
Allocation of We will apply payments we receive to your account in the 
Payments following order: 
1. Cash withdrawal fee 
2. Outstanding interest 
3. Transferred balances 
4. Purchases 
5. Cash 
See section xx of customer terms and conditions for full 
details. 
Minimum Greater of 2.25% of outstanding balance or £5 each month 
Repayment 
Amount of Credit Minimum credit limit of £500, maximum credit limit subject to 
status (or amount if the maximum is known) 
Fees No Annual Fee 
Charges Balance transfers 
- 
2% (minimum £2, maximum £50) 
Cash withdrawals 
- 
2% (minimum £2) 
Overseas transactions 
- 
2.75% (including purchase of foreign 
currency and travellers' cheques). 
Default Charges Late payment fee 
- 
£20.00 
Over credit limit 
- 
£20.00 
Returned cheque or direct debit 
- 
£20.00 
56 This summary box is for illustrative purposes only 
57 Adapted from Choosing and Using a Credit Card, which is available 
<http: //www. choosingandusing. com> 
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Appendix A4: Complete List of Credit Card Attributes 
Issuer 
Provider 
Classification 
Type of card 
Fixed/Variable rate of interest 
Number of years the interest rate fixed 
Credit card network (status) 
Introductory offer 
Length of introductory offer on purchases 
Length of introductory offer on balance transfers 
Introductory APR on purchases 
Introductory APR on balance purchases 
Interest rates (%) 
- 
APR on balance transfers 
- 
APR on cash transactions 
Default Charges 
- 
Overlimit 
- 
Late payment 
- 
Returned payment 
Fees 
- 
Balance transfer 
- 
Credit card cheques 
- 
Cash 
- 
Foreign currency transactions 
Minimum payment (%) 
Minimum payment (£) 
Fee pa 
Minimum credit limit 
Maximum credit limit 
Purchase protection 
Refund protection 
Fraud protection 
Minimum age 
Minimum income 
Loyalty scheme 
-Yes/No 
-Cashback 
- 
Points 
- 
Discounts 
- 
Airmiles 
- 
Vouchers 
- 
Other 
Card Benefits 
- 
Travel insurance 
- 
Travel benefits 
- 
Holiday discounts 
- 
Wine club 
- 
Legal and medical assistance while aboard 
Charity donation 
- 
Yes/No 
- 
Amount when account opened (£) 
- 
Amount per £100 spent (£) 
- 
Extra donations (£) 
Non-charity donation 
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Appendix B 
Additional Information Related to Chapter Five 
Appendix B1: Spread Diagrams for Provider Types 
Appendix B2: Falling Base Rate (January 2001 
- 
November 2003) 
Appendix B3: Rising Base Rate (July 1996 
-July 1998) 
Appendix B4: Additional Results Relating to Section 5. X 
Appendix B5: Results of Johansen Tests for Co-integration 
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Appendix B1: Spread Diagrams for Provider Types 
Figure B1.1: Banks 
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Figure B2.2: Building Societies 
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Figure B1.3: Converted Mutuals 
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Figure B1.4: Personal Loan Specialists 
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Appendix B. 2: Results of Johansen's tests for Co-integration 
Table B2.1: Barclaycard 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 32.40 15.41 
rs1 1.16 3.76 
rs2 
- 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r-0 31.24 15.41 
rs1 1.16 3.76 
r52 
- 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 3.77 2.11 1.01 
r51 3.51 1.79 0.65 
rs2 3.55 1.81 0.66 
Table B2.2: MBNA 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 22.29 15.41 
r51 3.41 3.76 
r52 
- 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 18.89 14.07 
r51 3.41 3.76 
rS2 
- 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 4.45 2.75 1.62 
r51 4.36 2.60 1.44 
r52 4.38 2.59 1.42 
Table B2.3: HBOS 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 24.53 15.41 
r51 3.60 3.72 
r52 
- 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 20.93 14.07 
rs1 3.60 3.76 
rs2 
- 
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Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 2.08 0.86 0.04 
r51 1.98 0.70 -0.16 
r52 1.99 0.69 -0.18 
Table B2.4: HSBC 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5%o Critical Value 
r=0 44.55 15.41 
rs1 2.63 3.76 
r52 - 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 41.92 14.07 
r51 2.63 3.76 
r52 - 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 4.56 2.71 1.49 
r51 4.13 2.22 0.96 
r52 4.15 2.22 0.95 
Table B2.5: RBS 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 26.11 15.41 
r51 0.74 3.76 
r52 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 25,36 14.07 
r51 0.74 3.76 
r52 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 1.51 -0.35 -1.56 
r51 1.32 -0.59 -1.85 
r52 1.37 -0.56 -1.83 
Table B2.6: Nationwide 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 17.38 15.41 
r51 0.32 3.76 
rs2 - 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 17.05 14.07 
r51 0.32 3.76 
r52 
- 
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Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r-0 0.92 
-0.22 -0.98 
r51 0.87 -0.33 -1.12 
r52 0.92 
-0.29 -1.10 
Table B2.7: Co-operative Bank 
No Co-integration found 
TableB2.8: Egg 
No Co-integration found 
Table B2.9: Lloyds TSB 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 10.28 15.41 
r51 3.51 3.76 
r52 - 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 25.77 14.07 
rs1 3.51 3.76 
rs2 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 0.00 -0.89 -1.50 
r51 -0.03 -0.98 -1.62 
rS2 -0.02 -0.99 -1.64 
Table B2.10: Capital One 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 1 5% Critical Value 
r51 
2.00 3.76 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r_0 15.23 
14.07 
rs1 2.00 
3.76 
rs2 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 3.30 2.40 1.80 
r51 3.28 2.32 1.69 
r52 3.31 1.69 1.69 
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Appendix B3: Short-Run Coefficients 
Table B3.1: Average Credit Card 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. creditcard 0.05 0.09 
L2D. creditcard -0.01 0.09 
L3D. creditcard 0.07 0.09 
L4D. creditcard 0.13 0.09 
L5D. creditcard 0.11 0.10 
L6D. creditcard 0.12 0.10 
L7D. creditcard 0.11 0.10 
L8D. creditcard 0.05 0.10 
L9D. creditcard 0.07 0.10 
L10D. creditcard -0.04 0.09 
L11D. creditcard -0.04 0.08 
L1D. baserate 0.45 0.18 
L2D. baserate -0.03 0.21 
L3D. baserate -0.03 0.21 
L4D. baserate -0.06 0.21 
L5D. baserate -0.02 0.21 
L6D. baserate 0.01 0.21 
L7D. baserate -0.21 0.21 
L8D. baserate -0.31 0.22 
L9D. baserate -0.04 0.22 
L10D. baserate 0.09 0.21 
L11D. baserate 0.03 0.20 
Trend 2.5e 4.2e 
Constant -0.04 0.04 
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Table B3.2: Standard Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. creditcard 0.11 0.22 
L2D. creditcard -0.02 0.22 
L3D. creditcard 0.08 0.22 
L4D. creditcard -0.20 0.23 
L5D. creditcard -0.16 0.23 
L6D. creditcard -0.27 0.25 
L7D. creditcard -0.30 0.28 
L8D. creditcard -0.08 0.30 
L9D. creditcard -0.22 0.28 
L10D. creditcard 0.28 0.28 
L11D. creditcard 0.08 0.28 
L12D. creditcard 0.25 0.26 
L13D. creditcard 0.27 0.25 
L14D. creditcard 0.08 0.22 
L15D. creditcard 0.12 0.23 
L16D. creditcard -0.12 0.21 
L17D. creditcard 0.24 0.22 
L18D. creditcard 0.12 0.23 
L19D. creditcard 0.28 0.20 
L20D. creditcard 0.19 0.19 
L1D. baserate -0.47 0.42 
L2D. baserate -0.44 0.44 
L3D. baserate -0.54 0.46 
L4D. baserate -0.02 0.45 
L5D. baserate -0.53 0.45 
L6D. baserate 0.06 0.43 
L7D. baserate 0.52 0.44 
L8D. baserate 0.52 0.45 
L9D. baserate -0.15 0.48 
L10D. baserate -0.52 0.46 
L11D. baserate 0.73 0.46 
L12D. baserate -0.35 0.48 
L13D. baserate 0.20 0.50 
L14D. baserate -1.22 0.51 
L15D. baserate -0.42 0.56 
L16D. baserate -0.67 0.48 
L17D. baserate 0.36 0.49 
L18D. baserate -0.88 0.46 
L19D. baserate 0.16 0.48 
L20D. baserate -0.20 0.41 
Trend 0.00 0.01 
Constant -0.06 0.15 
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Table B3.3: Gold Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. creditcard 0.20 0.26 
L2 D. cred itca rd 0.23 0.26 
L3D. creditcard 0.12 -0.26 
L4D. creditcard 0.32 0.26 
LSD. creditcard 0.32 0.26 
L6D. creditcard 0.27 0.26 
L7D. creditcard 0.53 0.25 
LSD. creditcard 0.16 0.24 
L9D. creditcard 0.18 0.23 
L10D. creditcard 0.41 0.22 
L11D. creditcard 0.071 0.20 
L12D. creditcard 0.301 0.19 
L13D. creditcard 0.27 0.19 
L14D. creditcard 0.03 -0.19 
L15D. creditcard 0.19 0.17 
L16D. creditcard 0.09 0.17 
L17D. creditcard 0.30 -0.16 
L1D. baserate 
-0.20 0.36 
L2D. baserate 
-0.53 0.40 
L3D. baserate 
-0.17 0.37 
L4D. baserate -0.15 0.37 
LSD. baserate 
-0.52 0.40 
L6D. baserate 
-0.40 0.37 
L7D. baserate 0.35 0.38 
L8D. baserate 
-0.09 0.37 
L9D. baserate 0.06 0.37 
L10D. baserate -0.25 0.41 
L11D. baserate 0.67 0.40 
L12D. baserate -0.22 0.39 
L13D. baserate -0.14 0.40 
L14D. baserate -0.51 0.40 
L15D. baserate 
-0.40 0.40 
L16D. baserate -0.06 0.39 
L17D. baserate 
-0.94 0.38 
Trend 0.00 0.00 
Constant 
-0.07 0.09 
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Table B3.4: Platinum Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. creditcard 0.70 0.28 
L2D. creditcard 0.53 0.24 
L3D. creditcard 0.24 0.20 
L4D. creditcard 0.28 0.19 
LSD. creditcard 0.40 0.20 
L6D. creditcard 0.30 0.19 
L7D. creditcard -0.14 0.20 
L8D. creditcard -0.02 
0.21 
L9D. creditcard 0.12 
0.20 
L10D. creditcard -0.01 
0.20 
L11D. creditcard -0.02 
0.19 
L12D. creditcard 0.02 
0.21 
L13D. creditcard -0.31 
0.21 
L14D. creditcard -0.39 
0.25 
L15D. creditcard -0.21 
0.25 
L16D. creditcard 0.06 
0.21 
L17D. creditcard 
L18D. creditcard 
-0.34 
-0.49 
0 22 
0.21 
L19D. creditcard -0.33 
0.24 
L20D. creditcard -0.27 
0.27 
L21D. creditcard 0.01 
0.23 
L22D. creditcard 0.25 
0.19 
L23D. creditcard 0.54 
0.21 
L1D. baserate -0.99 
0.56 
L2D. baserate -1.75 
0.51 
L3D. baserate -0.78 0.45 
L4D. baserate -1.12 
0.39 
L5D. baserate -0.79 
0.41 
L6D. baserate -1.57 
0.44 
L7D. baserate -0.79 
0.39 
L8D. baserate -0.93 
0.39 
L9D. baserate -0.79 
0.35 
L10D. baserate -0.06 
0.32 
L11D. baserate -0.16 
0.28 
L12D. baserate -0.05 0.27 
L13D. baserate -0.73 0.27 
L14D. baserate -0.31 0.29 
L15D. baserate 0.28 0.28 
L16D. baserate -0.65 0.29 
L17D. baserate -0.26 0.29 
L18D. baserate -0.23 0.29 
L19D. baserate -0.45 0.28 
L20D. baserate -0.18 0.29 
L21D. baserate -0.60 0.33 
L22D. baserate 0.57 0.29 
L23D. baserate -0.39 0.26 
Trend 0.00 0.00 
Constant 0.19 0.15 
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Table B3.5: Barclaycard 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. Barclaycard 0.07 0.25 
L2D. Barclaycard 0.13 0.24 
L3D. Barclaycard 
-0.07 0.25 
L4D. Barclaycard 0.01 0.27 
LSD. Barclaycard 0.10 0.29 
L6D. Barclaycard 
-0.08 0.29 
L7D. Barclaycard 0.01 0.28 
L8D. Barclaycard 
-0.16 0.29 
L9D. Barclaycard 
-0.26 0.30 
L10D. Barclaycard 0.29 0.29 
L11D. Barclaycard 
-0.18 0.29 
L12D. Barclaycard 
-0.07 0.28 
L13D. Barclaycard 0.16 0.26 
L14D. Barclaycard -0.05 0.25 
L15D. Barclaycard 0.02 0.25 
1.16D. Barclaycard -0.04 0.24 
L17D. Barclaycard -0.11 0.22 
L18D. Barclaycard 0.07 0.21 
L19D. Barclaycard 0.18 0.20 
L20D. Barclaycard 
-0.12 0.19 
L21D. Barclaycard 0.13 0.18 
L1D. baserate 
-0.08 1.59 
L2D. baserate 
-0.83 1.58 
L3D. baserate -1.75 1.55 
L4D. baserate 0.30 1.61 
LSD. baserate -0.21 1.68 
L6D. baserate 0.13 1.68 
L7D. baserate -0.06 1.66 
L8D. baserate 1.23 1.65 
L9D. baserate -0.14 1.55 
L10D. baserate -0.86 1.53 
L11D. baserate 0.87 1.57 
L12D. baserate 2.56 1.56 
L13D. baserate -0.40 1.80 
L14D. baserate -1.39 1.78 
L15D. baserate -2.28 1.81 
L16D. baserate 1.22 1.86 
L17D. baserate -0.45 1.80 
L18D. baserate 1.54 1.69 
L19D. baserate 
-0.58 1.59 
L20D. baserate 2.69 1.62 
L21D. baserate 
-2.08 1.43 
Constant 
-0.03 0.15 
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Table B3.6: HBOS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. HBOS 0.04 0.15 
L2D. H BOS 0.03 0.15 
L3 D. H BOS 
-0.01 0.14 
L4D. H BOS 
-0.07 0.14 
L5D. HBOS 
-0.11 0.14 
L6D. HBOS 
-0.18 0.14 
L7D. H BOS 
-0.03 0.14 
L8D. H BOS 
-0.20 0.14 
L9D. HBOS 0.01 0.15 
L10D. HBOS 
-0.05 0.18 
L11D. HBOS 0.01 0.18 
L12D. HBOS 0.22 0.18 
L13D. HBOS 
-0.10 0.19 
L14D. HBOS 0.22 0.18 
L15D. HBOS 0.20 0.19 
L16D. HBOS 
-0.20 0.19 
L1D. baserate 
-1.25 0.87 
L2D. baserate 
-0.50 0.85 
L3D. baserate 
-0.14 0.86 
L4D. baserate 
-1.03 0.85 
L5D. baserate 
-0.17 0.91 
L6D. baserate 
-0.53 0.88 
L7D. baserate 
-0.42 0.91 
L8D. baserate 1.03 0.92 
L9D. baserate 
-0.23 0.87 
L10D. baserate 0.02 0.87 
L11D. baserate -0.54 0.84 
L12D. baserate 1.26 0.84 
L13D. baserate -0.03 0.86 
L14D. baserate -0.49 0.85 
L15D. baserate -0.61 0.85 
L16D. baserate 0.67 0.71 
Constant 0.00 0.08 
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Table B3.7: HSBC 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. HBSC 
-0.45 0.44 
L2 D. H BSC 
-0.61 0.46 
L3 D. H BSC 
-0.69 0.46 
L4D. HBSC 
-0.54 0.48 
L5 D. H BSC 
-0.61 0.44 
L6D. HBSC 
-0.56 0.43 
L7 D. H BSC 
-1.23 0.47 
L8D. HBSC 
-0.60 0.48 
L9 D. H BSC 
-0.82 0.49 
L1OD. HBSC 
-0.55 0.46 
L11D. HBSC 
-0.62 0.46 
L12D. HBSC 
-0.53 0.42 
L13 D. H BSC 
-0.48 0.41 
L14D. HBSC 
-1.27 0.40 
L15 D. H BSC 
-0.44 0.42 
L16D. HBSC 
-0.76 0.45 
L17 D. H BSC 
-0.49 0.35 
L18D. H BSC 
-0.29 0.35 
L19D. HBSC 
-0.40 0.32 
L20D. H BSC 
-0.39 0.29 
L21 D. H BSC 
-0.74 0.32 
L22D. HBSC 
-0.32 0.31 
L23 D. H BSC 
-0.43 0.32 
L1D. baserate 1.49 1.92 
L20. baserate 
-1.31 2.00 
L3D. baserate 0.63 1.90 
L4D. baserate 
LSD. baserate 
-1.31 
3.10 
2.00 
2.00 
L6D. baserate 
-0.43 2.06 
L7D. baserate 
-1.24 
2 09 
L8D. baserate 
-0.86 
2.07 
L9D. baserate 0.78 2.09 
L10D. baserate 
-0.40 2.04 
L11D. baserate 
-1.37 2.03 
L12D. baserate -0.94 1.95 
L13D. baserate 0.59 2.02 
L14D. baserate 1.19 2.02 
L15D. baserate 0.47 2.04 
L16D. baserate 
-3.02 2.01 
L17D. baserate 1.53 2.08 
L18D. baserate 2.02 1.91 
L19D. baserate 
-3.28 2.00 
L20D. baserate 
-0.12 2.06 
L21D. baserate 
-3.18 2.10 
L22D. baserate 1.88 2.06 
L23D. baserate 
-1.12 1.96 
Constant -0.02 0.30 
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Table 83.8: RBS 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. RBS 0.06 0.76 
L2D. RBS 0.30 0.75 
L3D. RBS 0.41 0.76 
L4D. RBS 0.13 0.70 
L5D. RBS 
-0.08 0.68 
L6D. RBS 
-0.10 0.69 
L7D. RBS 
-0.06 0.67 
L8D. RBS 0.33 0.64 
L9D. RBS 0.07 0.62 
L10D. RBS 0.07 0.63 
L11D. RBS 
-0.04 0.60 
L12D. RBS 0.09 0.54 
L13D. RBS 0.15 0.50 
L14D. RBS 0.19 0.51 
L15 D. RBS 0.14 0.48 
L16D. RBS 
-0.04 0.40 
L17D. RBS 
-0.07 0.31 
L18D. RBS 0.03 0.29 
L19D. RBS 0.09 0.30 
L20D. RBS 
-0.19 0.26 
L21 D. R BS 0.09 0.15 
L22D. RBS 0.08 0.15 
L23 D. RBS 
-0.07 0.15 
L1D. baserate 
-0.86 0.92 
L2D. baserate 0.25 0.90 
L3D. baserate 0.62 0.72 
L4D. baserate 
-0.27 0.70 
L5D. baserate 
-0.36 0.82 
L6D. baserate 
-1.50 0.80 
L7D. baserate 0.67 0.77 
L8D. baserate 0.26 0.81 
L9D. baserate 0.18 0.84 
L10D. baserate 0.14 0.90 
L11D. baserate 
-0.26 0.73 
L12D. baserate 0.12 0.68 
L13D. baserate 
-0.49 0.92 
L14D. baserate 0.27 0.92 
L15D. baserate 0.34 0.77 
L16D. baserate 
-0.58 0.76 
L17D. baserate 
-0.16 0.83 
L18D. baserate 
-0.40 0.78 
L19D. baserate 
-0.15 0.65 
L20D. baserate 0.15 0.63 
L21D. baserate 0.27 0.59 
L22D. baserate 0.64 0.61 
L23D. baserate 
-0.33 0.52 
Constant 
-0.02 0.03 
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Table B3.9: Nationwide 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. Nationwide 
-0.17 0.20 
L2D. Nationwide 
-0.14 0.20 
L3D. Nationwide 
-0.45 0.20 
L4D. Nationwide 0.02 0.20 
L5D. Nationwide 0.04 0.19 
L6D. Nationwide 
-0.05 0.19 
L7D. Nationwide 0.05 0.19 
LBD. Nationwide 
-0.04 0.16 
L9D. Nationwide 
-0.12 0.15 
L10D. Nationwide 0.00 0.16 
L11D. Nationwide 
-0.26 0.16 
L12D. Nationwide 
-0.03 0.16 
L13D. Nationwide 0.01 0.15 
L14D. Nationwide 0.04 0.14 
L15D. Nationwide 0.07 0.14 
L1D. baserate 0.54 0.51 
L2D. baserate 
-1.05 0.56 
L3D. baserate 0.61 0.57 
L4D. baserate 
-0.35 0.53 
LSD. baserate -0.02 0.53 
L6D. baserate 0.33 0.52 
L7D. baserate 
-0.57 0.56 
L8D. baserate 1.15 0.56 
L9D. baserate 0.23 0.57 
L10D. baserate 0.45 0.53 
L11D. baserate 
-0.39 0.53 
L12D. baserate -0.70 0.52 
L13D. baserate 1.14 0.54 
L14D. baserate -1.35 0.57 
L15D. baserate 0.30 0.51 
Constant 0.05 0.04 
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Table 83.10: Lloyds TSB 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. Lloydstsb 0.24 0.13 
L2D. Lloydstsb 0.20 0.14 
L3D. Lloydstsb 0.09 0.14 
L4D. Lloydstsb 0.11 0.13 
L5 D. Lloydstsb 0.25 0.13 
L6D. Lloydstsb 0.11 0.13 
L7D. Lloydstsb 0.12 0.13 
L8D. Lloydstsb 0.18 0.12 
L9D. Lloydstsb 0.01 0.13 
L10D. Lloydstsb 0.24 0.13 
L11D. Lloydstsb 0.22 0.13 
L12D. Lloydstsb 0.16 0.13 
L1D. baserate 0.32 0.32 
L2D. baserate 
-0.32 0.34 
L3D. baserate 
-0.12 0.34 
L4D. baserate 0.25 0.35 
LSD. baserate 
-0.08 0.36 
L6D. baserate 
-0.21 0.36 
L7D. baserate 
-0.15 0.36 
L8D. baserate 0.56 0.36 
L9D. baserate 
-0.67 0.35 
L10D. baserate 0.69 0.37 
L11D. baserate 
-0.25 0.37 
L12D. baserate 0.02 0.32 
Constant 0.00 0.02 
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Table B3.11: Capital One 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
L1D. capitalone -0.13 0.22 
L2D. capitalone -0.16 0.22 
L3D. capitalone -0.23 0.21 
L4D. capitalone -0.12 0.21 
L5D. capitalone -0.17 0.20 
L6D. capitalone -0.11 0.21 
L7D. capitalone -0.12 0.21 
L8D. capitalone -0.15 0.22 
L9D. capitalone -0.30 0.36 
L10D. capitalone -0.18 0.35 
L11D. capitalone -0.24 0.35 
L12D. capitalone -0.10 0.35 
L1D. baserate 2.92 1.68 
L2D. baserate 
-1.55 1.83 
L3D. baserate 
-0.54 1.87 
L4D. baserate 
-0.12 1.92 
L5D. baserate 0.18 1.97 
L6D. baserate 0.36 1.96 
L7D. baserate 
-0.82 1.91 
L8D. baserate 0.80 1.91 
L9D. baserate 
-0.66 1.84 
L10D. baserate 
-1.28 1.81 
L11D. baserate 0.57 1.79 
L12D. baserate 
-0.26 1.59 
Constant 0.02 0.31 
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Appendix C 
Additional Information Related to Chapter Six 
Appendix Cl: Unit Root Tests 
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Appendix C3: Marginal Effects for Ordered Probit Model 
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Appendix Cl: Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron Test Results 
C1.1: Base Rate 
Interest Rate Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Base Rate 
-0.585 
-1.022 
ABase Rate 
-5.342 
-5.344 
No intercept or constant included. A(. ) is the first difference operator. Critical values for the Dickey- 
Fuller and Philips-Perron tests at the 5% significance level. The critical value is 
.... 
C1.2: Portfolio without a Trend 
Issuer Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Barclaycard 
-1.576 
-1.595 
tBarclaycard 
-8.894 
-8.877 
MBNA 
-2.033 
-2.226 
AMBNA 
-9.343 
-9.350 
HBOS 
-1.337 -1.351 
AH BOS 
-9.247 -9.247 
HSBC 
-2.527 -2.644 
L HSBC 
-9.277 -9.277 
R BS 
-2.868 -2.858 
tRBS 
-9.602 -9.609 
Nationwide 
-1.720 -1.638 
Nationwide 
-10.062 -10.116 
Co-operative Bank 
. 
1.400 
-1.434 
ACo-o erative Bank 
-9.481 -9.491 
Egg 
-2.135 -2.144 
DEBg 
-9.417 -9.417 
Lloyds TSB 
-1.843 -1.953 
dLloyds TSB 
-9.383 -9.384 
Capital One 
-0.079 0.029 
Capital One 
-9.591 
-9.597 
C1.3: Portfolio Results with a Trend 
Issuer Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Barclaycard 
-2.100 -2.194 
ABarcla card 
-8.851 -8.832 
MBNA 
-2.193 -2.349 
AMBNA 
-9.372 -9.376 
HBOS 
-2.056 -2.208 
OHBOS 
-9.216 -9.215 
HSBC 
-2.622 -2.846 
AHSBC 
-9.269 -9.269 
RBS 
-2.598 
-2.581 
ARBS 
-9.723 
-9.739 
Nationwide 
-2.482 
-2.354 
ANationwide 
-10.206 
-10.326 
Co-operative Bank 
-0.013 0.098 
ACo-operative Bank 
-9.969 
-9.967 
Eg 
-1.763 
-1.758 
AEgg 
-9.561 
-9.565 
_Lloyds 
TSB 
-1.658 
-1.772 ALIo ds TSB 
-9.407 
-9.407 Capital One 
-1.648 
-1.635 ACapital One 
-9.770 
-9.796 
347 
C1.4: Standard 
Issuer Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Barclaycard 
-1.551 -1.576 
ABarclaycard 
-9.362 -9.362 
MBNA 
-2.287 -2.314 
OMBNA 
-9.391 -9.391 
HBOS 
-0.877 -0.856 
tHBOS 
-9.633 -9.642 
HSBC 
-1.684 -1.684 
tHSBC 
-9.433 -9.434 
RBS 
-7.327 -7.876 
ARBS 
-9.464 -9.464 
Nationwide 
-0.869 -0.775 
ONationwide 
-9.342 -9.363 
Co-operative Bank 0.556 0.885 
ACo-operative Bank 
-9.753 -9.766 
Egg 
-1.293 -1.299 
AEgg 
-10.161 -10.275 
Lloyds TSB 
-1.676 -1.751 
Lloyds TSB 
-5.660 -5.639 
Capital One 
-0.870 -0.855 
Capital One 
-9.512 -9.515 
C1.5: Gold 
Issuer Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Barclaycard 
-1.908 -1.899 
ßBarclaycard 
-6.795 -6.723 
MBNA 
-1.171 -1.141 
AMBNA 
-3.606 -3.611 
HBOS 
-0.597 -0.468 
AHBOS 
-7.452 -7.550 
HSBC 
- - 
AHSBC - - 
RBS 
-1.915 -1.975 
ARBS 
-9.416 -9.416 
Nationwide 
-1.519 -1.590 
ANationwide 
-9.383 -9.383 
Co-operative Bank 0.574 0.906 
ACo-operative Bank 
-9.804 -9.817 
Egg 
- - 
AEgg 
- - 
Lloyds TSB 
-1.227 -1.299 
ALloyds TSB 
-9.487 -9.487 
Capital One 
- 
- 
ACapital One 
- 
- 
C1.5: Platinum 
Issuer Dickey-Fuller Phillips-Perron 
Barclaycard 
-2.628 
-2.558 
ABarcla card 
-9.482 
-9.549 
MBNA 
-2.653 
-2.854 
AMBNA 
-9.381 
-9.381 
HBOS 0.065 0.295 
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tH BOS 
-6.622 -6.665 
HSBC 
- - 
EHSBC 
- - 
RBS 
-1.174 -1.313 
ARBS 
-8.124 -8.114 
Nationwide 
- - 
ANationwide 
- - 
Co-operative Bank 
-0.188 -0.118 
ACo-operative Bank 
-8.374 -8.381 
Egg 
- - 
AEgg 
- - 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.257 -0.179 
Lloyds TSB 
-7.360 -7.371 
Capital One 
-0.199 -0.189 
Capital One 
-9.454 -9.454 
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Appendix C2: Johansen Co-Integration Tests 
C2.1: Portfolio 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 465.842 277.71 
r51 350.56 233.13 
r52 266.02 192.89 
r53 204.52 156.00 
r54 153.40 124.24 
r55 106.54 94.15 
r56 63.72 68.52 
r57 39.03 47.21 
r<_8 19.23 29.68 
r59 6.57 15.41 
r510 0.30 3.76 
r511 
- 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 115.28 68.83 
r51 84.55 62.81 
r52 61.49 57.12 
r53 51.12 51.42 
r54 46.86 45.28 
r55 42.82 39.37 
r56 24.69 33.46 
rs7 19.81 27.07 
r58 12.65 20.97 
r59 6.27 14.07 
r510 0.30 3.76 
r511 
- 
- 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 22.81 16.53 12.29 
r51 22.57" 15.93 11.45 
r52 22.58 15.62 10.92 
r53 22.74 15.50 10.61 
r54 22.93 15.43 10.37 
rs5 23.06 15.24 10.13 
r56 23.13 15.22 9.90 
rs7 23.31 15.25 9.82 
r58 23.44 15.26 9.76 
r59 23.55 15.29 9.73 
r510 23.63 15.33 9,22 
r511 23.68 15.36 g"74 
C2.2: Standard/Classic 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r-0 1008.43 233.13 
r51 761.71 192.89 
r52 567.18 156.00 
r53 405.32 124.24 
r54 262.54 94.15 
r55 182.20 68.52 
r56 115.21 47.21 
r57 58.77 29.68 
r58 27.14 15.41 
r59 10.70 3.76 
r510 
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Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 246.73 62.81 
r51 194.54 57.12 
rs2 161.86 51.42 
r53 142.77 45.28 
r54 80.34 39.37 
r55 66.99 33.46 
rs6 56.44 27.07 
r57 31.63 20.97 
r58 16.43 14.07 
r59 10.70 3.76 
r510 
- 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 23.65 13.17 6.12 
r51 21.74 10.93 3.66 
r52 20.34 9.24 1.77 
r53 19.22 7.86 0.22 
r54 18.22 6.64 
-1.15 
r5S 17.85 6.08 
-1.84 
r56 17.53 5.61 
-2.42 
r57 17.23 5.19 
-2.91 
r58 17.12 4.99 
-3.17 
rs9 17.08 4.90 
-3.29 
r510 17.00 4.81 
-3.39 
C2.3: Gold 
Maximum Rank Trace Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 163.53 68.52 
rs1 99.80 47.21 
r52 56.58 29.68 
r53 16.56 15.41 
r54 1.09 3.76 
r55 
- 
Maximum Rank Max Statistic 5% Critical Value 
r=0 63.73 33.46 
r51 43.22 27.07 
r52 40.01 20.97 
r53 15.47 14.07 
r54 1.09 3.76 
r55 
- 
Maximum Rank SBIC HQIC AIC 
r=0 2.03 
-1.54 
-3.94 
r51 1.74 
-1.99 
-4.49 
r52 1.60 
-2.26 
-4.85 
r53 1.38 
-2.56 
-5.21 
r54 1.35 
-2.64 
-5.32 
r55 1.39 
-2.62 
-5.31 
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Appendix C3: Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Estimation 
Sample: Barclaycard 
d E 
Marginal Effects 
Coefficient rror St 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 
-0.851 0.198 0.115 -0.074 -0.042 
MBNA 0.066 0.171 
-0.009 0.006 0.003 
HBOS 0.239 0.226 
-0.032 0.021 0.012 
HSBC 0.126 0.122 
-0.017 0.011 0.006 
RBS 2.054 0.559 
-0.278 0.178 0.100 
Nationwide 
-0.155 0.301 0.021 -0.013 -0.008 
Co-operative 
-0.840 0.423 0.114 -0.073 -0.041 
Egg 
-0.136 0.230 0.018 -0.012 -0.007 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.328 0.454 0.044 -0.028 -0.016 
Capital One 
-0.149 0.020 -0.013 -0.007 
Base Rate 1.375 0.114 
-0.186 0.119 0.067 
Cut-off point 1 10.291 12.282 
Cut-off point 2 13.811 12.318 
Number of observations 92 - 
Log Likelihood 
-43.949 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.28 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 34.34 (0.000) 
Notes: ' All figures in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
Sample: MBNA 
Marginal Effects 
Coefficient Std. Error Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 0.179 0.273 
-0.001 0.000 0.001 
MBNA 
-0.817 0.307 0.005 -0.001 -0.004 
HBOS 0.388 0.367 
-0.003 0.001 0.002 
HSBC 
-0.629 0.225 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
RBS 
-0.998 0.715 0.007 -0.002 -0.005 
Nationwide 0.730 0.428 
-0.005 0.001 0.004 
Co-operative 0.481 0.633 
-0.002 0.001 0.002 
Egg 
-0.076 0.274 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.933 0.726 0.006 0.002 -0.005 
Capital One 0.110 0.134 
-0.001 0.000 0.001 
Base Rate 
-1.253 1.245 0.008 -0.002 -0.006 
Cut-off point 1 
-36.941 18.761 
Cut-off point 2 
-31.105 19.121 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-25.682 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.38 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic 31.15 (0.001) 
Notes: "All values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
352 
Sample: HBOS 
ffi i t C E Std 
Marginal Effects 
en oe c rror 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 0.019 0.168 
-0.004 0.002 0.002 
MBNA 
-0.162 0.150 0.037 -0.020 -0.017 
HBOS 
-0.343 0.199 0.079 -0.043 -0.036 
HSBC 
-0.063 0.114 0.015 -0.008 -0.007 
RBS 0.790 0.478 
-0.183 0.100 0.083 
Nationwide 0.088 0.268 
-0.020 0.011 0.009 
Co-operative 0.082 0.355 
-0.019 0.010 0.009 
Egg 
-0.296 0.225 0.068 -0.037 -0.031 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.244 0.392 0.056 -0.031 -0.025 
Capital One 
-0.046 0.103 0.011 -0.006 -0.005 
Base Rate 
-0.371 0.605 0.086 -0.047 -0.039 
Cut-off point 1 
-3.636 11.407 
Cut-off point 2 
-0.956 11.409 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-59.294 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.12 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 16.00 (0.141) 
Notes: 'All values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
Sample: HSBC 
Coefficient Std Error 
Marginal Effects 
Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 
-0.056 0.262 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
MBNA 0.115 0.195 
-0.006 0.002 0.004 
HBOS 0.150 0.283 
-0.07 0.002 0.005 
HSBC 
-0.305 0.174 0.015 -0.005 -0.010 
RBS 
-0.598 0.575 0.029 -0.010 -0.019 
Nationwide 
-0.712 0.379 0.034 -0.011 -0.023 
Co-operative 
-0.186 0.522 0.009 -0.003 -0.006 
Egg 
-0.132 0.296 0.006 -0.002 
-0.004 
Lloyds TSB 
-1.410 0.707 0.068 -0.023 
-0.045 
Capital One 0.059 0.146 
-0.003 0.001 0.002 
Base Rate 1.514 0.881 
-0.073 0.024 0.048 
Cut-off point 1 
-43.103 17.900 
- 
- 
Cut-off point 2 
-38.796 17.540 
- 
- 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-29.176 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.24 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 18.36 (0.073) 
, votes: Aft values in Dora are signsjicanr ar me. -) percent tevei 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
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Sample: RBS 
Coefficient Std Error 
Marginal Effects 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 0.052 0.199 
-0.006 0.007 0.004 
MBNA 0.099 0.173 
-0.012 0.003 0.008 
HBOS 
-0.007 0.226 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
HSBC 
-0.038 0.129 0.005 -0.001 -0.003 
RBS 
-1.443 0.501 0.174 -0.050 -0.124 
Nationwide 0.139 0.291 
-0.017 0.005 0.012 
Co-operative 1.928 0.426 
-0.023 0.007 0.017 
Egg 
-0.021 0.254 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.231 0.454 0.028 -0.008 -0.020 
Capital One 
-0.081 0.119 0.010 -0.003 -0.007 
Base Rate 0.953 0.653 
-0.115 0.033 0.082 
Cut-off point 1 
-20.514 12.674 - - 
Cut-off point 2 
-17.212 12.620 - - 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-42.705 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.16 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 16.60 (0.163) 
Notes: 'All values in bold are significant at the 5% level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
Sample: Nationwide 
Coefficient Std Error 
Marginal Effects 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 0.373 0.251 
-0.010 -0.005 0.014 
MBNA 0.093 0.196 
-0.002 -0.001 0.004 
HBOS 
-0.483 0.334 0.013 0.006 
-0.019 
HSBC 0.100 0.148 
-0.003 -0.001 0.004 
RBS 0.853 0.666 
-0.022 -0.011 0.033 
Nationwide 
-1.076 0.453 0.028 0.013 
-0.042 
Co-operative 
-0.114 0.504 0.003 0.001 
-0.004 
Egg 
-0.290 0.313 0.008 0.004 
-0.011 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.274 0.602 0.007 0.003 
-0.011 
Capital One 0.200 0.141 
-0.005 
-0.002 0.008 
Base Rate 
-0.528 0.893 0.014 0.007 
-0.020 
Cut-off point 1 
-11.063 15.990 
- 
- 
Cut-off point 2 
-6.571 15.952 
- - 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-25.861 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.27 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 19.57 (0.052) 
Notes: -All values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
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Sample: Co-operative Bank 
Coefficient Std Error 
Marginal Effects 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 
-0.054 0.163 0.013 -0.002 -0.011 
MBNA 0.217 0.140 
-0.051 0.007 0.043 
HBOS 
-0.108 0.195 0.025 -0.004 -0.022 
HSBC 0.173 0.109 
-0.410 0.006 0.035 
RBS 
-1.710 0.441 0.400 
-0.058 -0.342 
Nationwide 0.237 0.250 
-0.055 0.008 0.047 
Co-operative 
-0.228 0.346 0.053 -0.008 -0.046 
Egg 
-0.331 0.209 0.073 -0.011 -0.062 
Lloyds TSB 
-0.421 0.383 0.099 -0.014 -0.084 
Capital One 
-0.119 0.098 0.028 
-0.004 -0.024 
Base Rate 1.298 0.610 
-0.304 0.044 0.260 
Cut-off point 1 
-32.280 11.208 - - 
Cut-off point 2 
-30.072 11.155 - - 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-68.218 - 
Pseudo R-square 0.22 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 38.61 (0.000) 
Notes: 'All values are significant at the 5 percent level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
Sample: Egg 
ffi i Std E 
Marginal Effects 
c ent Coe rror 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 
-0.657 0.445 7.85e-25 5.03e-07 -4.30e-07 MBNA 
-0.673 0.460 8.04e-25 5.. 16e-07 -4.40e-07 HBOS 
-0.664 0.730 7.93e-25 5.09e-07 -4.34e-07 HSBC 
RBS 1.137 
-1.134 
0.675 
0.953 
-1.36e-24 
1.36e-24 
-8.71e-07 
8.70e-07 
7.44e-07 
-7.42e-07 Nationwide 
-4.030 2.239 4.82e-24 3.09e-06 -2.62e-06 Co-operative 
-1.091 1.401 1.30e-24 8.36e-07 
-7.14e-07 Egg 
-4.445 2.423 5.31e-24 3.41e-06 
-2.91e-06 Lloyds TSB 
-5.571 2.970 6.66e-24 4.27e-06 
-3.65e-06 Capital One 0.068 0.214 
-8.12e-24 -5.21e-08 4.45e-08 Base Rate 4.675 2.527 
-5.59e-24 
-3.58e-06 3.06e-06 
Cut-off point 1 
-242.409 126.749 
Cut-off point 2 
-224.710 118.206 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-15.879 
- 
Pseudo R-square 0.43 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 23.50 (0.015) 
mores: All values usesrynq: conr ar me 
.5 percent level 2 The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
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Sample: Lloyds TSB 
Coefficient Std Error 
Marginal Effects 
. Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 0.006 0.227 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 
MBNA 0.293 0.226 
-0.002 -0.007 0.009 
HBOS 0.659 0.297 
-0.003 -0.016 0.019 
HSBC 0.109 0.156 
-0.001 -0.003 0.003 
RBS 
-0.082 0.684 0.000 0.002 
-0.002 
Nationwide 0.600 0.475 
-0.003 -0.014 0.018 
Co-operative 
-1.371 0.567 0.008 0.032 
-0.040 
Egg 0.138 0.317 
-0.001 -0.003 0.004 
Lloyds TSB 
-2.881 0.126 0.017 0.068 
-0.085 
Capital One 0.159 0.149 
-0.001 -0.004 0.005 
Base Rate 2.778 0.997 
-0.016 -0.065 0.082 
Cut-off point 1 
-25.271 - - 
Cut-off point 2 
-20.078 - - 
Number of observations 92 
Log Likelihood 
-25.880 
Pseudo R-square 0.31 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 23.71 
notes: -All coefficients in bold are significant at the 5% level 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
Sample: Capital One 
C ffi i t r Std E 
Marginal Effects 
oe en c 
. 
rro Decrease Same Increase 
Barclaycard 0.066 0.188 
-0.007 -0.002 0.009 MBNA 0.321 0.163 
-0.036 -0.007 0.043 HBOS 
-0.156 0.217 0.018 0.004 
-0 021 HSBC 
RBS 0.023 0.106 
0.117 
0.467 
-0.003 
-0.012 
-0.001 
-0.002 
. 
0.003 
0 014 Nationwide 
-0.097 281 0 0.011 0.002 
. 
-0 013 Co-operative 
-0.123 
. 
0.397 0.014 0.003 
. 
-0 017 Egg 
Lloyds TSB 
0.367 
0.528 
0.233 
0.450 
-0.041 
-0.059 
-0.008 
-0.012 
. 
0.050 
0 072 Capital One 
-0.125 0.112 0.014 0.003 
. 
-0.017 Base Rate 
-0.028 0.663 0.003 0.001 
-0.004 
Cut-off point 1 12.278 12.185 
Cut-off point 2 15.339 12.259 
Number of observations 92 
- 
Log Likelihood 
-48.013 
- 
Pseudo R-square 0.10 
- 
Chi-Square Statistic (p-val) 10.92 (0.450) 
, vuLc,. nn vu, uC3 III w, u UI C yryn, unt uL cne 
-)percenr revel 
2The marginal effects are calculated at the mean values of the explanatory values 
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